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The overall objective of the study is to provide a vulnerability assessment of the mobile 
communications infrastructure to information warfare attacks; this study has a South African focus. 
The mobile infrastructure was selected as the infrastructure and mobile devices incorporate the 
majority of modern ICT technologies, namely social networking, wireless connectivity and 
mobility, mass storage, as well as the telecommunications elements. The objectives of the study are 
to: 
 Propose a new information warfare model, and from this deduce a vulnerability assessment 
framework from the specific information warfare perspective. These are the guiding 
frameworks and model for the study. 
 Gather information regarding threats and vulnerabilities, with particular focus on potential 
use in information warfare and relevance to South Africa. 
 Establish the criticality of the mobile infrastructure in South Africa. 
 Use the gathered information in the vulnerability assessment, to assess the vulnerability of 
the mobile infrastructure and related devices and services. 
The model and framework are generated through desk-based research. The information is gathered 
from research protocols that are relevant to both research and risk and vulnerability assessment, 
these include: expert input through interviews and a research workshop, incident and trend analyses 
through news and vendor reports and academic publishing, computer simulation, questionnaire 
survey, and mathematical analyses. The information is then triangulated by using it in the 
vulnerability assessment. 
The primary and secondary data shows that attacks on confidentiality are the most prevalent for 
both computer-based networks and the mobile infrastructure. An increase in threats and incidents 
for both computer and mobile platforms is being seen. The information security trends in South 
Africa indicate that the existing security concerns are likely to worsen, in particular the high 
infection rates. The research indicates that the mobile infrastructure is critical in South Africa. The 
study validates the proposed framework, which indicates that South Africa is vulnerable to an 
information warfare attack in general. Key aspects of vulnerability in the mobile infrastructure are 
highlighted; the apparent high load of the mobile infrastructure in South Africa can be seen as a 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the thesis and research study. The background to the study is provided in 
Section 1.2, and the problem is stated in Section 1.3. The objectives of the study and relevant 
methodologies used are introduced in Section 1.4, and the relevance of the study is discussed in 
Section 1.5. The layout of the thesis and the research output from this thesis are presented in 
Sections 1.6 and Section 1.7, respectively. Section 1.8 presents writing conventions, and Section 1.9 
concludes the chapter. 
1.2 Background 
This section presents the background to the study; many concepts will be summarised here, as they 
will be covered in more detail in the literature review. The growth of the Internet and World Wide 
Web has resulted in the networking and connection of many infrastructures and persons. This 
effectively has connected malicious actors electronically with potential targets for attack or 
exploitation. 
During the 1990s the concept of information warfare (IW) gained prominence, particularly in the 
United States (Armistead, 2010; Kopp, 2000). This encompassed a number of areas, some of which 
were relatively old, and others still emerging. Of particular concern were the emerging threats due 
to the growth of the Internet; it was realised that malicious actors could potentially access and 
disrupt infrastructures that were of national strategic importance, and therefore considered critical. 
The initial concept that attacks could be mounted on the critical infrastructure through the Internet 
was named "strategic information warfare" (Molander, Riddile, & Wilson, 1996; Molander, Wilson, 
Mussington, & Mesic, 1998). A series of publications also highlighted the possibility of a virtual 
"cyber-war" or "netwar" (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1996; 1997; 2001). The overall concept of IW, and 
the extended philosophy of information operations (IO), is still developing and undergoing changes 
as researchers and practitioners attempt to understand the many subtleties and complexities in such 
a philosophy (Armistead, 2010). 
Information warfare can be loosely defined as actions that are taken to attack or defend information 
and related resources and processes; Chapter 2 will provide a more detailed discussion of different 





however it is also applicable to the corporate, economic, and social spheres (Cronin & Crawford, 
1999). The IW constructs by Libicki (1995) and the Indian military (Chatterji, 2008) both list 
economic information warfare as one of the functional areas; this indicates non-military 
infrastructures which are critical to national economies may be considered as a legitimate target for 
IW. Potential aggressors can vary from state actors such as military, intelligence, or other 
government agencies; and non-state actors, such as rogue groups, terrorists, non-government 
organisations, and even individuals (Anderson, et al., 1999; Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001; Molander, 
Riddile, & Wilson, 1996). 
The field of critical infrastructure protection developed due to the growing concerns that these 
strategic infrastructures were vulnerable to attack; in particular there was increased effort to protect 
the critical information infrastructures. This led to a research focus on vulnerability and risk 
assessments of information infrastructures, notable early works include Anderson et al. (1999), 
Cordesman (2000), the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (2000), and Ware (1998). One of 
the earlier vulnerability assessments is the Minimum Essential Information Infrastructure Process 
proposed by Anderson et al. (1999), since then there have been multiple vulnerability and risk 
assessment frameworks proposed for information systems; these will be covered in more detail in 
the literature review. Many of these frameworks focus the assessment on assets, and not on an entire 
infrastructure; there also does not appear to a suitable mix of broad considerations and in-depth 
technical analysis that is suitable for assessment from the specific IW perspective. 
As technology evolves, so does the IW landscape; therefore new threats and vulnerabilities emerge. 
This modern technology that this thesis is primarily concerned with is the evolved mobile 
infrastructure and technologies. The introduction of smart mobile devices and their growing 
prevalence in society is impacting of information security (Fleizach, Liljenstam, Johansson, 
Voelker, & Mehes, 2007; Roman, 2011). Similarly, Web 2.0 social media also results in many 
security challenges (Lawton, 2007); these social networking applications are also available on many 
mobile devices, converging the security concerns that each technology presents. There is a growing 
prevalence of mobile devices (Global Mobile Suppliers Association, 2011a; 2011b), particularly in 
Africa where often there is a vastly higher penetration rate of mobiles compared to traditional fixed-
line telecommunications (International Telecommunications Union, 2011). 
The concerns highlighted by the above researchers are beginning to unfold. Large-scale cyber-
attacks were conducted against Estonia and Georgia in 2007 and 2008, respectively (Hart, 2008; 





estimated at R10.9 billion; it is estimated that 62% of South Africa adults who are online 
experienced some form of cyber-crime in the twelve months prior to the survey (Symantec 
Corporation, 2011b). In 2009 a "world-first" attack on the mobile infrastructure in South Africa 
allowed cyber-criminals to intercept online banking one-time passwords sent by SMS, providing 
them with access to individuals' bank accounts (van Rooyen, 2009). Throughout the period that this 
study was being conducted numerous incidents illustrated the growing prevalence of IW, and the 
roles modern technologies were playing in these incidents. 
Due to these continuing developments, it is necessary to continuously gather data to analyse trends 
and incidents, and to conduct a vulnerability assessment of the critical infrastructure. The thesis will 
focus on the mobile infrastructure due to the prevalence of mobile communications in Africa. This 
infrastructure also appears to be a central point around which various information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) are converging; social media applications, wireless networking, 
access to cloud computing resources, and traditional computing functionality are now found in one 
smart mobile device. From the Banking SMS incident mentioned above, the threats and 
vulnerabilities associated with these technologies will also be applicable to mobile communications. 
Therefore by considering the mobile infrastructure, there is the ability to analyse multiple modern 
ICTs. 
1.3 Problem Statement 
Many vulnerability and risk assessments are general and high-level in nature; a framework is 
required which provides for the high-level structure down to the technical implementation and data 
acquisition methods. The framework should also be dedicated towards the assessment infrastructure 
(as opposed to individual asset risk assessment). The IW perspective may also require an integration 
of some broad, non-technical aspects to the technical aspects of assessment; there may also be the 
case that some considerations become irrelevant, or new considerations are introduced. To conduct 
a vulnerability assessment of this type, a current holistic view of the information security and IW 
aspects globally and in the relevant nation is required. This information needs provide an indication 
of potential threats, vulnerabilities, and potential impacts of incidents. 
Much of the research focuses on specific vulnerabilities or threats relating to the mobile 
infrastructure, and a broader consolidated view is scarce. Due to the prevalence of the mobile 





order to protect this infrastructure as a national asset. The problem statement for this thesis can be 
formalised as: 
 To provide a broad view of incident trends and IW and security aspects globally and how it 
relates to South Africa, with relevance to modern ICT technology; 
 To assess the vulnerability of a modern ICT infrastructure to IW attacks, with focus on the case 
of a mobile communications infrastructure. 
1.4 Objectives and Methodologies 
The main aim of the thesis will be to provide a vulnerability assessment of a generic mobile 
infrastructure in a South African setting. To accomplish this, the thesis has four primary objectives: 
 To further develop a framework that may be used in the vulnerability assessment of critical 
infrastructure from an IW perspective; 
 To gather data relating to attacks and other security incidents on infrastructure; 
 Establish the criticality of the mobile infrastructure in South Africa; and, 
 Apply the proposed framework to the mobile infrastructure to conduct the vulnerability 
assessment. 
Secondary objectives of the thesis are to apply the framework to a second infrastructure, and 
identify or propose solutions to mitigate the vulnerabilities considered in the study. The 
methodologies to be employed in this research are as follows: 
 Desk-based research (incident and trend analysis through document analysis); 
 Interviews; 
 A research workshop; 
 A survey; 
 Computer simulations; and, 
 Mathematical simulations. 
Sections 1.4.1 to 1.4.5 will discuss the objectives in more detail, and relate them to the relevant 
research methodologies. 
1.4.1 Develop a Vulnerability Assessment Framework 
As mentioned in Section 1.3, the existing vulnerability assessment frameworks do not provide a 





the specific case of IW. The objective is to propose a vulnerability assessment framework that is 
scalable to different infrastructure sizes and types, and is adaptable to allow for different 
methodologies as required by the infrastructure being assessed. The assessment framework will 
provide a single metric that can be used to monitor changes in the vulnerability and risk ratings, or 
compare different aspects of the existing vulnerability environment. 
This objective is sub-divided into two sub-objectives: 
 The various IW models that will be discussed in Chapter 2 need to be consolidated into one 
model relating the various aspects of IW; and 
 The vulnerability assessment framework needs to be generated from the various existing 
vulnerability and risk frameworks and methodologies that will be discussed in Chapter 2. This 
needs to be related to the IW model above. 
The model and framework will be generated by deskwork, where the existing models and 
frameworks will be analysed and discussed; from this common or significant areas will be identified 
to propose an IW model and vulnerability assessment framework. 
1.4.2 Data Gathering on Incidents and Attack Trends 
As mentioned earlier, a coherent big picture is required of incidents and trends relating to 
information warfare and security; there is a particular shortage of information pertaining to South 
Africa (Scheepers, 2009). The objective is to collate information regarding incidents and trends 
from various sources to indicate what vulnerabilities and threats are prominent, what attack types 
have been successful, and what the concerns are regarding threats and vulnerabilities. 
The trends and incidents will be analysed for the following categories: 
 General trends in conflict and the roles of technology, and the resulting impact on IW; 
 General IW and information security trends and incidents globally; 
 Trends and incidents related to mobile technology; 
 Trends and incidents related to social media; 
 Trends and incidents relevant to Africa and South Africa. 
These trends and incidents will be drawn from deskwork, where both physical and online 
documents and secondary data will be referred to for information to illustrate and investigate the 
trends. The proposed IW model will be used to analyse incidents; common factors amongst the 





related to the general vulnerabilities and threats, and those related to the mobile infrastructure. The 
respondents will be both South African and international, thus providing both local and 
international contexts. The research workshop will indicate the trends and incident types that South 
African information security practitioners and researchers are noticing in the country. Computer 
simulations and mathematical calculations will be used test the feasibility and potential impacts of 
proposed attacks on the mobile infrastructure in a South African setting. 
1.4.3 Establish the Mobile Infrastructure as Critical 
As the primary focus of the vulnerability assessment will be the mobile infrastructure and it is to be 
treated as part of the critical information infrastructure, the criticality of the mobile infrastructure 
needs to be determined. The expert interviews will provide insight into their perceptions of the 
relevance of the mobile infrastructure to the critical information infrastructure. A pilot 
questionnaire-based survey of informal traders in the eThekwini (Durban) area will provide 
indications of the reliance of the informal sector on mobile communications. Secondary data and 
incidents from the trend and incident analysis will also provide insights into the criticality of the 
mobile infrastructure. 
1.4.4 Application of the Framework to the Mobile Infrastructure 
This objective employs the framework to organise the information gathered to assess the threats, 
vulnerabilities, potential impacts of incidents, and associated risks to the mobile infrastructure. This 
comprises primarily of deskwork and some mathematical calculation as the data from the trend and 
incident analysis, interviews, workshop, and simulations and calculations are triangulated. 
A generic mobile infrastructure will be assessed using open source information only; this is to 
protect sensitive information relating to the specific mobile networks in the country. The mobile 
infrastructure was chosen as the infrastructure and devices dependent upon this infrastructure 
exhibit most, if not all, of the modern information and communication technologies, such as social 
media, wireless networking, mass storage, messaging, and both voice and data communications. 
This provides the opportunity to investigate the vulnerabilities and threats related to a wider range 
of technologies. 
1.4.5 Secondary Objectives 
There are two secondary objectives in this study: applying the framework to a second infrastructure; 





framework to a second infrastructure will not do so at the level as described in Section 1.4.4; 
instead, it will be a smaller case to initially provide some validation of the framework. This is done 
in Section 4.3.2. Some solutions will arise from the interviews, workshop, and incident or trend 
analysis; the candidate also proposes some methods of mitigating attacks or vulnerabilities in 
publications or in this thesis. 
1.5 Relevance of the Study  
As discussed in Section 1.2, the evolution of ICTs results in a changing landscape for threats, 
vulnerabilities, and IW. This indicates that previous studies may become rapidly out-dated, and new 
research is required to keep track of the changing trends. During the study, numerous incidents 
occurred which are directly relevant to the study, which illustrates the need for such research. 
The research conducted in these fields is very often centred on developed nations, and not on the 
developing countries; the available data on the developed countries is readily available, but is 
sometimes scarce for the developing nations. As illustrated in Section 1.2, malicious online activity 
impacts South Africa both economically and socially. As this research considers South Africa and 
other developing nations throughout the study, it aims at filling this gap in the knowledge. In some 
areas in this thesis research conducted in the United States is applied to the case of South Africa. 
Research regarding the security of mobile devices and infrastructures tends to focus on specific 
technical aspects; these will be covered in the document analysis in Chapter 5. Vendor reports focus 
on malware and cyber-crime from a high-level statistical point of view, and mobile or Web 2.0 
security concerns only form a portion of these reports. Whilst these reports provide trends, not all 
facets or incidents are covered. The study aims at providing a holistic view of incidents and trends, 
from both a high-level context and technical view points; this provides a more coherent bigger 
picture which provides knowledge about the likelihood and potential for further incidents to occur. 
Vulnerability assessment is cited as one of the main aspects of South Africa's defensive IW efforts 
(Hefer & Theron, 2009). Due to the prevalence of mobile communications in the country, this 
infrastructure should be considered as critical. Therefore, a holistic vulnerability assessment of the 






1.6 Layout of the Thesis 
This section presented the layout of the thesis, and provides a brief overview of each chapter. There 
are a total of nine chapters in this thesis, including this introduction. Chapter 2 presents literature 
review, where the theory and models for IW, critical information infrastructure, and vulnerability 
assessment is introduced and discussed. The vulnerability and risk assessment methodologies 
discussed in the literature reviews are also the applicable research methodologies used in the thesis. 
The literature reviews also presents the relevant technical background to the infrastructures and 
technologies that will be considered in this thesis. 
The research methodology is presented in Chapter 3; this provides more detail on the research 
instruments, the research processes (both administrative and implementation), and relates the 
methodologies to the research objectives in more detail than was covered in Section 1.4. 
Chapter 4 presents the proposed IW model and vulnerability assessment framework. The IW model 
is applied to a series of incidents to illustrate its validity; this also forms part of the incident analysis 
and deskwork to acquire data. The vulnerability assessment framework validity is also illustrated by 
application to a generic cloud computing scenario; this also satisfies the secondary objective of 
applying the framework to a second infrastructure.  
Chapter 5 presents the incident and trend analysis; this constitutes the deskwork, where information 
regarding incidents and trends are extracted from documents such as news reports, online sources, 
academic research output, and vendor reports. Secondary data is also presented and analysed here. 
General trends in IW and information security are presented, and trends in mobile and social 
network incidents are discussed. Specific trends relating to South Africa are also presented. The 
trend and incident analysis is related to the objective of gathering data to provide a holistic view of 
the IW landscape; the information will also be used in the vulnerability assessment, and some 
information will provide insight into the criticality of the mobile infrastructure. 
The primary data and the analysis thereof are presented in Chapter 6; this constitutes the interviews, 
research workshop, and pilot survey of informal traders. The data gathered from these methods will 
provide an indication of the perceived criticality of the mobile infrastructure, and threats and 
vulnerabilities globally and in South Africa. This relates to the objectives of gathering data on 





Chapter 7 presents the computer simulations and mathematical calculations; these are used to 
identify the feasibility and limitations of proposed attacks, the potential impact of such attacks, and 
identify centralised components or singularities in the mobile infrastructure. This relates to the 
objectives of gathering data and conducting analysis for the vulnerability assessment. 
The vulnerability assessment of the mobile infrastructure is presented in Chapter 8. The framework 
proposed in Chapter 4 provides the outline for triangulating the information from Chapter 5 to 
Chapter 7. The criticality of the mobile infrastructure is summarised, the threats, vulnerabilities, 
impacts, and risks are assessed and evaluated. Some solutions arising from the data gathering phase 
of the research are presented. This chapter relates to the objective of conducting a vulnerability 
assessment of the mobile infrastructure. 
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis. The conclusion provides the outcomes for the four primary 
objectives and the secondary objectives. Recommendations and suggestions for future research are 
provided. Following the conclusion, appendices provide additional information related to the 
technical content, research instrumentation, and the administrative process of the study. 
1.7 Research Output from the Thesis 
This section presents the main research output from this thesis. There are other outputs from this 
thesis such as internal seminar series and presentations, and other outputs that are related to the 
thesis; a full list is given in Appendix A. The main conference, journal, and book chapter outputs 
are: 
1. van Niekerk, B., and Maharaj, M.S. (2009a) "The Future Roles of EW in IW," Aardvark Roost 
Big Crow Conference, Pretoria, 25-26 August. 
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Africa," 3rd Annual Teaching and Learning Conference, Durban, 21-23 September, pp. 206-
224. 
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1.8 Writing Conventions 
This section provides a summary of the writing conventions in the thesis. Due to the number of 
acronyms, those that are seldom used will be typed in full the first time they are used in each 
chapter for the reader's convenience. Due to the number of publications, it will be indicated at the 







Information warfare methods may be used to attack information infrastructures of organisations and 
nations. New technologies provide new targets and threats related to IW. As the mobile 
infrastructure is prominent in modern society, it may be targeted by IW attacks to achieve various 
objectives. However, there is no consolidated information about IW attacks on the mobile 
infrastructure, except for isolated reports and research proposing specific attacks. Consolidated 
information for South Africa is also scarce. A framework to assess the vulnerabilities of information 
infrastructures from an IW perspective is also needed. 
The objectives of the study are therefore to propose the vulnerability assessment framework, and 
gather information to provide a consolidated view of IW, with a particular focus on South Africa 
and the mobile infrastructure. The gathered information will be used to provide an indication of the 
criticality of the mobile infrastructure in South Africa, and be used to apply the proposed 
framework in assessing the vulnerability a generic mobile infrastructure in South Africa. Multiple 
research methods will be used: interviews, a workshop, trend and incident analysis through 
document analysis, a questionnaire-based survey, computer simulations and mathematical 







Chapter 2. Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the literature review and background for information warfare, critical 
infrastructure protection, vulnerability and risk management, and the structure of the technologies 
and infrastructures that will be considered in this dissertation. The focus of the background theory 
will be the models describing these various concepts as related to the dissertation. In some cases 
adaptations of models are proposed; these will be employed in Chapter 4 to develop the new IW 
and vulnerability assessment models. 
A funnel approach will be adopted for the literature review; Section 2.2 discusses the relationships 
between information, data and knowledge. This flows into the information concept, where the 
models and constructs will be discussed in Section 2.3. More detailed discussions of the IW 
functional areas most relevant to the dissertation, namely network warfare, electronic warfare, and 
critical infrastructure protection are provided in Sections 2.4 to 2.6, respectively. Section 2.7 
discuses vulnerability and risk management, which is a key component of critical infrastructure 
protection. After this funnel approach, Section 2.8 provides the background to the relevant 
technologies and infrastructures that will be discussed in the dissertation. Figure 2.1 illustrates the 
flow of the literature review and the relationships between the concepts and sections. 












2.8 Modern Information and Communication Technologies 
 





Possible sources were identified by searching online for specific key words and phrases; online 
journals, conferences, and academic databases, book sellers, and general search engines were used 
to identify books, reports, articles, and specialised subject directories. The search strategy used 
follows one that is recommended by the University of California Berkeley Library (2009), where 
distinctive words, synonyms, and equivalent terms were used for searching. For example, the terms 
information warfare, network warfare, and cyber-warfare are commonly used interchangeably.  
The types of sources used include books, major research reports, and journal or conference papers. 
A core set of books, namely Denning (1999), Hutchinson and Warren (2001), Jones, Kovacich, and 
Luzwick (2002), and Waltz (1998) are used throughout the literature review, particularly in 
Sections 2.3 and 2.4, which form the basis of the IW background. Other sources are then used when 
discussing and providing contrasting view points. Appendix B provides a concept matrix of the 
major sources used. The literature for specific incidents will be presented in Chapter 5; the sources 
for these incidents are news articles, vendor reports, and blogs, and will therefore be considered as 
secondary data. Some incidents will be mentioned in this chapter to illustrated concepts. 
2.2 Information, Data, and Knowledge / Information Theory 
This section discusses the relationship between information, data and knowledge, and aspects of 
information theory that are relevant to the dissertation. Various aspects of this section have been 
published in van Niekerk & Maharaj (2010a). 
Hutchinson and Warren (2001) describe the relationships of knowledge, information and data as 
follows: data is analogous with a thing (such as an event or object) in that it describes the different 
states of the object or event and consists of the attributes of the object or event. Knowledge is 
likewise associated with an agent; it is analogous to a set of interacting mind models which 
influences the interpretation of the data, but can also be influenced by the data, during an event. 
Knowledge can only be possessed by an intelligent being; usually a human, but could also be 
possessed by an animal or intelligent machine. Information is the data that has been filtered by the 











Figure 2.2: The Relationship between Data, Information and Knowledge, adapted from (Hutchinson, 2002) 
 
Waltz (1998) describes the data fusion model, shown in Figure 2.3. Data, in the form of 
measurements and observations, is processed to create or form information by placing it in context, 
indexing and organising it. Knowledge is then developed by detecting patterns and relationships 
amongst the information; this allows the information and data to be understood, explained, and 
modelled. These models could also possibly be used to predict future behaviour of the entity or 
process being observed. Wisdom can then be considered as the effective application of knowledge 





Figure 2.3: Data Fusion Model, adapted from (Waltz, 1998) 
 
An extended model may be derived from the two models discussed above: data is collected and 
processed; and filtered by a priori knowledge (the agent in Figure 2.2) in the form of experience 
and perception to produce information. The information is analysed and understood to create 
additional knowledge (a posteriori knowledge), which provides wisdom when applied effectively, 
and can be used as a priori knowledge in future analyses. The model also accounts for external 
influences, such as media and peer opinions that may influence perception and the processing of 
data and information. These relationships are shown in  Figure 2.4. 
Another interpretation is that data is comprised of the bits and bytes that form the basis of digital 
communication systems, whereas information is the data presented in a format understandable to 
humans, such as image, text or video. Knowledge is then the modelling of information in order to 
understand trends and possibly predict behaviour of certain systems (Waltz, 1998). 
Shannon (1948) developed a mathematical theory of communication; the theorem indicated that the 
data carrying capacity of a communications channel was limited by the bandwidth of the channel, 
and the interference, known as noise, that is present on the channel. The following equation was 








The capacity, C, is measured in bits, W is the bandwidth of the communications channel, and SNR is 
the ratio of the signal strength to the noise strength. This mathematical theory goes on to derive the 
entropy of information; Taub and Schilling (1991) describe the entropy as the average amount of 
information transmitted over a message interval. The equation for entropy is (Shannon, 1948; Taub 
& Schilling, 1991): 
 2.2 
The entropy is denoted by H, M is the total number of possible messages, and pk is the probability 
that message mk is transmitted (Shannon, 1948; Taub & Schilling, 1991). Borden (1999) uses the 
following conceptual model to illustrate entropy: 
Paul Revere considered an attack that came from the sea equally probable as an attack by land; 
therefore the pland = psea = 0.5. If we calculate the entropy of this using Equation 2.2, we get H = 1. 
Borden equates this to one bit of uncertainty. A lookout was told that if the attack came by sea, he 
was to show two lanterns or one lantern if the attack was by land. When he showed two lanterns, 
psea = 1 and pland = 0. Again using Equation 2.2, we get H = 1; Borden equates this to one bit of 
information was received. In this case the signal by the lanterns was the data, and the decoding of 
the data using knowledge resulted in the information that the attack was by sea. 
Entropy is related to noise in a communications channel through the concept of mutual information 
(Waltz, 1998); that the information transmitted is what is received. In digital communications the 















signals, which results in some of the bits or  symbols being incorrectly interpreted by the receiver; 
this is equivalent to the wrong message being received compared to what was transmitted. The more 
bits or symbols received in error, the lower the probability that the transmitted message will be 
received; this will therefore affect the mutual information. In an IW environment, an attacker may 
intentionally interfere with the transmitted information, thereby reducing the mutual information, to 
deny the recipient the information. 
As the world has become information-centric, there has been a drive to understand how to 
determine the value of information, and how to manage information; from this the field of 
Knowledge Management arose (Prusak, 2001). A method of calculating the value of information 
based on its capital utility is presented in Waltz (1998): 
,   2.3 
where: 
 Iv is the information value; 
 At are the assets derived from the information at the time of arrival; 
 An are the assets should the information not have arrived; 
 Lt are the liabilities derived from the information at the time of arrival; 
 Ln are the liabilities should the information not have arrived; 
 In is the total cost of the information; 
 I1 is the cost for generating information; 
 I2 is the cost to format information; 
 I3 is the cost to reformat information; 
 I4 is the cost for information duplication; 
 I5 is the cost for information dissemination; 
 I6 is the cost for information storage; and, 
 I7 is the cost for information retrieval and usage. 
As information assets have value to the owner, competitors will attempt to maximise the value for 
their own objectives, and possibly minimise the value of the information assets for other actors 
(Denning, 1999). This competition surrounding information and its use leads to the concept of IW, 
discussed in Section 2.3. The value of the information may also be used in calculations of risk, 





2.3 Information Warfare  
Information Warfare is a relatively new concept, first gaining prominence during the early 1990's 
(Kopp, 2000), and the first recognised paper considering the topic was published in China in 1985 
(Adams, 1998). Whilst most of the methods and tactics encompassed by IW are old, they have been 
amalgamated under a single concept that is still evolving; consequently there is no standard 
definition for IW. Two underlying principles that will always hold true regarding IW is that 
information has value (Denning, 1999) and that the information itself, as well as the systems that 
transport and store it, are both weapons and targets, (Hutchinson & Warren, 2001). Information 
warfare as a concept has also undergone a transition to information operations (IO); which 
encompasses IW and the relevant supporting functions (United States Air Force, 1998). 
This section discusses the theories and models of IW, and the constituents that make up the broader 
concept of IW. The models discussed are relevant to the proposal of the new IW model in Chapter 
4. A previous version of this section was initially published in van Niekerk and Maharaj (2011c). 
2.3.1 Definitions 
As the term suggests, the fundamental component in IW is information; it is both a weapon and a 
target that needs to be protected, and can be used to gain a strategic or competitive advantage over a 
competitor or adversary. As the concepts of IW and IO are still evolving, it is difficult to provide 
precise definitions; those provided by each organisation or nation reflects their specific 
perspectives. As such, a number of definitions from various sources are presented: 
 "Actions taken to achieve information superiority by affecting adversary information, 
information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks while 
defending one's own information, information-based processes, information systems, and 
computer-based networks,"  United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (1996a). 
 "Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending 
one's own information and information systems," Joint Chiefs of Staff (1998, pp. I-1). 
 "Information warfare is combat operations in a high-tech battlefield environment in which 
both sides use information-technology means, equipment, or systems in a rivalry over the 
power to obtain, control, and use information," Baocun and Fei (1997, p. 328). 
 "Offensive and defensive operations against information resources of a "win-lose" nature. It 





to increase this value for the offence while decreasing it for the defence. Defensive 
operations seek to counter potential losses in value," Denning (1999, p. 21) 
 "All actions taken to defend the military‟s information-based processes, information 
systems and communications networks and to destroy, neutralise or exploit the enemy‟s 
similar capabilities within the physical, information and cognitive domains," Brazzoli 
(2007, p. 219). 
 Jones, Kovacich, and Luzwick (2002:24) use the same definition as the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(1998, pp. I-1); however, specific definitions for defensive and offensive information 
warfare are provided: defensive information warfare "is the ability to protect and defend" 
the information environment while offensive information warfare aims to make an 
adversary "bend to the will of the attacker". 
The fact that IW consists of actions to attack and defend information and related systems and 
processes are mentioned by the majority of the definitions presented above. Denning (1999), 
however, specifically mentions the fact that information has value; and Brazzoli (2007), defines 
three domains in which these actions may be taken: the physical, information and cognitive; the 
importance of which will be discussed in Section 2.3.3. The definitions by Brazzoli (2007) and 
Baocun and Fei (1997) restrict IW to the military, however the two definitions by the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff only refer to an adversary; yet the 1996 definition mentions information superiority, which 
Hutchinson and Warren (2001) also relate to the corporate sphere; this will be discussed further in 
Section 2.3.3. 
From the definitions presented above, a new definition is proposed, which will be used for the 
purposes of this dissertation: 
Information warfare is actions taken to attack, protect, or exploit information and its supporting 
systems and processes in the physical, information, and cognitive domains in order to achieve 
tactical, operational, and/or strategic objectives. 
2.3.2 Models 
This section discusses various models for IW; these models will be used to develop the new IW 
framework. Section 2.3.2.1 describes defensive concepts, Section 2.3.2.2 discusses offensive 
concepts, and Section 2.3.2.3 describes potential target types. Section 2.3.2.4 introduces some 





2.3.2.1 Defensive Models 
The "CIA Model" or "CIA Triad" (Denning, 1999; Hutchinson & Warren, 2001) illustrates three 
aspects of information (and information infrastructure services) that need to be maintained; they 
are: 
  Confidentiality: only those who should have access to sensitive information or knowledge 
of the functioning, operations or characteristics of infrastructures; 
 Integrity: only authorised persons should be able to alter information or systems settings 
that could affect the infrastructure; 
 Availability: the information and its supporting infrastructure should be available when 
required. 
Parker (2002) expands the CIA Triad, proposing three additional attributes: possession or control, 
authenticity, and utility. Parker states that the loss of possession and/or control of information or the 
information systems does not necessarily breach confidentiality, unless the information has actually 
been read. Authenticity is the correct attribution of information to a field in a database or a source, 
and authenticity is compromised should this be incorrect; an attacker my intentionally subvert 
authenticity by claiming to be a legitimate user. Utility is the usefulness of the information; it is 
argued that should a decryption key be lost, all aspects of information are preserved, yet it cannot be 
used. Wylder (2004) states that there is a consideration that availability should be replaced with 
authenticity as availability is related to business continuity planning. However, the availability of 
information can be attacked, as will be discussed in Section 2.3.2.2; therefore it will remain as part 
of the CIA Triad for the purposes of this dissertation. It can be argued that the extended attributes 
are subsets of the original CIA Triad; possession and control may be considered as a special case of 
confidentiality as the information has been accessed in some form, then confidentiality has been 
breached. The availability may also be breached should the rightful owner also have lost physical 
control of the information or information systems. Authenticity may be considered as a subset of 
integrity, as incorrect attribution reduces the quality of the information. It can be argued that should 
the utility of the information be breached, then so is the availability, as it needs to be available 
before it can be utilised; utility is a subset of availability. 
Other attributes proposed include authentication, non-repudiation (Denning, 1999; Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 1998; Waltz, 1998), and restoration (Waltz, 1998). Authentication attempts to ensure that 
only authorised persons have access to relevant restricted information or infrastructure, or the 





participation (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1998); which attempts ensures a false denial may not call 
integrity into question. Restoration provides the ability for information and infrastructures 
operations to continue should a disturbance occur (Waltz, 1998). These factors may be considered 
as controls used to preserve the attributes of the CIA Triad: authentication seeks to maintain 
confidentiality and integrity, non-repudiation protects integrity, and restoration aims to preserve 
availability. The CIA Triad and related attributes that are discussed above are the same for both IW 
and general information security perspectives, and have been described as the industry standard for 
information security (Whitman & Mattord, 2010). 
Poisel (2004) also discusses three attributes: relevancy, accuracy, and timeliness. Wylder (2004) 
also considers accuracy, which is analogous to integrity in that inaccurate information will have 
poor integrity. Timeliness is analogous to availability in that a delay in the receipt of the 
information breaches the availability for a period of time (Defense Science Board, 1996). 
Relevancy may impact on both integrity and availability in that the requested information is 
irrelevant and therefore has low integrity, and the required information is unavailable. Should the 
information be extra and irrelevant, then it has no affect on the integrity or availability.   
From the discussions above it can be seen that the CIA Triad constitutes the fundamental attributes 
of information and infrastructures; the extensions proposed may be considered as subsets of or 
controls for the three attributes described by the CIA Triad (van Niekerk & Maharaj, 2011c), as 
shown below: 
 Confidentiality 
o Possession  
o Control 
 Integrity 
o Authenticity  











2.3.2.2 Offensive Models 
Waltz (1998) describes a number of strategies can be used to attack information: disruption of 
access to the information or information service, corruption of the information, and exploitation of 
the information. Borden (1999) and Kopp (2000) provide a similar model, however they divide the 
disruption strategy into two subsets: deny and degrade. Similarly, the United States Air Force 
(1998) divides disruption into denial/loss and destruction, which also implies the use of the physical 
domain to conduct IW; this will be discussed in Section 2.3.3. In addition, exploit is termed as 
compromise, and corrupt as deceive/corrupt, which implies the human vulnerability to deception. 
Pfleeger and Pfleeger (2003) divide corruption into fabrication and modification, and term disrupt 
as interrupt, and exploit as intercept. 
Hutchinson and Warren (2001) provide a far more intricate model, with six strategies: 
 Deny and/or disrupt access to data. 
 Destroy data. 
 Steal data. 
 Manipulate data. 
 Alter the context in which the data is viewed. 
 Change the perceptions of people towards the data. 
This model divides disrupt into disrupt, deny, and destroy; corrupt into manipulate, alter perception, 
and change context, and exploit is termed steal. This model again implies human vulnerabilities 
through the tactic of altering the perception of the target. The models discussed above are compared 
in Table 2.1. 
From the comparison, it can be see that Waltz's model describes the 'fundamental' strategies, and the 
other models provide subsets of these strategies. The strategies described by Waltz also directly 
oppose or attack the CIA Triad discussed in Section 2.3.2.1; for this reason this will be the primary 
offensive model adopted for use in the dissertation. 
The Defense Science Board (1996) provides a high-level taxonomy for IW which also relates 
offensive strategies to the CIA Triad, and also considers the time taken to detect the attack; this 
model is illustrated in Table 2.2, where t denotes the unit of time, which can vary from 






Table 2.1: Comparison of Information Warfare Attack Strategies (van Niekerk & Maharaj, 2011c) 
Waltz (1998) 


















Deceive/corrupt Alter perception 
Fabricate 
Change context 
Exploit Exploit Steal Intercept Compromise 
 
Table 2.2: A Top-Level Taxonomy for Information Warfare, adapted from Defense Science Board (1996) 
Confidentiality 
Compromise of information or 
information service  
Detected on occurrence 
Detected after t units of time 
Undetected 
Integrity 
Unauthorised change in data 
Detected on occurrence 
Detected after t units of time 
Undetected 
Insertion of false data from a correct 
source 
Detected on occurrence 
Detected after t units of time 
Undetected 
Insertion of false data from a incorrect 
source 
Detected on occurrence 
Detected after t units of time 
Undetected 
Availability 
Loss of information or information 
service 
Detected on occurrence 
Detected after t units of time 
Undetected 
Delay of an information service or in 
receipt of information 
Detected on occurrence 
Detected after t units of time 
Undetected 
 
The United States Air Force (1998) relates the various strategies discussed above to specific threats 
that may be employed to conduct an attack; this is illustrated in Table 2.3. These threats are still 
relevant; the candidate added network overload to the denial/loss column, and malware insertion to 
the destruction column to account for aggressive worms spreading through networks, network 






Table 2.3: Information Warfare Threats, adapted from the United States Air Force (1998) 































Potential targets for exploitation or attack in an information system are described by Denning 
(1999) and Hutchinson and Warren (2001): 
 Data storage, such as disk drives and computer or human memories, which can have their 
contents corrupted or can be physically damaged or destroyed;  
 Transporters, such as humans and telecommunication systems, may have their performance 
degraded by a denial of service attack, or may be intercepted to exploit the information; 
 Sensors and Input Devices, such as cameras and human input devices, which could be 
destroyed or fed false signals; 
 Recorders, Writers, and Output Devices, such as printers and disk writers, which can have 
the output stream of data corrupted; 
 Processors, such as microprocessors and humans, which also include software, may be 
corrupted by altering the logic, or be subjected to degradation or destruction. 
 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (1998) identified the following areas as being vulnerable to attack: 
information, human factors, links, and nodes. The links and nodes of networks and 
telecommunications are particularly susceptible to attack, as many are easily identifiable and 
physically accessible. Human factors may include emotions, which make them susceptible to 





2.3.2.4 Mathematical Models 
A model developed independently by Borden (1999) and Kopp (2000), subsequently called the 
Borden-Kopp Model by Kopp (2000); is the primary model of IW that has a mathematical 
background. It is based on Shannon's Information Theorem (Shannon, 1948) which is discussed in 
Section 2.2. The Borden-Kopp model relates Shannon's Theorem to IW through the fact that 
decisions are made on information (as described in the Paul Revere example in Section 2.2), and IW 
intends to degrade or protect and improve the efficiency of decision making (Borden, 1999). This 
relates to the SNR term in Equation 2.1, where an attacker may seek to increase the noise (the 
variable N) to degrade efficiency, and the defender will attempt to reduce the noise while improving 
the message or signal (the variable S). To follow on from the Paul Revere example, assume that the 
attacking English forces used deception and only sent an advance party by sea, whilst the main 
force would attack by land at a later stage. The lookout would have signalled the attack by sea, 
however that information is incorrect due to the noise introduced by the attackers. Even if the 
lookout signalled a land attack at a later stage, two contradictory sets of information would have 
been transmitted, which degrades the efficiency of the decision making. 
2.3.3 Information Warfare Domains, Arenas and Constructs 
Information warfare may be conducted in different domains and arenas, and may be constructed 
differently according to national perspectives. The categorisation of IW discussed in this section 
will be used to develop the new IW framework. Section 2.3.3.1 discusses the domains of operation, 
the arenas or spheres are described in Section 2.3.3.2.  Section 2.3.3.3 discusses the various IW 
constructs, and Sections 2.3.3.4 to 2.3.3.9 describe certain components in more detail. 
2.3.3.1 Information Warfare Domains 
The definition of IW provided by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) states that 
IW can be conducted in the "physical, information and cognitive domains" (Brazzoli, 2007); Cronin 
and Crawford (1999) provide the same categories with different wording. Waltz (1998) extends this 
model by dividing the cognitive domain into perception and will. Various information systems 
models also break information systems down into analogous categories: Laudon and Laudon (2004) 
divide information systems into hardware, software and persware (human assets), Lehman and 
Quilling (2009) have people, processes, software, data, and hardware as categories, while O'Brien 
and Marakas (2008) replaces processes with networks. Table 2.4 compares various IW and 
information systems models. From the comparison, it can be seen that the distinction of physical, 





the dissertation. The purpose of these distinctions is to categorise the domains according to broad 
principles; namely the human thought, intangible information assets, and the tangible hardware 
assets. These three fundamental domains may then have sub-domains, such as will, perception, data, 
and software. For the purposes of this dissertation, three main domains (cognitive, information, and 
physical) will be used, with their relevant sub-domains. 
Table 2.4: Comparison of Information Warfare and Information Systems Models, adapted from van Niekerk 


















People People Persware 
Perception 
Information Soft Information 
Processes Software 
Software Software Networks 
Data Data Stores 
Physical Physical Physical Hardware Hardware Hardware 
 
2.3.3.2 Information Warfare Spheres or Arenas 
The term information warfare has significant military connotations; its origin was in military 
thought as can be seen by the definitions presented above. However, it is also applicable to other 
spheres: this was implied above by terms such as political warfare and economic information 
warfare. Schwartau (1996) divides IW into personal, corporate and global spheres. Global 
information warfare may incorporate military IW as well as competition and IW in the international 
economic and political spheres, and large-scale social information warfare. Waltz (1998) describes 
IW at national, corporate and personal levels. Cronin and Crawford (1999) discuss it in military, 
corporate/economic, community/social, and personal spheres. There may be overlaps in many of the 
terms; aggressive competition amongst multi-national corporations may constitute both global and 
corporate information warfare. For each of these spheres, IW may still be conducted in the physical, 
information and cognitive domains, for example physical theft of documents, arson, and theft of 





Busuttil and Warren (2002) summarise the differences between military and corporate views of IW: 
the military has well-defined national boundaries, whereas corporations often operate 
internationally and may have websites or information assets hosted outside of their physical 
boundaries, and therefore do not well-defined boundaries for IW. The military may also escalate IW 
to include physical destruction, whereas corporations will more likely limit themselves to computer-
based attacks. The actors for the military viewpoint are listed as well-defined organised groups, and 
the actors for the corporate perspective are described as not well-defined. However, activity by 
'rogue' groups advocating for transparency, such as Wikileaks and the hacker group Anonymous 
publically releasing military and government information (Bronstein, 2010; Walker, 2010), indicate 
that potential attackers are not well-defined for government or military perspectives either.  
The importance of these spheres is that it illustrates the extension of IW beyond the military sphere; 
this also implies there may be a blurring in the distinction of military and civilian systems, which 
will be discussed under the trend analysis in Chapter 5. 
2.3.3.3 Information Warfare Constructs 
Six functional areas or pillars of IW are identified by Brazzoli (2007) and Théron (2008), which are 
also shown in Figure 2.5, and discussed further in Sections 2.3.3.4 to 2.3.3.9: 
 Command and control warfare (C2W), which protects the ability to effectively command 
and control (C2) forces whilst attempting to hinder an oppositions‟ command and control 
abilities; 
 Intelligence-based warfare (IBW), attempts to maximise the intelligence gathering, 
assessment and dissemination capabilities and degrade those of the opposition; 
 Information infrastructure warfare (IIW), where the aim is to protect the information 
infrastructure whilst attacking or exploiting the opposition's; 
 Electronic warfare (EW), prevents the opposition's use of the electromagnetic spectrum, 
whilst preserving its availability for friendly use; 
 Network warfare (NW), protects the information networks and attacks or exploits the 
oppositions information networks; and  
 Psychological operations (PSYOP), which are planned and co-ordinated activities to 
influence the emotions, reasoning and behaviour of an audience to further the objectives. 
These can then be grouped into two domains; the application domain, comprising of command and 





domain comprising of electronic warfare, network warfare and PSYOPs (Brazzoli, 2007; Théron, 
2008). The pillars in the application domain can be considered to be the targets which are affected; 
and the enabling domain is where activities are performed to create effects in the application 
domain, and can be considered to be the weapons which attack or defend the pillars in the 
application domain, analogous to a sword and shield of old. It should be noted that the definitions 
given above (and Figure 2.5) are the perspective of the South African National Defence Force. 
 
Figure 2.5: The Functional Areas of Information Warfare, adapted from van Niekerk and Maharaj (2009c) 
Libicki (1995) proposes seven categories of IW, which are also discussed in Waltz (1998). The 
definitions of various terms may differ slightly from those above: 
 Command and control warfare: attacking and defending command and control capabilities, 
this relates to the chain of command; 
 Intelligence-based warfare: the collection, exploitation, protection, dissemination and 
analysis of information for use in warfare  and competition; 
 Electronic warfare: "Communications combat in the realms of the physical transfer of 





 Psychological operations: actions taken against the human mind; 
 Hacker warfare: combat over the global information infrastructure; 
 Economic information warfare: the attempts to control economic activity by controlling 
information  and the relevant information systems; 
 Cyber-warfare: "Futuristic forms of terrorism, fully simulated combat, and reality control". 
The Indian military also defines seven pillars (Chatterji, 2008; Ventre, 2009). Definitions are only 
provided where there is a difference from the South African description. 
 Command and control warfare; 
 Intelligence-based warfare; 
 Electronic Warfare;  
 Psychological warfare: the doctrine specifically mentions that psychological warfare is 
conducted through the mass media to influence public opinion; the use of information 
technologies to conduct subtle psychological actions is also mentioned (Ventre, 2009). 
 Cyber-warfare: the attacking of computer systems; 
 Network centric warfare: the networking of military components. The doctrine clearly 
distinguishes between network centric warfare and cyber-warfare, whereas other doctrines 
combine the two.  
 Economic information warfare: the use of information as to destabilise a nation‟s economy. 
Ventre (2009) notes that this forms part of the military IW doctrine, which implies that 
operations in the economic sphere may be controlled by the military. 
The Chinese publications on IW also mention seven pillars: electronic warfare, tactical deception, 
strategic deterrence, propaganda warfare, psychological warfare, computer warfare, and command 
and control warfare (Mulvenon, 1998). These theories also appear to have a greater emphasis on 
non-technological aspects of IW, particularly social implications or physical means to achieve the 
same results; this is due to the fact that the perceived enemy is considered to be technologically 
superior (Mulvenon, 1998; PuFeng, 1997; Rawnsley, 2005). This thinking also appears to view IW 
as a form of unconventional (or guerilla) warfare rather than a force multiplier (as some Western 
nations do) (Mulvenon, 1998); and advocates pre-emptive strikes to disrupt logistics and 
communications via computer warfare (Rawnsley, 2005) or physical means. This view by the 





Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1997) identify four forms of IW: netwar, political warfare, economic 
warfare, and cyber-war as a form of command and control warfare. Political warfare is the use of 
political power, policy and diplomacy to achieve objectives (Waltz, 1998); netwar is the use of 
networked societies and populations to conduct IW through the media, politics, diplomacy, 
propaganda and psychological operations, political and cultural subversion, and the promotion of 
political dissention via computer networks (Waltz, 1998). 
The United States Air Force provides an information operations construct, which illustrates the 
military components of IW as it was viewed in the United States, and the extension of IW to 
information operations. Figure 2.6 is an adaptation of this construct, which has been extended to the 
corporate environment where OPSEC denotes operations security and TRANSEC denotes 
transmissions security. Table 2.5 combines the three pillars of the enabling domain as discussed 
above with the construct shown in Figure 2.6. Table 2.6 relates the IW functional areas to the 










Table 2.5: Information Warfare Tactics and Tools for the Enabling Domain, adapted from Smith & Knight 
(2005) and van Niekerk and Maharaj (2009c). 
 EW NW PSYOPs 
Disrupt / Deny / 
Destroy 








Disrupt and deny 
communications and media 










Intrusion Detection Systems 




















Table 2.6: Domains of IW, adapted from Waltz (1998) 





Command and control warfare 
Corporate 
Network-based espionage, sabotage, and source intelligence 
Insider espionage or sabotage 
Precision physical attack on information systems 
Destruction of media 
Notebook and computer theft 
Exploitation and analysis of competitor products and former employees 
Capture and analysis of competitor trash 
Arson and other non-precision attacks on information systems 
Personal 
e-commerce fraud 
Identity theft, impersonation, spoofing, e-mail harassment, spamming 
Wiretapping and mobile phone intercepts 
Bank card impersonation, band and credit card theft, "shoulder surfing" and PIN capture 
Telephone harassment 







From the discussion above, a new model was developed which incorporates the six functional areas 
of the South African construct as shown in Figure 2.5, and the various domains and spheres 
described above. The model also illustrates the relationship between the functional areas and 
domains, and is shown in Figure 2.7.  
 
Figure 2.7: The Relationship between the IW Functional Areas and IW Spheres 
 
The functional areas are important as they distinguish between the ultimate objectives of IW; there 
may also be subtle differences in how each functional area relates to the different spheres. For the 
purposes of this dissertation, the six functional areas proposed by the SANDF will be used; 
economic IW (as proposed by some theorists) will be considered as the application of the various 
functional areas to the economic sphere. Sections 2.3.3.4 to 2.3.3.9 describe the six pillars of the 
South African construct in more detail.  
2.3.3.4 Command and Control Warfare 
The US Department of Defense defines command and control warfare (C2W) as: 
"C2W is the integrated use of psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception, operations 
security (OPSEC), electronic warfare (EW), and physical destruction, mutually supported by 
intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary C2 capabilities while 
protecting friendly C2 capabilities against such actions" (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1996b, p. V). 
Wik (2002) describes command and control warfare as "a subset of information warfare and is an 
application in military operations that specifically attacks and defends the command and control 
systems." From the definitions above, the links between command and control warfare and the other 
functional areas described in Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6 are apparent. One of the primary ways of 
affecting command and control, or management in a corporate environment, is to attack the decision 
cycle, shown in Figure 2.8.  This is the standard model for the decision cycle is the observe, orient, 
decide, and act (OODA) loop (Waltz, 1998); Figure 2.8 also illustrates how the different forms of 





information superiority, one needs to have a shorter or more efficient decision cycle than that of any 
competitors. 
2.3.3.5 Intelligence-based Warfare 
Intelligence-based warfare encompasses the gathering and dissemination of intelligence, protecting 
friendly intelligence processes, and disrupting the intelligence processes of an adversary. 
Intelligence may be collected from various sources: 
 Open-sources intelligence – this usually comes from information found in the public 
sphere, such as from the broadcast and print media, publications, and websites (Denning, 
1999; Waltz, 1998);  
 Network intelligence (NETINT) – this is the gathering of intelligence from computer 
networks, and may involve analysis and monitoring of the network and traffic on the 
network, the interception of messages and system intrusions and exploitation (Waltz, 1998); 
 Signals intelligence (SIGINT) – this is the gathering of intelligence from broadcast signals 
(Denning, 1999; Waltz, 1998), and comprises of: 
o Electronic intelligence (ELINT) – this is intelligence gained from the physical 
characteristics of signals, or "externals". An order of battle can be generated by 
analysing the various types of emitted signals (Adamy, 2011; Waltz, 1998); and 
 





o Communications intelligence (COMINT) – this is the interception of the message, 
or "internals" that the signal is carrying (Adamy, 2011; Waltz, 1998); 
 Human intelligence – this is intelligence from human sources (Denning, 1999; Waltz, 
1998); 
 Imagery intelligence – this is the intelligence from images, particularly those from satellites 
and reconnaissance aircraft, and may include either still images or video (Denning, 1999; 
Waltz, 1998). 
Other forms of intelligence are competitive intelligence, which is the legal collection of corporate 
information, possibly by a competitor for use in strategic planning. A more aggressive version is 
industrial espionage, which may use covert or illegal methods for acquiring the information. 
Economic intelligence is the legal gathering of national economic information by other states or 
organisations; economic espionage is more aggressive and uses covert and possibly illegal methods 
to gather the intelligence (Denning, 1999). 
Waltz (1998) describes the intelligence cycle as consisting of the collection of data from one or 
more of the sources described above; the data is then distributed for processing, where it is indexed, 
organised, and translated if required. After processing, the data is analysed, after which an 
intelligence report can be produced and then disseminated to the required users to act upon. 
To protect against an adversary collecting intelligence against an organisation or operations, the 
signals emissions should be controlled, called emission control (EMCON), and operational security 
should be employed be reduce the transparency of operations. Transmissions security, primarily 
encryption, can be employed to maintain the confidentiality of communications. Deception may be 
employed to actively affect the integrity of the adversary's intelligence collection efforts. 
2.3.3.6 Information Infrastructure Warfare 
Information infrastructure warfare is the defence of friendly information infrastructure, and the 
exploitation and attacking of the adversary's information infrastructure; the energy infrastructure, 
upon which the information infrastructure is dependent to function, is included in this form of IW 
(Brazzoli, 2007). At a strategic or national level, this is strongly related to strategic information 
warfare (SIW), see Section 2.3.4, and the defence is related to critical infrastructure protection 





2.3.3.7 Psychological Operations 
Psychological operations can be defined as planned operations "designed to convey selected 
information and indicators to foreign leaders and audiences to influence their emotions, motives, 
objective reasoning, and ultimately their behaviour to favour friendly objectives" (United States Air 
Force, 1998). 
Psychological operations are closely related to perception management, which also seeks to 
influence the emotions, reasoning, decisions, and behaviour of the target audience (Denning, 1999). 
Psychological operations can be seen as using more aggressive tactics, and therefore are offensive, 
whereas perception management may be more subtle and can be considered defensive (Denning, 
1999; Ramluckan & van Niekerk, 2009a). Both PSYOP and perception management are based on 
the truth, whereas propaganda may involve deception and distortion (Ward, 2003). The message to 
be conveyed by the PSYOP or perception management needs to be carefully constructed to be 
culturally correct for the intended target audience, and the media for delivery needs to be chosen to 
maximise the reception by the target audience (Waltz, 1998). The message may be delivered 
through actions (ibid.) as well as print or broadcast media (Cox, 1997), and also the Internet through 
web pages (Hutchinson & Warren, 2001).  
Figure 2.9 illustrates a message flow process that describes the process used in PSYOPs. The sender 
of the message will construct the message in such a way that it coerces, deters or provides 
incentives to the target audience with regards to a specific behaviour or action (Cox, 1997). The 
message is delivered via the instrument of power (IOP), such as the delivery methods mentioned 
above, which then create a phenomenon that is observed, interpreted and internalised by the target 
audience, who would react according to whether they support or oppose the message; the sender can 
then re-evaluate the message by assessing this reaction (ibid.). 
 






The media has traditionally been an effective instrument of power as it shapes public attitudes and 
can influence operations (Department of the Army, 2001). An example is the US forces 
withdrawing from Somalia due to public pressure after televised images of the bodies of US 
servicemen was broadcast; this has subsequently become known as "The CNN Effect" (Taylor, 
2002).  
2.3.3.8 Network Warfare 
Network warfare is the based on the attacking, defending and exploitation of information networks; 
in particular computer networks. This will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.4. 
2.3.3.9 Electronic Warfare 
Electronic warfare is the based on denying an adversary the use of the electro-magnetic spectrum, 
whilst preserving its use for one's own use. This will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.5. 
2.3.4 Strategic Information Warfare 
Strategic information warfare can be defined as the intersection of strategic warfare and IW 
(Molander, Riddile, & Wilson, 1996; Molander, Wilson, Mussington, & Mesic, 1998). Command 
and control warfare is typically tactical battlefield management, and is primarily concerned with the 
military and physical domains; conventional warfare extends this to the economic, political and 
possibly the social domains; SIW however, may attack a national homeland without the use of 
military, political or economic actions (Molander, Riddile, & Wilson, 1996).  Libicki (2009) 
considers IW to be strategic when it is the primary method of warfare or competition; when IW is 
secondary and supporting other activities it is then considered as operational information warfare.  
There are a number of defining features in SIW which add to the complexities when assessing SIW; 
these are illustrated in Table 2.7. The low entry cost to enter the SIW arena may result in many 
actors, from nations to organised crime, and possibly even individuals, as all that is needed is a 
personal computer (Molander, Riddile, & Wilson, 1996). Due to the nature of SIW and network 
warfare, there is a great deal of uncertainty: lack of strategic intelligence and difficulties in warning 
and assessments results in difficulties in determining potential threats, infrastructure vulnerabilities 
and knowing if an attack is occurring, who the perpetrator is and what the current or possible future 
damage will be (ibid.). An added difficulty for the subject of the attack is that the traditional 
boundaries of the various agencies become blurred, resulting in uncertainties regarding the 





features are relevant to other forms of IW, in particular network warfare which may be used to 
conduct SIW; network warfare will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.4. The concept of a 
Minimum Essential Information Infrastructure (MEII) was proposed to mitigate the effects of such 
an attack (Anderson, et al., 1999). This concept is a framework to aid the identification and 
management of possible vulnerabilities in critical information infrastructures (CII) to ensure a 
minimum level of functionality to provide continuity of operations (Anderson, et al., 1999). This 
concept will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.7.2.1. 
Table 2.7: The SIW Environment, adapted from (Molander, Wilson, Mussington, & Mesic, 1998) 
Defining Features Implications Dimensions 
Low entry cost 
Potential for many actors in the SIW 
environment 
Number of offensive SIW actors 
No or little strategic intelligence on 
possible threats 
Identity and capabilities of actors 
and potential adversaries may be 
unclear 
Unknown number of offensive SIW 
players, including identity 
Tactical warning difficult May not know an attack is occurring Tactical warning capability 
Attack assessment difficult May not know perpetrator or targets 
Attack assessment capability, 
including perpetrator identity 
Damage assessment difficult 
May not know the full implications 
of the attack 
Damage assessment capability 
Blurring of traditional boundaries 
Responsibility allocation before, 
during or after an attack may be 
unclear 
N/A 
Uncertain weapons effects 
Both the offensive and defensive 
actors may be uncertain about the 
effects of weapons 
Uncertainty in weapons effects 
Infrastructure vulnerabilities 
uncertain 
National homelands may not be 
sanctuaries, vulnerable partners may 
make sustaining coalitions more 
difficult 
Degree of SIW vulnerability 
2.3.5 The Application of Information Warfare 
Ventre (2009) contends that many confrontations on computer networks stem from tense political 
situations, and has developed a model to illustrate this shown in Figure 2.10. Whilst it was 
developed for the case of politically connected cyber-attacks it can be used to describe any situation 
where an IW attack has occurred. Some contexts results in potential adversaries and motivations, 
which results in an IW attack. This obviously has ramifications for the target, which reacts in an 






Figure 2.10: Information Warfare Cycle, adapted from Ventre (2009) 
 
Wik (2002) mentions that the disciplines and capabilities that are relevant to command and control 
warfare may be employed to achieve IW objectives outside of the military command and control 
target set; and other less traditional methods may also be employed. From this he developed a 
process for information operations, which is illustrated in Figure 2.11. From the planning of the 
operations, the available tools are applied to the infrastructure and systems which modern society 
revolves around, particularly data and communications systems, the mass media, and other 
infrastructure in society (Wik, 2002). The affects created then impact on the humans themselves, 
resulting in altered or new thought processes and ultimately actions. This model fits in with the 
attack to reaction blocks in Figure 2.10. 
Examples of IW objectives are: deterring war, supporting peace operations, exposing deception, 
affecting infrastructure, and the protection and defence of the information infrastructure (Wik, 
2002). In terms of this dissertation, the objectives of affecting infrastructure and the protection and 





Information warfare can be applied in six stages as two or more nations progress from a state of 
competition to war, and in post-hostility actions (Jones, Kovacich, & Luzwick, 2002), as illustrated 
in Figure 2.12. Intelligence gathering is ongoing, and probably the most common occurrence of IW; 
however the focus is shifting from the human spies of old to more technical methods, including 
surveillance satellites and recently "netspionage" or cyber-espionage (ibid.). An example of cyber-
espionage is the system penetrations of multiple international organisations (Nakashima, 2011). As 
the competition becomes more aggressive, diplomatic pressure increases; modern technology 
provides additional means to project diplomatic pressure, particularly the mass media, and the 
Internet and social networks, where non-state actors could conceivably become involves through 
hacking and defacing websites (Hutchinson & Warren, 2001; Jones, Kovacich, & Luzwick, 2002).  
The next stage is economic pressure, where traditionally embargoes have been employed; in future 
IW, it is possible that economic information of adversaries is intentionally targeted and affected. As 
tensions deepen, military posturing will begin, signifying heightened military alert levels and 
infrastructure protection, and an increase in propaganda and PSYOPs (Jones, Kovacich, & Luzwick, 
2002). The next stage is actual combat, where command and control warfare and tactical IW is 
apparent on the battlefield in addition to the strategic information  
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Figure 2.12: The Stages of Information Warfare, adapted from Jones, Kovacich, and Luzwick (2002) and Waltz 
(1998) 
 
operations. After combat has ended, reconstruction occurs; where IW could be employed to support 
peace-keeping operations (ibid.). 
2.4 Network Warfare 
Network warfare is the computer-based aspect of IW, and it many go under many names, such as 
cyber-warfare, computer-based operations and sometimes hacker warfare. The majority of IW texts 
focus on this aspect of IW (Denning, 1999; Hutchinson & Warren, 2001; Jones, Kovacich, & 
Luzwick, 2002). Computer network warfare can be divided into three components: computer 
network attack, computer network defence, and computer network support, as illustrated in Figure 
2.13. 
Another view breaks computer network operations, as it is termed in the United States, into 
computer network defence, computer network attack, and computer network exploitation (Hayden, 
2010). Computer network exploitation deals with the penetration of information systems in order to 
steal information (ibid.); for the purposes of this dissertation, computer network exploitation will be 








Figure 2.13:  Network Warfare Components 
 
2.4.1 Network Warfare Attack 
Computer network attack covers those activities which seek to exploit, corrupt, degrade or deny the 
performance of networks or the various components that constitute the network. This may be 
accomplished through various tactics, which are either active or passive. Active attacks include: 
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks; the introduction of malware and backdoors; system penetration; 
and various other activities. Passive attacks are more difficult to detect, and usually include the 
monitoring of networks in order to retrieve more information about that network (Thion, 2008). The 
availability of hacking tools and malicious code on the World Wide Web provides ready-made IW 
weapons to any nation or group seeking to obtain an IW capability (Jones, Kovacich, & Luzwick, 
2002). The following paragraphs discuss types of attacks. 
A denial-of service attack is when a target is flooded with false requests, overloading the gateway 
or network so that legitimate traffic is severely hampered or is prevented altogether (Peltier, Peltier, 
& Blackley, 2005). When the attack originates from multiple machines it is known as a distributed 
denial of service (DDoS) attack (ibid.). 
Viruses are a type of malicious software which requires another program of file to propagate. They 





 Boot viruses, which infect the boot sector of a disk and executes every time the system is 
turned on, and may infect any removable disk that is inserted into a drive (Denning, 1999). 
 Macro viruses, which are contained in the macros of Microsoft Office documents (Denning, 
1999; Hutchinson & Warren, 2001). 
 Program viruses are contained in, or infect, executable files, primarily of programs 
(Denning, 1999). 
Worms are self-replicating and actively seek to spread to other systems via the network, the intent 
being to infect the network (Hutchinson & Warren, 2001; Waltz, 1998). Rabbits are also 
independent and self-replicating, but do not spread to other systems; it replicates continuously 
exhausting the resources of the infected system (SpyOps, Technolytics Institute, and Intelomics, c. 
2008). Waltz (1998) gives this definition to bacteria, whereas (SpyOps, Technolytics Institute, and 
Intelomics, c. 2008) differentiate the two; they agree that the bacterium exhausts computer 
resources, yet mention that it specifically attaches itself to the operating system. A Trojan, or Trojan 
Horse, appears to perform a legitimate function, however it contains additional hidden malicious 
functions (Hutchinson & Warren, 2001; Waltz, 1998). Backdoors are inserted code fragments or 
programs that provide a covert means of accessing the system after the initial penetration or 
infection (SpyOps, Technolytics Institute, and Intelomics, c. 2008), and may be used in conjunction 
with Trojans (Waltz, 1998). Logic bombs are pieces of code that are inserted into software to trigger 
potentially malicious activity when certain conditions are met (ibid.). 
Two modern versions of malicious code are Rootkits and malware that creates networks of systems 
controlled by the attacker, called Botnets. Rootkits are a collection of tools that can be used to mask 
intrusion and gain administrator-level access to computers, networks and related systems (SANS 
Institute, 2010); they may also mask the running of illegitimate programs or processes, and possibly 
take control of a system (Poulsen, 2003). In 2005 Sony used a rootkit for to hide software for 
copyright protection of its CDs. This use was not intended to be malicious; however it was 
discovered that the rootkit created vulnerabilities that could be exploiting by attackers (BBC, 2005). 
Botnets are a network of software bots (short for robot), which run autonomously (SpyOps, 
Technolytics Institute, and Intelomics, c. 2008). Malicious variants may seize control of computers 
(these are then called zombies), and the network can be used for conducting DDoS attacks or 
committing other cyber-crimes (Ajoku, 2009), they may also be used for the distribution of spam 
emails. For the purposes of this thesis, all forms of viruses, worms, and other malicious code or 





A man-in-the middle attack is where an eavesdropper manages to intercept communications 
(particularly those that are encrypted) between two parties; the attacker receives each message sent 
and then transmits it to the intended recipient, and then receivers and relays the replies. This type of 
attack is most commonly used against secure websites, particularly e-commerce sites in order to 
compromise the client‟s credit card details (Whitman & Mattord, 2010). A modern variation is the 
man-in-the browser attack, which is facilitated through the use of a Trojan, and is effectively a man-
in-the-middle attack between the user and the security mechanisms of the web browser application 
(Gühring, 2006). These attacks are capable of modifying information on the fly, so no fraudulent 
activity is readily detectable (ibid.). These attacks could also conceivably be used to gain 
information required to logon to websites or servers that contain other forms of sensitive 
information. Cross-Site scripting is a popular attack vector against both the average user and 
organisational networks; this can be used for stealing user sessions, injecting malicious content, and 
to compromise usernames and passwords (Dhanjani, Rios, & Hardin, 2009). The attacker inserts 
malicious code into a legitimate dynamic web page; this can be a hyperlink which loads or redirects 
the user to malicious content (Janczewski & Colarik, 2008; Lawton, 2007). Cross-site request 
forgery is when an attacker compromises a legitimate user's computer and uses it to send requests to 
web-sites or organisation intranets for which the user has legitimate authentication (Lawton, 2007). 
This allows the attacker to pose as the legitimate user and conduct malicious acts once access is 
gained to the web sites. Cross-site scripting and cross-site request forgeries are particularly relevant 
to social networks (ibid.); cross-site scripting has been used to attack both YouTube (Barnett, 2010) 
and Twitter (Twitter, 2010). 
Phishing attacks utilise spam emails to coerce or trick users to go to fake banking sites and enter 
their online banking details; a modification on this is the chat-in-the-middle attack, where a fake 
technical support instant messaging chat window is used to trick the user into providing account 
information. These attacks primarily target online banking to gain access to the victim‟s finances 
(RSA FraudAction Research Labs, 2009).  
Coleman (2008a) describes three components of cyber-weapons: there needs to be a delivery 
vehicle (also called an attack vector), a security breaching mechanism, and the payload. Delivery 
may be manual (from a hacker), through an email or webpage, or from hardware (such as a 
universal serial bus (USB) drive). The weapon then needs to exploit vulnerabilities in the system 





virus software and firewalls that may be in place. Once the system is infected the malicious content, 
or payload, is activated.  
Figure 2.14 shows a network warfare attack process; information is required regarding the 
interfaces to reach the target network, and information about the target network itself, particularly 
the vulnerabilities that could potentially be exploited (Jones, Kovacich, & Luzwick, 2002). In this 
figure GII denotes the global information infrastructure and NII denotes the national information 
infrastructure. Once the system has been penetrated, the attacker may accomplish the objectives of 
the attack, and possibly identify additional networks that could be targeted; the attack then proceeds 
to these new targets. Usually backdoors are left so that the systems and networks may be easily 
penetrated at a later stage as required (ibid.). A distributed denial of service attack may not require 
the level of planning indicated in this process; all that is required is that the target is flooded with 
illegitimate data streams to reduce its performance; therefore all that is required is preliminary 
scanning to determine the IP range of the target. 
Due to the prevalence of wireless technologies, there are a number of attacks that arose from 
weaknesses in the implementation. These include jamming, Wardriving and related attacks for 
WLAN; and Bluejacking, sniffing, and DoS attacks on Bluetooth networks. These attacks will be 
described in more detail in Section 2.8.2. 
2.4.2 Network Warfare Defence 
Computer network defence are those measures taken to mitigate attacks against the computer 
networks. These usually incorporate conventional information security measures, such as the use of 
encryption, anti-virus programs, firewalls, and intrusion detection systems (Denning, 1999; 
Hutchinson & Warren, 2001). Honey pots and honey nets may also be used; these are fake systems 
or networks that are used to entice an attacker into penetrating them so their attack methods can be 
monitored and analysed while reducing the risk of any sensitive information being compromised 
(Jones, Kovacich, & Luzwick, 2002). Other procedural and physical security measures are also 
incorporated, such as video surveillance, access controls and audits (Denning, 1999; Hutchinson & 
Warren, 2001; Jones, Kovacich, & Luzwick, 2002). As with network warfare attack, the available 
hacker tools can be used to conduct penetration testing of networks infrastructures to identify 







Figure 2.14: Network Warfare Attack Process, adapted from (Jones, Kovacich, & Luzwick, 2002) 
 
The various security measures, also called controls or countermeasures, have strengths and 
limitations. Firewalls act as a gateway between private or trusted and public or untrusted networks 
by performing packet filtering based on a set of rules; certain protocols can be blocked and only the 
necessary protocols and their relevant ports are left open (Whitman & Mattord, 2010). The 
limitation of firewalls is that they do not check what the packets contain; therefore what appear to 
be legitimate packets to the firewall may still transfer malicious code or sensitive information 
(Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2003). Firewalls also do not protect against DoS attacks (Whitman & 





Sinkholes redirect and trap malicious traffic from a DoS attack to protect the target and allow 
defenders to monitor and analyse the traffic (Glenn, 2003; Jeong, 2007). Black hole filtering allows 
traffic to be redirected to a different IP address; this technique is useful when the unavailability of a 
website is less harmful than traffic hindering the organisational network. It is implemented by 
reconfiguring the network perimeter routers to redirect the traffic at an organisational or service 
provider level (Glenn, 2003). 
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) monitor the network or system and report on potential malicious 
activity; a signature-based IDS compares activity against known attack patterns, and a behaviour-
based IDS builds a model of acceptable or normal behaviour, and reports on activity that does not 
correspond to the model (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2003). A protocol-anomaly IDS is a type of 
behaviour-based IDS that tests for anomalies in network or data-transfer protocols (Das, 2002). 
Host-based IDSs (based on a system) can also check the system log files and file integrity 
(Gollmann, 2011). An improperly configured IDS may result in a flood of false alarms, or not 
detect attacks (Whitman & Mattord, 2010); behaviour-based IDSs are particularly susceptible to 
false alarms. Gollman (2011) also suggests that an attacker may intentionally create alarms on 
network IDS, resulting in the network administrator's email account being flooded with warnings. 
Finding the balance of the sensitivity of the IDS may be difficult (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2003). An 
advanced IDS may have built in protection mechanisms that can reconfigure network devices to 
block the attack, or blocking the network connection; the IDS can therefore provide some protection 
against a DoS attack (Whitman & Mattord, 2010). A firewall and an IDS can complement each 
other well; the firewall blocks specified traffic and ports, and the IDS monitors the traffic that is 
allowed through (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2003). Anti-virus software is a form of IDS; the software 
scans files and processes to check for malicious code, and remove any infection that is discovered 
(Denning, 1999). Anti-virus software, and signature-based IDSs, may be limited to detecting 
malicious code and attacks that are encoded into the signature database (ibid.); this makes it 
imperative to ensure that the signature databases are updated regularly. Some sophisticated attacks 
use multiple methods; therefore multiple signatures will be required to counter these threats (Das, 
2002). Rootkits, with their ability to mask intrusions and infections, may also be able to subvert the 
scans performed by anti-virus tools, however most modern anti-virus tools have some anti-rootkit 
capability. 
Encryption scrambles the original plaintext into unreadable cipher text through the use of a key and 





key cryptography and digital signatures provide for a mechanism that provides authenticity, non-
repudiation and integrity checks (ibid.). However, the integrity checks performed can only indicate 
that what was sent arrived at the destination without alteration; it cannot determine the accuracy of 
the information. Encryption schemes also assume that the end-points are secure; if a system or end-
user is compromised, the source will be recognised as legitimate, however the communications as a 
whole is illegitimate. Public-key cryptography is susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks (ibid.), as 
discussed in Section 2.4.1. It is also possible to use virtual private networks, which are essentially 
encrypted tunnels between two trusted networks, allowing users to access a trusted private network 
over a public or untrusted network (Gollmann, 2011; Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2003). Vulnerabilities in 
the implementation of devices for virtual private networks may circumvent the secure 
communication channels they are intended to provide; in one instance general web browser security 
was undermined (US-CERT, 2009). 
A concept that is applicable to both information security and network warfare defence is defence-in-
depth; a range of countermeasures are implemented that will provide protection in the physical, 
information, and cognitive domains (Jones, Kovacich, & Luzwick, 2002). These measures typically 
attempt to prevent intrusion, detect any intrusion that has occurred, minimise the impact of the 
intrusion, recover from any damage or loss (Jones, Kovacich, & Luzwick, 2002; Peltier, Peltier, & 
Blackley, 2005), and possibly respond to the attack (Hutchinson & Warren, 2001; Jones, Kovacich, 
& Luzwick, 2002). Defence-in-depth usually contains layers of controls such as those discussed 
above in order to protect various aspects of the networks (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2003); for example 
firewalls provide gateway protection, anti-virus software protects against malicious code, and 
encryption protects confidentiality. Figure 2.15 illustrates this concept; in the figure ConOps 
denotes concept of operations, and BDA denotes battle damage assessment. 
A defensive concept in the networked world is the air-gap or air wall. This physically and 
electronically separates critical systems from those that are connected to the Internet (Festa, 1998); 
with the use of wireless it should also electromagnetically separate the networks using 
electromagnetic shielding. This is primarily used to separate sensitive networks (such as high-
security military networks) and industrial control networks from the normal network that is 
connected to the Internet (Festa, 1998). The concept behind this is that it will prevent an attacker 
from gaining electronic access to those critical systems. However, the Stuxnet worm of 2010 






2.4.3 Computer Network Support 
Some of the defensive countermeasures taken may also fall under computer network support. This 
term was used by Smith and Knight (2005), and denotes normal maintenance of network and 
computer components and applications. Applying security patches and ensuring anti-virus 
applications are updated, conducting vulnerability and risk assessments, and creating benchmarks 
for normal network and system performance and behaviour may fall into this category (Smith & 
Knight, 2005). 
2.4.4 Network Warfare Framework 
Veerasamy and Eloff (2009) proposed a network warfare framework that incorporates all the 
concepts discussed in this section; this can be seen in Figure 2.16. In addition, the figure includes 
factors that may constrain the use of network warfare and the intended target sectors as discussed in 
Section 2.3.5. The syntactic level denotes the structured organisation of the networks, and the 
semantic level denotes the meaning of the received data (Veerasamy & Eloff, 2009), and could be  
 
 






Figure 2.16: Network Warfare Framework, adapted from Veerasamy and Eloff (2009) 
 
partly related to the cognitive domain as it involves trust. Many of the techniques and objectives 
have been discussed previously. 
2.4.5 Cyber-Conflict Spectrum 
Adkins (2001) distinguishes the various forms of network warfare in what is called the cyber-








 Cyber-terrorism; and 
 Cyber-warfare. 
Cyber-crime is the illegal accessing of computer systems primarily for personal gain or 
entertainment, or in an extreme case to affect other persons; hacktivism is the use of network 
warfare techniques for social disobedience and protest (Adkins, 2001; Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001; 
Jones, Kovacich, & Luzwick, 2002). Cyber-terrorism, however, has the intention of creating fear 
and possible physical destruction through the network warfare attacks; they may also employ 
network warfare or cyber-crime to generate funds for terrorist activities (Adkins, 2001; Veerasamy, 
2009a). Cyber-espionage was mentioned in Section 2.3.3.5 as network intelligence (NETINT), 
which attempts to penetrate systems with the primary goal of gathering information (Adkins, 2001); 
this may take the form of industrial or corporate espionage as well as espionage between nation 
states (Schwartau, 1996). Cyber-warfare is possibly the most aggressive form of network warfare, 
where the intent is to drastically affect the opponents‟ information infrastructure (Adkins, 2001; 
Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1997).  
2.5 Electronic Warfare 
Electronic warfare is the use of electromagnetic (EM) energy to disrupt or deny an adversaries use 
or the EM spectrum (EMS), and ensure the availability of the EM spectrum for one's own use. 
Electronic warfare can be subdivided into three components: electronic attack, electronic protection 
and electronic support (see Figure 2.17). Each of these components may be applied to two areas: 
radar and communications. For the purposes of this dissertation, the focus will be on 
communications electronic warfare. 
Sections 2.5.1 to 2.5.3 discuss the three components of electronic warfare in more detail. Sections 






Figure 2.17: Electronic Warfare Components, adapted from (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007) 
2.5.1 Electronic Attack  
This was previously known as electronic countermeasures, and is the "use of EM energy, directed 
energy or anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities or equipment with the intent of 
degrading, neutralising, or destroying enemy combat capability" (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007). This 
constitutes jamming, which affects the timeliness and availability of information; deception, which 
targets the integrity or accuracy of the information; and directed energy, which is similar to 
jamming, however it attempts to permanently damage or destroy communications equipment 
(Poisel, 2004). Anti-radiation missiles and decoys (flares and chaff) also fall into this category 
(Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007), in that they seek to deceive and destroy threats; however these are 
usually employed against radar and optical systems. 
2.5.2 Electronic Support 
Actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, 
identify, and locate or localise sources of intentional and unintentional radiated EM energy for the 
purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning, and conduct of future operations (Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2007). This may include threat warning on aircraft, direction finding, SIGINT, 





confidentiality of the information, either by attempting to identify the source, or the transmitted 
information itself. Adamy (2011), however, distinguishes between SIGINT and electronic support 
in that SIGINT is at a strategic level and focuses purely on intelligence gathering and timeliness is 
not critical; whereas electronic support is at a tactical level and is used for targeting information, 
and the timeliness of information is critical. 
2.5.3 Electronic Protection 
This was formerly known as electronic counter-countermeasures, and is defined as "actions taken to 
protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy use of EMS that 
degrade, neutralise, or destroy friendly combat capability (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007). Examples of 
electronic protection are screening of communications from detection and jamming, which includes 
low probability of intercept (LPI) and anti-jam communications, emissions control, and spectrum 
management (Poisel, 2004). Equipment may also be hardened against directed energy through 
shielding (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007). Other forms of electronic protection are encryption (Poisel, 
2004) and low-observability technology (commonly called stealth). 
2.5.4 Signal Detection and Interception 
In order to exploit a communications signal, its presence first needs to be detected, then the emitter 
located through direction finding in order to optimise detection, and then it may be possible to 
demodulate the signal in an attempt to retrieve its contents; this process is shown in Figure 2.18. 
The process of detecting the presence of signals to provide an image of the electromagnetic 
environment is SIGINT, and the interception of signals to access the contents is COMINT.  
 
Figure 2.18: Process to Exploit Communications 
 
The probability of intercept is defined as the electronic warfare system will detect the presence, and 
some parameters, of a particular signal from the time the signal first reaches the electronic warfare 
systems locations and before it is too late to complete the interception. Spread-spectrum 
communications are classified as LPI due to the fact that their characteristics make them very 
difficult to intercept (Adamy, 2009). Frequency hopping signals are only present at a specific 





difficult as the electronic warfare system will need to track the hops (Adamy, 2009; Poisel, 2004). 
Direct-spread communications, such as those found in 3G mobile phone communications, often 
have the signal energy distributed over such a wide frequency bandwidth that the spread signal 
strength is below the background noise, making them difficult to detect and intercept (Adamy, 
2009; Poisel, 2004). Adamy (2004) and Nicholson (1998) provide in depth discussion on the 
requirements and probability of detecting various signal types. 
There are three basic search strategies when attempting to detect the presence of signals: a general 
search, where there is no prior knowledge of signal presence, and every possible frequency and 
direction needs to be considered without any priority. A directed search is possible when some 
characteristics are known, such as the frequency range, or possible direction from which the signal 
could be arriving; then any signals that fall within the search criteria are given priority over other 
signals. A sequentially qualified search measures specific parameters of possible signals in a 
sequential order; depending on each step the signal may be assigned a priority  to determine the 
amount of effort that will be employed to further analyse the signal (Adamy, 2009). 
The location of the emitters can then be located with some precision, depending on the technique 
used. Multiple direction finding stations could be used to triangulate the emitter location, more 
stations usually result in a greater degree of accuracy; the mobility of the direction finders and 
target also affects accuracy. Adamy (2009) provides more detail on location techniques and 
accuracy. 
The interception of the signal attempts to demodulate the signal to access the data contained within; 
however as the information is usually encrypted, the interception may not be practical unless the 
encryption can be broken while knowledge of the information carried by the signal is still of some 
worth to the interceptor (Adamy, 2009). As mentioned above, the characteristics of spread-spectrum 
communications hinder interception of the information; this depends on the length of the pseudo-
random sequence used for the spreading, as longer codes are more secure (ibid.). Adamy (2009) 
discusses this in more detail. 
2.5.4.1 Mathematical Calculations for Detection of Radio Communications 
This section will describe how to calculate if a signal can be detected for a given sensitivity of an 
intercepting antenna, and the maximum range at which a transmitted signal can be detected. The 
equations presented are in a form taken from Adamy (2009); other sources such as Nicholson 





dissertation. These equations are presented as they will be used in Chapter 7 to determine the 
maximum range that communications can be intercepted as to determine the effectiveness of an 
electronic warfare threat. 
The first step is to calculate the signal strength at the receiving intercept antenna; the received signal 
power is related to the power that it was originally transmitted at, the gains of the transmitting and 
receiving antennas (in the direction of the intercept receiver), and the loss in power that the signal 
experiences during transmission. This can be calculated by: 
 2.4 
Where PR is the received signal strength in dBm, PT is the transmitted power in dBm, GT is the gain 
of the transmitting antenna in dB, L is the propagation loss in dB, and GR is the gain of the receiving 
antenna in dB. 
Two forms of propagation loss (L) will be considered, for line of sight and two-ray propagation. 
Two-ray propagation occurs when the distance between the transmitting and receiving antennas is 
such that there are reflections from the ground in addition to the main signal. To determine which 
form of loss will occur, the Fresnel Zone needs to be calculated; if the distance between the 
antennas is greater than the Fresnel Zone, then two-ray propagation occurs. The Fresnel Zone is 
affected by antenna heights and the frequency of the signal. The formula for calculating the Fresnel 
Zone is: 
 2.5 
Where FZ is the Fresnel Zone distance in kilometres, f is the transmitted frequency in MHz, hT is 
the height of the transmitting antenna in metres, and hR is the height of the receiving antenna in 
metres. The constant terms in Equations 2.5 to 2.7 are due to the fact that radio waves propagate 
spherically, In Equation 2.6 the speed of light (3 x 10
8
 m/s) is also taken into account. The loss from 
line of sight propagation is a function of the distance between the two antennas and the signal 
frequency; this is calculated as: 
 2.6 
where d is the distance between the two antennas in kilometres, and the other variables have been 
described before. The loss from two-ray propagation is a function of the distance, and the height of 






If the received power is greater than the intercepting antenna's sensitivity, S (in dBm), then the 
signal can be successfully intercepted. Therefore, to calculate the maximum range a signal can be 
intercepted for a given sensitivity, the received power, PR, should be replaced by the sensitivity, S, 
and then solve for the distance, d. The formula to calculate maximum distance at which the signal 
can be successfully intercepted for line of sight propagation is then:  
 2.8 
The equivalent formula for two-ray propagation becomes: 
 2.9 
 
2.5.5 Jamming of Radio Communications 
As communications plays a vital part on the modern battlefield, the ability to hamper an adversary‟s 
communications can decide the outcome of a battle or campaign. From a safety and security 
perspective, the ability to jam the communications of criminal elements prevents them from sending 
out a warning about an impending takedown, and could also hamper the ability to employ explosive 
devices using a RF-controlled detonator. As mentioned earlier, electronic warfare is related to either 
radar systems or communication systems; the primary difference in relation to jamming is that the 
transmitter and receiver are co-located, whereas in communications the transmitter and receiver are 
in different locations (Adamy, 2009). 
The primary jamming missions employed by ground forces on the battlefield are planned jamming, 
where the jamming missions are integrated with fire support missions and friendly communications 
windows. This includes on-call jamming, where jamming is employed as required, usually against 
reinforcements. Electronic masking is the use of jamming to hide friendly communications by 
interfering with potential listening posts that the enemy may have deployed. Standard operating 
procedures (SOP) jamming is when a target is jammed upon recognition, usually when it is not 
possible to determine the minimum power required, so maximum power is used (Department of the 
Army, 1992). 
The most common method of analysing the effectiveness of a jammer is the jammer-to-signal ratio 
(JSR), which is usually expressed in decibels. Jamming is essentially the intentional introduction of 





relation to the communications signal, the more errors and the less likely the receiver will be able to 
recover the transmitted information. The jamming-to-signal ratio (in decibels) is determined by 
subtracting the power of the signal at the receiver from the power of the jamming at the receiver. 
The received powers are calculated from the transmitting power, the loss due to the channel, and the 
gain of the receiving antenna in the direction of the signal or jamming. A general formula for 
calculating the JSR is (Adamy, 2009): 
 2.10 
Where ERPj is the effective radiated power of the jammer (in dBm), ERPs is the effective radiated 
power of the desired signal transmitter (in dBm), Lj is the propagation loss from the jammer to the 
receiver (in dB), Ls in the propagation loss of the desired signal (in dB), Grj is the gain of the 
receiver in the direction of the jammer (in dBi), and Gr is the gain of the receiver in the direction of 
the desired transmitter (in dBi). The channel loss follows the same rules for line of sight and two-
ray propagation as in Section 2.5.4.1. 
There is some difference in jamming analogue signals to digital signals. Generally, a high JSR, in 
the region of 10dB, is required to effectively jam analogue signals, with 100% duty cycle (i.e. 
continuously jammed). In the case of digital signals, the jammer attacks the digital modulation to 
make the signal unreadable by the demodulator; here a quantifiable measurement of jammer 
performance can be used: the bit error rate (BER), also known as the probability of error (Pe). 
Generally, only 20% to 33% of a digital signal needs to be unreadable for it to be useless, however 
error correction codes may reduce the jammer performance (Adamy, 2009; Poisel, 2004). It should 
be noted that a BER of 50% is the worst achievable, as anything lower makes the signal more 
coherent (Adamy, 2009). This is equivalent to reducing the mutual information by increasing the 
noise levels (as described in Section 2.2), thereby introducing errors in the digital communications 
signal. 
The probability of bit error for a basic binary phase shift key (BPSK) modulated signal in an 
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel is , where Eb is the bit energy and 
N0 is the power spectral density of the Gaussian noise. From this the equation for BER for BPSK 






where J0 is the energy of the jamming signal. In general, J0 is much larger then N0, so the equation 
can be simplified to: 
 2.12 
For Equations 2.11 and 2.12, the equality   (Nicholson, 1998) is used. 
If the jammer does not have enough power to jam the entire message, partial-message jamming, 
also called pulse jamming (Adamy, 2009), can be employed. The concept is that if the power is 
concentrated on a specific part of a message, that part will be destroyed, and if enough of the 
message is destroyed, then the message as a whole can be destroyed. A simple tactic for partial 
message jamming is to transmit band-limited white Gaussian noise with a power spectral density of 
J0/ρ for a time period ρ, and to transmit nothing for the remainder of the time. The parameter ρ is 
known as the duty factor of the jammer. As partial-message jamming creates blocks of errors, and 
some error correcting codes which can correct blocks of erroneous data, it may not be effective 
(ibid.).  
Other jamming strategies include (Poisel, 2004):  
 Broadband jamming: where a large frequency spectrum is jammed;  
 Partial band jamming: where the jamming energy is focussed on specific channels of the 
frequency band; 
 Narrowband jamming: where the jamming energy is focussed on a small portion of the 
frequency band; 
 Multi-tone jamming: the jamming energy is focussed on certain specific frequencies; and 
 Single-tone jamming: the jamming energy is focussed on a single frequency. 
These strategies are particularly useful against spread-spectrum communications, which have 
inherent anti-jamming features; an example of such technology is the CDMA employed in 3G 
mobile communications, and frequency-hopping radios (Adamy, 2009; Poisel, 2004). The 
performance of the various types of spread spectrum communications are derived in Adamy (2009) 





dissertation, a basic description of direct-spread CDMA (DS-CDMA) communications, such as 
those used in 3G mobile networks will be presented here. 
In spread-spectrum communications, the signal is distributed over a wider frequency range, as the 
name suggests. This is done by the means of a pseudo-random sequence, which spreads the data 
signal with bit rate Rb to a rate that is equal to the chip rate of the sequence, Rc (Adamy, 2009; 
Poisel, 2004). When this signal is transmitted, the interference is introduced (as indicated by the 
dashed line in Figure 2.19); at the receiver, the received signal is de-spread using the same pseudo-
random sequence, however as the interference has not been spread, the de-spreading process now 
does so, thereby reducing the spectral density of the interference (Adamy, 2009; Poisel, 2004). 
 
Figure 2.19: The Effects of Spreading on Interference, adapted from (Nicholson, 1998) 
This advantage over interference is known as the processing gain, Gp, and is a function of the rate of 
the pseudo-noise sequence divided by the original data rate, which is equivalent to the bandwidth of 




where W is the original (non-spread) bandwidth and Wss is the spread bandwidth. Due to the 
spreading of the interference, in this case the jamming signal, it first needs to overcome the 
jamming margin, which is calculated as (Blahut, 1990): 
 2.14 
which is the difference of the processing gain (in dB) and the minimum required SNR (in dB) for 






Figure 2.20 compares the theoretical performance of spread-spectrum communications signals 
against those of a common binary phase shift key (BPSK) communication system; the spread 
spectrum signal is not as badly affected by the jamming.  
 
Figure 2.20: Comparing Theoretical Jammer Performance against Spread-Spectrum and Conventional 
Communications Signals 
For the case where multiple users are present on a channel, such as for mobile communications, 
correlated jamming may be used to improve the performance of the jammer. Correlated jamming 
results when the jammer has some knowledge of the target signals, and can adjust the ERP of the 
jamming accordingly (Shafiee & Ulukus, 2009). This information about the target signal may be 
gained from SIGINT, as discussed in Section 2.5.4. Such a method of gaining information is 
proposed by Yao and Poor (2001), where an expectation-maximisation algorithm is used to estimate 
the spreading sequence of mobile CDMA systems in order to eavesdrop of the signals. Simulations 
in Chapter 7 will be done to illustrate potential limitations of this concept. 
The BER equations (Equations 2.11 to 2.15) may be used to describe the theoretical performance of 





Section 7.6 and generate Figure 2.20. For the purposes of the dissertation, the dB equations 
(Equations 2.5 to 2.10) will be used to estimate the maximum distance for which jamming and 
signal interception is effective; this will be presented in Section 7.5. 
2.6 Critical Infrastructure Protection 
This section will discuss critical infrastructures and the need for their protection. Section 2.6.1 
defines critical infrastructure, and Section 2.6.2 discusses their inter-dependencies. As this 
dissertation focuses on information infrastructure, Section 2.6.3 will discuss critical information 
infrastructures in more detail. Section 2.6.4 will explicitly relate critical infrastructure protection 
and IW. 
2.6.1 Defining Critical Infrastructures 
A critical infrastructure is one that is vital to the well-being and functioning of a nation, society, or 
an organisation. A disturbance of such an infrastructure may result in severe degradation or 
cessation of operational capabilities or service delivery (Department of Homeland Security, 2009; 
Macaulay, 2008). The US Presidential Directive 63 of 1998 defines critical infrastructure as "those 
physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operation of the economy and 
government" (Moteff & Parfomack, 2004). The Department of Homeland Security in the United 
States considers critical infrastructures as "the assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or 
virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating 
effect on security, national economic security, public health or safety, or any combination thereof" 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2010). 
As can be seen, the definition of critical infrastructure may have subtle differences according to 
organisational or national perspectives, similar to the variations in the definitions of IW.  
The Presidents Commission for Critical Infrastructure Protection in the United States identified five 
main critical infrastructure sectors, namely (Ware, 1998): 
 Information and communications, 
 Banking and finance, 
 Energy (electrical power, oil and gas), 
 Physical distribution, and 





The Department of Homeland Security expands the concept of critical infrastructures to critical 
infrastructures and key resources (CIKR), where the key resources may be defined as "publicly or 
privately controlled resources essential to the minimal operations of the economy and government" 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2010). This has also resulted in a re-organisation of the main 
sectors (Department of Homeland Security, 2010). Table 2.8 compares the critical infrastructure 
sector groupings described above with those of Nickolov (2005) and Macaulay (2008). 
 
Table 2.8: Comparison of Critical Infrastructure Sectors 
Ware (1998) 
Department of Homeland 
Security (2010) 
Nickolov (2005) Macaulay (2008) 
Information and 
communications 
Banking and finance 
Energy (electrical power, 
oil and gas) 
Physical distribution 
Vital human services 
 
Agriculture and food 










Healthcare and public 
health 
Information technology 
National monuments and 
icons 
Nuclear reactors, materials 
and waste 
Postal and shipping 
Transportation systems  
Water 




Food supply and waste 
management 




Military and defence 
systems and civil 
protection 
Emergency, health and 
rescue services 
Public agencies, 
administration and legal 
systems 
Media, major research 
establishments, etc 
 
















As can be seen, the five sectors described by Ware (1998) have been divided into their components 
by the Department of Homeland Security. An interesting addition is the classification of national 
monuments and icons as a critical infrastructure or key resource. This is related to the will 
component of IW as discussed in Section 2.3.3; the destruction or damaging of these monuments 
may affect the morale and will of the public. The Department of Homeland Security specifically 
mentions the psychological consequences of an attack on, or using, the CIKR (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2010). Grobler, Jansen van Vuuren, and Zaaiman (2011) also recognise the 
psychological relevance in the South African situation. This potential psychological impact is also 
evident from user frustration due to non-attack related service outages. Both Nickolov (2005) and 
Macaulay (2008) provide extended versions of the five sectors; as occurred with South Africa's 
mobile networks (Mtshali, 2011) and wide-spread BlackBerry services (Press Association, 2011) in 
2011. Macauly compares the sectors and subsectors of the United States, Canada and the European 
Union to arrive at the “harmonised CI sectors” presented in Table 2.8. Table 2.9 provides a re-
working of the models to include six sectors and their components or key resources. The original 
five sectors described by Ware (1998) were kept with their components as indicated in the other 
three models. The military and defence was added as a sixth sector as their infrastructure is 
generally separate from the others. 
 










































































As these infrastructures are critical to the well-being of a nation, they need to be protected from 
intentional attacks which could potentially damage the social well-being and economic stability of a 
nation.  
2.6.2 Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies 
There are interdependencies amongst the various infrastructure sectors; this is important when 
considering their protection as the dependencies and interdependencies of critical infrastructure 
sectors on each other may produce cascading effects that are far beyond the physical location of the 
incident, or the original sector that was disrupted (Department of Homeland Security, 2010). 
Figure 2.21 and Table 2.10 illustrate the inter-dependencies of the sectors. As can be seen there is a 
very high reliance on the energy and information sectors, which is echoed by Ware (1998)  and 
Nickolov (2005); large disturbances of these sectors will result in severe disruptions in the financial 
sector and some vital services, and to a lesser degree the physical distribution sector. Banking and 
finance can be considered to be indirectly depended upon by the other sectors, as a disruption will 
not immediately result in noticeable affects in the information, energy or physical distribution 
sectors. 
The energy sector requires some degree of communications infrastructure for its control systems, 
and physical distribution for the delivery of fuel for the power stations; the finance and economy 
may also affect the supply of fuel due to mining industry or imports being affected. The information 
and communications requires energy to operate, physical distribution to facilitate maintenance and 
repairs, and the finances to fund the functioning and maintenance of the systems. The physical 
distribution sector requires energy and communications to operate airports and sea-ports and rail 
systems, and to a certain degree the traffic lights on the roads. The financial and economic sector is 
heavily reliant on the energy to run its systems, and the communications to exchange information; it 
does have some dependency on the physical distribution system to transport goods and raw 
materials. Essential services are dependent on all sectors except the military. The military is reliant 
on the physical distribution systems for deployments, it generally has its own communications 
systems, and has some capability for its own power generation, however fuel is still required; it has 







Figure 2.21: Infrastructure Interdependencies, (van Niekerk & Maharaj, 2011c) 
 

















































































Energy  Medium Medium Medium Low Low 
Information & 
communications 
High  Medium Medium Low Low 
Physical distribution High Medium  High Low Low 
Financial & economic High High Medium  Low Low 
Essential Services High High High High  Low 






2.6.3 Critical Information Infrastructure Protection 
There are three concepts of interconnected and inter-dependent information infrastructures, as 
described below (Dudgeon, 2008; Jones, Kovacich, & Luzwick, 2002): 
 Global information infrastructure (GII): this is the global connections and links between the 
information infrastructures of nations. It comprises of the interconnections of all 
telecommunications systems, networks and related devices. Examples of these may include 
undersea fibre-optic cables. 
 National information infrastructure (NII): this is the information infrastructure contained 
within a nation. It comprises of the telecommunications, networks and related devices 
within a nation. Most of the infrastructure may be in private hands; especially as most of the 
mobile phone and Internet service providers are private corporations. 
 Defence information infrastructure (DII): this is the information and communications 
infrastructure used for military and defence purposes. Whilst it forms part of the national 
information infrastructure, much of it is separate from the public and private infrastructure. 
It incorporates the command and control, communications, computer, intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems that the military and defence department 
uses. 
Busutill and Warren (2002) also suggest two additional infrastructure levels: the organisational 
information infrastructure (OII) and the personal information infrastructure. Critical information 
infrastructure (CII) can be described as including “telecommunications, computers/ software, 
Internet, satellites, fibre optics, etc. The term is also used for the totality of interconnected 
computers and their critical information flows” (Wenger, Metzger, & Dunn, 2002). Combining this 
definition with the definitions of critical infrastructure in Section 2.6.1, the CII can therefore be 
seen as the information systems within the NII, DII, or OII which is essential to its operations. 
2.6.4 Critical Infrastructure Protection and Information Warfare 
On a day-to-day basis, infrastructures generally experience disturbances that may degrade 
performance or results in interruptions or outages of services; examples of this may include road 
accidents, daily criminal activity, or transients and component failures on a power or 
communications grid (Ware, 1998). This has been termed "infrastructure noise", after the concept of 
engineering noise, which interferes with audio and electronic signals (ibid.). Such disturbances can 





and respond to such incidents (ibid.). These disturbances effectively form the noise floor; this 
concept is relevant to CIP and IW in that a deliberate attack needs to be distinguished from the 
everyday noise floor in order to respond effectively (ibid.). 
The network warfare attack process, shown in Figure 2.14, is also applicable to information 
infrastructure warfare; the process can be followed to gain access and plant malicious code and 
backdoors. Rather than steal information, infrastructure control processes could be modified in 
order to create disturbances such as altering the output of a generator. An example of this is the 
Stuxnet worm, which altered the code for industrial controllers; this is reported to have caused 
physical damage to an Iranian nuclear processing facility (Fisher & Roberts, 2011). 
When considering IW threats to the CII at a national level, there are characteristics that separate 
these threats from the more common nuisance hacker attacks (Anderson, et al., 1999). The IW 
attacks are more likely to form part of a larger operation to achieve an objective, which may include 
conventional economic, political and military actions (ibid.). The ability to predict the impact of an 
IW attack is important for the attacker; if the impact is less than expected the entire operation may 
fail, or if the impact is far worse, the retaliation by the target may be extreme (ibid.). In relation to 
IW, the nuisance attacks may form part of the infrastructure noise; however it is possible that these 
attacks are part of a larger, co-ordinated effort. The main example that has been used to illustrate an 
attack on a critical infrastructure occurred in 2000 in Australia when a disgruntled former employee 
wirelessly accessed the control systems of the sewerage system and release sewerage into the public 
waterways (Abrams & Weiss, 2008). This example illustrates the concept of nuisance attacks, 
where the perpetrator was only doing enough, hoping to be rehired. The Stuxnet worm is a possible 
example of an attack by a nation, as it is rumoured that it was developed specifically to damage the 
Iranian nuclear facility in order to hinder its completion (Fisher & Roberts, 2011). 
From the interdependencies discussed in Section 2.6.2 and the concept of infrastructure noise, it is 
possible to model a number of critical infrastructures as an information or communications network. 
Electrical power is distributed via an electrical waveform with a voltage and current; it is 
susceptible to disturbances which create spikes or dips in the voltage. This is equivalent to the noise 
that a communications signal experiences. The electrical power signals are converted to the voltages 
that are supplied to the end-users; this is analogous to the antenna processing in a wireless 
communications system. The physical distribution infrastructure may similarly be modelled on a 
digital communications system; the vehicles can be seen as bits or packets, bridges are gateways, 





and gather information through the use of their memory, mind, and senses, primarily use the 
physical distribution infrastructure to travel; therefore it can be seen as a system for transporting 
information (van Niekerk & Maharaj, 2011c). 
Physical attacks on these infrastructures can be modelled as IW attacks; destroying or severely 
damaging a bridge will deny its availability. This will have implications for the entire infrastructure 
as traffic increases over other bridges in the area, degrading their performance. Intentionally 
introducing high voltage spikes into the power grid may damage infrastructure components, 
denying their availability and impacting on the integrity of the infrastructure; end-user equipment 
may also be damaged or destroyed (van Niekerk & Maharaj, 2011c). As mentioned above, an 
Iranian nuclear facility was reported to have sustained damage due to an infection by the Stuxnet 
worm (Fisher & Roberts, 2011). 
2.7 Risk and Vulnerability Management 
In order to defend against IW attacks, one needs to know where potential vulnerabilities are in order 
to better protect them (Hefer & Theron, 2009). The vulnerabilities are identified and documented 
through a process known as a vulnerability assessment (Whitman & Mattord, 2010). Whilst the 
dissertation is to focus on the vulnerability of infrastructures, risk and threats also need to be taken 
into account, as they are all related, as shown in Figure 2.22. The figure illustrates the "Information 
Security Lifecycle," which illustrates that other analyses need to be conducted to determine risk, 
threats and possible impacts. 
Vulnerabilities can be defined as weaknesses or faults in a system, design, procedure, 
implementation or security mechanism that exposes information or the supporting systems to an 
attack (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2003; Whitman & Mattord, 2010). A threat is an entity, set of 
circumstances or occurrence that has the potential to cause harm, loss or otherwise breach security 
(Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2003; Whitman & Mattord, 2010). Mechanisms used to address 
vulnerabilities are known as controls or countermeasures. A consequence, or impact, is the effect of 
an incident, and it reflects the level, duration and nature of the loss resulting from the incident 














Figure 2.22: The Information Security Lifecycle, adapted from Peltier, Peltier and Blackley (2005) 
 
Pfleeger and Pfleeger (2003) define risk as the possibility for harm to occur; however there are a 
number of variations of this, which will be discussed later. It is virtually impossible to prevent all 
risk or vulnerabilities; a defender will have to successfully protect all possible vulnerabilities, 
whereas an attacker only needs to expose and exploit a single vulnerability. In addition, protecting 
all systems from all risks may become prohibitively expensive; therefore there is a certain amount 
(or nature) of risk that an organisation is willing to accept, known as risk tolerance (Whitman & 
Mattord, 2010). Usually after a risk assessment has been conducted only the risks and associated 
vulnerabilities that do not fall into the acceptable range have controls applied. For those risks that 
are mitigated via controls, the remaining risk to the asset after the control has been applied is known 
as residual risk (ibid.). 
As mentioned above, there are variations on the definition of risk. One of the more common 
calculations to determine risk is that it is the product of the probability of an incident occurring (i.e. 
the probability of a threat exploiting a vulnerability) and the magnitude of the impact or loss 
(Boehm, 1991), as illustrated in Equation 2.16.  
 2.16 
 
As an example, if there is a 50% chance that a computer will be infected by a virus (Pvirus = 0.5) in a 





risk can be calculated as R1000. The total cost of the infection may include the salary of the 
employees who are idle waiting for the virus to be removed, the loss due to the delay of a project, 
and the cost of the virus removal itself. The impact or loss may be measured as an actual monetary 
value, if it is available; however in some instances it may not be possible to assign or predict the 
actual monetary loss. 
The Pincident term in Equation 2.17 may be expanded to include the contributions of the threats, 
vulnerabilities, and controls, as illustrated by Equation 2.17 (Wik, 2002): 
 2.17 
Risk may also be determined by using a Risk Matrix (Habegger, 2008), shown in Table 2.11. Risk 
again is determined by the probability and potential impact, however ranked values are used; this 
method may be useful when it is impossible to accurately determine a figure for the probability or 
potential loss. 
Table 2.11: Risk Rating Matrix 
Impact 
Probability 
Low Medium High 
Low 1 2 3 
Medium 4 5 6 
High 7 8 9 
A variation on this is used by Anderson et al. (1999), shown in Table 2.12.  
Table 2.12: Vulnerability Distinctions (Anderson, 1999) 
 Damage Potential 
 Limited Serious 











There are two approaches to assessing the vulnerabilities; the first is as part of the risk assessment 
as described above. The second approach regards vulnerability as a combination of risk analysis and 
emergency management evaluation, where the vulnerability is the collective results of risks and the 
ability of an organisation, nation, society, or local municipal authority to cope with and survive 





2.7.1 Vulnerability and Risk Assessment Techniques 
There are a number of techniques and methodologies to conduct risk and vulnerability assessment. 
This section provides a summary of the techniques that are relevant to this dissertation; the majority 
of techniques are taken from Habegger (2008), who provides a more extensive list. These 
techniques will be used when developing and proposing the new framework in Chapter 5, and 
implementing the framework in Chapter 8. Aspects of this section were previously published in van 
Niekerk and Maharaj (2011a). 
2.7.1.1 Risk Matrices   
The risk rating matrix is shown in Table 2.11 above. A slight variation of this is the risk level 
matrix, illustrated in Table 2.13. An example of a qualitative risk matrix is shown in Table 2.14. 
Table 2.13: Risk Level Matrix, Adapted from (Wenger, Metzger, & Dunn, 2002) 
Impact 
Probability 






















Key: High >50-100 Medium >10-50 Low >1-10 
 
Table 2.14: Qualitative Risk Matrix 
Impact 
Probability 
Very Low Low Medium High Very High 
Very High Medium High High Very High Very High 
High Low Medium High High Very High 
Medium Low Low Medium High High 
Low Very Low Low Low Medium High 
Very Low Very Low Very Low Low Low Medium 
 
2.7.1.2 Delphi Technique 
The Delphi Technique is an information-gathering technique which is used to reach a consensus of 





having a strong influence on the outcome, as the subject experts participate anonymously. Thoughts 
on the subject in question are solicited by means of a questionnaire. The responses of the 
participants are summarized and then re-circulated or further comment in order to achieve 
consensus, which may be reached in several rounds (Habegger, 2008). The follow-up interviews 
may also be used to gain deeper insight into previous responses. Expert assessment and interviews 
may be used to assess critical infrastructure (Wenger, Metzger, & Dunn, 2002); this technique may 
be employed in this role. The interviews may also be conducted via electronic means, such as email 
and instant messengers; this is known as the E-Delphi technique (Lindqvist & Nordanger, 2007). 
2.7.1.3 Focus Groups 
Focus groups can be considered as a group interview, consisting of an open-ended, structured 
discussion with a representative group. Focus groups explicitly use group interaction as part of the 
technique; people are encouraged to talk to one another and may ask questions, exchange anecdotes, 
and comment on each participant's experiences and points of view. One or more interviews with 
small groups of participants are conducted (Habegger, 2008). This is another technique that may be 
used to gain expert assessment of critical infrastructures. 
2.7.1.4 Simulation 
Simulation use models that translate uncertainties that are specified at a detailed level into their 
potential impact on processes or systems; usually computer models and estimates of risk are used to 
conduct the simulation (Habegger, 2008). 
2.7.1.5 Monte-Carlo Simulation 
Monte-Carlo simulations are a type of “what-if” simulation that measures the effects of uncertainty 
on a process or system through the use of random numbers. Traditional “what-if” simulations reveal 
what is possible, whereas a Monte-Carlo simulation reveals what is probable (Habegger, 2008). 
2.7.1.6 Trend Analysis 
Trend analysis is an analytical technique that attempts to forecast future outcomes based on 
historical results. It is a method for predicting the variance from a baseline parameter by using 
collected data from earlier periods, and projects how much a parameter might diverge from the 
baseline at some future point assuming no changes are made and the underlying patterns from the 






PESTEL is an analytical tool used to systematically analyse an organisation's environment and to 
structure identified factors for specified categories. The PESTEL framework uses six different 
categories of factors that may affect the organisation under consideration: Political, Economic, 
Societal, Technological, Environmental/Ecological, and Legal factors (Habegger, 2008). 
2.7.1.8 Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) Analysis 
A SWOT assessment structures information and generates strategic planning alternatives by 
analysing both internal and external factors that influence an organisation. The organisation's 
strengths and weaknesses form the internal factors, while opportunities and threats constitute the 
external factors (Habegger, 2008). 
2.7.1.9 The Threats-Vulnerabilities-Assets Worksheet 
A Threats-Vulnerabilities-Assets (TVA) worksheet is used at the beginning of a risk assessment 
process in order to identify and list the vulnerabilities that associate specific threats with assets 
(Whitman & Mattord, 2010). A threat may have multiple associated vulnerabilities for an asset. 
While this worksheet considers assets, it could be easily adapted to consider an infrastructure, and is 
a useful tool to present the vulnerabilities and their associated threats. 
2.7.1.10 Graph Theory Analysis 
Graph theory may be used to analyse networks and infrastructures; it is useful in identifying critical 
nodes, and possible singularities of choke points; destruction of these nodes may result in 
segmentation or failure of a network or infrastructure. Lewis (2004) discusses the model-based 
vulnerability analysis (MBVA), where an infrastructure is represented as a graph; once the critical 
nodes are identified they are analysed using fault-tree and event-tree analysis. The critical nodes are 
identified by performing a scale-free network test. A network is scale-free if the node distribution 
for each degree of node (a node degree is the number of edges that connect to it) is approximated by 
degree 
-p
, where p > 1. For scale-free networks the critical nodes are the one of the highest degree; if 
the network is not scale-free then it may be a small world network, where there are critical clusters 
or neighbourhoods of nodes of high degree (Lewis, 2004).  
Shake, Hazzard, and Marquis (1999) model links in fibre-optic network as an electronic resistive 
circuit, where each edge has a vulnerability value. The overall vulnerability value between two 
nodes may then be calculated as one would calculate the value of the equivalent resistance; the 





of links in parallel is the product of the individual values divided by the sum of the individual 
values (Shake, Hazzard, & Marquis, 1999). 
2.7.2 Frameworks and Processes 
This section provides an overview of selected frameworks that have been proposed to analyse 
vulnerabilities and risk. These frameworks are relevant to the development of the new vulnerability 
assessment framework, proposed in Chapter 4. Aspects of this section were previously published in 
van Niekerk and Maharaj (2011a). 
2.7.2.1 Minimum Essential Information Infrastructure (MEII) Process 
The Minimum Essential Information Infrastructure (MEII) process was proposed by Anderson et al. 
(1999). The concept is based upon the Minimum Essential Emergency Communication Network 
established to ensure emergency messages could be received by nuclear forces in the United States 
during the Cold War. The MEII, however, was proposed as an answer to the threat of a cyber-based 
attack on the information infrastructure of the United States. Due to a number of concerns, it was 
deemed impractical to develop a static or fixed portion of the infrastructure that was hardened or 
protected against all forms of attack, especially due to the speed with which computer, networking, 
and communication technology was advancing. The MEII was therefore developed as a process, 
which can be applied to portions or local elements within a larger infrastructure (Anderson, et al., 
1999).  
The MEII process is as follows: 
1. Identify the critical information functions which are essential for the unit or infrastructure 
element to successfully complete its objectives or mission. 
2. Determine the information systems that are essential to accomplish the information 
functions. 
3. Identify vulnerabilities for each information system. The system vulnerabilities that the 
MEII process identifies are categorised in Table 2.15. 
4. Identify techniques that can be used to mitigate each of the identified vulnerabilities. Table 
2.16 shows a list of security techniques and their impact on each of the vulnerabilities. 
5. Implement the security techniques. 






Table 2.15: System Vulnerabilities, adapted from Anderson et al. (1999) 
Vulnerability A system or process: 
Inherent Design/Architecture 
Uniqueness That is unique and may be less likely to have been thoroughly tested and 
perfected. 
Singularity Representing a single point of failure, or even acting as a “lightning rod” for 
attacks. 
Centralisation In which all decisions, data, and control must pass through a central node or 
process. 
Separability That is easily isolated from the rest of the system. 
Homogeneity In which a flaw may be widely replicated in multiple identical instances. 
Behavioural Complexity 
Sensitivity That is especially sensitive to variations in user input or abnormal use-an 
attribute that can be exploited. 
Predictability Having external behaviour that is predictable; attackers can know the results 
their actions will have. 
Adaptability and Manipulation 
Rigidity That cannot be easily changed in response to an attack, or made to adapt 
automatically under attack. 
Malleability That is easily modifiable. 
Gullibility That is easy to fool. 
Operation/Configuration 
Capacity limits Near capacity limits that may be vulnerable to DoS attacks. 
Lack of recoverability Requiring inordinate time or effort to recover operation relative to 
requirements. 
Lack of self-awareness That is unable to monitor its‟ own use. 
Difficulty of management That is difficult to maintain, so known flaws may not be found or fixed. 
Complacency and co-optability With poor administrative procedures, insufficient screening of operators, etc. 
Indirect/Non-physical Exposure 
Electronic accessibility For which remote access provides an attack opening. 
Transparency That allows the attacker to gain information about it. 
Direct/Physical Exposure 
Physical accessibility In which attackers can get close enough to a system to do physical damage. 
Electromagnetic susceptibility In which attackers can get close enough to use radiated energy to disable a 
system. 
Supporting Facilities/Infrastructures 







Table 2.16: The Impact of Security Controls on Vulnerabilities, adapted from Anderson et al. (1999) 
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 May incur vulnerability indirectly 
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The vulnerabilities identified, shown in Table 2.15, are sub-divided into categories: the design and 
architecture of the infrastructure, the behavioural complexity, the adaptability and ability to 
manipulate the infrastructure, the operation and configuration of the infrastructure, indirect and 
direct exposure, and the dependency on other infrastructures.  
The MEII framework provides generic vulnerabilities that may be applied to most infrastructures; 
however, due to the rapid evolution of information systems, this framework can be considered a bit 
dated. While the majority of vulnerabilities listed are still applicable, there are some additional 
aspects and alterations to those listed due to the evolving technology. The convergence of 
communications technologies, such as mobile phones, online applications (particularly social 
networks) and processing power may introduce new vulnerabilities or impact on those that are 
already identified in the framework. Due to the rise of mobility and wireless technologies, there will 
now be an overlap between the electronic accessibility listed under indirect exposure and 
electromagnetic accessibility listed under direct exposure. 
The MEII framework provides a guide to categories where vulnerabilities may exist. Some may 
constitute an entire vulnerability; such as operating close to the capacity limit. Others, such as 
electronic accessibility, may encompass a range of technical vulnerabilities that reside in the 
applications or protocols that are used to facilitate the electronic access. The framework also 
provides suggestions for mitigating the vulnerabilities. However, there is less focus on the specific 
nature of the threats, and again there is not a single rating for the overall vulnerability of an 
infrastructure. The centralisation vulnerability can be illustrated through the wide-spread 
international outages of BlackBerry services due to the failure of centralised components (Press 
Association, 2011). 
2.7.2.2 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Framework 
The NIST framework is comprehensive, and is the standard for the United States Federal 
Government (Elky, 2006). The framework may also be incorporated into the system design 
lifecycle (Stoneburner, Goguen, & Feringa, 2002). 
This framework consists of nine steps (Stoneburner, Goguen, & Feringa, 2002): 
1. Characterise the system 
2. Identify threats 
3. Identify vulnerabilities 





5. Likelihood determination 
6. Analyse impacts (loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability) 
7. Determine risk 
8. Recommend controls 
9. Document results 
As mentioned, the NIST framework is a comprehensive process and details various sources that 
may be used to identify potential threats and vulnerabilities, such as attack history, intelligence 
reports, vendor notifications and the mass media (Stoneburner, Goguen, & Feringa, 2002). Other 
than using sources for vulnerability identification, the only other method suggested is the use of 
automated network analysis tools, and does not provide much detail on other forms of information 
infrastructures. 
2.7.2.3 Facilitated Risk Analysis and Assessment Process (FRAAP) 
This is a framework developed by Peltier (2005). It is primarily a quantitative assessment, however 
it does not aim to precisely quantify the risks as the documentation and consumption of time to do 
so is seen as too large, and exact estimates of the potential impacts are not required to determine if a 
control is required (Peltier, 2005). During the process brainstorming and open sources are used to 
identify the threats and their potential impacts to broadly categorise the risks, and possible controls 
that could be implemented (ibid.). The brainstorming focuses on the threats to the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of information resources, and considers each process, system or operations 
individually. These assessments make use of risk matrices and worksheets (ibid.). There is also a 
pre-FRAAP phase, where a pre-screening is done to identify systems and processes that are 
required to undergo the risk assessment. The post-FRAAP phase involves the reporting and 
documenting the outcomes of the process, specifically the identified threats, associated risk levels, 
controls and responsible parties (ibid.). 
The FRAAP framework has a variation which allows for assessing infrastructure risk, and a 
separate variation allows for the assessment of vulnerabilities (Peltier, 2005). The infrastructure 
variation focuses on threats and impacts to the infrastructure; and the vulnerability variation does 







2.7.2.4 Factor Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR) 
Jones (2005) developed this framework, which combines multiple factors to calculate risk. The 
FAIR framework utilises the risk matrix to determine the value of each level as shown in Table 
2.17. Each variable is represented by a five-point scale, generally ranging from very high to very 
low. The framework provides definitions for the terms illustrated in the table; some may differ 
slightly from those discussed previously. The definitions provided by Jones (2005) are: 
 Risk – the probable frequency and probable magnitude of future loss; 
 Loss event frequency – the probable frequency that a threat will cause harm to an asset in a 
given timeframe; 
 Threat event frequency – the probable frequency that a threat will act against an asset in a 
given timeframe; 
 Vulnerability – the probability that an asset will succumb to a threat action that has been 
made; 
 Contact frequency – the probable frequency that a threat will come into contact with an 
asset in a given timeframe; 
 Action frequency – the probability that a threat will act against an asset should contact 
occur; 
 Control strength – the ability of a control to prevent or deter a threat action; 
 Threat capability – the probable level of force that a threat is able to apply against an asset; 
 Probable loss magnitude – this is the estimated loss resulting from a threat action against an 
asset; 
 Primary loss factors – this is the probable loss as a direct result of a threat action, and is 
comprised of threat loss factors and asset loss factors; 
 Threat loss factors – considers the location of the threat (an internal or external threat) and 
the type of action that may be performed, such as misuse, modification or denial; 
 Asset loss factors – this is comprised of volume (the more assets at risk, the higher the loss 
magnitude) and the value and liability for each asset, such as the sensitivity of the 
information, legal or regulatory implications, loss of image and competitive advantage, and 
the cost of the asset itself.  
 Secondary loss factors – these are losses that occur indirectly from an incident, and are 





 Organisational loss factors – these factors are internal losses such as liability with regards to 
due diligence, and the response to the incident (including remediation, containment and 
recovery); 
 External loss factors – these are indirect losses due to influence by the media, stakeholders, 
competitors and legal ramifications. 
The threat event frequency is determined by applying the risk matrix to the contact frequency and 
action frequency; the vulnerability is determined by the control strength and the threat capability. 
The loss event frequency can then be determined by applying the results of the vulnerability and 
threat event frequency to a threat matrix. The probable loss magnitude and risk are determined 
similarly. This framework has a detailed depth to determining risk and a consistent way of 
estimating loss, threats and vulnerability. This allows simple adaptation of variables to the specific 
case of IW threats for specific assets. It does not however provide an overall vulnerability or risk 
figure for an entire infrastructure. 
Table 2.17: FAIR Constituents, adapted from Jones (2005) 
Risk 
Loss Event Frequency X Probable Loss Magnitude 
Threat Event Frequency X Vulnerability 
 
Primary Loss Factors X Secondary Loss Factors 
 Contact frequency 
 Action frequency 
 
 Control strength 
 Threat capability 
 
 Asset loss factors 
 Threat loss factors 
 
 Organisational loss 
factors 
 External loss 
factors 
 
2.7.2.5 Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) 
The OCTAVE framework was developed at Carnegie Mellon University, and uses a workshop-
based approach for the analysis. The framework‟s structure is outlined as (Software Engineering 
Institute, 2003): 
 Planning 
 Phase 1: Organisational view 
o Assets 
o Threats 
o Current practices 





o Security requirements 
 Phase 2: Technological view 
o Technological vulnerabilities 
 Phase 3: Strategy and plan development 
o Risks 
o Protection strategy 
o Mitigation plans 
During implementation, the framework consists of eight processes, as outlined below (Software 
Engineering Institute, 2003): 
 Phase 1: Organisational view 
o Process 1: Identify senior management knowledge 
o Process 2: Identify operational area management knowledge 
o Process 3: Identify staff knowledge 
o Process 4: Create threat profiles 
 Phase 2: Technological view 
o Process 5: Indentify key components 
o Process 6: Evaluate selected components 
 Phase 3: Strategy and plan development 
o Process 7: Conduct risk analysis 
o Process 8: Develop protection strategy 
 Workshop A: Protection strategy development 
 Workshop B: Protection strategy selection 
The OCTAVE framework is primarily an organisational information security risk assessment; 
however some information infrastructure assessments are conducted under the second phase and 
when creating threat profiles. However, like the NIST framework, this seems limited to using 
automated tools to assess computer networks, and does not cater for larger information 
infrastructures. 
2.7.2.6 Tool-driven Assessments 
Risk Watch is a tool that uses a database of expert knowledge to guide the user through the risk 
assessment and report on compliance and provide advice on managing risks (Elky, 2006). The 





Objective and Bi-Functional Risk Analysis process focuses on a business approach to risk 
assessments, and also utilises knowledge bases and templates to aid the user (ibid.). 
2.7.2.7 Summary of Frameworks 
Of the frameworks discussed, the most suitable for consideration for adapting to a scalable 
framework for infrastructure vulnerability and risk assessments with regards to IW threats are the 
MEII and FAIR frameworks due to their structure and scope. The MEII framework is especially 
suitable as it was designed as a vulnerability assessment for infrastructure elements; due to the 
rapidly evolving landscape of information systems the framework may be considered as being 
dated, however the generic vulnerabilities maintain its applicability. The OCTAVE and NIST 
frameworks may be useful for guiding high-level processes of the risk and vulnerability assessment. 
Tool driven assessments may in some cases be suitable for performing specific analysis of software 
components or existing organisational procedures. None of the frameworks appear to provide a 
single measure of the vulnerability of an entire infrastructure; but rather focus on individual 
elements or assets. 
2.7.3 Relating Risk and Vulnerabilities to Critical Infrastructure Protection and 
Information Warfare 
The definitions presented in Section 2.7 hold true for critical infrastructure protection and IW, 
however the calculations may have subtle differences and subcategories when dealing with CIP and 
IW. Consequences usually are divided into four categories: public health and safety; direct and 
indirect economic impact; psychological; and governance or mission impacts (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2009). When calculating the risk of an intentional hazard, vulnerability is 
measured as the likelihood that an attack is successful, given that it is attempted; the threat for an 
intentional hazard is the likelihood that an attack will be attempted by an adversary (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2009). An example is given for the case of a terrorist attack, where the threat is 
estimated based on the capabilities and intent of the terrorists (Department of Homeland Security, 
2009), a similar estimation may be used for IW. Figure 2.23 shows the process suggested by the 
Department of Homeland Security (2009) for critical infrastructure protection; it can be seen that 






Figure 2.23: Continuous Process for Critical Infrastructure Protection, adapted from Department of Homeland 
Security (2009). 
To calculate the risk of an IW attack, it may be necessary to determine the economic consequences 
of the attack. Erbschloe (2001) provides a guide to the impacts over time for a single organisation, 
an industry sector, and a country or region for a cyber-attack. These impacts are summarised in 
Table 2.18. An attack on a specific information infrastructure is equivalent to an attack on an 
industry sector. It is conceivable that the impacts listed in Table 2.18 could have secondary effects, 
such as an increase in unemployment due to a decrease in the economic stability following the 
attack. 
Table 2.18: Economic Impacts Over Time for a Cyber-Attack, adapted from Erbschloe (2001) 
Target Immediate Impact Short-Term Impact Long-Term Impact 
Organisation Damage to systems that 
require human intervention to 
repair or replace 
Business operations disrupted 
Cash flow and transactions 
delayed 
Loss of contractual 




Development of new business 
hindered 
Market valuation declines 
Investor confidence eroded 
Stock price declines 
Industry Sector Supply chain systems 
damaged, requiring human 
intervention to repair or 
replace 
Sector production disrupted 
Cash flow and transactions 
delayed 
Disruption of productivity in 
organisations that consume 
sector products 
Reputation of the sector 
negatively impacted 
Development of new business 
hindered 
Investor confidence eroded 
Stock prices declines across 
the sector 
Market valuation declines 
across the sector 
Country National banking or 
commerce disrupted 
National industrial production 
disrupted 
Delay of military activity 
International trade disrupted 
Reputation of the country‟s 
economy negatively impacted 
Military activity continually 
hindered 
Investor confidence eroded 
Stock prices of companies 
within the country decline 
Market valuation of 
companies within the country 
decline 
Vulnerability and risk assessments are generally considered as defensive measures as their objective 
is to identify potential problem areas and then mitigate the chance of an incident occurring; 
however, with sufficient information, it may be possible for an attacker to conduct vulnerability and 





tools can therefore aid decision making in applying offensive resources to increase the effectiveness 
or likelihood of success of the attack. 
2.8 Modern Information and Communications Technology 
This section presents a background to modern information and communication technology. Section 
2.8.1 describes the universal serial bus (USB). Wireless networking is described in Section 2.8.2, 
and Web 2.0 technologies are covered in Section 2.8.3. As the focus of the dissertation is on the 
mobile phone infrastructure, Section 2.8.4 will provide a description of this infrastructure in some 
details. Section 2.8.5 will describe cloud computing. 
2.8.1 Universal Serial Bus 
USB provides for high data transfer rates to and from devices; USB 2.0 allows for transfer rates up 
to 480Mb/s (60MB/s) (Compaq, et al., 2000), and USB 3.0 allows for a theoretical data transfer of 
up to 5Gb/s (Perenson, 2010). This, and other technological advancements, has resulted in the 
introduction of mass storage devices that are physically smaller than the old 3.5” magnetic discs or 
a CD, yet can hold significantly more data. The most common flash drives can hold 2GB up to 
32GB of data. USB is also used to connect external hard-drives, which can contain terabytes of 
data. This is a risk as large amounts of information could be compromised by copying should an 
attacker gain physical access. Also the autorun capabilities of these devices makes then ideal for a 
vector to spread malware; the Win32/Autorun worm was one of the most common malware types in 
2010 (Microsoft Corporation, 2011a).  
2.8.2 Wireless Networking 
Wireless networking for local area networks (WLAN) is governed by the Institute for Electrical and 
Electronic Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 standards, which define the media access control (MAC) and 
physical layers. The variations of the standards may have different levels of security and data 
transfer rates; the IEEE 802.11b variant had transfer rates of 11 Mbps, whereas the IEEE 802.11g 
version has a theoretical transfer rate of 54 Mbps (Smyth, McLoone, & McCanny, 2006). WLAN 
usually operates on a frequency range of 2.4GHz to 2.48GHz (Nichols & Lekkas, 2002). A security 
issue with wireless is that it is very difficult to constrain wireless signals, making it possible to 
physically connect to the network without physically being on an organisation's property. It is also 
easier to disrupt (i.e. jam) or eavesdrop on wireless connections than it would be on a physical line. 





it may become prohibitively expensive for large buildings. There are various security mechanisms 
such as wired equivalent privacy (WEP), Wi-Fi protected access (WPA), and restricting MAC 
addresses that may connect to the access point; however a determined and sophisticated attacker 
may still be able to circumvent these (Whitman & Mattord, 2010).  
Bluetooth is designed as a personal wireless network, primarily to connect two devices or a device 
to a peripheral; such as a mobile phone to a head-set. Bluetooth specifications are governed by the 
IEEE 802.15 working group and the Bluetooth special interest group (Dwivedi, Clark, & Thiel, 
2010). Bluetooth also operates at a frequency of 2.4GHz (Nichols & Lekkas, 2002), and has three 
power classes: power class 1 is used for access devices, and has a maximum output power of 
100mW; peripheral devices such as keyboards fall under power class 2, with a maximum of 2.5mW 
output power; power class 3 has a maximum output power of 1mW, and is used for devices such as 
headsets (Dwivedi, Clark, & Thiel, 2010). Early versions of Bluetooth had transmission rates of up 
to 400Kbps (Nichols & Lekkas, 2002), however more modern Bluetooth versions can achieve up to 
1Mbps (Dwivedi, Clark, & Thiel, 2010). Bluetooth access points and devices can form ad-hoc 
networks. Piconets are where two or more devices organise themselves dynamically; a scatternet is 
where two or more piconets where a device acts as a slave in one piconet, and a master in a second 
piconet (ibid.). 
Both WLAN and Bluetooth can be jammed and intercepted due to the fact that they are based on 
radio waves; therefore the electronic warfare jamming and detection discussed in Section 2.5 are 
applicable. In addition to traditional jamming which targets the physical layer, there are 
vulnerabilities in the media access control (MAC) layer which allows attackers to manipulate the 
management and control frames (Motorola, 2010). Like wired networks, the wireless networks are 
also susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks. Wardriving is the process of driving through an area 
with a laptop of other device that scans for open wireless access points, or ones which have not 
been sufficiently secured (Whitman & Mattord, 2010). Warwalking is a similar concept, where the 
travelling is done on foot; warchalking is where those scanning for wireless networks leave marks 
indicating the location of the open or unsecured wireless access point (ibid.). Attacks on Bluetooth 
include Bluejacking, where an attacker exploits Bluetooth pairing to send illegitimate messages or 
access data on the targeted device; BlueChop, which is a DoS attack on Bluetooth Piconets; and 
BlueDump, which is used to sniff key exchanges between devices by spoofing the address of one of 





2.8.3 Web 2.0 
In this section the background to the modern phenomenon of Web 2.0 and online „social 
networking‟ will be provided. An earlier version of this section was published in Pillay, van 
Niekerk, and Maharaj (2010), and the content presented here was originally generated by the 
candidate. 
The term web 2.0 covers a number of technologies, including online social networking, wikis, and 
blogs (O'Reilly, 2005). Web 2.0 is currently classified as the new media; where the new media can 
be defined as the incorporation of new information and communications technologies into the 
traditional media (Williams, Rice, & Rogers, 1988). Web 2.0 differs from the traditional web and 
media in that it focuses on user-generated content, collaboration, and the collective intelligence 
principle (O'Reilly, 2005). As such, it can be seen as a many-to-many communications, whereas 
web 1.0 is still considered as a one-to-many communications; these concepts are shown in Figure 
2.24. 
One – to – one 
 
Telephone, fax, postal 
services 
One – to – many 
 
Email, television, radio, 
SMS 
Many – to – many 
 
Web 2.0: blogs, social 
networks, discussion 
forums 
Figure 2.24: Modes of communication, Pillay, van Niekerk and Maharaj (2010) 
 
Web 1.0 was different from the traditional media in that it provided content on demand; in the 
traditional media the audience were restricted to the broadcast times of what they wanted to view, 
whereas on the Internet the audience could go online and access the desired content when it suited 
them. A level of interaction was provided where the audience could provide feedback to the 





with a space to comment on stories or items. Web 2.0 came to full strength when the users 
generated their own content, and comment on the content that others have shared online. As many 
mobile devices now have integrated social networking capabilities, users can access and share 
content on the move. 
More technical vulnerabilities and threats are exhibited by Web 2.0 technologies compared to the 
traditional Web 1.0 sites due to the scripting requirements that provide the user with the ability to 
upload content (Lawton, 2007). Common threats in Web 2.0 are cross-site scripting, cross-site 
request forgery, and mobile worms (ibid.). YouTube was affected by a cross-site scripting attack 
that appeared to have targeted the singer Justin Bieber (Barnett, 2010), as was Twitter, where 
attackers used a cross-site scripting flaw to open unauthorised marketing pop-ups when the user's 
mouse cursor moved over a link (Twitter, 2010).  Many Web 2.0 sites use applications that allow 
video and audio playing; these applications may also have vulnerabilities which can be exploited 
(Lawton, 2007). Davidson and Yoran (2007) suggest that users are coming to expect the same 
interactivity and collaborative ability in the workplace as Web 2.0 provides; however, Naraine 
(2009) states that users do not have the same restraint with personal information on Web 2.0 as they 
would when disclosing the information in person. These factors may result in Web 2.0 posing a risk 
regarding information leaks. The security implications of Web 2.0 will be discussed in more detail 
in Section 5.6. 
2.8.4 Mobile Phone Infrastructure 
This section will provide the background to the mobile phone infrastructure. Mobile phones have 
advanced from purely voice communications and short message services (SMS); they have the 
ability to transfer data and multimedia, and have additional connectivity options, such as USB, 
Bluetooth and WLAN. Section 2.8.4.1 describes the physical architecture of the mobile networks, 
Section 2.8.4.2 describes the wireless links, and Section 2.8.4.3 discusses the prevalence of mobile 
phones, with a focus on South Africa. The security concerns and IW aspects related to mobile 
communications will be introduced in Section 2.8.4.4, and discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
2.8.4.1 Physical Infrastructure 
The following description of the physical mobile phone infrastructure is an amalgamation from 






The devices themselves form mobile stations (MS), and they communicate to the base station (BS), 
or mobile phone tower, wirelessly. In South Africa this wireless link follows the Global System for 
Mobile Communications (GSM) standard and the Third Generation (3G) Wideband Code Division 
Multiple Access (WCDMA) standard, the other major 3G standard is known as CDMA2000 
(Global Mobile Suppliers Association, 2010). The link from the mobile device to the base stations 
is known as the uplink, whereas the link from the base station to the device is known as the 
downlink. The reason the term cellular phone is commonly used is that the coverage area is divided 
into cells, each of which covered by a base station transceiver (BST). The mobile devices are free to 
roam within a cell, or into a different cell, at which time it will be handed over to the relevant base 
station. 
The base station systems (BS) comprise of the BST, and the base station controller (BSC); multiple 
BSTs may connect to a single BSC (Ojanpera & Prasad, 1998; Xenakis & Merakos, 2006). The 
base stations connect to the mobile switching centre (MSC) via fibre-optic cable or wireless 
microwave data links between the BSC and MSC; the MSC connects the mobile phone 
infrastructure to the public switched telephone network (PSTN), which allows calls between the 
mobile devices and the fixed-line infrastructure (Enck, Traynor, McDaniel, & La Porta, 2005). The 
MSC is responsible for any circuit-switched services, such as voice calls, and connects to the core 
network and also provides a gateway to other network providers (Enck, Traynor, McDaniel, & La 
Porta, 2005; Xenakis & Merakos, 2006). The home location register (HLR) manages permanent 
information regarding the mobile users, including billing information (Enck, Traynor, McDaniel, & 
La Porta, 2005); the visitor location register (VLR) contains information related to the handling of 
the mobile station services (Xenakis & Merakos, 2006). The equipment identity register (EIR) 
contains information regarding the identity of the mobile equipment, and the authentication centre 
(AuC) contains security information for the subscribers‟ identity (ibid.). 
There is little difference between the GSM and 3G network architectures as described by Ojanpera 
and Prasad (1998). The following descriptions cover the additional services such as short messages 
and data transfer for the GSM infrastructure. Short messages are routed via the short messaging 
service centre (SMSC); these may connect to external short message entities (ESME) which allow 
SMSs to be received from external locations, such as the web-based SMS services (Enck, Traynor, 
McDaniel, & La Porta, 2005). In simulations, Traynor et al. (2009) estimated that each HLR could 





Data transfer was initially done through the global packet radio services (GPRS), which utilises the 
majority of the GSM infrastructure (Xenakis & Merakos, 2006). A serving GPRS support node 
(SGSN) is responsible for delivering the packets to and from the mobile station; a gateway GPRS 
support node (GGSN) provides external connection to the Internet and other data packet networks 
(ibid.).  
The descriptions of the network architecture for the voice, SMS and GPRS services provide a 




























Figure 2.25: Mobile Phone Infrastructure 
 
2.8.4.2 Wireless Physical Layer 
The wireless physical layer in mobile phones provides the uplink from the device to the base 
station, and the downlink from the base station to the device. Two standards are used in South 
Africa: global system for mobile communications (GSM) and wideband code-division multiple-





wideband CMDA technology is W-CDMA), which is the deployed third generation (3G) standard 
in the country. The other major 3G standard is cdma2000. 
GSM is a second generation (2G) mobile communications standard. It has four major operating 
frequencies: 850MHz, 900 MHz, 1800 MHz, and 1900 MHz, and uses 200 kHz channel (Ojanpera 
& Prasad, 1998). Multiple users are accommodated through time-division multiple-access, where 
each user or channel is allocated time slot to broadcast in (ibid.). GSM has evolved with the 
introduction of data services through GPRS, and data rates were increased through and enhanced 
data rated for GSM evolution (EDGE). 
Both WCDMA and CDMA2000 uses DS-CDMA as discussed in Section 2.5.5, which is a form of 
LPI communications and has inherent noise-cancellation and anti-jam features. As WCDMA is the 
main standard used in South Africa, this will be focussed on. The spreading is performed with the 
aid of pseudo-noise sequences, which generate a series of chips. The digital signal is spread with the 
chips so that the signal is transmitted over a larger bandwidth than the original data signal would 
have required (Ojanpera & Prasad, 1998; Taub & Schilling, 1991). The correlation characteristics of 
the pseudo-noise sequences are also used to separate the users, as they have high auto-correlation 
and low cross-correlation. The same code is used for spreading and despreading; therefore any 
interference from other signals is cancelled due to the low-cross correlation (Ojanpera & Prasad, 
1998; Taub & Schilling, 1991), as illustrated in Section 2.5.5. WCDMA uses Gold codes for the 
spreading sequence, and has possible chip rates of 4.096 Mcps (mega chips per second), 8.192 
Mcps, and 16.384 Mcps for channel bandwidths of 5 MHz, 10 MHz, and 20 MHz, respectively 
(Ojanpera & Prasad, 1998). 
For the purpose of simulating a mobile communications environment where multiple users are 
present, the environment will need to be described mathematically. Multi-user DS-CDMA 
communications can be described in matrix form as (Proakis, 2001; Verdu, 1998): 
 2.18 
where y(i) is the ith bit or symbol for each user, S is the spreading sequence for each user, A is a 
diagonal matrix with the amplitude of each user's signal, b(i) is the ith bit for each user, and n(i) is 
the noise or interference experienced by the ith bit of each user. 







where r is the bit stream that is the output of the matched filters for each user, R is a correlation 
matrix of all the spreading sequences described by S, b is the bits, and n is the interference. The 
purpose of the correlation matrix is to take into account interference between the signals; while the 
spreading sequences have low cross-correlation, there is still some interference. The simulations 
will be presented in Chapter 7. 
The channels used for GSM and WCDMA are similar, and can be divided into two types: traffic 
channels and control channels (Enck, Traynor, McDaniel, & La Porta, 2005). The paging channel 
and random access channel are used to initiate voice and data services; devices are instructed by the 
base station to monitor a stand-alone dedicated control channel (SDCCH) which is used for 
authentication, enable encryption, and deliver SMS messages. Once the authentication is complete, 
a traffic channel is allocated for voice traffic. For the purposes of the dissertation, the SDCCH will 
be the primary channel considered in Chapter 7. 
2.8.4.3 Prevalence of Mobile Phones 
During the second quarter of 2010, it was reported that there were approximately 535 million 
WCDMA subscribers and approximately 4 billion GSM subscribers globally; this accounts for 
89.7% of the approximately 4.933 billion mobile subscription worldwide  (Global Mobile Suppliers 
Association, 2011a). In Africa there are approximately 350 million GSM subscribers and 20 million 
WCDMA subscribers (Global Mobile Suppliers Association, 2011b). 
According to the State of the Cities Report (South African Cities Network, 2011b) 16% of 
households have access to both mobile phones and fixed line telecommunications; 67% only have 
access to mobile phones, 1% only has access to fixed line telecommunications, and 16% has no 
access. These figures are for 2009, and indicate a total of 83% of households have access to mobile 
phone, compared to 17% with access to fixed line telecommunications. The International 
Telecommunications Union (2011) estimates that there are 92.67 mobile subscriptions per 100 
people in South Africa in 2009, compared to 8.62 fixed telephone lines per 100 inhabitants. This is 
a ratio of 10.75 mobile subscriptions per fixed line. There are an estimated 8.82 Internet users per 
100 inhabitants in South Africa, and approximately 0.97 fixed broadband subscribers per 100 
inhabitants, compared to 10.52 mobile broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants (International 
Telecommunications Union, 2011). This is a ratio of 10.85 mobile broadband subscriptions per 





communications in South African society. The number of fixed line telecommunications has 
exhibited an annual decease from 2004 to 2009, whereas the mobile subscriptions have continued to 
grow (ibid.). This indicates that mobile communications are becoming more prevalent, to the 
detriment of the fixed line communications. 
The prevalence of mobile phones may increase with the introduction of mobile commerce (m-
commerce); online banking services use SMS for providing one-time codes, and mobile money 
such as M-Pesa has had huge success in Kenya (Aker & Mbiti, 2010). In addition, many 
development projects in Africa revolve around the innovative use of mobile phones and mobile 
applications; these projects include the health, education, and governance sectors (Aker & Mbiti, 
2010).  This additional functionality increases the importance of mobile communications in South 
Africa and elsewhere on the continent; it is possibly the backbone of the continent's 
telecommunications infrastructure. 
2.8.4.4 The Mobile Infrastructure and Information Warfare and Security 
This section relates aspects of IW to the mobile infrastructure. A previous version was published in 
van Niekerk and Maharaj (2010b). As electronic warfare targets the electro-magnetic spectrum, all 
wireless channels (particularly the physical layer) can be considered as falling under the auspices of 
electronic warfare. The infrastructure hardware and logical connections fall under network warfare, 
and the entire infrastructure will fall under information infrastructure warfare. Figure 2.26 shows a 
simplified mobile infrastructure and the relationships to these IW functional areas. It is also 
conceivable that the legitimate functionality of the mobile services may be used for malicious 
intent; in Kenya SMS services were used to distribute hate messages (Okeowo, 2008). 
As with traditional computer-based systems and networks, mobile devices and infrastructures have 
security vulnerabilities and may be attacked. Modern mobile devices, in particular smartphones, are 
capable of being infected by malicious code or applications (Morales, 2009a); Fleizach et al. (2007) 
model the spreading of mobile worm infections using MMS and voice over IP. The simulations 
indicate that all mobile phones that could possibly be infected would be within a matter of minutes 
should there be no bandwidth constraints; taking bandwidth limitations into consideration the 
maximum number of infections could take up to 12 hours. This is attributed to the mobile 
infrastructure network reaching its processing capacity early in the malware propagation (Fleizach 
et al., 2007); this indicates that a DoS attack on the mobile infrastructure is possible. Enck et al. 





possibility of using SMS services to perform a DoS attack on the mobile infrastructure; this is 
expanded in Traynor et al. (2009), who illustrate a possible DoS attack on the core mobile 
infrastructure.  
The applications that run on mobile devices, as well as the communication capabilities may be 
attacked and the mobile device compromised (Dwivedi, Clark, & Thiel, 2010). It is also possible to 
eavesdrop on the wireless channels (Nohl & Paget, 2009), or attack the mobile infrastructure in 
order to eavesdrop, as occurred in Greece in 2004 (Prevelakis & Spinellis, 2007). The security and 
IW aspects of the mobile infrastructure will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, and the 
simulations and calculations will be expanded to the South African situation in Chapter 7. 
2.8.5 Cloud Computing 
A previous version of this section was published in van Niekerk and Maharaj (2011a). A 
hypothetical situation using cloud computing services is used to initially validate the proposed 
vulnerability assessment framework in Chapter 4. 
Cloud computing is "a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool 





























The computing resources have the capability to be "rapidly provisioned and released with minimal 
management effort or service provider interaction" (Information Systems Audit and Control 
Association, 2009). The resource usage should be automatically monitored and controlled, with the 
ability to be "elastically provisioned" so that the client may increase or decrease usage at any time; 
the cloud services should be accessible from any location on various platforms, including smart 
mobile devices (ibid.). 
The deployment models for cloud computing include public, private, community, and hybrid 
clouds. A public cloud is owned solely by the cloud service provider, and is made available to the 
general public or a large industry group. Multiple organisations with a shared interest may share 
cloud services thus forming a community cloud; it can reside on the premises of any of the 
organisations, or external to all of them. The management of the community cloud may be 
undertaken by one or more of the organisations or outsourced to a third party (Information Systems 
Audit and Control Association, 2009; Red Hat, 2010). A private cloud is operated for the sole 
purposes for a specific organisation; the management and hosting can be provided by the 
organisation itself, or a third party. A combination of two or more of the above cloud deployment 
models is known as a hybrid cloud. The two clouds remain separate entities but are bound together 
by a technology that is proprietary or standardised; this allows the porting of applications or data 
between the two clouds (Information Systems Audit and Control Association, 2009; Red Hat, 
2010). 
Cloud computing typically has three service models: software as a service (SaaS), infrastructure as 
a service (IaaS), and platform as a service (PaaS). SaaS is the ability to use and access the cloud 
service provider's applications through an interface such as a web browser; these applications reside 
on the cloud infrastructure (Information Systems Audit and Control Association, 2009; Red Hat, 
2010). Google Docs is an example of this. The client's control for SaaS is limited to user-specific 
application settings; the client does not have any control over storage, operating systems, or the 
underlying infrastructure (Red Hat, 2010). IaaS provides the client the ability to access and use 
computing resources, such as storage, processing, and networking, and allows the client to run 
operating systems and applications on the infrastructure. The IaaS model places the IT functions of 
an organisation into the hands of the service provider (Information Systems Audit and Control 
Association, 2009; Red Hat, 2010). Dropbox (http://www.dropbox.com) is an example of IaaS for 
storage. For the IaaS model, control over the operating system, applications, and storage is given to 





client the ability to deploy applications that have been either created or acquired by the client onto 
the cloud infrastructure through the use of tools and programming languages which are supported 
by the cloud service provider (Information Systems Audit and Control Association, 2009; Red Hat, 
2010). The PaaS model gives the client control over the applications and possibly some control over 
the hosting environment configuration; as with SaaS the client does not have control over the 
underlying cloud infrastructure, operating system, or storage (Red Hat, 2010). 
Amazon's Elastic Compute Cloud is one of the established cloud computing infrastructures; this is 
an example of the IaaS model, and provides scalable resources and load balancing. There are also 
PaaS and SaaS elements, where multiple operating systems and software applications for a web 
hosting, data basing, and development are available (Amazon, 2011). Microsoft's Windows Azure 
cloud is aimed at running and developing applications (Microsoft Corporation, 2011c); therefore 
this can be considered as following the PaaS model. IBM is another provider of cloud services 
(IBM, c. 2011), and in South Africa Teraco provides SaaS and IaaS cloud models (Teraco, 2011). 
As cloud computing is a new technology there is an element of risk involved when deploying these 
services as part of an IT strategy. Confidentiality of information is a concern as the information is 
processed or stored by applications and infrastructure which the client has very little control over; 
the cloud service provider therefore responsible for the security and privacy of the information 
(Information Systems Audit and Control Association, 2009). In many cases, data from multiple 
clients may be stored together; if this is not controlled properly, it may result in an accidental data 
breach. Responsibility for maintaining the integrity of stored data (so that it is not altered 
accidentally or by unauthorised entities) also falls to the cloud service provider. Should a breach of 
the confidentiality or integrity of the data occur, there may be uncertainty regarding legal liability 
(Information Systems Audit and Control Association, 2009); the owner of the information is the 
client, however the storage and processing was outsourced to a third party (the cloud service 
provider). While the cloud provider is responsible for service delivery, the connectivity between the 
client and the provider may prove to be a weak point as it may be the subject of DoS attacks and 
attempts to intercept the information, and availability will also be reliant on the client's Internet 
service provider and the correct functioning of network gateways (ibid.). For those reliant on the 
cloud services, an outage may have severe impacts, such as when Amazon experienced outages of 





2.9 Chapter Summary 
The chapter presented the background that is relevant to this study. Primarily, the models describing 
the IW constructs and taxonomies were discussed. Three areas of IW, namely network warfare, 
electronic warfare, and critical infrastructure protection, were described in more detail. The 
frameworks and methodologies for conducting risk and vulnerability assessments were described 
and discussed. The background to the information and communication technologies relevant to the 
study was presented; here the focus was on the mobile phone infrastructure as the primary case of 
the study considers that infrastructure. In some cases adaptations to models and frameworks were 














Chapter 3. Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research methodologies employed in conducting this study. The literature 
review is described and presented in Chapter 2. Multiple methodologies were employed; the data 
gathering and analysis methodologies are also relevant techniques for conducting vulnerability and 
risk assessments, as discussed in Section 2.7.1. The majority of the work for each methodology 
could be conducted in parallel; an advantage of this was that any potential delays in one 
methodological implementation did not affect other areas of research. During the study, multiple 
conference and journal papers were submitted; this provided a continuous feedback from the peer-
review process and from the conference presentations themselves. Appendix A contains a list of 
publications that were generated from the research. The flow of the research is shown in Figure 3.1, 
and a description of the process and their relation to the objectives is provided below: 
 The project was developed and designed from the initial concept, the research proposal was 
defended and ethical clearance was obtained. 
 The primary literature review was conducted, which was an expansion of the initial literature 
review conducted for the research proposal. This provided the background to conduct the study. 
 From the models reviewed in the literature, two new models were proposed: an IW incident 
model and a vulnerability assessment framework. This was an objective of the research in itself. 
 A continuous literature review was conducted, which allowed for the ongoing analysis of trends 
and occurring incidents. This contributes to the vulnerability assessment by providing current 
trends in threats and provides information on possible vulnerabilities based on previous 
incidents. 
 Interviews were conducted. The analysis of the interview responses was used to assist in 
designing the workshop objectives. These provided expert opinion on the criticality of the 
mobile infrastructure, general threat and vulnerability concerns, and specific concerns related to 
the mobile infrastructure and its use. 
 Simulations and mathematical calculations were performed to analyse specific scenarios and 
expand on previous research; the simulations can visually represent the results. These are used 





 The overall vulnerability assessment is based on the proposed framework, and performs the 
data-triangulation from the results of all the research methodologies. This is the objective of the 
research. 





































The multiple research methodologies are aimed at meeting the four primary objectives of the 
research study. The research methodologies described above relate to the main objectives and their 
breakdowns as follows: 
 Further develop a framework that may be used in vulnerability assessment of critical 
infrastructure from an IW perspective 
o Further development of IW models and frameworks. This expands on the 
comparison of IW models in the literature review, and will be primarily deskwork. 
A new model will be proposed. 
o Assess existing frameworks. This will be primarily based on deskwork, and will be 
an extension of the vulnerability and risk assessment discussions from the literature 
review.  
o Development of new framework. This will be primarily deskwork, where the 
proposed IW model will be integrated into the analysis of the vulnerability and risk 
assessment frameworks. From this a new vulnerability assessment framework will 
be proposed. 
 Gather data relating to attacks against information infrastructure; 
o Gather data regarding the number of attacks. Document and secondary data 
analysis will be conducted to assess trends in the number of and types of attacks. 
Data from the research workshop will also contribute. 
o Gather data regarding computer-based security incidents. Document and secondary 
data analysis will be conducted to assess global trends of threats and vulnerabilities 
with regards to computer-security incidents. The interviews and research workshop 
will also contribute. 
o Gather data regarding cell phone security incidents. Document and secondary data 
analysis will be conducted to assess global trends of threats and vulnerabilities with 
regards to mobile-related security incidents. The interviews and research workshop 
will also contribute. 
 Further establish the cellular phone infrastructure as a critical information infrastructure; 
o A survey of informal enterprises using questionnaires will assess the possible 





Interview results will solicit information on the perceived criticality of mobile 
phones on various sectors. Document analysis will also contribute. 
 Apply the proposed framework to a generic cellular phone infrastructure to assess potential 
vulnerabilities that may be encountered; 
o The proposed vulnerability assessment framework will be used to triangulate the 
data collected from the various research methodologies. This will provide a generic 
vulnerability and risk profile for a mobile infrastructure in an IW environment. 
The secondary objectives include: 
 Conducting a basic vulnerability assessment on another infrastructure; 
o This will be deskwork, based on document analysis. The purpose is to provide an initial 
test of the proposed vulnerability assessment framework. 
 Provide suggestions for solutions and considerations to improve the protection of information 
infrastructures, and discuss related aspects that do not fall under the vulnerability assessment; 
o This will be based on document analysis of whitepapers and vendor recommendations. 
Possible solutions to security issues and concerns may be suggested in the research 
workshop, which will contribute to this section.  
Table 3.1 illustrates the applicability of the research methods to the objectives. The sections in this 
chapter describe the research methodologies in more detail; including the administrative processes, 
data gathering protocols and the data analysis methods that are employed in the study. The chapter 
is structured as follows: Section 3.2 describes the administrative process, particularly the defence 
and acceptance of the research proposal, and the ethical clearance process. Section 3.3 describes all 
desk-based research, which includes the trend and incident analysis, creating the proposed 
frameworks, computer simulations, mathematical calculations, and the application of the proposed 
models. Section 3.4 describes the interview process, and Section 3.5 describes the workshop. 








Table 3.1: The Relationship of Research Methodology to Research Objectives 
































































Further develop frameworks         
 IW         
 Vulnerability         
Gather Security Information         
 Attack trends         
 Security Trends         
 Mobile Security Trends         
Establish the criticality of 
the mobile infrastructure    
     
Apply Framework         
2nd Vulnerability assessment         
Recommendations         
 
3.2 Administrative Process 
This section describes the administrative process that is required by the Faculty of Management 
Studies at the University of KwaZulu-Natal to conduct the research study. Two major milestones 
are required prior to conducting the study: defending the research proposal and obtaining ethical 
clearance. The proposal was successfully defended and formal acceptance was received on the 5 
October 2009; a copy of the acceptance letter is provided in Appendix I. Section 3.2.1 presents the 
ethical clearance process for this study in more detail. 
3.2.1 Ethical Clearance 
The ethical clearance process is to ensure the candidate understands and adheres to ethical 
principles while conducting the research. The form to apply for ethical clearance and the relevant 
documentation is submitted to the Faculty, who then approve the application and submit it to the 





As part of the ethical clearance respondents for the interview process were identified and 
gatekeeper's letters were obtained to access them. Copies of informed consent forms, interview 
schedule and draft surveys need to be provided. Some of the organisations that were providing 
gatekeeper's letters required ethical clearance prior to providing approval; as a result provisional 
ethical clearance was obtained on the 12 December 2009. This was then submitted to the 
organisations to provide gatekeeper's approval. Final ethical clearance was obtained on the 17 May 
2009. See Appendix J for copies of the ethical clearance letters. 
3.3 Desk-Based Research 
This section describes the desk-based research methodologies. Section 3.3.1 discusses the creation 
of the models and Section 3.3.2 describes the application and testing of the model and framework. 
Section 3.3.3 describes the methods used to conduct the trend and incident analysis, Section 3.3.4 
describes the mathematical methodologies, and Section 3.3.5 describes the simulations. Section 
3.3.6 describes the formulation of the recommendations. 
3.3.1 Creating the Models 
A primary objective of the study was to develop and propose a vulnerability assessment framework 
from an IW perspective. This involves the creation of two models: an IW model and the 
vulnerability assessment framework. The models were developed by comparing existing models 
(discussed in Chapter 2) and identifying common aspects; these aspects are then incorporated into a 
single model in order to provide a generic model that is scalable. 
As IW has high-level considerations such as situational context, and technical aspects such as the 
actual attack and defence methods and tools, a need for a consolidated IW model and a vulnerability 
assessment framework from an IW perspective. Both the need for consolidated taxonomies or 
models for IW and the consideration of broader contexts rather in addition to the technical aspects is 
corroborated by Armistead (2010). The purpose of proposing the IW model is to provide a model 
which provides a single, consolidated description of an IW event by integrating the models that 
describe various aspects of IW. Existing high-level models are also considered (which are presented 
in Sections 4.2.1 to 4.2.5), and their common aspects incorporated into the consolidated model. 
Similarly, the proposed vulnerability assessment model was aimed at providing a framework which 
takes both high-level contextual issues and the technical issues and implementation into 





are either too broad, or limited to the technical aspects. In addition, the existing frameworks are 
asset-centric rather than infrastructure-centric; the proposed model provides a single metric with 
which to measure the vulnerability and risk of an infrastructure or a single asset as required. 
The proposed IW model is a descriptive model. This is in two parts: a high-level taxonomy adapted 
from the models discussed in the literature review; and an information warfare lifecycle model 
which is used to describe IW incidents. The vulnerability assessment incorporates techniques and 
common elements from existing frameworks to provide a top-down approach where the 
vulnerabilities and associated risks are assessed at a high-level, which flows to in-depth technical 
assessments. A technique for providing vulnerability and risk metrics for an entire infrastructure is 
proposed; this may also be used to assess the vulnerability and risk relating to specific IW areas and 
attack types. The information warfare lifecycle model was also used to in the development of the 
vulnerability assessment framework by relating IW characteristics to components of vulnerability 
and risk assessments. Chapter 4 presents the new models. 
As the models are descriptive, it is possible to propose the models and then apply them. The test of 
these models will be the accuracy with which they describe the phenomena to which it is being 
applied. As such the models were tested by applying them to cases. For the IW Lifecycle model, it 
was tested by applying it to a number of IW incidents of varying type and complexity to determine 
the accuracy with which it described those incidents. The vulnerability assessment was applied to a 
cloud computing scenario to determine the accuracy with which it described the scenario. These 
tests are presented in Chapter 4. 
3.3.2 Applying the Proposed Models 
A need was identified for a consolidate model that describes IW incidents and a vulnerability 
assessment framework that considers both contextual and technical aspects from an IW perspective; 
this need is corroborated by Armistead (2010). The motivations for the proposed models are 
presented in more detail Section 3.3.1.  
The models were initially applied to cases to determine their accuracy in describing the phenomena 
they are applied to. For the IW model, a series of IW incidents of varying type and complexity were 
used for the cases. For the vulnerability assessment framework, a cloud computing scenario was 
employed. These are presented in Chapter 4.  
The proposed IW model is applied to the documents that describe specific incidents. The model 





model is also used as a guide for developing the vulnerability assessment framework from an IW 
perspective. 
The application of the proposed vulnerability assessment framework forms one of the major 
objectives of the research. The framework is applied to the case of a generic mobile phone 
infrastructure. The results from the various research methodologies are brought together in specific 
categories determined by this framework; this provides the overall vulnerability assessment of the 
mobile infrastructure. This is presented in Chapter 8. 
3.3.3 Trend and Incident Analysis 
A primary objective of the research is to gather information regarding IW and security incidents. 
This information can be gathered from analysis of documents and secondary data. Chapter 5 
presents the trend and incident analysis, which contains a lot of literature; however, as the sources 
are primarily reports from newspapers, online news agencies, vendor notifications, and white 
papers, they will be considered as secondary data and documents for analysis. As such, the incidents 
were not included in the literature review except as examples for specific concepts. Section 3.3.3.1 
discusses the document analysis methods in more detail, and Section 3.3.3.2 presents the secondary 
data collection and analysis. 
3.3.3.1 Document Analysis 
Document analysis is conducted on online news reports, threat notifications, and corporate weblog 
postings to identify recent IW and security incidents. The document analysis of specific incident 
reports illustrates the prevalence of attack types, specific vulnerabilities, and threats. By comparing 
the reported dates of incidents, trends over time for incident characteristics may become apparent. 
The proposed IW model is used to analyse these incidents (as described by the documents), and 
categorise the characteristics of the incident. Document analysis may also provide secondary 
quantitative data in addition to qualitative information. For example, security surveys generally 
provide quantitative data illustrating incidents numbers and categorisation; however, incident and 
trend descriptions are usually qualitative.  
The documents were gathered from various sources. A method to semi-automate this process that 
was used was to subscribe to the major news groups, vendors, and security-related websites via 
email and social networking websites. These subscriptions then provided alerts when news reports 
and vendor reports were released, and provided the links to access them. Online search engines 





should there have been a report on television, then the story was accessed on the relevant news 
agency's website, and online search engines were used to identify and access alternative reports. 
Only reports in English were considered. 
For the incidents, the following information, where available, is extracted from the documents as 
determined by the proposed IW model: 
 Context and background;  
 The nature of the aggressor and target;  
 The IW functional area;  
 The IW tactic (denial, corruption, steal information); 
 Technical aspects in terms of offensive and defensive tools and techniques; 
 The outcome and impact of the incident. 
Where multiple sources are available, these can be used to corroborate facts, or provide additional 
detail. The emphasis will be on facts; any assumptions or perceptions that are presented by the 
authors of the documents are indicated as such. As one of the aspects of IW is the altering of 
perceptions, it is important not to place too much emphasis on them; however it is still important to 
consider the perceptions presented in reports, as these may shape public perception and 
consequently reaction. Where possible, the complexity of the incidents was assessed to indicate the 
viability of such an attack being conducted again in the future. 
The temporal occurrence of the incidents is also of interest; this provides trends in the shift between 
incident types, or shifts in the technologies or methods used to achieve similar objectives. General 
increases or decreases in incident numbers will also become evident. For this a timeline is used to 
illustrate the reported time period of the incident, and show clustering of incidents or incident types. 
Information regarding the role of information and information technologies in conflict is also 
extracted from documents. This allows the trends in the relevance of IW, and the impact technology 
evolution is having on IW. 
The document analysis was aimed at extracting specific information regarding incidents, assessing 
the significance and viability of similar incidents occurring, and trends in incident types and the 





3.3.3.2 Secondary Data 
Secondary data was gathered from reports released from research organisations, vendors, and 
national computer emergency response teams. As with the document analysis above, subscriptions 
to the relevant newsletters and vendor notifications via email and social networking websites 
provided a method of monitoring latest developments in information security related-topics, 
releases of research reports and surveys, and incidents as they developed. The secondary data is re-
analysed in order to identify trends or specific vulnerabilities that contributed to security incidents. 
This monitors the changing threat and vulnerability landscape, and can predict possible future 
developments.  
Secondary data from national computer emergency response teams (CSIRTs) was gathered from 
their websites. The data is presented over time, providing for general trends in incident numbers. 
This data is then analysed for trends across the data sets, looking at the prevalence of specific 
reported incident types in a global context, as opposed to the localised context provided by the 
individual data sets. 
Secondary data was gained from vendor reports and books; these were used to analyse trends in 
malware infections. The trends for computer-based malware were re-analysed by re-ranking 
countries according to infection rates. The infections of African nations could then be assessed in a 
global context and compared to the world average. The secondary data for mobile malware was 
fragmented; therefore the various datasets were incorporated to provide trends over a longer period 
of time. 
In some instances, the secondary data is used only to illustrate a point; such as the penetration of 
mobile devices compared to other communications devices. Secondary data from a webpage was 
presented to illustrate the susceptibility of South African web servers to hacking. The secondary 
data is also used to collaborate and supplement outcomes from the qualitative document analysis. 
3.3.4 Mathematical Calculations 
Certain vulnerabilities can be determined by mathematical calculations. This can determine 
technical restrictions for certain scenarios to determine vulnerability. The calculations are done 
primarily for electronic warfare, to determine detection and jamming ranges for wireless 
communications. Network capacity limits can also be calculated. The results of the calculations 
determine the feasibility and restrictions of certain attacks. The equations used are identified in the 





critical nodes or choke points that may severely hinder network services should they be 
compromised. The calculations were done by writing a program in the Matlab software, and then 
confirming the results by hand to ensure no errors occurred. Chapter 7 contains the calculations and 
analysis. 
3.3.5 Simulations 
As with mathematical calculations, simulations can be used to analyse the impact of specific 
variables or scenarios. The simulations are aimed at assessing the performance of network under 
different loading conditions or electronic warfare performance. By investigating these 
characteristics of the networks, the susceptibility to certain attacks can be ascertained. The 
simulations provide visual representation of the results, and can be used for scenarios which are too 
complex to calculate by hand. The simulations are computer-based Monte-Carlo simulations, where 
numerous iterations of the same set-up are performed with a randomised input. The results of the 
iterations are averaged together to provide the final result. The specific simulation set-up is 
determined by the objectives and certain parameters, and will be discussed with the results and 
analysis of the simulations in Chapter 7. 
3.3.6 Conclusions and Recommendations 
The conclusions are drawn from the analysis of the gathered data, and from the outcomes of the 
vulnerability assessment. The recommendations follow the specific findings in the conclusion; 
information from the workshop and documents analysis may also provide possible 
recommendations. A secondary objective of the research is to provide solutions to possible 
vulnerable areas; these will also form part of the final recommendations. 
3.4 Interviews 
The interviews were to solicit opinions from experts in the field of information security, IW, and 
critical infrastructure protection. Both international and South African experts were approached. 
Expert interviews are also a valid methodology for collecting information during a vulnerability or 
risk assessment process, as described in Section 2.7.1. The objective of the interviews was to 
ascertain the perceptions of experts as to the preparedness of South Africa regarding the national 
critical infrastructure policies, IW concerns relating to South Africa, IW concerns regarding mobile 





anonymity, therefore no information will be provided that can identify an individual person or an 
associated organisation. 
It was proposed that a minimum of ten interviews should be conducted, of which at least two should 
be international experts. The British Educational Research Association (2006) suggests six to 
twelve interviews are sufficient for unstructured interviews, and should the interviews be 
supplementing other data sufficient respondents are required cover the range of topics in the 
research study. Guest, Bunce, and Johnson (2005) show that the majority (approximately 70%) of 
code creation in interviews occurs in the first six, then approximately another 18% in the following 
six. As the interviews were semi-structured and were in conjunction with additional data, the ten 
interviews would be sufficient to cover the topic areas and provide the required information. The 
international respondents were to provide an international context to the South African respondents. 
Twelve interviews were achieved; this is discussed in more detail below. 
The experts were identified through a combination of convenience and judgement sampling. The 
sample was based on convenience as many were professional contacts that the candidate had made 
previously, and the others had contact details that were readily available to approach them. The 
judgement sampling was required as the candidate needed to ascertain if the prospective 
respondents had the relevant experience. The judgement used was based on either the publications 
of the prospective respondent, or the candidate's knowledge of their professional experience. All of 
the prospective international respondents identified have authored a book or major report. The 
prospective South African respondents have published at least a conference paper, or have had 
professional contact with the candidate. 
A modified E-Delphi method was employed; the respondents had no knowledge of other 
respondents or their responses, and the interviews were conducted electronically. As a number of 
respondents were from international locations with large time differences, email was used to 
communicate with them; for consistency purposes, email was also used for the South African 
respondents (however, they were given the option of alternate contact should they wish). The E-
Delphi method usually seeks to obtain consensus from respondents through iteration, where the 
outcomes from previous iterations are employed to solicit additional information from the 
respondents (Lindqvist & Nordanger, 2007). The methodology employed in this study deviates 
from the E-Delphi method in that consensus of responses were not required; however, reasons for 





As per the ethical requirements for the research, as described in Section 3.2.1, consent is required 
from the organisations where necessary, and the individual prospective participants. Where 
necessary, the organisations of the prospective respondents were contacted in order to get 
gatekeeper's permission. The letter requesting the permission is presented in Appendix E. Receiving 
gatekeeper's permissions was facilitated through email. Some organisations required ethical 
clearance prior to providing permission; therefore provisional clearance was obtained in order to 
receive permission from the organisations. Due to the interviews being conducted by email, the 
informed consent letters were sent as attachments, and in the body of the email it was stated that 
response to the email indicates consent; however it would be preferred if the respondents explicitly 
stated their consent. The letter of informed consent is presented in Appendix F. 
The interview was semi-structured, in that the questions were tailored or prioritised according to the 
individual respondent's area of specialty. The questions were pre-tested where the candidate's 
colleagues checked the questions. The interview questions were designed to meet the objectives of 
gathering data on the information warfare and security landscape, and establish the criticality on the 
mobile phone communications in this context. Table 3.2 illustrates the interview questions and their 
relevance to the study objectives. 
A total of twenty-two requests were sent, seven to international experts and fifteen to South African 
experts. From this, a total of fifteen initial confirmations were received, giving an initial response 
rate of 68%. Five of the confirmations were from international experts and ten were from South 
African experts. Of these, twelve completed interviews were received; all five international experts 
responded, and seven South African experts responded. This is a 55% response rate from the initial 
requests, and an 80% response rate from the initial confirmations. 
The responses to questions relating to perceptions were categorised into negative, neutral, and 
positive responses. Categories of very negative or very positive were added; these are for cases 
where the respondent added emphasis. Responses regarding concerns required a range of responses, 
these were categorised according to the offensive and defensive information warfare models 
presented in Sections 2.3.2.2 and 2.3.2.1, respectively. Responses were summarised quantitatively, 
in that the number of responses in each category were recorded. The Nvivo software package and 
Microsoft Excel were used for the coding and summarising process. For questions where a range of 
answers were expected, such as identifying threats, the responses were divided into pre-determined 





confidentiality, information theft, denial, and corruption. Individual responses were then used to 
provide a more detailed analysis regarding the research objectives. 





































































































Are you aware of any critical information infrastructure 
protection (CIIP) efforts in South Africa? 
   
If yes: 
Do you believe it is sufficient? 
What do you think of SA‟s efforts compared to those 
internationally? 
Are there any international policies that may be beneficial to 
South Africa? 
   
What is the largest Information Warfare threat globally and in 
South Africa? (How will this affect CIIP?) 
   
Do you think cell phones form part of the critical information 
infrastructure? 
   
What is the biggest security threat or risk regarding cell phones, 
and what should or can be done about it? 
   
How important do you think cell phones are for: 
 Large businesses 
 Small businesses 
 Military 
 Government 
 Security services 
 Insurgents/criminals/terrorists 
   
How do you think SA‟s CIIP efforts are viewed internationally? 
(for South African respondents only) 
   
How do the SA efforts and policies compare to those in your 
country? (for international respondents only) 
   
Are there any policies in your country that may of benefit to SA, 
or vice versa? (for international respondents only) 







The workshop was aimed at soliciting information regarding information security and mobile-
related security trends and concerns in South Africa. In particular, the intent was to corroborate data 
from the interviews and trend analysis, and to gain additional insight into the vulnerability and 
threat landscape in South Africa, and the impact of modern ICT technologies on these landscapes.  
The prospective participants were invited based on judgement sampling; they had to reside or work 
in the local area where the workshop was to be held, and had to have the relevant experience or 
knowledge to contribute to the discussion. The prospective participants consisted primarily of 
professional contacts that have experience in the information security and risk fields. 
The workshop was held at the Riverside Hotel, Durban, South Africa, on the 9 June 2011. This date 
was selected due to the number of public holidays in May 2011, and conferences in July 2011. 
Initially nineteen prospective participants were invited; two suggested they be replaced by another 
person. These persons were invited, giving a total of 21 invitations to participate. Five responded 
that they were unable to attend, seven did not respond, seven accepted the invitation, and the two 
remaining suggested their replacements. There were a total of nine people present at the workshop; 
seven participants, the candidate, and the candidate's supervisor. Multiple recordings were made of 
the discussions for redundancy. Prior to beginning the discussions, the recording mechanisms and 
procedure was explained to the participants. 
The output of the workshop consists of the topics discussed and focussed on (due to conversational 
flow), and the agreements and conclusions reached by the participants based on their discussions. 
The importance of the various topics was inferred from the amount of time focussed on that topic. 
Information on specific trends may be gained from specific statements from the participants, or 
their general agreement on these trends. The participants also discussed and proposed solutions to 
issues raised; these are incorporated into the recommendations arising from the study. 
3.6 Survey 
The objective of the survey was to assess possible economic impacts of due to the effect of major 
outages of mobile services on the informal business sector; this contributes to establishing the 
criticality of the mobile infrastructure. The questionnaire assessed the perceptions of the informal 






The nature of the survey questions was pre-tested by colleagues; the questions were projected onto 
a screen, and the suitability and phrasing of the questions were discussed. During this process 
possible wording of the questions to make them suitable for translation into languages other than 
English (namely Zulu and Xhosa) were assessed. The questionnaire is presented in Appendix G, 
and the letter of informed consent is presented in Appendix H. 
The survey was piloted in central Durban and the surrounding suburbs. For the pilot in the informal 
markets, the Warwick Project Office, which forms part of the city's urban renewal project, provided 
a guide who selected respondents and acted as interpreter where required. A total of eight pilot 
responses were obtained from nine respondents; one did not wish to participate in the survey. The 
results of the pilot are discussed in Chapter 6. The survey of the informal traders was not completed 
for two reasons: 
 The research is a project on its own, and a more in-depth study is required than what would be 
done as part of this dissertation; and 
 The survey was not essential to the overall outcome of the dissertation, and as per the proposal 
acceptance letter, it was decided to discontinue this avenue to focus on more promising aspects. 
3.7 Chapter Summary 
The chapter presented the research methods employed in this study. From the literature review, a 
new IW model and vulnerability assessment framework is proposed. Secondary data and document 
analysis will be conducted to analyse trends and incidents; the proposed IW model will be used to 
analyse incidents described by documents. This will gain information on trends of threats, 
vulnerabilities, and incidents related to the information and mobile infrastructures. Primary data is 
to be gathered through expert interviews, a workshop, and a survey. These provide perspectives and 
experience regarding threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality of the information and mobile 
infrastructures. The full survey was not completed due to the proposal acceptance requiring 
confinement of the study to the most promising aspects. Simulations and mathematical calculations 
and analysis will be conducted to assess the feasibility of certain attack methods. The information is 
triangulated through the implementation of the proposed vulnerability assessment; from this 






Chapter 4. New Models 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the new models for IW and an infrastructure vulnerability and risk 
assessment. Section 4.2 presents the new IW model; which will be used for incident analysis in this 
chapter and Chapter 5, and will be used to further relate IW to the vulnerability and risk analysis 
framework, which is presented in Section 4.3. Chapter 5 to Chapter 7 will contain the analysis of a 
mobile phone infrastructure as prescribed by the infrastructure vulnerability framework, and the 
overall assessment will be provided in Chapter 8. Section 4.4 concludes the chapter. 
4.2 Information Warfare Model 
This section presents the new model for IW. Armistead (2010, p. 109) claims that the "lack of 
standardised nomenclature or taxonomy" hinders the ability to conduct information operations; this 
can be considered to apply to IW. The purpose of proposing this model is to provide a single 
consolidated model and framework that brings together and relates the various models for IW; the 
models presented in Sections 4.2.1 to 4.2.5 are derived from those discussed in Chapter 2, by 
comparing the existing models and combining their common aspects. The generation of the IW 
model falls into one of the main objectives of the dissertation. Section 4.2.1 proposes a definition 
for IW, and Section 4.2.2 presents the model describing the relationships between information, data, 
and knowledge. The consolidated domains are defined in Section 4.2.3, and the model mapping the 
SANDF IW construct to the spheres of IW is presented in Section 4.2.4. The offensive and 
defensive IW model is presented in Section 4.2.5. Section 4.2.6 presents the IW Lifecycle Model, 
which brings together various IW models and frameworks to be able to describe an IW event. This 
model will be used for incident analysis in Chapter 5, and will be used as a basis for developing the 
infrastructure vulnerability and risk analysis frameworks from the specific IW viewpoint, which is 
presented in Section 4.3. Examples of the application of the IW Lifecycle Model are presented in 
Section 4.2.7.  
4.2.1 Information Warfare Definition 





Information warfare is those actions taken to attack, protect, or exploit information and its 
supporting systems and processes in the physical, information, and cognitive domains in order to 
achieve tactical, operational, and/or strategic objectives. 
4.2.2 Extended Model for Information Relationships 
Following the discussion in Section 2.2, a model describing the relationships between different 
relationship types and the influences of external factors was proposed. This is shown in Figure 4.1. 
Data can be considered as raw descriptors of an object or event. Data is processed into information; 
the processing may be subjected to bias introduced by experience, perception, and external 
influences. The information is understood to form knowledge; this process may also be influenced 
by external factors and a priori knowledge in the form of experience and perception. Knowledge 
applied is wisdom. An adaptation to this is data is the raw bits and bytes, which is subject to 
external noise, and is processed by a system to form information that is readable by humans. This is 










Figure 4.1: The Extended Model for Information Relationships 
4.2.3 Information Warfare Domains 
Following the discussion in Section 2.3.3, the following domains and sub-domains are proposed: 
 Physical (real-world) 
o Hardware 
o Physical person 
o Physical networks 













4.2.4 Information Warfare Constructs and Spheres 
Following the discussion in Section 2.3.3, the following model mapping the IW construct of the 
SANDF to the spheres of IW is proposed. Figure 4.2 shows this model. The enabling domain 
consists of the IW functional areas that may be used to conduct or impact on the application 
domain. The application domain creates affects in the various spheres of IW. 
 
Figure 4.2: The Relationship between the IW Functional Areas and IW Spheres 
4.2.5 An Offensive and Defensive Information Warfare Model 
Following the discussion in Section 2.3.2, the consolidated model describing defensive and 
offensive IW tactics is presented in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: The Information Warfare Taxonomy 





































4.2.6 Information Warfare Lifecycle Model 
This section presents the Information Warfare Lifecycle Model; the model was originally proposed 
in van Niekerk and Maharaj (2011d); and was used to analyse the role of ICTs in the Tunisian and 
Egyptian unrest in van Niekerk, Pillay and Maharaj (2011). This model was generated by 
combining the common aspects of multiple models that were presented in Chapter 2: 
 Message Flow Model for PSYOPs (Section 2.3.3.7) 
 Network Warfare proposed by Veerasamy and Eloff (Section 2.4.4)  
 Wik (Section 2.3.5) 
 Ventre (Section 2.3.5) 
The objective is to generate a consolidated model that can adequately describe IW incidents through 
a combination of high-level and detailed concepts; yet is scalable to accommodate incidents of 
differing magnitude. The objective was also for the model to be applicable to the various functional 
areas of IW which may be distinct from each other, for example electronic warfare and PSYOPs. 
The reason for generating this model is that the existing models are either high-level, or are specific 
to a functional area of IW. Therefore a more general model is required, with sufficient detail, which 
can be related to the vulnerability assessment models. 
From the four figures, there are common aspects describing IW:  
 There is a context, which includes: 
o An aggressor; 
o Some motivation for the aggressor to attack, or an objective to achieve; and 
o A defender. 
 Planning is required, which needs to account for: 
o Operational restrictions for political, legal, ethical, or financial reasons; 
o Technical and human capabilities; and 
o Other considerations, such as social impact. 
 The attack occurs: 
o Specific target set(s) are focussed on, using 
o Offensive tactics and tools, according to 





 The target defends against the attack, by: 
o Protecting the CIA attributes of information and its systems, through the use of 
o Defensive tactics and technical countermeasures. 
 The offensive and defensive operations result in an impact on society in general; who 
 React and respond to the incident; which affects the context. 
Many detailed models and high-level concepts may overlap; for example the planning of operations 
will be relevant to the context, attack, and defence. For this reason, a two-layered model was 
generated, with a detailed layer overlapping a high-level layer. The high-level layer contains the 
following blocks: context, attack, defence, consequences, reactions, recovery, and influence. The 
planning block of the detailed layer overlaps the context, attack, and defend and protect blocks of 
the high-level layer. The attack block contains the target set, functional areas, offensive tactics, and 
offensive weapons of the detailed layer. The defend and protect block similarly contains the 
defensive tactics, defensive weapons, and defensive attributes of the detailed layer. The society 
block is relevant to four high-level blocks: attack, defend and protect, consequences, and recovery. 
The human block is relevant to the consequences and reaction blocks. The reaction of the humans 
provides the feedback which ultimately influences the context. The IW Lifecycle Model is shown in 
Figure 4.3. 
Armistead (2010) shows that there is a view that there is still a divide between the technical issues 
of IW and the broader context that governs these issues. As such, the context, planning, and 
consideration blocks from Ventre, Wik, and Veerasamy and Eloff are retained through the high-
level context and detailed plan information operations/warfare blocks in the proposed IW Lifecycle 
model. This relates the broader context, planning issues, the technical implementation, and the 
consequences of IW actions. 
4.2.7 Application of the IW Lifecycle Model 
The application of the IW model to recent and historical cases of IW incidents is illustrated in this 
section. The purpose is to provide a basic 'proof of concept' evaluation of the model. Sections 
4.2.7.1 to 4.2.7.6 each focus on a specific incident, each of which falls into a different functional 

























































































4.2.7.1 Estonia: Cyber-based Attack on Infrastructure 
Many ethnic Russians were offended when the Estonian government decided to relocate a war 
memorial which also honoured Russian troops from the Second World War; initially there were 
street riots during which the Estonian embassy was attacked (Germain, 2008; Rolski, 2007). The 
DDoS attack via Botnets was first apparent on the 26 and 27 April 2007, and after a few days access 
to the websites of some newspapers were blocked (Landler & Markoff, 2007). The Russian 
government denied claims that it was responsible for or aiding the attacks (Germain, 2008; Landler 
& Markoff, 2007; Rolski, 2007). Initial defensive measures were aided by ISPs who blocked the 
attack-related traffic. Additional preparations began due to an expected onslaught prior to a public 
holiday celebrating the Soviet victory in the Second World War; the attack occurred on the 9 and 10 
May, where government websites and email systems were severely affected. The major bank was 
also forced to close its online services resulting in over $1 million in losses (Landler & Markoff, 
2007). The worst of the attacks had subsided by the 16 May (Rolski, 2007). This incident resulted in 
NATO expanding the treaty to include cyber-attacks, and a cyber-defence centre was established in 
the Estonian capital (StrategyPage.com, 2010c). 
The IW Lifecycle analysis of the incident is as follows: 
 Context:  
o Aggressor(s): Ethnic Russians;  
o Target: Estonian Government;  
o Motivation: Revenge for relocating a war memorial, and to show political 
dissatisfaction. 
 Attack:  
o Functional area(s): Network warfare and some psychological warfare employed 
through network warfare by defacing government websites.  
o Target set: Websites and network communications. 
o Tactic: Primarily DoS; some influence on perception. 
o Weapon: Botnets were used to flood target websites with traffic. 
 Defence: The initial defence by the Estonians was preventative; aid was requested from 
international ISPs to block the traffic that was related to the DoS attack. 
 Consequences: The initial attacks had a minor impact; a few websites of newspapers were 
inaccessible. As the attacks continued the disruption was more severe, and the main Estonian 





 Reaction: Defensive preparations were increased after the initial attacks. A cyber-protection 
centre was established after the incident. 
 Influence of context: The initial context was only minimally influenced; there was some 
increase in political tensions after Russia was accused being or aiding the perpetrators. A 
subsequent global impact has been that several nations have included cyber-attacks by 
expanding existing war treaties. 
4.2.7.2 The Channel Dash: Electronic Warfare Operations 
Radloff, quoted by Sikwane (2010), described the German electronic warfare operations during 
World War Two, which are summarised in this section.  Three German capital warships and their 
accompanying destroyers were ordered to return to Germany from France in 1942, necessitating a 
transit of the English Channel; to protect the warships from detection, German forces simulated 
interference from atmospheric disturbances on the British coastal radar stations by incrementally 
increasing noise jamming on the radar stations.  The aim was to have the British operators reduce 
the gain of their radar, further decreasing their ability to detect the warships. The operators fell for 
the deception, which allowed the warships to transit the English Channel virtually undetected; the 
warships were out of range by the time the deception was detected. 
The IW Lifecycle analysis of the incident is as follows: 
 Context:  
o Aggressor: German electronic warfare units. 
o Target: English radar stations.  
o Motivation: Disrupt the radar stations to provide cover for warships transiting the 
English Channel. 
o Restrictions and limitations: As this was a time of war, there was very little in terms of 
restrictions that could possibly effect planning, other than technical capability. 
 Attack:  
o Functional area: Electronic warfare. 
o Target set: Military radar sensors. 
o Tactics: Denial in that the functionality of the radar stations was degraded, and 
deception in that the jamming simulated atmospheric interference, which was aimed at 
having the radar operators further reduce the capability of the radar stations. 





 Defence: The radar operators were deceived and no effective defence conducted.  
 Consequence: In order to mitigate the effects of the interference, the English radar operators 
reduced the gain on the radar units; this enabled the German warships to transit the English 
Channel without being detected. 
 Recovery and Reaction: The British realised there was deception and returned the radars to their 
normal operating conditions, however it was too late to intercept the warships. 
 Influence on Context: The Germans successfully completed their objective. 
4.2.7.3 Somalia / Blackhawk Down – PSYOPs 
United Nations (UN) forces supplying aid in Somalia were being raided by the local militias; the 
US deployed a contingent to assist the UN. The US forces targeted a specific warlord, Mohammed 
Farah Aidid, in an attempt to halt the attacks on the convoys; a series of raids were conducted, 
during which the infamous Black Hawk Down incident occurred. During the skirmish, five US 
servicemen were killed and another captured (Adams, 1998). In order to force a US withdrawal 
from Somalia, the bodies of the US servicemen were dragged in front of CNN cameras. When these 
images were broadcast, the shock and the public outrage pressured the US government into leaving 
Somalia after rescuing the captured serviceman (Adams, 1998; Taylor, 2002). This type of 
psychological attack found both the US public and government completely unprepared; negative 
media towards the US government, policies, and military command continued after this incident 
and the subsequent withdrawal (Adams, 1998). 
The IW Lifecycle analysis of the incident is as follows: 
 Context:  
o Aggressor: The Somali warlord, Mohammed Farah Aidid 
o Target: The US public  
o Motivation: To drive the US forces out of Somalia 
 Attack: 
o Functional area: PSYOPs 
o Target set: Public opinion. 
o Tactic: Affect the will and perception of the US population. 
o Weapon: International mass media.  United States servicemen had been involved in a 
skirmish infamously known as the Black Hawk Down incident.  The bodies of those 





the US public. The planning was to affect the morale, will, and society of the US 
public. 
 Defence: This attack was a surprise, consequently no defensive measures were taken; very little 
could be done after the images were released. A reactive defensive measure was conducted by 
rescuing hostages and withdrawing due to public opinion. 
 Consequences and reaction: As was planned, the US public were shocked by the images; public 
opinion pressured the US government to cease operations in Somalia. The negative public 
reaction and media continued after the US withdrawal. 
 Influence on Context: The US forces were forced to withdraw due to the strategic use of the 
international mass media; the political context in the US was altered, and the situation in 
Somalia was change as the Somali warlord intended. 
4.2.7.4 The Wikileaks Incidents – Cyber-based Conflict and  Intelligence Warfare 
This case study comprises of a number of sub-incidents, making it the most complex of those 
considered. The initial incidents comprised of four releases of leaked documents; the eventual 
retaliation to this resulted in a series cyber-attacks and counterattacks. The releases of the 
documents can be attributed to intelligence warfare in that potentially sensitive information on 
coalition activities were made public; as were some of the operations of Wikileaks (Gilligan, 2010). 
The cyber-attacks can be seen as exhibiting an action-reaction cycle which may indicate how an 
actual cyber-war between nation states would occur. 
The Wikileaks releases made the information of US and coalition military and diplomatic activities 
available online for public consumption throughout 2010; the initial response was condemnation 
and an investigation into the original leak (Poulsen & Zetter, 2010). The releases appeared to be 
publicised by media partners of Wikileaks. The release of diplomatic cables resulted in a stronger 
retaliation, where Wikileaks was targeted directly and setting of counter-attacks; a chronology of 
the incident is presented here: 
 April 2010: A video was released showing journalists being fired on by a helicopter gunship 
(Bronstein, 2010); the accuracy of some claims regarding the video were questioned 
(StrategyPage.com, 2010b). 
 June 2010: A US intelligence analyst was arrested after the investigation; he appears to be the 
source of all leaked documents (Poulsen & Zetter, 2010). 





 October 2010: Wikileaks releases war logs from Iraq (Stewart, 2010). 
 29 November 2010: Wikileaks releases diplomatic cables and information on US cyber-
intelligence; this results in a DDoS attack against the Wikileaks website by a pro-US hacker 
(Goodwins, 2010). 
 Due to US pressure, Paypal, Visa, Mastercard, Amazon, and Swiss bank Post Finance block 
Wikileaks accounts; and the Wikileaks website is removed from the Internet domain registry 
(Walker, 2010). The IP address and content is made available on various websites supporting 
Wikileaks. Queries regarding the finances of Wikileaks are raised, and rape allegations against 
its founder re-surface (Gilligan, 2010). 
 4 December 2010: The hacker group Anonymous conduct a DDoS attack against the PayPal 
blog in support of Wikileaks (Walker, 2010). 
 6 December 2010: Anonymous attacks the main websites of Post Finance and PayPal; a pro-US 
hacker counterattacks Anonymous (ibid.). 
 7 December 2010: EveryDNS (who delisted Wikileaks), a US Senate website, Post Finance, the 
prosecutors of Julian Assange and the rape accuser lawyers are all targeted by Anonymous; 
who experiences another counter-attack (ibid.). 
 8 December 2010: The attack on the lawyers continues; Mastercard, Visa, and PayPal are 
targeted. Twitter disables the Anonymous profile (ibid.). 
 9 December 2010: PayPal continues to be targeted and Amazon is attacked by Anonymous; the 
counterattacks against Anonymous also continue (ibid.). 
The first iteration of the IW Lifecycle Model is as follows: 
 Initial Context: Wikileaks and apparently disillusioned US intelligence analyst may have been 
motivated to discredit the US, but claimed to be promoting transparency. 
 Planning: The intelligence analyst had access to the relevant documents; Wikileaks had the 
technical capability to release the information globally. The possible ethical and legal 
ramifications did not deter either party. 
 Attack: Authorised access to a sensitive intelligence network was leveraged; Wikileaks then 
released these documents. Confidentiality of the information was breached in what appears to 






 Defence and reaction: Initially the response was reactive by publicly condemning the releases; 
the alleged original source of the leak was arrested after an investigation. The reaction and 
defence due to the release of the diplomatic cables was stronger; multiple financial institutions 
were pressured into closing Wikileaks accounts, and the website was delisted. This appears to 
be preventative; in that the delisting reduces the availability of the information to the public, 
and the blocking of the accounts hinders Wikileaks operations by removing finances. A DDoS 
attack against the Wikileaks website was also conducted by a pro-US hacker.  
 Consequences and influence: The international public opinion and support was divided; 
political tension increased, and vigilante groups became more active. 
The second iteration of the IW Lifecycle Model is as follows: 
 Altered context: Support and international public opinion is divided after Wikileaks has released 
a number of potentially sensitive documents; the alleged source has been arrested and the 
releases publicly condemned.  
 Attack: Diplomatic pressure was applied by the US to remove financial support from Wikileaks; 
their website is also delisted. A vigilante has targeted Wikileaks with a DDoS attack. This is the 
reaction from the first iteration. 
 Defence and reaction: The IP address of the Wikileaks website was made available to allow 
access; other websites began hosting the content to support Wikileaks. The group Anonymous 
began targeting those organisations that withdrew support from Wikileaks. 
 Consequences and influence on context: US diplomatic pressure further polarised international 
opinion, and a pro-Wikileaks vigilante group began targeting institutions who withdrew support 
from Wikileaks. 
The third iteration of the IW Lifecycle Model is as follows: 
 Altered context: The international community has been further polarised by US diplomatic 
pressure against Wikileaks, and additional opposing vigilant groups are conducting DDoS 
attacks. 
 Attack: Anonymous conducts DDoS attacks (network warfare) against financial institutions and 
other websites who supported the US. 
 Defence: The DDoS attacks by Anonymous appear to have been ignored by the victims in that 






 Reaction: Pro-US hackers counter-attacked Anonymous. 
 Consequences and influence on context: Frustration with Anonymous due to the inability to 
access websites probably reduced support for them. DDoS attacks and counter-attacks 
continued between pro-Wikileaks and pro-US hackers. 
4.2.7.5 Revenge Attack against Infrastructure 
This section analyses an attack on an Australian sewerage plant by a disgruntled former contractor. 
This section was not previously published. Over a two-month period in 2000, 800 000 litres of 
sewerage was released into the public waterways of Maroochy, Australia (Abrams & Weiss, 2008; 
Wyld, 2004). The perpetrator was Vitek Boden, who was an ex-employee of a company that 
installed the wireless-controlled sewerage systems that the plant used; he had recently left his job 
due to differences, and then had his job application turned down by the city council. In an attempt to 
force the council to hire him, or just for revenge, he used stolen equipment to access the control 
systems from his car, releasing the sewerage into the waterways (Abrams & Weiss, 2008; Wyld, 
2004). This resulted in ecological damage and an unpleasant odour in the surrounding areas. The 
irregularities at the sewerage plant were investigated, and the controller addressing was altered in an 
attempt to protect against the attack, however Boden was still able to continue his attack (Abrams & 
Weiss, 2008). He was caught accidentally after the equipment was found in his car when he was 
stopped for a traffic violation; as compensation, he was ordered to cover the costs of the cleaning 
operation in addition to being sentenced to two years imprisonment (Wyld, 2004). 
The IW Lifecycle analysis of the incident is as follows: 
 Context:  
o Aggressor: A disgruntled ex-employee. 
o Motivation: Revenge for a work-related incident regarding his employment, and an 
attempt to secure employment.  
o Target: The sewerage works in Australia. 
 Attack:  
o Functional area: Infrastructure warfare. 
o Target set: Infrastructure controllers. 
o Tactic: Corrupt system integrity and malicious control.  





 Planning: Using the stolen equipment, access was gained to the systems; the objective was to 
release sewerage in an attempt to force being hired to solve the problem. He had the insider 
knowledge and technical expertise to conduct the attack. The legal and social consequences 
may have deterred other individuals; however this did not prevent the aggressor. 
 Defence: The attacks could not be stopped initially; after investigating the problem, the control 
addressing was adjusted, which temporarily halted the attacks. Boden was later arrested for 
unrelated activity, which led to the stolen equipment being found. 
 Consequences: The consequences were primarily physical; the area was polluted and the 
residents were affected by the unpleasant smell. 
 Recovery: The perpetrator was ordered to finance the cleanup, and upon his arrest the attacks 
stopped.  
 Influence of context: The attack ultimately failed, and the perpetrator was prevented from 
repeating the attacks. 
4.2.7.6 The Tunisian and Egyptian Political Unrest: PSYOPs and Command and Control 
Warfare in Social Uprisings 
This section analyses the social uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt from an IW perspective using the 
Lifecycle Model. A previous version was published in van Niekerk, Pillay, and Maharaj (2011), and 
was part of the candidate's contribution to the publication. The national uprising in Tunisia was 
instigated by unemployed university graduates, and fuelled by discontent on online political 
dialogue due to two decades of government misrule in late 2010 (Bay, 2011). Diplomatic cables 
leaked by Wikileaks, some of which outlined the extravagant lifestyle of the Tunisian presidential 
family, may also have contributed to fuelling the uprising (Kirkpatrick, 2011). The Jasmine 
revolution began in December, and first gained global prominence in January 2011, just prior to the 
Tunisian President Ben Ali resigning and fleeing the country (Bay, 2011). Demonstrators 
documented the protests by video, which were distributed via online social media and mobile 
phones to promote their cause; these tools were also employed to coordinate the protest actions 
(Bay, 2011; Kirkpatrick, 2011). The traditional broadcast mass media also contributed to 
disseminating the protestors' message; Al Jazeera covered the entire period of protests, and Western 
media began coverage in January 2011 (Kirkpatrick, 2011). The apparent success of the Tunisian 
demonstrations inspired massive anti-government protests in Egypt, which began less than two 
weeks after the resignation of the Tunisian government; as with Tunisia, the Egyptian protests were 





Mubarak's government (Hendawi, 2011). Mobile phones and online social media again appeared to 
be crucial to the organisation of the demonstrations (Hendawi, 2011). Many of the signs held by the 
protestors were in English; this indicates an intention of targeting the international community. The 
fact that a number of national leaders urged then President Mubarak to resign (Lee, 2011; Lekic, 
2011; Robinson, 2011) indicates that the protestors successfully influenced the behaviour of the 
international community. 
Both sets of demonstrations were reported to be using social media for both coordination of the 
protests, and advertise the protestor's plight (Kessler, 2011). Both governments targeted the social 
media in an effort to curb the protests: Madrigal (2011) reported that the Tunisian authorities 
attempted to hack into and delete the social media profiles of the primary instigators of the 
demonstrations. The Egyptian government shut down both mobile and Internet services (Kessler, 
2011; Kravets, 2011). Both these efforts were unsuccessful; as the social media allowed the protests 
to gain momentum; once this critical mass was achieved, the role of the social media appears to 
have diminished. These uprisings have resulted in subsequent upheaval in North Africa and the 
Middle East: Yemen, Bahrain, Jordan, Syria, Iran, and Libya all experienced anti-government 
protests (Black & Chulov, 2011; Sky News, 2011). 
The IW Lifecycle analysis of the incident is as follows: 
 Context: 
o Aggressor: The general population of the nations. 
o Target: The respective governments of the nations. 
o Motivations: Bring attention the dissatisfaction of the population and force the 
resignation of the governments that were perceived as corrupt and oppressive through 
internal and international pressure. 
 Planning: Online social media spread resulted in coordination of the dissatisfied population. 
Possible harsh government reprisals may have prevented some from participating, however 
many joined the uprisings. 
 Attack: 
o Target set: International public opinion, the will of the national governments, and the 
socio-political constructs of the countries. 
o Functional area: PSYOPs and command and control. 
o Tactics: Coordinate mass demonstrations and influence or corrupt international opinion 





o Weapons: Online social media, mobile devices, the international mass media, and the 
mass protests themselves. 
 Defence: The governments attempted to prevent the use of the online social media and mobile 
platforms to disrupt the organisation of the protests; this again indicates a form of command and 
control warfare. 
 Consequences and Phenomena: The protests gained momentum, and the international 
community was influenced against the respective governments. Protests have subsequently 
spread throughout the North Africa and Middle East region. Social media and mobile phones 
have been established as tools for popular uprisings. 
4.2.7.7 The Lifecycle Model Summary 
The IW Lifecycle Model proposed in Section 4.2.6 was tested by applying it to six incidents; each 
incident corresponds to an IW functional area, and they are of different magnitude. The background 
to the incidents was provided from documents; this was then analysed using the model. The 
proposed model was capable of describing each of the incidents, even though they were associated 
with different IW functional areas. Large incidents were accommodated with multiple iterations of 
the cycle. The model therefore meets the objectives of being independent of the IW functional area, 
and scalable; it was also able to provide detailed information in addition to the high-level cycle. 
4.3 Infrastructure Vulnerability and Risk Assessment Framework 
This section presents the proposed vulnerability assessment framework. Common and important 
aspects of the vulnerability and risk assessment frameworks presented in Section 2.7 are 
incorporated into the consolidated framework; this framework is then linked to IW through the IW 
model proposed in Section 4.2.  The proposal of this framework is a primary objective of the study; 
the data presented in subsequent chapters will be consolidated and triangulated in Chapter 8 through 
the use of this framework. The initial framework concept which was presented in the study proposal 
also guided the data gathering. A previous version of this section was presented in van Niekerk and 
Maharaj (2011a). Section 4.3.1 presents the proposed framework, and Section 4.3.2 presents an 
example of its implementation. 
4.3.1 Infrastructure Vulnerability Framework 
From Section 2.7, it can be seen that many frameworks are high-level, and give little attention to 





orientated. Most consider general risk, or information risk; only the Minimum Essential Information 
Infrastructure framework is dedicated to an IW scenario. However, this framework focuses on the 
technical issues, and not the political, legal, social, or ethical considerations. The intent therefore is 
to propose a model that is scalable and adaptable, which is layered and guides the user from the 
high-level to the detailed implementation. It is also intended to be related to cases of IW. The 
outcome of the framework is to be a single metric or figure for the vulnerability and risk of the 
infrastructure. Multiple metrics can be used (one each for different perspectives, threats, or other 
considerations) to compare possible scenarios. 
The following risk and vulnerability frameworks and methods will be considered: 
 SWOT (Section 2.7.1.8); 
 PESTEL (Section 2.7.1.7); 
 MEII (Section 2.7.2.1); 
 FAIR (Section 2.7.2.4); and, 
 TVA Worksheet (Section 2.7.1.9). 
The SWOT analysis is a high-level; for an IW situation, the weaknesses can be considered 
analogous to the vulnerabilities, and strengths can be considered as analogous to the controls, 
legislation, and policies that are in place, which will mitigate an attack. Threats are the IW threats, 
and opportunities may be considered as measures that may be improved or introduced to increase 
the controls or strengths. An addition needs to made, in that the potential impact of an incident 
needs to be assessed. 
For PESTEL, the political, legal, social, and economic considerations may overlap; these can all be 
grouped into non-technical factors. The technical considerations remain as is, and the ecological 
considerations can largely be ignored in an IW situation, except where there are possible ecological 
effects, such as in Section 4.2.7.5. This will fall under the impact assessment, and may be assessed 
through environmental impact assessments. 
For the proposed framework, the highest level of layers will be the modified SWOT analysis as 
described above, incorporating threats, vulnerabilities, countermeasures, and opportunities. For each 
of these, the next layer will be the modified PESTEL with two sections: technical; and non-
technical, which incorporates the political, economic, social, and legal considerations. This is 
shown in Table 4.2. A variety of methods may be used for the next layers: two levels of analysis are 





advisories, white papers, political and legal analysis methods, war gaming, and what-if scenario 
analysis. Information may also be gained from business and national intelligence, Monte-Carlo 
computer simulations, and expert input through workshops and interviews. 
For the technical vulnerabilities, the categorisation of the MEII process may be used to further 
segment the analysis; this will correspond to Analysis Method 1 in the figure. Methods may be used 
to assess each category (this will correspond to Analysis Method 2). For example, electronic 
accessibility may be assessed though penetration testing; singularities and centralisation may be 
tested by the use of graph theory, and computer simulations may test operating conditions and 
loading effects. Many technical threats and vulnerabilities may also be determined from CERT or 
CSIRT advisories and vendor reports; major incidents may be identified through the news media. 
For each of the modified SWOT elements, certain variables need to be rated for the IW situation. 
The non-technical threat (Step 1A in Table 4.2) is related to the context; who a potential aggressor 
could be, their capabilities, and the likelihood that they will conduct some form of attack. The 
technical threats (Step 1B) will the likelihood of the technical attack (certain attack methodologies 
are more common than others – this will be discussed in Chapter 5) and the complexity of 
conducting the attack. The vulnerability phase (Step 2) consists of identifying the potential 
vulnerabilities that are to be rated and prioritised in the assessment. Non-technical vulnerabilities 
(Step 2A) can be associated with both the context and limitations in the planning phase of the IW 
Lifecycle Model; for instance insufficient legal frameworks, political segregation, or economic 
dependence may make a nation susceptible to an IW attack. Technical vulnerabilities (Step 2B) can 
be identified through assessing the categories of the MEII process through the use of various 
techniques; examples of these are provided in the Analysis Method 2 column of Table 4.2. When a 
potential vulnerability is identified, the complexity or effort a threat would need to expend in 
exploiting it should be rated. 
The countermeasures and defences (Step 3) may be determined whilst identifying the 
vulnerabilities; the strength of the controls in place need to be rated; the non-technical factors (Step 
3A) will need to be estimated according to available information. The strength of the technical 
countermeasures (Step 3B) may be determined from datasheets, product specifications, vendor 
whitepapers and reports, and simulations. For example, a report may rate anti-virus applications 
according to the success rate of detecting and removing malware; this can then be used to rate the 





Table 4.2: The Proposed Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment Framework, van Niekerk and Maharaj (2011a) 
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The impact of a vulnerability being exploited by a threat (Step 4) can be estimated through use of 
wargaming, what-if and scenario analyses, simulations, and expert input. Potential ecological 
consequences (Step 4C) of an attack can be determined with a what-if or scenario analysis coupled 
with an environmental impact assessment. Possible opportunities or solutions to mitigate 
vulnerability (Step 5) can be identified through use of intelligence, product specifications, and 
vendor whitepapers; expert input may also be able to identify possible solutions through experience. 
Opportunities include participating in political alliances and joint technical committees, or 
improving and introducing technical controls. Ensuring compliance and accreditation will also aid 
in mitigating risk and vulnerabilities. 
In the paragraphs above five steps in the process were described; during this process certain 
variables need to be rated; these will be used to determine the vulnerability and risk rating in a 
process that has been modified from the FAIR analysis. These variables can be summarised as: 
 The likelihood of the threat taking action; 
 The estimate capability of the threat; 
 The required capability to overcome the identified vulnerability; 
 The strength of the controls and countermeasures in place to protect the vulnerability; and, 
 The impact or loss should the vulnerability be exploited. 
These variables will be combined through the use of a modified FAIR process (or equivalent 
method according to organisational preferences). This is Step 6, and is illustrated in Table 4.3, 
where the X indicates the two variables are used in a risk matrix to determine the rating of the 
variable above. The primary modification from the original FAIR process is that the loss or impact 
no longer has primary and secondary factors. This is due to the fact that the primary impact of an 
IW attack (which will correspond to the objectives and motivation of the aggressor in the IW 
Lifecycle Model) will be more significant than any secondary factors; however, if the secondary 
factors can be estimated this may be incorporated. Another modification is that the variables for 
rating the threat and vulnerability have been altered. In an IW situation, the likelihood that the threat 
is making contact indicates an action of some form; the threat rating is therefore a combination of 
the threat capability and the likelihood of action. The vulnerability rating is a combination of the 







Table 4.3: Proposed Framework Rating Determination, van Niekerk and Maharaj (2011a) 
Risk 
Likelihood of a successful attack X Loss or Impact 







Control strength  
X  
Required capability to 
exploit vulnerability 
    
The likelihood of a successful attack is a combination of the threat and vulnerability ratings; this is 
then combined with the impact rating to estimate risk for that particular vulnerability and threat 
pairing. Examples of the risk matrices used in the process are presented in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5; 
qualitative ratings of very low to very high are used (however these rating can be adjusted 
according to requirements). 
Table 4.4: General Risk Matrix for the IW Fair Process, van Niekerk and Maharaj (2011a) 
Variable 2 
Variable 1 
V. Low Low Med High V. High 
V. Low V. Low V. Low Low Med Med 
Low V. Low Low Low Med High 
Med Low Low Med High High 
High Low Med High High V. High 
V. High Med Med High V. High V. High 
 
Table 4.5: Vulnerability Matrix for the IW Fair Process, van Niekerk and Maharaj (2011a) 
Control 
Strength 
Required Capability to Exploit Vulnerability 
V. Low Low Med High V. High 
V. Low V. High V. High High Med Med 
Low V. High High High Med Low 
Med High High Med Low Low 
High High Med Low Low V. Low 
V. High Med Med Low V. Low V. Low 
To keep track of the threat, vulnerability, and impact associations used in the process above a 
modified Threats-Vulnerabilities-Assets (TVA) worksheet may be used; an example is illustrated in 





modified to be vulnerability-centric; threats are associated with the vulnerabilities. The potential 
impacts of the vulnerability-threat associations are estimated, and for each the risk is determined 
using the process described above. 
Table 4.6: Modified TVA Worksheet 
Vulnerability name and 
rating 
Associated threat names 
and ratings 
Estimated impact type 
and rating 
Estimated risk rating 
Vulnerability 1 (Rating) 
Threat A (Rating) 
Impact 1-A-1 (Rating) 
Impact 1-A-2 (Rating) 
Risk 1-A-1 (Rating) 
Risk 1-A-2 (Rating) 
Threat B (Rating) Impact 1-B-1 (Rating) Risk 1-B-1 (Rating) 
Threat C (Rating) Impact 1-C-1 (Rating) Risk 1-C-1 (Rating) 
Vulnerability 2 (Rating) 
Threat B (Rating) Impact 2-B-1 (Rating) Risk 2-B-1 (Rating) 
Threat D (Rating) Impact 2-D-1 (Rating) Risk 2-D-1 (Rating) 
Up to this point, the identified vulnerabilities and the associated risks have been evaluated; the 
vulnerability and risk ratings of the entire infrastructure need to be determined. Step 7 of the 
process is determining the ratings for the infrastructure vulnerability and risk using vector 
mathematics. The magnitude of a vector is calculated as shown in Equation 4.1: 
 4.1 
where I is the number of elements in the vector. The list of vulnerabilities are taken as a vector, with 
very low having a value of one, and very high having a value of five. The infrastructure 
vulnerability is then calculated as the magnitude of the vulnerability vector, as shown in Equation 
4.2: 
 4.2 
where N is the number of identified vulnerabilities and vi is the individual vulnerability rating. 
Similarly, the infrastructure risk is determined by taking the vector magnitude of all the individual 






where M is the number of risk elements and ri is the individual risk rating. As each vulnerability 
may have multiple threats associated with it, there may be more than one risk rating per 
vulnerability; therefore from Equations 4.2 and 4.3, Equation 4.4 should hold true: 
 4.4 
Vector magnitude is used to calculate the infrastructure vulnerability and risk as these exhibit 
similar characteristics: the vector magnitude increases as the number of elements or the magnitude 
of any one element increases. Likewise, the more individual vulnerabilities, or the more severe any 
single vulnerability, the greater the overall infrastructure vulnerability will be. 
This process provides the ability to compare the overall infrastructure vulnerability or risk as the 
individual vulnerability or risk ratings change or are introduced or eliminated. The vulnerabilities 
may be prioritised by calculating the risk magnitude for each identified vulnerability, then ranking 
them according to their associated risk values. Vulnerabilities with higher risk values need to be 
addressed with higher priority than those with low risk values. The vulnerability and risk ratings 
may also be calculated for an individual asset, or for a specific impact type or attack objective, such 
as DoS, exploitation, corruption, and misuse. The relevant elements are treated as a vector for each 
area of interest, and the magnitude is calculated. An example of this is illustrated in Table 4.7 and 
Equations 4.5 to 4.7. 





DoS Corruption Exploitation 
V1 3    
V2 2    
V3 4    
V4 3    









From this example, it can be seen that there is a greater vulnerability to a DoS attack compared to 
one to that will exploit or corrupt the data or information. The overall framework is adaptable in 
that it is modular, so any one aspect of the high-level structure can be replaced by an analysis or 
assessment methodology to suit the requirements of the organisation. Section 4.3.2 applies this 
proposed framework to the case of cloud computing. 
4.3.2 Framework Application Example 
This section presents an example of the proposed vulnerability assessment framework; in this case it 
is applied to the case of cloud computing in a corporate IW situation. A secondary objective of the 
thesis is to provide an additional assessment of an infrastructure; this section performs that role in 
addition to illustrating the application of the framework. The background to cloud computing is 
provided in Section 2.8.5. A previous version of this study was published in van Niekerk and 
Maharaj (2011a). During this assessment, some incidents will be referred to; some will be discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 5. Section 4.3.2.1 provides a background to the scenario, and Section 
4.3.2.2 presents a threat assessment. Section 4.3.2.5 presents the vulnerability and risk assessment, 
Section 4.3.2.6 presents the opportunities, and Section 4.3.2.7 provides a review of the framework. 
4.3.2.1 Scenario Background 
Some areas of the scenario will be hypothetical, yet based loosely on actual incidents. It can be 
assumed that the organisation employing cloud services in residing in Country A. This organisation 
has provided services to the political opposition of the government of Country B, who has an 
aggressive network warfare policy, and a number of cyber-based attacks and espionage incidents 
have been attributed to them. It can be assumed that a hybrid cloud model incorporating a 
combination of community and private deployments is employed; part of the cloud offers services 
that contain sensitive government information. A client is required to access the cloud services on 
all end-user machines, and it is possible to access the services from smart mobile devices. 
4.3.2.2 Threat Assessment 
This section provides the threat assessment for the scenario. This corresponds to Step 1 in the 
framework; both non-technical and technical factors will be considered. 
Step 1A: Non-technical factors 
It is apparent from the Wikileaks incident discussed in Section 4.2.7.4 that organisations which 
become involved in politically sensitive or controversial incidents may be targeted with cyber-based 





(Information Warfare Monitor, 2009; McMillan, 2010). According to the Trustwave Global 
Security Report 2011, two of the top three targeted data types are trade secrets and corporate data 
(Trustwave, 2011). There is also a possibility that there may be political or social attacks through 
public statements by the government condemning the support of their opposition and malicious 
rumours, respectively. It can be assumed there is a low prevalence of this, and such a government 
will have a high capability is such tactics, giving a medium threat. In a context where a company 
with sensitive information that has supported the political opposition of a government with 
aggressive cyber-policies, it is apparent there is a high likelihood that it will be attacked. 
Step 1B: Technical factors 
According to the Cisco Annual Security Report 2010, enterprise networks are regularly infected 
with malware and consumer systems also experience a high infection rate; large service abuse levels 
results from this (Cisco, 2011). This report also indicates that since 2008, one of the top three 
prevalent attack types is a DoS attack (ibid.); as discussed in Sections 4.2.7.1 and 4.2.7.4, this was 
also used to target Estonia and organisations in the Wikileaks incidents. As botnets are created 
through malware, the DoS attacks are in some way related to malware infection rates; however, the 
main target of malware is to gain financial account information (Cisco, 2011; Trustwave, 2011). 
These methods could also be used to gain account details for unauthorised access to cloud services. 
The Trustwave report also indicated that only a small proportion of attacks against applications 
were against vulnerable third-party software. Another security problem is that wireless 
communications are susceptible to interception, even with security measures in place, and the 
increase in prevalence of smart mobile devices is resulting in new vulnerabilities (Trustwave, 
2011). Social engineering is also considered a large threat (Cisco, 2011). According to Hayden 
(2010), the primary goal in IW is the ability to control an adversary's information through both 
breaching confidentiality and altering the information integrity; however this is complex. 
Monitoring the adversary's information is secondary, should full control not be achievable. A DoS 
attack is a last resort; however, this is the simplest to conduct (Hayden, 2010).  
From the threat description the ratings can be determined given a high likelihood of attack from a 






4.3.2.3 Vulnerability, Countermeasure, and Impact Assessment 
The section rates the vulnerabilities and countermeasures. This corresponds to Steps 2 to 4 in the 
framework. 
Table 4.8: Threat Ratings 
Attack Capability Prevalence/Likelihood Overall Rating 
DoS High Low Medium 
Breach confidentiality Medium Very High High 
Attack on client 
vulnerabilities 
Medium Medium Medium 
Malware High High High 
Attack on wireless services Medium High High 
Exposure due to mobile 
devices 
Medium High High 
Social engineering High High High 
Political attack High Low Medium 
 
Steps 2A, 3A, and 4A: Non-technical factors 
For this example there are only a few non-technical factors; these ratings will be from an 
organisational perspective. The legal liability when considering cloud computing is uncertain as 
there is no universal standard that governs this. A reasonable control will be a strong service 
agreement which clearly defines the security responsibilities and liabilities. Due to the legal 
uncertainty, this can be rated as medium. Any breach could leave the organisation open to legal 
proceedings; therefore the capability to exploit this vulnerability is low. Using Table 4.5, this gives 
a vulnerability rating of high. The impact from legal issues can be rated as medium; they use 
organisation resources and may provide negative publicity. 
An organisation does not have the political power of a full nation; therefore the required capability 
to politically attack the organisation is low. The only protection against this is to have strong 
political connections; however even this will be unable to prevent any attack, therefore the control 
can be considered as low. The vulnerability is therefore high; however the impact will not be great, 
and can be rated as low. 
A broad social attack, where malicious rumours are used to damage the organisations image, only 
requires low capability; however, laws and strong corporate communications will be a strong 





management as medium. The social impact can be considered as low, due to the origin of the 
rumours. However, should this be coupled with a data breach, both the impact and vulnerability will 
be high. 
Employees who are unaware of potential threats may fall victim to social engineering. Due to the 
widespread use of social networks, this has become an ideal social engineering tool through which 
employees can be targeted (Trustwave, 2011). As social networks can be accessed on personal 
mobile devices that are outside of the organisation's network blocking employee access will have 
little affect; employee awareness training is cited as the most effective measure (Cisco, 2011; 
Trustwave, 2011). The required capability to conduct social engineering is low. As it preys on 
human weaknesses and creates uncertainty, the affects of awareness training will have it limits; 
therefore the control strength can be rated as medium. This results in a high vulnerability to social 
engineering. Using the information gained from social engineering, such as logon details, an 
attacker may breach confidentiality and integrity; this has a very high impact. 
Steps 2B, 3B, and 4B: Technical factors 
Cloud services may be physically located outside of the physical and network perimeter of the 
organisation; therefore any data being retrieved from or sent to the cloud will pass through the 
organisation's network gateway. As the connectivity to the cloud is dependent on the functioning of 
the gateway, this can be considered as a singularity, or a central point. Should the organisation's 
gateway be subjected to a DoS attack, the availability of the cloud services will be severely 
hampered. Little can be done to protect from large quantities of illegitimate traffic overloading the 
gateway; filtering may help to a small extent. The control strength against a DoS attack is very low. 
To conduct a DoS attack a botnet needs to be created and maintained, however there are tools 
available on the Internet to do so. The required capability can therefore be rated as medium; using 
Table 4.5 the vulnerability rating is seen to be high.  
In April 2011 Amazon's cloud services experienced an outage (Brooks, 2011); the potential impact 
of an outage can be illustrated by this incident, where organisations that relied on these services 
were badly affected. For the SaaS and PaaS models, where the applications reside on the cloud, an 
outage may have a high impact as the client organisation will lose the availability of the 
applications or the ability to run them. For an IaaS model, where the cloud services can be seen as 






As the client used to access the cloud services is installed on all end-user machines, any design flaw 
or vulnerability will be repeated for every installation of the client. This is applicable to the concept 
of homogeneity; in this case it is high, and therefore the vulnerability will increase. Possible 
solutions to homogeneity proposed in Anderson et al. (1999) do not apply here; segmentation of the 
network will not remove the client vulnerabilities, and heterogeneity is not possible; therefore the 
control strength can be considered as very low. The client will not be freely available as it is for 
subscribers to the cloud services; any potential attack would first need to acquire the software in 
order to discover potential vulnerabilities prior to exploiting them. Therefore the capability required 
to exploit this is very high. This gives a vulnerability rating of medium. Should a vulnerability be 
exploited, an attacker may be able to access sensitive information, corrupt the information, or 
temporarily deny the user access to services. According to Hayden's priorities (described in Section 
4.3.2.2), the impact due to a breach of confidentiality or integrity can be rated as very high; 
temporarily denying a user access can be rated as low. 
As the cloud services require network connections, the proper functioning of the internal 
organisational network will affect availability of the cloud services. Should the internal network be 
operating very close to its maximum capacity it may be susceptible to internal DoS attacks. This 
can be created by propagating malware as the infect systems, or a few infected machines 
transmitting large quantities of data packets; this will degrade legitimate traffic and thus the 
accessibility to the cloud services. Antivirus applications can be considered to be able to detect and 
remove a large proportion of known malware; however, they are not effective against previously 
unseen malware. Therefore they can be rated as having a high control strength. Malware creation 
kits are freely available on the Internet (Fisher, 2011c), yet the attacker still requires some technical 
ability; this will therefore be rated as medium. Provided the anti-virus applications are updated 
regularly, the vulnerability to malware can be rated as low. 
The impact of a malware infection will be temporary; the infected machines can be removed from 
the network and cleaned, but the network services will not be available during recovery. Therefore 
the impact can be rated as medium for all cloud service models. Some malware, such as keyloggers 
and backdoors, allow for the retrieval of information from systems and logon details; this will then 
provide the attackers with the information to gains access to the cloud servers and corrupt the data 
and breach confidentiality. The vulnerability and threat ratings are the same for malware, however 





The introduction of mobility into an organisation's ICT increases vulnerability. The use of wireless 
networks and mobile communications results in electro-magnetic exposure, which is susceptible to 
jamming (denial of service) and interception. Whilst there are security measures on both wireless 
and mobile communications to prevent interception, these measures can still be broken (Nohl & 
Paget, 2009). The control strength against interception can be considered to be medium. Very little 
can be done regarding the jamming of wireless communications, except for removing the 
interference source; the control can therefore be considered as very low. The required capability to 
jam a connection is low as sufficient interference will do the job; however to break the encryption 
will be more difficult, and to breach integrity even more so. In addition to this, the attacker would 
need to be physically within signal range to conduct any of these attacks; this indicates a high level 
of planning would be required. The required capability will therefore be listed as very high to 
corrupt integrity, high to breach confidentiality, and low to jam the signal. This results in the 
respective vulnerabilities being high for jamming, and low for intercepting or corrupting the data in 
transit. The impact of jamming a mobile wireless connection is low; the user will only lose 
connectivity briefly. Breaches of integrity and confidentiality will be as before: very high. 
Mobile devices may also be lost or stolen which increases physical exposure. The information 
contained thereon can be used to access cloud services. Whilst there are methods of remotely 
wiping the devices of all information, the attacker may retrieve the required logon details before the 
owner realises the device is missing and locks it. The control strength can therefore be considered to 
be medium. Low capability is required to steal the device. The vulnerability is therefore high. The 
impact is as before: very high for the breach of confidentiality and integrity. 
There is also a degree of physical exposure of an organisation's internal network, and the connection 
points to the external Internet. An attacker may attempt to gain access in order to breach 
confidentiality or integrity, or disrupt services. With reasonable physical security and awareness 
training, gaining access may be difficult; therefore the control strength can be considered as high. 
The required capability to gain access can be considered to be medium, as there is a risk of getting 
caught and possibly inside information or assistance would be required to gain full access. This 
results in a low vulnerability. To cut external physical connections, however, may be simpler, and 
the required capability is low, with low control strength. This gives a high vulnerability to denial of 
external connectivity. As before, the impact of breaching confidentiality or integrity is very high, 





The data residing on the cloud infrastructure (for the IaaS model), and the data in transit between 
the organisation's network and the cloud infrastructure may also be targeted. Encryption provides a 
strong control, however it can be broken. It can therefore be rated as high for preventing a breach of 
confidentiality, and very high for detecting corruption. The required effort to break the encryption 
can also be rated as high for breaching confidentiality and very high for corrupting the information; 
this results in a low and very low vulnerability, respectively. The impact for these breaches will be 
very high. 
The functioning of cloud services is dependent on the correct functioning of the organisation's 
Internet service provider (ISP). Should a DoS attack be successfully mounted against the ISP, the 
organisation will lose access to the cloud services; no control can be provided by the organisation 
for this, and the strength can be considered to be very low. However, the ISPs are resilient, and have 
their own control measures; the required capability to disrupt them would be very high. The 
vulnerability is therefore medium. As for a DoS attack on the organisation's gateway, the impact 
will be low for IaaS and high for both SaaS and PaaS models. 
4.3.2.4 Modified TVA Worksheet and Individual Risk Ratings 
The threats from Section 4.3.2.2 and the vulnerability and impact rating from Section 4.3.2.3 are 
summarised in Table 4.9. Using the modified FAIR method (Table 4.3) and the risk matrix (Table 
4.4), the risk rating is determined. 
4.3.2.5 Infrastructure Vulnerability and Risk Ratings 
The ratings for the infrastructure vulnerability and risk are determined using Equations 4.2 and 4.3, 
respectively. The individual ratings are listed in Table 4.9; where very low is equivalent to 1 and 
very high is equivalent to 5. The infrastructure vulnerability and risk ratings are calculated for the 
IaaS and SaaS/PaaS models; and ratings for the three impact types (denial, corruption, and breach 
of confidentiality) are determined. These are presented in Table 4.10. There are a total of fifteen 
identified vulnerabilities, and twenty-three associated risks (with two variants between the cloud 
service models). From Table 4.10, it can be seen that the greatest vulnerability is to DoS attacks, 
then breaches of confidentiality, and least vulnerable to corruption of information. However, the 
highest risk is for confidentiality breaches, then corruption, and then DoS has the lowest risk. This 
corresponds to Hayden's (2010) claims that accessing information is more beneficial to an attacker; 
however, it is more difficult compared to simply denying access to the victim. Breaching 
confidentiality has a lasting impact, and is both detrimental to the victim and beneficial to the 





the attacker is able to allocate resources to the attack. There is also a difference in risk between the 
IaaS and SaaS/PaaS models; this is due to the potential impact that differs between the two service 
models. The non-technical areas also contributed to the risk; this indicates that considering the 
context will impact on the risk and vulnerability assessment. 
Table 4.9: Cloud Services TVA Worksheet 
Vulnerability name and 
rating 
Associated threat names 
and ratings 
Estimated impact type 
and rating 
Estimated risk rating 
Political (HIGH) Political (MEDIUM) LOW Political (MEDIUM) 
Social  
(MEDIUM) 
Rumour (MEDIUM) Rumour (LOW) Rumour (LOW) 
Including breach (HIGH) Including breach (HIGH) Including breach (HIGH) 
Social engineering (HIGH) 
Social engineering  
(V HIGH) 
Integrity (V HIGH) Integrity (V HIGH) 




SaaS/PaaS (HIGH) DoS SaaS (HIGH) 
IaaS (LOW) DoS IaaS (MEDIUM) 
Client vulnerability – 
homogeneity 
(MEDIUM) 
Attack on client 
vulnerability (MEDIUM) 
Integrity (V HIGH) Integrity (HIGH) 
Confidentiality (V HIGH) Confidentiality (HIGH) 
Denial (LOW) Denial (LOW) 
Internal network operating 
capacity (LOW) 
Malware (HIGH) Denial (MEDIUM) Denial (MEDIUM) 
Malware – key loggers and 
backdoors (LOW) 
Malware (HIGH) 
Integrity (V HIGH) Integrity (HIGH) 





Integrity (V HIGH) Integrity (MEDIUM) 
Confidentiality (V HIGH) Confidentiality (HIGH) 
Wireless jamming (HIGH) Jamming (HIGH) Denial (LOW) Denial (MEDIUM) 
Mobile devices – exposure 
(HIGH) 
Theft (HIGH) 
Integrity (V HIGH) Integrity (V HIGH) 
Confidentiality (V HIGH) Confidentiality (V HIGH) 
Network physical exposure 
(LOW) 
Inside access (MEDIUM) 
Integrity (V HIGH) Integrity (HIGH) 





Denial SaaS/PaaS (HIGH)  SaaS/PaaS (HIGH) 
Denial IaaS (LOW) IaaS (LOW) 
Encryption vulnerabilities 
– integrity (V LOW) 
Encryption attacks (HIGH) Integrity (V HIGH) Integrity (MEDIUM) 
Encryption vulnerabilities 
– confidentiality (LOW) 
Encryption attacks (HIGH) Confidentiality (V HIGH) Confidentiality (HIGH) 
Dependence on ISP 
(MEDIUM) 
DoS attack on ISP 
(MEDIUM) 
SaaS/PaaS (HIGH) DoS SaaS (HIGH) 






Table 4.10: Infrastructure Vulnerability and Risk Ratings, adapted from van Niekerk and Maharaj (2011a) 
 IaaS SaaS/PaaS Maximum possible rating 
Denial and disruption 
VI = 8.37 
RI =6.24 
VI = 8.37 
RI = 8.37 
VI = 12.25 
RI = 12.25 
Breach of confidentiality 
VI = 7.55 
RI = 11.4 
VI = 7.55 
RI = 11.4 
VI = 13.23 
RI = 13.23 
Corruption 
VI = 7.35 
RI = 10.77 
VI = 7.35 
RI = 10.77 
VI = 13.23 
RI = 13.23 
Non-Technical 
VI = 5.0 
RI = 5.39 
VI = 5.0 
RI = 5.39 
VI = 7.07 
RI = 8.66 
Overall 
VI = 12.0 
RI = 17.72 
VI = 12.0 
RI = 18.57 
VI = 19.36 
RI = 23.98 
 
The ratings presented here are for an IW scenario where there is a high likelihood of attack; for 
normal organisational operating conditions, the risks will not be as high, and there will also be a 
reduction in the vulnerability due to the different context. 
As confidentiality is the highest risk, the priority should be on addressing the relevant 
vulnerabilities. Addressing some non-technical issues may also reduce the threat context, which will 
reduce all risks. The two individual vulnerabilities that have the highest risk are social engineering 
and exposure due to mobile devices; these need to be addressed in particular. 
4.3.2.6 Possible Opportunities 
This section presents possible opportunities to reduce the risks and vulnerabilities presented above. 
This corresponds to Step 5 in the proposed vulnerability framework, presented in Table 4.2. 
Step 5A: Non-technical factors 
The organisation's political and legal standing may be improved by joining international 
partnerships and alliances. By becoming involved the organisation may be able to contribute to the 
necessary international security standards regarding cloud computing. Ensuring compliance to 
international standards will also aid in reducing risk and vulnerabilities. As social engineering and 
exposure due to mobility are the two highest risk vulnerabilities, awareness training should be 







Step 5B: Technical factors 
The organisation may introduce improved or additional technical security measures; improving 
technical access controls to the network and cloud services will reduce the vulnerability and risk of 
a breach. 
4.3.2.7 Framework Review 
The proposed vulnerability assessment framework was applied to a hypothetical scenario of an 
organisation under threat of an IW attack; the assessment was conducted to investigate the 
vulnerabilities and risks regarding the organisation's deployment of cloud computing services. 
The vulnerability framework was able to adequately describe the scenario, and the results were 
consistent with the literature regarding IW threats. The modular and layered nature of the 
framework will provide a user to replace certain techniques or methodologies with those that are 
more suitable for their specific needs. 
4.4 Chapter Summary 
The chapter presented the proposed adapted IW model, the IW Lifecycle model, and the 
vulnerability assessment framework. A need was identified for a consolidated and standardised 
model for IW; the proposed framework intended to contribute towards this. It was also used to 
generate the proposed vulnerability assessment framework, which is from an IW perspective. This 
framework will be employed throughout the remainder of the thesis to perform the vulnerability 
assessment of the mobile infrastructure. 
Both the IW model and the vulnerability assessment framework were applied to case studies; the 
IW model was used to analyse a series of historical and current incidents, and the vulnerability 
assessment framework was applied to a hypothetical scenario of an organisation employing cloud 
computing services. The IW model was able to describe the various incidents, even though they 
were related to different functional areas, and were of differing magnitude. The results of the 
vulnerability framework were consistent with literature. These results indicated that breach of 
confidentiality is the highest risk; however, there is a higher vulnerability to DoS attacks. The 







Chapter 5. Trend and Incident Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will discuss various trends that may be realised after discussing recent cyber-based 
incidents over the previous 12 years up to 20 October 2011; no information after this date was 
considered. Secondary data is also used to illustrate the cyber-environment for South Africa in a 
global context. The information presented was gathered from a variety of documents, including 
online and print news, books, academic articles, and reports. The chapter is organised into a funnel 
approach, where the later sections have a narrower focus than the earlier sections. 
Section 5.2 illustrates the importance of information as a strategic asset and how it relates to 
information warfare and security. Section 5.3 discusses the trends of recent conflicts, and the 
changing role that electronic warfare and network warfare are taking. Section 5.4 analyses the 
trends of cyber-based incidents, and how the Internet is becoming weaponised. Sections 5.5 and 5.6 
follow this line of analysis, yet focus on the security incidents related to mobile phones and Web 
2.0 technologies, respectively. Section 5.7 discusses these trends and secondary data in the South 
African environment, and places this in a global context. There may be some repetition regarding 
the analysis of specific incidents; however, the analysis will be conducted from different 
viewpoints. Section 5.8 summarises the chapter. Figure 5.1 illustrates the structure and flow of the 
chapter. 
5.2 Information as a Strategic Asset 
Information is a crucial element when in a state of conflict or competition. Unconventional and 
asymmetric conflict may be conducted by states, and non-state actors such as insurgents and 
criminals; this section will also discuss the role of corporate competition and network warfare as 
asymmetric conflicts. Society is becoming more reliant on the virtual world, and the information 
and related processes and systems are becoming increasingly important to strategic decision 
making. The effective use of information may prove to be an equaliser in an asymmetric 
environment, for example e-commerce allows small companies to compete on a global scale, and 
can reduce the decision cycle time through the production of timely, accurate and relevant 
information. A previous version of this section was published in van Niekerk & Maharaj (2010a). 





regarding conflict and competition in asymmetric environments; Section 5.2.3 illustrates the 
application of trend analysis to information security and warfare; and Section 5.2.4 summarises the 
section. 
5.2.1 A History of Strategic Information 
The concept of strategic information may be found in various forms throughout history. Examples 
from the myths and legends of the ancient world include the example of the Trojan Horse, where 
the Greeks used their knowledge of the Trojan customs to deceive and ultimately defeat them. The 
fall of the old gods in Norse mythology was brought about through the use of information by the 
trickster god Loki. Both Sun Tzu and Sextus Julius Frontinus in his work Strategemata discuss 
deception in battle (van Creveld, 2000). Alexander the Great made use of intelligence to find 
weaknesses in the Persian Empire, which allowed him to defeat a numerically superior force, and 
Genghis Khan improved his communications lines to allow his forces to provide critical mass at any 
point (Delibasis, 2007). A German general in the First World War, von Seekt, also recognised the 
importance of knowledge (van Creveld, 2000). Numerous examples of code-breaking, propaganda 
and deception can be found in the Second World War (Delibasis, 2007), and this continued through 
to modern times during the Cold War between the West and former Soviet Bloc; in South Africa the 
Apartheid regime censored the media in an attempt to control information, and this continues in 
some regimes today. 
Information in Asymmetric Conflict
Asymmetric Conflict Affects on Information Warfare
















Stannard (2008) provides examples of the South African Air Force using intelligence and 
information to avoid superior Soviet-made aircraft in order to avoid casualties in their sorties into 
Angola; this allowed a technologically inferior force to be more efficient than the superior one. 
During the Angolan and Mozambique campaigns, the detail of intelligence needed to be great – 
specific locations and addresses were needed prior to conducting raids. An example also shows that 
intelligence may prove beneficial beyond the battlefield: the South African forces captured a 
Soviet-made air-defence system in Angola which had not previously been seen by Western 
intelligence; this provided the South Africans with the opportunity to "trade" intelligence (Stannard, 
2008). 
5.2.2 Conflict and Competition in an Asymmetric and Unconventional Environment 
Asymmetric conflict is usually when one participant has a vast superiority over the other, most 
commonly in technological abilities or numbers; this situation usually results in an unconventional 
conflict, where the inferior participant changes tactics to compensate for the asymmetry. There are 
also cases of moral or ethical asymmetry, such as the use of child soldiers, suicide bombers, and 
human shields. With the modern pervasiveness of information and communications technology, the 
information asymmetry between adversaries and competitors has become more pronounced. 
5.2.2.1 State of Asymmetric Conflicts 
The majority of modern armed-conflicts are unconventional, and involve non-state actors. Table 5.1 
shows the number of armed conflicts for the period 2002 to 2005, from a dataset initiated by 
Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, & Strand (2002). Table 5.2 shows the number of non-
state armed conflicts for the same period. The two tables originate from different data-sets, so there 
is not a perfect match, however it can be seen that a large number of conflicts are classed as minor, 
and that the number of non-state armed conflicts is relatively large; from this it can be determined 
that the vast majority of armed conflicts are low-intensity with non-state actors. Figure 5.2 shows 
the number of armed conflicts for a longer period (1994-2008); as can be seen from 2003 there has 
been a gradual increase in the number of armed conflicts, primarily due to the increase in minor 
armed conflicts. From Table 5.2 it appears that the majority of non-state conflicts occur in Sub-








Table 5.1: Armed Conflicts 2002-2005 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 
Minor (25-999 deaths p.a.) 25 24 25 27 
Major / War (>1000 deaths p.a.) 7 5 7 5 
Total 32 29 32 32 
Source: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Ver.4-2009 (Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program, International Peace Research Centre, 2009); Gleditsch et al. (2002) 
 
Table 5.2: Non-State Armed Conflicts 
Region 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Sub-Saharan Africa 24 23 17 14 
Americas 2 2 4 3 
Asia, Central and South 3 5 3 4 
Asia, East & SE & Oceania 2 0 1 1 
Middle East & North Africa 3 3 3 3 
Total 34 33 28 25 
Source: UCDP/Human Security Centre Dataset (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 
Internation Peace Research Institute, 2007). 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Number of Armed Conflicts per Year, source: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Ver.4-2009 





The low-intensity unconventional conflicts may have an impact on business, in that many revolve 
around the areas rich in strategic raw materials; therefore industries reliant on these materials may 
face shortages or increased prices, or may be required to introduce additional security measures for 
their operations in regions of conflict. Security and defence-related industries may actually receive a 
boost due to conflict in that there is a greater demand for their products and services. Tourism may 
also be negatively affected in areas which experience heightened levels of violence. It is therefore 
important to follow the trends in conflict as it may impact on business, or on the political 
environment resulting in increased tensions and therefore the possibility of related security 
incidents. 
5.2.2.2 Strategic Information Related to Piracy 
Piracy at sea is growing, particularly off the coast of Somalia, where pirates see this as a viable 
financial or economic venture; and they have learnt that the ransom for the crew and cargo is far 
more rewarding than robbery (Carney, 2009). Many shipping corporations have learnt that 
tolerating the pirates and paying the ransom is often less costly and troublesome than having to deal 
with the insurance, the resulting investigations and the negative impact on their reputations 
(Torchia, 2009). Webb (2009) reports that the Somali pirates are utilising a form of business 
intelligence, whereby informants in London are providing shipping details to the pirates by satellite 
phone; this information provides the pirates with a strategic asset that allows them to plan and 
choose their targets. However, the pirates still make mistakes despite their advantage of being 
forewarned; the French naval flagship was misidentified in poor light and attacked, which resulted 
in the capture of five pirates (Asquin, 2009). Decision makers in the shipping companies, and those 
who rely on these companies, would be wise to keep track of pirate tactics and trends to evaluate 
the risk of using shorted (but pirate-infested) routes as opposed to longer (but safer) shipping lanes. 
Due to hostilities amongst many of the nations that are providing naval forces to police the pirate-
infested waters, a fully co-ordinated effort is difficult; this has resulted in a neutral communications 
channel called Mercury (StrategyPage.com, 2009b). This circumvents the political hostilities, and 
together with increased aerial reconnaissance is hindering the pirate's operations (StrategyPage.com, 
2009b). 
Broadcasts may also be pirated; as they are wireless, it is easy to receive the signal, which then 
could be unscrambled using modified decoders, enabling the broadcast to be viewed without having 
to pay the subscription. An example is DirectTV in the United States; the access cards for their TV 





to understand the workings of the signal pirates, and then using this information released apparent 
updates that rendered the pirated access cards useless (ibid.). It is also possible to interfere with 
these broadcasts by transmitting another signal over it, which effectively jams the signal; this 
occurred in Sri Lanka, where the British Broadcasting Corporation suspended their partnership with 
the Sri Lankan national broadcaster after the transmission had been interfered with (TamilNet.com, 
2009). Other media, such as CDs, DVDs, and software are also pirated, resulting in loss to the 
production companies; it is in their interests to protect the copyright of their products, which has 
resulted in an ongoing struggle between to improve copyright protection schemes and methods to 
break them. 
5.2.2.3 Strategic Information and Asymmetric Competition in Business 
During the industrial age, organisations that were heavily dependent on communications needed to 
be centralised; however, the rapid advancements in information and communications technology 
have allowed organisations to become geographically dispersed without compromising their 
communications. Even though organisations are physically dispersed, the employees may become 
virtually coalesced through regular contact via the use of communications technologies and social 
networking applications. 
The concept of asymmetric conflict may be seen in the corporate sector. Small, medium, and micro 
enterprises (SMMEs) are disadvantaged when compared to larger companies; they do not have the 
financial strength, buying power, employee numbers and possibly brand recognition that the larger 
corporations are renowned for. By making effective use of information technologies, and 
particularly the Internet, the SMMEs can compete on a global scale. Their smaller size and lower 
overheads allows them to be more adaptable, undercut costs of their larger competitors, or offer 
customised services, all of which would prove to be an advantage. This is analogous to small 
guerrilla forces in a military context. 
Information regarding the culture of a target audience is of strategic value in both propaganda and 
marketing. Iraqi propaganda broadcasts during the 1991 Gulf War failed in their attempt to 
disillusion American forces due to their lack of understanding of American culture; the broadcasts 
claimed that the soldier‟s wives would be sleeping with Tom Cruise, Tom Selleck, and Bart 
Simpson (Denning, 1999). Coca Cola introduced Diet Coke into Japan, and the product failed and 
had to be renamed Low-Calorie Coke due to a negative perception of dieting in Japan (Nakamoto, 






Corporations may also be provided opportunities by asymmetric conflict: a California-based 
company developed software based on PayPal‟s model for identifying cyber-criminals which they 
used to discover terrorist financing networks and trends in roadside-bomb attacks (Weinberger, 
2009). 
5.2.2.4 Network Warfare as an Asymmetric Conflict 
Cyber-attacks provide the attacker with an asymmetric advantage: Hayden (2010), a retired general, 
claims that Internet "geography" favours the attacker. Major cyber-attacks include the DDoS attacks 
against Estonia and Georgia. The largest Estonian bank was forced to close its Internet banking 
website and is estimated to have lost over $1 million (Rolski, 2007). The cyber-attack on Georgia 
preceded the Russian military incursion into South Ossetia, and by targeting the government and 
media organisation the Georgian ability to communicate domestically and internationally was 
severely hindered (Hart, 2008); this gave the Russians information dominance regarding the view of 
the conflict. 
Cyber-incidents may also be used to gain information; Section 5.4 will discuss these in more detail. 
Phishing attacks are aimed at tricking online banking customers into revealing sensitive account 
information that allows criminals to access the money (Pickworth, 2009). Phishing attacks were 
involved in the SMS banking fraud in 2009, where an excess of R5 million was stolen (De Vries, 
2009); a scam that targeted South African Airways in 2007 resulted in a R14 million loss 
(Rondganger, 2007). Remediation costs from major outbreaks of viruses and worms may also prove 
to be costly (Veerasamy & Eloff, 2008). 
Cyber-attacks are asymmetric in that the attacker may be able to maintain a high degree of 
anonymity; whilst it is possible to identify individual computers that are involved in a DDoS attack, 
the persons controlling them may never be identified. The cost to the attacker is also far less than 
that of the defender. Cyber-based scams also present a lower risk than a physical robbery, and may 
be more rewarding, as can be seen from the examples the amounts stolen were in the order of 
millions of Rands. 
It is not yet established as to what constitutes network warfare in the form of cyber-war: some 
contend that for it to be a true cyber-war, then it should be nation-states as the main protagonists 
(Schneier, 2010; Fiterman, 2010). Others argue that due to the global shift towards unconventional 
conflict between sub-national groups and organisations, cyber-war cannot be expected to follow the 





organisations participating as a major protagonist (Fiterman, 2010). Should this be the case, then it 
is probable that cyber-war would exhibit asymmetries, as are found in the modern unconventional 
conflicts. 
5.2.3 The Application of Trend Analysis to Information Warfare and Security 
As mentioned in Section 5.2.2.4, cyber-based security incidents are asymmetric in that the attack is 
essentially faceless. There is a definite need to protect corporate and personal information and the 
systems the information resides on, as a breach raises concerns of information integrity, corporate 
image and legal liabilities. Knowing the trends in security incidents and the legalities that surround 
them is of strategic importance. This section discusses examples and illustrates the usefulness of 
applying trends to generate models. 
A written information security policy is a strategic asset in that it aids in mitigating corporate 
liability should an employee use a corporate system for breaching confidential information or 
launching an attack on another party; should there be no written policy, that employee cannot be 
held liable for misconduct, which will place liability on senior management (Etsebeth, 2006). 
Similarly, it is possible for organisations to be held legally liable for a compromised system to be 
emitting unsolicited or malicious transmission; many organisations set their gateway or firewall 
policies to filter data ingress, however leave egress policies and allow networks to freely transmit 
over the Internet (Brenton, 2006). By providing egress protection, the organisation may preserve the 
availability of its gateways to the Internet from flooding; and may mitigate the legal implications of 
participating in a DDoS attack, even if it was unintentional. This policy is also wise with wireless 
application services on mobile phones, as unsolicited and spam SMS messages may also result in 
legal liability. In South Africa, the Wireless Applications Service Providers Association attempts to 
regulate the industry and fines offending organisations (Perelson, Ophoff, & Botha, 2006). 
To illustrate the creation of knowledge from information, and the use in strategic decision making 
with regard to risk analysis, a trend showing the potential compensation payout for the number of 
records compromised if an organisation's systems were breached was generated; this is shown in 
Figure 5.3. The plot was generated from actual compensation amounts due to legal proceedings in 
the United States. A trend line was then fitted to the data points using the trendline option in 
Microsoft Excel, and the equation of the trend line was displayed in the figure. As can be seen, the 
trend in compensation amounts follows a power law, and increases rapidly initially compared to the 





were compromised. This is a rough estimate; with more data points the plot will be more accurate, 
and can be used to calculate the potential loss due to a data breach.  
The Ponemon Institute (2008; 2009a; 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; 2011a; 2011b) releases annual studies 
of the costs of data breaches. Table 5.3 summarises these costs per record breached. The main trend 
that is that the cost to the organisation per record breached is increasing each year. 
Table 5.3: Cost Per Record Breached, source: Ponemon Institute (2008; 2009a; 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; 2011a; 
2011b; 2011c) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
US $138.00 $182.00 $197.00 $202.00 $204.00 $214.00 
UK   £47.00 £60.00 £64.00 £71.00 
Germany    112.00 € 132.00 €  
Australia     $123.00 $128.00 
 
Similarly, the fine for distributing spam emails in the United States can be approximated with the 
following equation (Hartman, 2005): 
, 5.1 
where F is the fine is Dollars, Lemail is the size of the emailing list, and Tdistributed is the number of 
times the emails were sent per annum. 
 
































Such models may be used in a risk analysis process to calculate the financial impact due to systems 
being compromised and used to distribute spam, or the data being breached. Likewise, analysing 
trends in attack statistics and methods may aid the identification of future threats and the likely 
vulnerabilities that they will exploit. These trends will also be useful in attempting to protect critical 
information infrastructure from attack. 
5.2.4 Summary 
Information, data, and knowledge may aid in strategic decision making. This section provided a 
history of strategic information, and the benefits in an asymmetric environment. Examples were 
provided to illustrate the corporate sector and network warfare have strong asymmetric elements, 
and the role strategic information may play in these situations. Examples of using trends to predict 
financial impact from information security breaches were provided. 
5.3 Trends in Conflicts and the Impact on Information Warfare 
In order to assess what the future roles of IW could entail, it is necessary to analyse trends in recent 
conflicts. Of particular interest is the technology level employed in conflicts, and how this would 
affect the enabling domain of the IW construct. This section will analyse the employed technologies 
in a number of sample conflicts and incidents from 1993 to 2010. An earlier version of this section 
was published in van Niekerk & Maharaj (2009c). The chronological order of the conflicts and 
incidents is shown in Figure 5.4; however, they will be discussed in groupings according to themes 
in Section 5.3.1. Section 5.3.2 will summarise the trends in these conflicts, and Section 5.3.3 will 
discuss the potential future roles of IW. 
5.3.1 Background to the Sample Conflicts 
The conflict in Somalia is generally known for the Black Hawk Down incident in 1993, however 
the events preceding and immediately following that incident is what defined that conflict. The 
United Nations troops providing aid in Somalia were continuously having their convoys ambushed 
and raided by the warlords; the primary weapons used for this purpose were remotely detonated 
mines. United States forces entered Somalia to support the United Nations, and aimed to capture the 
most powerful warlord, Mohammed Farrah Aidid, and his aides. The Central Intelligence Agency 
supplied sophisticated electronic surveillance technology; however, this was defeated by the 
Somalis, who were using basic-handheld radios and drums to communicate (Adams, 1998). The 





servicemen in front of CNN cameras; this resulted in the US public successfully pressuring the 
government to withdraw (Taylor, 2002). This incident was described in more detail in Section 
4.2.7.3. Subsequently, handheld radios and mobile phones were captured along with Somali pirates; 
therefore it is obvious that these devices are still being used to coordinated attacks (Shachtman, 
2009b). 
The Rwandan genocide of 1994 used a mix of low-technology and high-technology; radio 
broadcasts were used to incite the violence, yet machetes were the main weapon to conduct the 
slaughter (Hutchinson, Huhtinen, & Rantapelkonen, 2007). Ethnic tensions in the Congo region and 
Darfur in 2003 employed similar low-technology solutions. The border war between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea, where two of the world‟s poorest nations managed to field advanced weapon systems, 
including fighter aircraft with electronic warfare systems, came as a surprise (Du Toit, 2003). These 
examples illustrate the use of improvisation with everyday items to conduct violent conflict, 
however technology can be bought and introduced almost overnight; this creates a degree of 
uncertainty in the battlefield. 
Ignatieff (2001) has dubbed the NATO intervention in Kosovo as a "virtual war"; the actual fighting 
consisted of aerial bombardment, there were a number of cyber-based attacks from both sides, and a 
propaganda war through the media. The initial attacks concentrated on suppressing the Yugoslav 
 





air-defence network, before migrating to military ground forces and dual-use targets. These latter 
targets could be used by both civilian and the military; such as bridges, broadcasting stations and 
power substations (Ignatieff, 2001). The conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2003 was initiated in a 
similar fashion; with the suppression of adversary capabilities using bombardment and electronic 
warfare, which was followed by a ground offensive (conducted by the rebels in the Afghan case). 
These conflicts also saw the introduction of embedded journalists who reported virtually real-time 
from the battlefield. After the overthrow of the regimes, the conflict turned into an insurgency, 
where ambushes were orchestrated through the use of suicide bombers and improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs); which have been the most effective weapon deployed against coalition forces 
(Eshel, 2007). Many of the IEDs are remotely detonated using everyday devices, such as toy radio 
controls and mobile phones (Eshel, 2007); and are comparatively low-technology compared to the 
systems of the coalition forces. Similar devices were used in the urban terrorism in Cape Town 
during the late 1990‟s; again mobile phones were occasionally used as trigger devices 
(Sabasteanski, 2005). 
Political confrontation has migrated to the communication networks; in April 2007 Estonia was 
subjected to cyber-based attacks that were a demonstration of dissatisfaction over the relocation of a 
war memorial. Estonia was left without some critical services as the websites of the government, 
financial institutions and media were attacked for a period of three weeks (Veerasamy N. , 2009b; 
Germain, 2008); this was described in more detail in Section 4.2.7.1. In 2009 three waves of similar 
attacks targeted the websites of financial institutions, government and the media in the United 
States and South Korea (Sudworth, 2009). As discussed in Section 5.2.2.4, Georgia was also 
targeted with similar attacks; this case is unique in that the cyber-attack immediately preceded by 
the Russian incursion into South Ossetia. The Russian government denied involvement in the cyber-
attacks, and it appears as they were orchestrated by hackers sympathetic to the Russian cause 
(Waterman, 2008). Myanmar also experienced a large scale DoS attack in 2010 due to internal 
political conflict (Labovitz, 2010). Modern equipment was fielded by both sides in the fighting 
itself (McDermott, 2009). Intelligence gathering of a confrontational nature has also migrated to 
cyber-space; in 2004 during the Titan Rain incident, military computers were penetrated in what 
appeared to be an intelligence gathering operation (Thornburgh, 2005a;2005b), and the GhostNet 
cyber-espionage network targeted political adversaries (Information Warfare Monitor, 2009). The 
Israeli conflict with Palestinian groups also migrated online through the "Electronic Intifada" (Yin, 





vehicles for surveillance and electronic warfare activities (Kunkel, 2008a). There are also reports of 
Israeli IW units hacking into mobile phone and media systems to disseminate PSYOPs messages 
(StrategyPage.com, 2009a); for the purposes of this dissertation, the concept in penetrating the 
communications infrastructure to insert illegitimate messages is important. 
Mobile phone SMS services and social networking applications have been used to orchestrate anti-
government protests, and to provide information after government-initiated media blackouts; the 
Philippines government resigned in 2003 (Rigby, 2008). Three occurred in 2009: the Iran post-
election protests (Faris & Heacock, 2009), Moldova‟s "Twitter Revolution" (Hodge, 2009a), and 
unrest in Urumqi, China (World Movement for Democracy, c. 2009). Subsequently there was 
political unrest in Tunisia and Egypt in early 2011, where social media and mobile devices played a 
role (Bay, 2011; Kessler, 2011).  Mobile phone SMS services were also used to distribute hate 
messages in Kenya during the 2008 election period (Okeowo, 2008); and were used to aid the 
orchestration of the 2010 food riots in Mozambique (Jacobs & Duarte, 2010). 
The incidents described in this section illustrate the increasing asymmetric nature of conflict, and 
the roles that civilian communications technologies are playing in these conflicts. The trends will be 
discussed in more detail in Section 5.3.2, and the impacts of these trends on IW will be discussed in 
Section 5.3.3. 
5.3.2 Conflict Trends 
In the conflicts presented in Section 5.3.1, some did exhibit direct engagements between forces with 
modern equipment; however; the majority exhibited asymmetric warfare, with the use of civilian 
infrastructure and technology as the primary tools for the inferior party. The introduction of 
network warfare as a tool in conflict is also apparent.  
A conflict may therefore have a technological complexity that can be divided into two broad 
categories: low-technology and high-technology. However, a conflict may transition between the 
two, or exhibit a mixture of the characteristics. These characteristics are shown in Figure 5.5. As 
example of a conflict is transitioning between the two complexities is the Iraq conflict; the initial 
coalition invasion exhibit force-on-force conflict. Subsequently, during the peacekeeping phase, the 
conflict has become an insurgency-type conflict, where improvised devices (such as IEDs) are 
driving the technological development of the superior forces, who struggle to counter such devices. 
The funding for research into jamming IEDs approximated US$ 6 billion in the 2006 fiscal year; 





illustrates the impact an improvised device can have on the more advanced militaries. It should 
therefore be noted that improvised or low-technology solutions may be extremely effective at 
countering modern high-technologies. 
 
 
 Unconventional, guerrilla tactics, 
possibility of high asymmetry. 
 Use of readily available civilian 
equipment and systems. 
 Improvisation using available 
equipment e.g. IEDs. 
 Possibility of cyber-war and hacking 
(if infrastructure supports it) 
 Use of civilian media. 
  Conventional force-on-force, 
possibility of low asymmetry. 
 Deployment of modern war-fighting 
technologies and introduction of new 
technology. 
 Convergence of Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT). 
 High probability of related cyber-war 
& hacking. 
 Use of civilian media. 
Figure 5.5: Technological Aspects of Conflict, adapted from van Niekerk and Maharaj (2009c) 
The conflicts exhibiting network warfare follow a high-technology route, where the convergence of 
ICTs can be readily seen. The conflict becomes largely virtual, where the actual attacks and 
counter-attacks are conducted across the Internet. The potential use of such an attack was seen in 
the Georgian conflict, where a DoS attack disrupted the Georgian communications during the initial 
stages of the Russian incursion. The mass anti-government demonstrations illustrate the fact that the 
ICT technologies become an enabler to the masses, who use these technologies to mobilise 
themselves and propagate their ideology. 
The arising conflicts occur for two reasons: ideology, or disputes over territory. Ideological 
conflicts are more likely to be information-based; as the conflict intensifies physical forces may 
become involved. Information-based conflicts cannot take and hold territory, therefore any 
territorial disputes will constitute primarily of physical forces. However, their tactics and success 








5.3.3 The Impact on Information Warfare, and its Future Roles in Conflict 
The conflict trends described above will have an impact on IW. The convergence of ICTs and the 
migration of mass-communications to computer-based systems, such as social networks and smart 
mobile devices, also results in the convergence of IW functional areas. 
A result of ICT convergence is that mobile devices are becoming smarter: they have processors, 
mass storage, cameras, traditional telecommunications, data communications, and social 
networking applications. This combination of wireless communications technologies and the 
capability for both data and voice communications results in a convergence of electronic warfare, 
network warfare, and information infrastructure warfare. Similarly, the social media and mass 
communications over the Internet result in a convergence of psychological operations, network 
warfare, and information infrastructure warfare. The use of the broadcast media for the spreading of 
hate speech illustrates a convergence of psychological operations with electronic warfare, as the 





EW – Electronic arfare 
NW – Network warfare 
 
IIW – Information infrastructure warfare 
PSYOPS – Psychological operations 
Figure 5.6: The Convergence of the IW Functional Areas 
Just as the use of civilian technologies in conflict is impacting on the military, military-style 
technology is becoming available in non-military situations. Jamming (electronic warfare) is being 
used to combat the use of smuggled mobile phones in prisons (Hodge, 2009b); the threat of IEDs 





operations. Another example is the use of a man-portable air defence system to attack a DHL 
aircraft at Baghdad International Airport in 2003 (McKenna, 2007); this indicates a decreasing 
distinction between military and civilian technologies. This raises a potential ethical dilemma: when 
can civilian infrastructures be targeted, and for what reason? Typically the targeting of civilian 
infrastructures is viewed negatively (Ignatieff, 2001); however inaction when radio stations to 
continuously advocate genocide, as in Rwanda, may be viewed as more immoral. The use of IW 
tactics, where the broadcasts may be jammed or prevented without physical destruction may make 
the action more acceptable from a moral standpoint. 
As cyber-space is global, and there is an ever-increasing demand on the electro-magnetic spectrum 
due to wireless communications, it is inevitable that there will be an overlap in military and civilian 
uses of the information sphere. Therefore it is highly likely that military operations in cyber-space 
will have some impact on the civilian usage of the information sphere. 
The roles of IW may therefore evolve from the concept of information superiority in a traditional 
military conflict to one that is capable of addressing a wider range of threats; this may include the 
targeting of civilian infrastructures out of necessity during policing actions in low-intensity 
conflicts, peacekeeping operations, or mass uprisings by populations against national governments. 
The use of these tactics, particularly network warfare tactics, may be employed by opposing 
factions who become vigilantes in tense political situations for ideological or patriotic reasons. 
Likewise, the use of military IW technologies may be used to support civil safety and security in 
situations where non-state aggressors have superiority over security forces in the information 
sphere. Section 5.4 focuses on this aspect of IW; Sections 5.5 and 5.6 focus on the specific cases of 
the mobile phones and Web 2.0 technologies, respectively. 
5.4 The Weaponisation of the Internet 
This section presents a trend analysis of IW and security incidents related to computer networks. As 
before, it will consist of incident case studies; these will be more in-depth than those presented in 
Section 5.3. The case studies will be presented in Section 5.4.1, and secondary data analysis will be 
presented in Section 5.4.2. This section aims at illustrating trends with regards to incidents using IW 
tactics; this will provide information regarding the context and threats for the vulnerability 





5.4.1 Incident Case Studies 
The incidents considered here range from 1998 to 2010, and include large-scale DoS attacks, major 
system penetrations, and major virus outbreaks. A timeline of the incidents is shown in Figure 5.7. 
Some were analysed in Section 4.2.7 and a summary will be provided; the remainder will be 
analysed using the IW Lifecycle Model.  
From Figure 5.7, general trends can be seen. Large-scale DoS attacks appear to occur from 2007 
onwards; whilst other examples exist, these are the only ones that were of national scale. There 
appears to be a decline of major viruses and worms that cause network disruptions; malware has 
shifted its focus to financial gain for criminals. System penetrations appear to be evenly spread over 
the considered time-frame. 
5.4.1.1 Solar Sunrise 
In February 1998, US Department of Defence systems were penetrated by a series of attacks; the 
subsequent multi-agency investigation was code-named Solar Sunrise (Cordesman, 2000; 
GlobalSecurity.org, 2011). The attackers hid their tracks, and it appeared that they were originating 
from multiple points across the globe (GlobalSecurity.org, 2011). The attacks were traced to two 
teenagers in California, led by another in Israel (Cordesman, 2000). This incident occurred during a 
period when the US was preparing for possible military action due to problems with the UN 
weapons inspections in Iraq; there was an initial concern that the attacks may attempt to disrupt 
deployments (GlobalSecurity.org, 2011). 
The importance of this incident is that it is one of the first recorded cyber-based attacks, and 
illustrated that teenagers had the ability to compromise government and military systems; this 
confirmed the vulnerabilities and the lack of warning capabilities of a cyber-attack that an exercise 












5.4.1.2 Moonlight Maze 
This is a series of attacks that began in March 1998 and lasted approximately three years; the first 
official report was in October 1999, and the incidents were codenamed "Moonlight Maze" (Adams, 
2001; Cable News Network, 2001; Cordesman, 2000). At the time this was the largest sustained 
attack on the US through the Internet, and appears to have originated from Russia; the targets 
included military, Department of Energy nuclear research laboratories, and the National Space 
Agency (Cable News Network, 2001; Cordesman, 2000). The timing and source of the attacks led 
experts to believe that they were state-sponsored (Cordesman, 2000). Large quantities of 
information were copied, and backdoors left for future access; as a result, the US Department of 
Defence ordered new encryption, and upgraded intrusion detection systems and firewalls (Adams, 
2001; Cordesman, 2000). 
The motivation appeared to be industrial espionage to gain technological information; hackers were 
used in network warfare to penetrate systems and extract the information. The US Department of 
Defence upgraded its network defences to mitigate the possibility of future successful attacks. The 
importance of this incident is it again illustrated the vulnerabilities to this type of attack, and is the 
first recorded incident of such a magnitude that appears to be state-sponsored espionage. 
5.4.1.3 Maroochy Water Services 
This incident was analysed in Section 4.2.7.5. To summarise, a disgruntled former employee used 
stolen equipment to penetrate sewerage works in Australia, and released raw sewerage into the 
public waterways. This incident has been used as the main example for an attack on infrastructure 
and the vulnerability of infrastructures to attack. The Stuxnet incident has further illustrated the 
possibility of cyber-based attacks on infrastructure, and will be discussed in Section 5.4.1.13. 
5.4.1.4 Titan Rain 
In 2003 to 2004 there were a series of system penetration into the US government, research 
facilities, and the military; these penetrations were given the codename "Titan Rain" (Thornburgh, 
2005a). The targeted systems would be methodically commandeered by the attackers, who would 
then copy as much information (in terms of computer files) as they could onto temporary storage in 
South-East Asia; these files would then be transferred from the temporary storage to servers in the 
Chinese mainland (ibid.). Beginning during the night of 1 November 2004, an intense period of 
intrusions occurred where four military systems were attacked within a twelve hour period (Espiner, 
2005). Among the stolen files was software for flight planning, and military helicopter 





(Espiner, 2005; Thornburgh, 2005b). From the reports, many are certain that the attacks were 
conducted, or sanctioned, by the Chinese government; however this very difficult to prove 
(Thornburgh, 2005b). It appears that in an attempt to defend the systems, the Titan Rain servers 
were counter-hacked; however, the person who was counter-hacking the servers, investigating the 
attacks, and passing the information onto the relevant authorities, lost his job as hacking was illegal 
in the US, and it could not be determined if his actions were sanctioned by the authorities. During 
later investigations, the Chinese government did not co-operate with the US investigators (ibid.). 
Using the IW Lifecycle model, the motivation for the attacks appears to be intelligence gathering 
and industrial espionage. The functional areas are therefore using network warfare to conduct 
intelligence gathering. The attack used expert hackers to penetrate systems, and copy files. A 
defence was mounted, however this was hindered by the US's own laws, and the Chinese 
government refusing to co-operate. What is important in this case is the effective use of hacking to 
gather intelligence and penetrate military networks. This could be used in a conflict situation where 
strategic and tactical information is required. 
5.4.1.5 Estonia 
This incident was described and analysed in Section 4.2.7.1; therefore a summary is provided here. 
A botnet-based DDoS attack was launched against Estonia in 2007, apparently by ethnic Russians 
who were offended by the relocation of a war-memorial. The attacks occurred over a period of three 
weeks, and government, financial, and media websites were targeted. The importance of this case is 
it is the first illustration that a nation's networks and function could be severely hindered by a large-
scale attack on computer networks over the Internet. 
5.4.1.6 Georgia 
Georgia was also the focus of a DDoS attack in 2008; the attack occurred just before Russian 
military forces entered the Georgian-South Ossetia conflict in support of the South Ossetians; the 
Russian government denied allegations that they were responsible for or supporting the attacks, and 
claimed that they were also a victim of DDoS attacks (Hart, 2008). The results of the attacks 
included internal and external communication difficulties for Georgia; in addition Georgian 
websites were also defaced (Coleman, 2008b). The traffic generated by the DDoS attack was 
estimated at approximately 814 Mbps (Labovitz, 2010). The attacks occurred at an opportune 
moment for the Russian military, as due to the lack of communication by the Georgians, Russian 





Using the IW Lifecycle model, assuming the DDoS attacks were sanctioned by the Russian 
government, the motivation would be to hinder Georgian communications in support of a military 
incursion, conduct psychological operations against the Georgians (through web defacements), and 
dominate the international perspective on the conflict by denying the information flow from 
Georgia. Botnets were used as a tool to conduct network-warfare, which supported psychological 
operations and command and control warfare. This incident illustrates the potential of using a 
DDoS attack (network warfare) via the Internet to support physical military actions. 
5.4.1.7 The GhostNet Cyber-Espionage Attacks 
The Information Warfare Monitor (2009) investigated a cyber-espionage network, which they 
named GhostNet. Computers were compromised by using social engineering and email attachments 
with malicious code to exploit vulnerabilities; these computers could then be mined for information. 
The retrieved information could then be used to further propagate the infection as legitimate 
documents (such as meeting minutes) would be circulated with malicious code (Information 
Warfare Monitor, 2009). The first recorded infections dated from May 2007, with spikes in 
December 2007 and August 2008, and lasted until March 2009; approximately 30% of the 
estimated 1300 infected computers across 103 countries were considered high-value targets. The 
ultimate target appears to be the Office of the Dalai Lama and organisations or political 
representation that has interaction with the office; the origin of the attacks appears to be in China 
(Information Warfare Monitor, 2009). Symantec Security Response released an online video 
illustrating the tools and the capability of espionage network; the attackers could take full control of 
an infected computer and monitor any activity on it (Symantec Security Response, 2009). The 
investigation began by request due to suspicions of system penetration; during the investigation the 
infections were removed (Information Warfare Monitor, 2009). 
Using the IW Lifecycle model, the motivation for the attacks is political espionage, in the context of 
political tensions between the office of the Dalai Lama and China. Malicious documents and social 
engineering were used to conduct network warfare, and ultimately gather intelligence. The 
investigation also removed the infection, thereby defending against it. This incident further 
illustrates the use of the Internet in mass remote espionage. 
5.4.1.8 DDoS Attacks on South Korea and the United States 
In July 2009 a series of DDoS attacks that appeared to originate from compromised systems located 
across sixteen countries were used to target websites in South Korea and the United States over a 





attacks against Estonia and Georgia, this did not appear to have a large impact; however it 
illustrates the potential of an individual, group, or nation to anonymously attack systems in multiple 
nations.  
5.4.1.9 DDoS Attacks on Twitter 
In 2009 a number of social networking websites were subjected to a DoS attack; Twitter was the 
worst affected and was inaccessible for a number of hours (Menn & Gelles, 2009). This attack 
appears to be related to the Russia-Georgia conflict in that the attack appears to have been aimed at 
silencing a pro-Georgian blogger by Russian hackers (Miguel, 2009). A few days later, a second 
DDoS attack targeted Twitter; on this occasion it appears to be related to the DDoS attacks on the 
websites in South Korea and the United States (Adhikari, 2009). 
The motivation for both the attacks appears to be silencing bloggers from making politically 
sensitive comments; the context is from previous political or ideological conflict. It can be assumed 
that botnets were again the tool used to conduct network warfare. Subsequent to the attacks, Twitter 
has improved its resilience to DDoS attacks. These attacks indicate that social websites may also be 
targeted due to one or more subscribers making politically sensitive comments. This confirms that 
the broader context is important when considering IW attacks. 
5.4.1.10 The Shadow Network: Cyber-Espionage 2.0 
This appears to be a second iteration of cyber-espionage originating in China; these attacks utilised 
free social media websites and email, such as Google, Yahoo! Mail and Twitter, as part of the 
command-and-control structure of the espionage network in order to "maintain persistence" 
(Information Warfare Monitor and Shadowserver Foundation, 2010). The Office of the Dalai Lama 
again appears to have been targeted as 1500 letters sent by the office between January and 
November 2009 were recovered; in addition a number of documents from the Indian government, 
some marked secret, and visa applications to the Indian representation in Afghanistan were 
recovered (ibid.). 
As with GhostNet, the motivation appears to be political espionage, in a context of political tension. 
This signifies the use of freely available online public communication and social applications as 






5.4.1.11 Operation Aurora: Cyber-Espionage on Google 
During the period when Google was threatening to cease operations in China due to censorship 
concerns, it was noticed that breaches had compromised Google's systems in what appeared to be 
state-sponsored corporate espionage emanating from China (McMillan, 2010). The attack type is 
known as an advanced persistent threat, and is in some ways similar to the GhostNet and Shadow 
Network espionage attempts; the McAfee team investigation the breaches of Google and other 
corporations named this attack "Operation Aurora" (Kurtz, 2010). As with the GhostNet espionage 
network, the attackers could gain complete control of the infected computers (South African Press 
Association, 2010). At the same time as the details were unfolding, a DoS attack was directed at 
lawyers involved in a software piracy case against China (ibid.). 
The motivation appears to be corporate and political espionage in a context of a tense political, 
economic, and corporate atmosphere. Network warfare attacks using the advanced persistent threat 
were employed to gain intelligence. As in previous cases, the investigation sought to recover and 
prevent these attacks. This further illustrates the use of the Internet as a vector for espionage; and 
the growing number of such attacks emanating from China is resulting in growing concern. 
5.4.1.12 Myanmar/Burma  
A DDoS attack against Myanmar (previously Burma) appears to have begun on the 25 October 
2010, and peaked on the 1 November; the generated traffic was estimated to be in the region of 10 
to 15 Gbps (Labovitz, 2010; Ragan, 2010). As the nation's external connectivity consists of 45Mbps 
terrestrial and satellite links, the nation's connectivity was easily overwhelmed. The motivation for 
this attack appears to be political, as this occurred just prior to the country's general elections, and 
the government has been known sever the Internet connectivity. Anti-government websites hosted 
outside of the nation were targeted by DDoS attacks earlier in 2010 (Labovitz, 2010). 
The motivation for the attacks appeared political; due to the scale of the attack it can be assumed 
that a large botnet was used to effectively deny international connectivity. The scale of the traffic 
flood should be noted; many nations would be hard-pressed not to have severe network degradation 
due to an attack of this intensity. 
5.4.1.13 Malware 
From Figure 5.7, there is a noticeable decrease in major malware outbreaks; the only noticeable 





infections. Table 5.4 lists the most expensive malware in terms of estimated financial impact, which 
is usually due to lost productivity and clean up (Kretkowski, 2007; Marquit, 2010). 
Table 5.4: Costliest Malware, sources: Kretkowski (2007) and Marquit (2010)  
Name Year Impact (US$) 
Morris 1988 10 million 
Blaster 2003 320 million 
Sasser 2004 500 million 
Nimda 2001 635 million 
SQL Slammer 2003 750 million 
SirCam 2001 1 billion 
Melissa 1999 1.2 billion 
Code Red 2001 2 billion 
Conficker 2007 9.1 billion 
ILOVEYOU 2000 15 billion 
SoBig 2003 37.1 billion 
MyDoom 2004 38.5 billion 
 
In addition to its financial impact, the speed at which the SQL Slammer worm spread was 
phenomenal; in half an hour it had infected many countries across all continents, and is shown by 
the interactive timeline (PBS.org, 2003b). The Witty worm of 2004 was the first known to be 
specifically designed to attack network security software. This attack was vendor specific to the 
product family of IBM Internet Security Systems; this limited its overall damage, even though it 
carried a destructive payload which gradually overwrites the hard-drive of infected PCs 
(Kretkowski, 2007). The Storm worm of 2006 was used to infect computers and turn them into bots, 
used to send spam; many versions tricked potential victims into downloading the malware with the 
use of fake links to online news reports or videos (Strickland, 2008). 
In 2009 there was a resurgence of the Conficker worm; reports indicate that British and French 
military systems were infected, causing widespread outages (Kirk, 2009; Willsher, 2009). There 
were reports that British warships were affected (Kirk, 2009) and that French fighter aircraft were 
prevented from taking off due to the infections (Willsher, 2009). This incident illustrates the 
possible use of malware to disrupt military systems and hinder war-fighting capability. 
The Mariposa botnet has also been considered as the worst malware of all time; it was estimated to 





(Associated Press, 2010). It appeared in late 2008, and spread through over 190 countries; those 
arrested by Spanish police in connection with some of the larger botnets bought this on the black 
market (Associated Press, 2010). 
Other versions of credential stealing malware are the Zeus series and SpyEye Trojans; these were 
originally rivals, but there were plans to merge the two into a single, powerful kit. There were also 
reports that existing clients of Zeus would receive a discount when purchasing SpyEye (Krebs, 
2010). Stevens and Jackson (2010) provide an in-depth report of the Zeus Trojan, which illustrates 
how advanced the Trojan was; the most expensive version was selling for approximately US$ 3000 
to US$ 4000. The Zeus malware also migrated to mobile platforms to target mobile banking 
(Kitten, 2010). The Rustock botnet was estimated to control over one million bots, making this the 
largest single botnet in 2010; the cost of hiring ten thousand bots was US$ 15 in 2010 (Symantec 
Corporation, 2011a).  This indicates an underground economy based on the production and hiring of 
malware used for cyber-crime, spam, and DDoS attacks. Occasionally the kits for the malware are 
made freely available online: the Zeus code eventually appeared for free, followed a few weeks 
later by the "Black Hole" exploit kit (Fisher, 2011c). 
The Stuxnet worm of 2010 was extremely advanced: it exploited four zero-day vulnerabilities, had 
multiple propagation methods, and utilised stolen digital certificates; it also is the first malware to 
specifically target industrial control systems (Falliere, O Murchu, & Chien, 2010; Keizer, 2010; 
Matrosov, Rodionov, Harley, & Malcho, 2010). Despite this, some experts believe there were 
mistakes, and that the worm could have been far more effective (Fisher & Roberts, 2011). The 
infection statistics of the worm were unusual: over 50% of the infections occurred in Iran (Falliere, 
O Murchu, & Chien, 2010; Keizer, 2010; Matrosov, Rodionov, Harley, & Malcho, 2010); and the 
targeted Siemens programmable logic controllers were used in an Iranian nuclear facility which was 
affected by the worm (Keizer, 2010; Moyer, 2010). This leads many to believe that the facility was 
the ultimate target of the worm, and that due to its sophistication, it was created by a state-
sponsored group (Fisher & Roberts, 2011; Keizer, 2010; Moyer, 2010). The ability to spread 
through USB drives allows the virus to cross over air-gaps into sensitive industrial networks, and 
the interference of the control systems may result in physical damage to the equipment. This 
incident is important as the capability to attack infrastructure through pseudo-targeted malware (in 
that it is product-specific) has been clearly demonstrated. There are also reports that the code for the 





From Figure 5.7 and Table 5.4, it can be seen that the period from 1999-2004 exhibited the bulk of 
the damaging malware; subsequently, the malware appears to be focussed more on creating botnets 
for use in cyber-crime; there appears to be an online black market economy based on these botnets. 
The impact of Conficker on military systems in 2009 and the Stuxnet incident in 2010 illustrate that 
the use of malware in a military network warfare scenario is no longer theoretical; the capability to 
target and affect both infrastructure and military information systems has been clearly 
demonstrated. 
5.4.1.14 Other Incidents 
This section presents examples of additional incidents; some of these incidents (or reports thereof) 
were released late in the study, and are therefore not analysed in-depth, but are included for 
completeness. 
In 1994 hackers accessed a US Air Force Research centre, known as Rome Labs, through the use of 
sniffer programs; from there they accessed other government networks (Cordesman, 2000). Initially 
the investigators were content with monitoring the hacking activities to determine the source; one 
was found to be living in the UK, and the relevant authorities were contacted. Eventually the 
hackers used the Rome Labs systems to penetrate a Korean nuclear facility and copy information; 
this caused a panic as it was not immediately apparent if the facility was in North or South Korea. A 
few days later a teenager in the UK was arrested and admitted to participating in the attacks. The 
US Air Force lost over US$ 200,000 in the attack, not including costs for the investigation, 
monitoring, and recovery (Cordesman, 2000).  
In 2001, suspicious intrusions were noticed in the systems of Mountain View, California; similar 
intrusions were found throughout the US and appeared to originate from South East Asia and the 
Middle East (PBS.org, 2003a). This appears to be related to evidence of monitoring of the US 
infrastructure uncovered when Al Qaeda computers were seized and examined after the 9/11 attacks 
(PBS.org, 2003a). 
Internal political tensions may also exhibit the use of cyber-based attacks: a series of hacking 
attacks and DDoS attacks occurred during both the 2005 elections in Kyrgyzstan (Open Net 
Initiative, 2005) and the 2006 elections in Belarus (Open Net Initiative, 2006). These attacks 
resulted in the websites of the media, non-government organisations, and political parties becoming 
inaccessible. International political tensions also result in spates of web-defacements; an example 





series of anti-government protests occurred; these protests made use of mobile technology and 
online social networks to co-ordinate activity and distribute information. The 2011 demonstration in 
Tunisia and Egypt was analysed in Section 4.2.7.6. A website known as Wikileaks was releasing 
compromised military and diplomatic information, which eventually resulted in a series of vigilante 
DoS attacks; this was analysed in Section 4.2.7.4. 
In August 2011 a report was released detailing intrusions into many international organisations over 
a five-year period; a total of 72 victims were listed in the report. The systems of the organisations 
were compromised using the advanced persistent threat, similar to the Google Aurora attacks; this 
series has been named "Operation Shady RAT" (Alperovitch, 2011). Although the report did not 
name the origin of the attacks, China is suspected of conducting the espionage (Nakashima, 2011). 
In addition to this, 2011 also exhibited a number of other significant system penetrations and 
attacks, some of which may be related to Operation Shady RAT:  
 The International Monetary Fund was reportedly hacked by a nation state (Kitten, 2011; Paul, 
2011);  
 Systems of three departments in the Canadian government were penetrated by an attack that 
appeared to originate in China. This included financial and defence research department 
(Weston, 2011); 
 The French Ministry of Finance confirmed computers were compromised, and apparently 
connected to China (Roberts, 2011a); 
 Malware was planted on the NASDAQ web portal (Leyden, 2011); 
 The London Stock Exchange reportedly suffered attacks (Goodin, 2011a); 
 Sony was the victim of multiple penetrations, most notably the PlayStation Network (Kitten, 
2011; Paul, 2011);  
 Google uncovered a campaign to compromise email accounts of Chinese political activists and 
officials in the US and Asia, media, and military personnel (Kitten, 2011; Paul, 2011);  
 Epsilon, an email marketer, had its subscribers details exposed after its servers were penetrated 
(Kitten, 2011; Paul, 2011); 
 Details of CitiGroup cardholders (in the US) were exposed after a penetration through the web 
portal (Kitten, 2011; Paul, 2011); 
 Iran reported a second malware-based cyber-attack in April 2011 (Dareini, 2011); 
 A report indicates a rising number of attacks against critical infrastructure organisations, 





 An infection in a Massachusetts Department of Labour and Workforce Development by the 
Qakbot worm was observed copying 200 MB of information each day during the infection 
(Roberts, 2011b); 
 RSA's SecurID authentication product was compromised by a advanced cyber-attack (Kitten, 
2011; Paul, 2011); 
 Lockheed Martin (a defence contractor) experienced attempted penetrations related to the 
SecurID hack, but it was reported that no data was compromised (Kitten, 2011; Paul, 2011); 
 L-3 Communications (also a defence contractor) experienced attempted penetrations related to 
the SecurID hack (Poulsen, 2011); 
 Northrop Grumman (another defence contractor) suspected a cyber-attack related to the 
SecurID hack (Kaplan, 2011); 
 The Oak Ridge National Laboratory in the US reported an advanced persistent threat attack 
similar to the one used against Google and RSA (Munger, 2011); 
 The Zimbabwe Stock Exchange website was hacked twice, apparently to be used to host 
malicious content (Kabweza, 2011); 
 The Hong Kong Stock Exchange suffered disruptions due to hack attempts (Subhedar & Leung, 
2011); 
 Hacker groups LulzSec (responsible for the Sony attacks) and AntiSec also target other 
websites, such as the US Senate, Central Intelligence Agency, and Apple (Sherr, 2011); 
 A Japanese military contractor, Mitsubishi, was a victim of "hack attack" in September 2011, 
where information was stolen from infected systems (Savitz, 2011); 
 A certificate authority DigiNotar was breached and the private key used for digital certificates 
was compromised. Counterfeit certificates were then distributed, indicating that this attack may 
breach other victims other than the initial attack (Chabrow, 2011); 
 In October 2011 there were reports that key-logger malware had infected the US Air Force 
systems that are used to control and pilot unmanned aerial vehicles (Roberts, 2011d; 
Shachtman, 2011); 
 In October 2011 malware was discovered that appears to be strongly related in the Stuxnet 
worm (Symantec Security Response, 2011).  
These incidents illustrate the early vulnerabilities to penetration and potential espionage; similar 





linked to political tensions and competition. The infection of the US Air Force systems further 
illustrates the applicability of malware to military systems and IW operations. 
5.4.1.15 Discussion of Incident Trends 
From the incidents presented in Sections 5.4.1.1 to 5.4.1.14, trends can be seen. The initial worms 
in the early 2000s resulted in degradation of network services and financial impact due to hindered 
productivity and recovery; this form of malware has given way to botnets, which can be used to 
steal details for cyber-crime, send spam messages, or conduct DDoS attacks. The major targeted 
DoS attacks that affected national connectivity have only recently occurred since the advent of the 
botnets. The low-key DoS attacks against websites are common (Labovitz, 2010); it is the size of 
the botnets that provides the capability to severely disrupt networks on a national level. Similar 
technology also appears to have been used in widespread cyber-based espionage. 
Whilst many attacks appear to originate from one specific nation, that government may not be 
involved; it could theoretically be another nation with advanced network warfare capabilities using 
compromised servers in China. The Stuxnet worm illustrated that malware can be used to target and 
affect infrastructure; Conficker affected military systems. China and other nations consider network 
warfare as a first-strike weapon to be used to cripple military deployments or response in the event 
of a conflict (Mulvenon, 1998). Whilst most of the malicious activity can be attributed to crime, 
there is growing recognition that the Internet is becoming "weaponised" (van Niekerk & Maharaj, 
2010c) or 'militarised' (Habib, 2011). The Internet is likely to be increasingly used for espionage 
and attack purposes. Reports by Crowdleaks (the successor to Wikileaks) indicate that the US 
military may have been seeking to develop a rootkit (laurelai, 2011). 
Of the incidents, the majority compromised the confidentiality of information; then second came the 
DoS attacks. This is consistent with Hayden (2010), who claims that the objective should be to 
control or monitor a competitor's information; if this is not possible then deny them the information. 
The DoS attacks also appear to be linked to cases where groups want to openly display political 
dissatisfaction. Espionage networks require stealth, and therefore are less overt. The incidents also 
confirm the need to consider the broader context when dealing with IW. The rate of system 
penetrations continues to indicate there are vulnerabilities in many websites and infrastructures; a 





5.4.2 Secondary Data Analysis – CSIRT Data 
This section presents the analysis of secondary data from various national CSIRTs; the raw data 
used in the analysis is freely available on the websites or the annual reports of the respective 
CSIRT. Many other CSIRTs exist, however their data is not made available to the public. Figure 5.8 
shows the total number of recorded incidents each year for the CSIRTs; the actual quantities are not 
as important as the trends. Certain categories, such as spam, were not considered. All the plots in 
Figure 5.8 show an exponential increase; some then peak and show a decline in the number of 
incidents. For Brazil and Malaysia the number of incidents at the time of typing in 2011 has already 
exceeded the 2010 number (CERT Brazil, 2011; Malaysian CERT, 2011). 
 
 








































































































































































Figure 5.8 (f): Hong Kong, source: (Honk Kong CERT, 2011) 
Figure 5.8: Total Number of Recorded Incidents per Annum for Various National CSIRTs 
Table 5.5 shows the most prevalent reported incident types for each CSIRT, where 1 is the most 
prevalent, and 5 is the least prevalent of those considered. The Netherlands was introduced, but was 
not considered in Figure 5.8 as absolute amounts were not provided; incidents were listed by 
percentage of the total. Hong Kong data was not used in Table 5.5 as it is only categorised into 
security incidents and virus incidents. To determine the overall prevalence, values are assigned to 
the categories according to their ranking, and added (top ranked is assigned a value of five, lowest 
ranking a value of 1). From this, the five most prevalent reported incidents are (in order): malware, 
fraud, intrusions and intrusion attempts, scanning, and website attacks. It should be noted that DoS 
attacks was the sixth most prevalent reported incident type for the CSIRTs of Finland, Malaysia, 
Poland, and joint sixth for the Netherlands. For Brazil intrusions were ranked sixth and DoS was 
seventh. 
This indicates that malware is still a common problem, and there are a large number of attacks that 
are aimed at penetrating systems or are scanning, which could be planning an attack. As discussed 
in Section 5.4.1, recent trends in malware allow them to be used for system intrusion and DoS 
attacks; therefore the prevalence of malware may be linked to the other reported incidents. As 
malware is so prevalent, it can be said that the Web is being weaponised; mostly for cyber-crime, 























  Table 5.5: Top Five Ranked Incidents by Prevalence in 2010, sources: CERT Brazil (2011); CERT 
Finland (2011); Indian CERT (2011); Malaysian CERT (2011); CERT Netherlands (2011); CERT Poland 
(2011); van Niekerk and Maharaj (2010c) 
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5.5 Mobile Device and Mobile Infrastructure Incidents 
This section discusses incidents regarding mobile phones and the mobile infrastructure. This will be 
split into two main areas: incidents regarding attacks or misuse of mobile devices or infrastructure, 
and trends in malware specific to mobile devices. The objective of this section is to identify 
vulnerabilities and threats from trends in incident reports; this aligns with the study objectives of 
gathering information in these areas, and then using it in the vulnerability framework. The possible 
roles of mobile devices and infrastructure in IW will be presented. 
5.5.1 Incident Trend Analysis 
This section presents the incidents regarding attacks on mobile devices or infrastructure, or misuse 
of legitimate functionality. Some of the incidents are potential vulnerabilities that have been raised 
through academic research. A previous version of this section was presented in van Niekerk and 
Maharaj (2010b). 
5.5.1.1 Attack by a Disgruntled Employee 
In 1999 the Vodafone messaging network was hacked into by an individual who was disgruntled 
with his employees; the attacker used the access to send illegitimate SMSs to more than 30,000 
international subscribers (Jones, Kovacich, & Luzwick, 2002; Weaver, 1999). The messages 
claimed that the recipients had won a car, and the attacker's employer should be contacted to claim 





resulting in an estimated financial impact of £10,000 (Jones, Kovacich, & Luzwick, 2002; Weaver, 
1999). Using the IW Lifecycle model, the motive of the attack was revenge; it appears that a 
network-based attack was conducted to gain illegitimate access to the mobile infrastructure, which 
was put to malicious use. As with the Maroochy Water Services incident (Section 5.4.1.3), this 
incident illustrates that someone with knowledge of the systems can gain illegitimate access; it can 
therefore be deduced that there are threats to the mobile infrastructure, and that a vulnerability was 
exploited. 
5.5.1.2 The Athens Affair: Espionage on Greek Mobile Phones 
In January 2005 it was detected that attackers had gained access to and manipulated network 
components of Vodafone Greece, allowing them to eavesdrop on more than 100 high-level 
dignitaries, including the Greek Prime Minister (Prevelakis & Spinellis, 2007). It appears that the 
attack first occurred just prior to the Athens Olympic Games in August 2004; due to the 
sophisticated nature of the attack, it was unclear if the system was penetrated from the outside, or 
there was insider assistance. It is also unclear if the eavesdroppers made recordings of the 
compromised calls (ibid.). The attack was detected when malicious software was discovered on four 
mobile switching centres (MSCs); the code subverted the legitimate wiretapping capabilities of the 
MSCs, which created a copy of the phone call that was sent to other mobile phones. An SMS was 
also transmitted to the attackers providing location information of the original caller (ibid.). 
As the MSCs are the core of a mobile network, there are advantages to compromising them: the 
signal through them is not encrypted, whereas the GSM and 3G wireless signals are encrypted; and 
the MSCs handle the majority of the voice traffic. However, the process to compromise the MSCs 
was complex: the rogue software had to be installed; remote access was required to add or change 
the target mobile phone numbers; it needed to remain hidden, therefore it had to circumvent system 
activity logging and prevent system administrators from discovering the activity. This process is 
described in details by Prevelakis and Spinellis (2007).  
An in-depth knowledge of the process is not required for this study; the fact that such 
eavesdropping was conducted illustrates that there are vulnerabilities in the mobile infrastructure 
that can be exploited to monitor mobile communications, and possibly compromise very sensitive 
information. The motivation of this attack appears to be espionage; with some network warfare 
aspects being used to control the rogue software. The possibility of insider assistance illustrates the 
potential threat of malicious insiders in a telecommunications company.  It should be noted that 





mobile phone networks to implement in South Africa due to the Regulation of Interception of 
Communications Act (RICA, 2002). Such legitimate functionality may therefore provide attackers 
the opportunity to intercept mobile communications. 
5.5.1.3 The SMS Banking Scandal 
In July 2009 it was discovered that a criminal group was intercepting online banking one-time 
passwords in South Africa; this allowed them to gain access to the accounts, and it is estimated that 
they stole over ZAR 7 million (van Rooyen, 2009).  Potential targets were identified through a 
phishing scam, and a Vodacom engineer was coerced into assisting the gang; he created duplicate 
SIM cards which allowed the interception of the SMS containing the one-time password (Dingle, 
2009; van Rooyen, 2009). The motivation for this attack was personal gain; some form of 
psychological operation (social engineering) was employed to coerce the engineer into assisting the 
gang. As the ultimate target was online banking accounts; this incident illustrates the use of the 
mobile infrastructure to compromise financial services that make use of mobile communications for 
security features. The relevance of the insider threat in the mobile telecommunications is further 
illustrated. 
5.5.1.4 The GSM Project 
This project used distributed computing to generate a look-up table that would allow an 
eavesdropper to break the A5/1 stream cipher that is employed to encrypt voice communications in 
the GSM wireless link (Nohl & Paget, 2009; Ragan, 2009). Whilst the technology required was 
demonstrated by Nohl and Paget (2009), the GSM Alliance estimates the required look-up table will 
be 2 TB in size, in addition to the equipment required to intercept the wireless signal (Ragan, 2009). 
In addition to this, the attack will need to be within range to be able to intercept the target signal; 
this method will probably not be able to conduct mass interceptions such as The Athens Affair. The 
motivation of the project was not malicious; it intended to illustrate vulnerabilities is the employed 
encryption to coerce mobile providers to improve the encryption of their networks (Nohl & Paget, 
2009). Due to the complexities of this attack it will be beyond most individuals; governments and 
intelligence agencies will have access to more sophisticated eavesdropping capabilities so this 
method would not be required. The methods employed in The Athens Affair and SMS Banking 
Scandal will probably be more efficient than the method proposed in this section. 
5.5.1.5 Exploitation of SMS Service for Denial of Service Attacks 
Enck et al. (2005) illustrate the potential for conducting a DoS attack on mobile services in a 





services. As the SMS service uses a control channel to transmit the message, a flood of messages 
may prevent the control channel from being allocated to voice calls; there is also the possibility that 
the switching stations in the network may become saturated. It is proposed that web-based SMS 
functionality (through External Short Messaging Entities (ESME)) may be compromised and used 
to flood the mobile network. It was calculated that 240 messages per second would be required to 
disrupt Washington, D.C., 165 messages per second to disrupt Manhattan. Allowing for improved 
capacity, these figures increase to 720 messages a second and 330 messages a second, respectively. 
It was calculated that approximately 325 500 messages per second would be required to disrupt the 
entire of the US mobile services. Given that the attack is conducted via the Internet, the required 
traffic capacity was calculated to be at worst 8437.5 kbps for Washington, D.C., 3867.3 kbps for 
Manhattan, and 3.8 Gbps for the US. It was also noted that using multi-recipient messages will 
reduce the required traffic (Enck, Traynor, McDaniel, & La Porta, 2005). Given the magnitude of 
the DDoS attack on Myanmar (presented in Section 5.4.1.12), this traffic is achievable. The 
calculations conducted by Enck et al. are conducted for a South African situation in Section 7.3. 
This research illustrates the potential susceptibility of mobile networks to a network-warfare style 
attack. As the capacity of mobile infrastructure components increases, the required messages and 
traffic will also need to increase to have the same affect. An interesting scenario may be where the 
network is flooded with malicious SMSs designed to crash smartphones; these SMSs are described 
in Mulliner and Miller (2009). This would both disrupt the network and result in many phones 
needing to be reset; this will be a DoS attack against both the network and the devices. 
5.5.1.6 Additional Incidents and Reports 
This section presents additional incidents; some of these occurred during 2011 and are not discussed 
in any depth, but are included for completeness.  
After the December 2007 elections in Kenya, the SMS services of the mobile networks were used 
as a delivery mechanism for hate speech, further inciting ethnic violence in the country (Okeowo, 
2008). Reports from the Middle East suggested that Israel has gained access to telephone and 
mobile phone networks through hacking. In 2008 reports claimed that Israel had used Syrian 
telecommunications to distribute messages offering rewards for information on missing troops; and 
attacks on the Lebanese telecommunications used the voicemail and SMS services to disseminate 
anti-Hezbollah messages (StrategyPage.com, 2008; StrategyPage.com, 2009a). In 2009 messages 
were sent to residents of Gaza warning them to remain indoors during Israeli military operations 





incidents illustrate the possibility of legitimate functionality of mobile services being put to 
alternative use; in these cases psychological operations. In the case of the Israeli attacks, it appears 
that network warfare methods were used to access and compromise the telecommunications 
systems; this further illustrates that vulnerabilities do exist which may result in the mobile 
infrastructure being compromised from a remote network-based attack. There have also been 
reports that Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles are jamming mobile phones and other broadcasts in 
Gaza (Shachtman, 2008). In September 2011 reports emerged that mobile phone networks in South 
Korea had been affected when it was alleged that the North Korean forces electronically attacked a 
US military aircraft (AFP, 2011). This indicates the potential use of electronic warfare against 
mobile communications; particularly in a conflict situation. Electronic warfare tactics have also 
been used to detected illegal mobile phones smuggled into prisons (Hodge, 2009b), and is being 
proposed to jam the mobile communications in US jails (Singel, 2009). Such commercial devices 
could also be used by attackers to disrupt legitimate mobile communications in cities. 
A phone hacking scandal resurfaced in the UK during 2011; journalists are accused of gaining 
access to individuals' voicemail for information in news coverage (INet Bridge and AFP, 2011). 
This further illustrates the vulnerability of telecommunication systems to illegitimate access. One of 
the war logs from Afghanistan that was released by Wikileaks (Section 4.2.7.4) indicated there was 
concern by coalition forces that the insurgents had insider assistance in the Afghan mobile 
networks, who would eavesdrop on coalition mobile calls (Tisdall, 2010). The report indicated that 
the calls from all ranks of the military and diplomatic representation was carried by the Afghan 
networks; from this it can be deduced that some militaries do routinely use mobile phones on 
deployment. Therefore, the security concerns of mobile devices apply to the military, and IW. 
Proposals for Android applications in military battlefield equipment (Ackerman, 2010) and a 
proposed mobile infrastructure for mobile computing in the US Army (US Army Signal Center of 
Excellence, 2011) further indicates the growing prevalence of mobile devices and infrastructure to 
the military, and therefore its relevance to IW. 
Mobile phones and social networks have also been used in mass anti-government demonstrations. 
These occurred in the Philippines in 2003 (Rigby, 2008); Iran, China, and Moldova in 2009 (World 
Movement for Democracy, c. 2009); and Tunisia, Egypt, and the North African and Middle East 
region in 2011 (Sky News, 2011). The demonstrations in the Philippines, Tunisia, and Egypt 





legitimate services are used to instigate actions that are considered illegal by the respective 
governments. These incidents will be discussed in more detail in Section 5.6. 
In 2011 vulnerabilities in GSM modules were demonstrated, where an attacker could identify and 
locate the modules (by GPS co-ordinates) over the mobile network; similar vulnerabilities also were 
found in industrial control systems (Fisher, 2011e). Research in Motion (RIM) discovered a severe 
vulnerability in their BlackBerry servers, where a malicious image sent to a device could potentially 
provide an attacker control of the servers; a patch was released for this vulnerability (Goodin, 
2011b). As the enterprise servers provided control of all BlackBerry devices connected to it, an IW 
attack against the server could have been severe for the victim organisation. There are also reported 
concerns over mobile-based DDoS attacks that could target the mobile operators; infected 
applications flood the mobile towers with requests to overload them (Spirovski, 2010). 
It was discovered that there was a breach of the Apple iPad's 3G services in June 2010; the SIM 
card authentication and email addresses of more than 100,000 high-ranking individuals in the 
United States were compromised (Tate, 2010). A report in 2011 suggests that the growing public 
concern over privacy and information security is related to the evolution of mobile technology; 
people want to know that they are secure when using mobile devices to conduct online transactions 
(Roman, 2011). Davidson and Yoran (2007) provide an example where a multi-billion Dollar 
corporate deal was lost due to employees discussing the details using unsecured mobile phones; this 
indicates either the discussion was intercepted, or some corporations are extremely concerned over 
the security of mobile devices. 
Phishing scams migrated to mobile devices in the United States in 2005 (Enck, Traynor, McDaniel, 
& La Porta, 2005; Swartz, 2005); these phishing scams appeared on South African mobile networks 
by 2009 (Francis, 2009). In South Africa, there have also been incidents where users have been 
billed for unwanted SMS subscription services (Knowler, 2010); this and the phishing scams 
indicate mobile phones are being subjected to similar techniques that targeted emails. The 
convergence of mobile devices and social networking applications may further increase the 
prevalence of these attacks. 
The concept of the remote kill switch may prove to be a useful security mechanism, but could also 
potentially be used maliciously to illegitimately disable devices or clear them of data. Intel has 
implemented this to allow an SMS to be used to disable lost or stolen notebooks (Roberts, 2010); 





twice (Keizer, 2011). Should such systems be compromised and used maliciously, an attacker could 
switch off notebooks at will, or remove legitimate functionality of Android devices. Malware may 
also be able to exploit any vulnerabilities in this system to deny the use of the devices. 
As mobile devices and the towers have antenna, they may be susceptible to attack by directed 
electromagnetic energy or electromagnetic pulses (EMPs). Miller (2005) indicates that there was 
low proliferation of weapons using directed energy or EMPs in 2005, and a high technological 
competency was required to develop such weapons. High-altitude detonation of nuclear weapons 
also generates a large EMP; this therefore will be restricted to nations with both nuclear weapons 
technology and the missile capability to detonate the payload at high altitudes (ibid.). A report 
assessing the impacts of EMPs on critical infrastructures in the US indicates that the mobile 
infrastructure is more susceptible to a widespread EMP than the fixed-line communications 
infrastructure due to mobile infrastructure components being less robust, and having less backup 
power (the electrical power grid may also be disrupted due to a large EMP) (EMP Commission, 
2008). Miller (2005) states that even if the devices and infrastructure survive, there will be a surge 
of attempted voice calls, which may overload the infrastructure. Other low-power directed energy 
weapons may have localised effects; therefore multiple attacks would be required for noticeable 
effects. The mobile infrastructure would have some measures taken to mitigate the effects of 
lightning strikes and interference (EMP Commission, 2008); these may be sufficient to protect 
infrastructure components from homemade devices. 
5.5.1.7 Summary and Discussion of Trends 
The incidents presented illustrate that there are vulnerabilities in the mobile infrastructure that can 
be exploited via network warfare. Examples of the relevance of insider threats to the mobile 
infrastructure were also presented. Once the infrastructure has been compromised, the attackers may 
accomplish a variety of objectives; including espionage, psychological operations, and 
compromising the security of financial services relying on mobile communications. Legitimate 
functionality may also be used in actions that may compromise national security such as the mass 
anti-government demonstrations. There is also a concern over the threat of EMP or directed energy 
weapons. 
The majority of the cases presented targeted confidentiality; the examples of using the legitimate 






5.5.2 Mobile Malware 
This section presents trends in mobile malware from the initial appearance of such malware; 
secondary data and specific reports are considered. Many of the trends presented here are deduced 
from descriptions and malware listings by Gostev (2006a; 2006b), Morales (2009a; 2009b), and 
Gostev and Maslennikov (2009). A previous version of this section was presented in van Niekerk 
and Maharaj (2011b).  
5.5.2.1 Trends in Mobile Malware Prevalence 
This section presents the trends in the prevalence of mobile malware; the figures for newly detected 
mobile malware variants and families over time are used to illustrate this prevalence. The numbers 
of newly detected families per year are illustrated in Figure 5.9. The reports by Gostev and Gostev 
and Maslennikov are not consistent with the listing presented by Morales; Parial (2005) and Gostev 
consider the Cabir virus of 2004 as the first mobile virus; however Morales lists three previous 
versions for the Palm devices, which is supported by the Trustwave report (2011). Morales lists 
malware up to July 2008; however Gostev and Maslennikov show a number of new malware 
detected from September 2008; this accounts for the large discrepancy between the two plots in 
2008. The plot of the total number of families assumes the higher figure between the two as correct; 
this provides an estimate of the overall number of detected mobile malware families. This plot 
exhibits an extremely rapid growth rate.  
The increase in the number of malware variants is presented in Figure 5.10. The number of new 
variants may be significantly underestimated in the figure due to the quantities of mobile malware 
discovered in the latter part of 2008. The same rapid growth rate is seen. Due to the increasing 
prevalence of mobile devices in society, and their increasing technical capabilities, this trend is 







Figure 5.9: Malware Family Numbers, sources: Gostev (2006a), Morales (2009a); and Gostev and Maslennikov 
(2009); van Niekerk and Maharaj (2011b) 
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Gostev and Maslennikov (2009) indicate that the number of malware trebled between 2006 and 
2009, which maintains the growth rate between 2004 and 2006 that was reported by Gostev 
(2006a). The Trustwave Global Security Report 2011 (Trustwave, 2011) indicates a 15% increase 
in mobile ransomware from 2010, and an 8% increase in general mobile malware. The increase in 
mobile malware illustrates that this is a growing threat, and may soon become as prevalent as 
traditional PC-based malware. 
5.5.2.2 Trends in Targeted Mobile Platforms 
The percentage of mobile malware targeting specific platforms from 2004 to August 2009 is shown 
in Figure 5.11 for malware families and Figure 5.12 for malware variants. The majority of activity 
surrounds the Symbian platform, with the Java (J2ME) platform also exhibiting a large proportion 
of activity compared to the other platforms. This is due to the prevalence or popularity of the 
platforms; the malware coders target the most prevalent operating system or platform to maximise 
the impact of the malware. The Nokia devices with the Symbian OS were the most common 
therefore they initially were targeted the most; the majority of Symbian malware is reported to be 
from the period 2004 to 2006 (Hyppönen, 2010). 
 
 
















Figure 5.12: Variants by Platform, source: Gostev and Maslennikov (2009); van Niekerk and Maharaj (2011b) 
Since the initial studies by Gostev and Maslennikov (2009) and Morales (2009a), additional devices 
and platforms have been targeted. In particular the Apple iPhone and iPad and the Google Android 
devices are being targeted; Seriot (2010) lists four malware types for the iPhone, however the 
discovered malware is limited to jailbroken devices (Hyppönen & Sullivan, 2010). 
5.5.2.3 Trends in Malware Type 
The percentage of each type of malware reported by Morales (2009a) for the period 2000 to July 
2008 is presented in Figure 5.13. From this, it is apparent that Trojans are the most prevalent, 
followed by viruses and spyware. This indicates that the majority of malware appears legitimate 
initially, and is therefore probably inserted into legitimate applications, such as a trial or demo 
version that is freely available. The viruses indicate that some infections occur due to the 
transmission of infected files. It is difficult to present a graphical representation of malware types 
per family as variants of the family may be of different type; for example, CommWarrior has 
Trojan, worm, and virus variants (Morales, 2009a). 
The numbers of detected malware types are listed per year in Table 5.6. From this it can be seen 
that the Trojans and viruses were prevalent up to 2006; during 2007 and 2008 the worm and 
spyware types were introduced and became prevalent. Account logon details may be compromised 
by spyware; therefore the introduction of this type indicates that mobile malware may be used for 


















Figure 5.13: Variants by Type, source: Morales (2009a); van Niekerk and Maharaj (2011b) 
 
Table 5.6: Annual Numbers for Types of Malware Variants, source: Morales (2009a); van Niekerk and 
Maharaj (2011b) 
Malware Type 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Virus 1 15 19 17 6 0 58 
Trojan 2 11 105 160 23 10 311 
Worm 0 0 0 0 2 7 9 
Spyware 0 0 0 5 15 0 20 
Garbage 0 0 0 8 0 0 8 
Riskware 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 
Total 3 26 124 191 46 18 408 
 
5.5.2.4 Trends in Malware Payloads 
The numbers of malware variants and families detected from 2004 to August 2006 are given for 
their payloads in Table 5.7. From these figures, the top three payloads can be seen to be sending of 
illegitimate SMSes, interfering or deleting files, and copying information. This trend is also noticed 
by Morales (2009a); however, he also raises the issue that the infected device's battery may be 
drained due to the heightened use of the SMS and Bluetooth connectivity due to the malware 

















financial gain by criminal elements (Hyppönen & Sullivan, 2010). The SMSes are charged for 
premium rate or international delivery; however the message is never transmitted fully resulting in a 
difference between the amounts charged to the victim and the transmission cost. The criminal 
elements retain this difference. Payloads have also been detected where the device dials these 
numbers, resulting in large phone bills. It is believed that these attacks will become even more 
prevalent (Hyppönen, 2010). Of the malware that send SMSes as a payload, only two families are 
classed as SMS flooders which could potentially be used to conduct DoS attacks; and one family 
with four variants uses SMS as a propagation vector.  A notable family of malware that interferes 
with system files is the Skulls virus, propagates by Bluetooth and replaces system applications with 
a skull icon, leaving only the telephone functionality operational (F-Secure Corporation, 2005). The 
subsequent introduction of mobile spyware may result in increasing amounts of malware that 
attempt to steal user data; three of the reported iPhone malware variants stole data from the device 
(Seriot, 2010). One iPhone malware variant behaved like a botnet (Porras, Saidi, & Yegneswaran, 
2009); botnets are widely used in PC-based malware as a tool for cyber-crime. 
Table 5.7: Malware Payloads, sources: Gostev (2006); Gostev and Maslennikov (2009); 
van Niekerk and Maharaj (2011b) 
Action Families (%) Variants (%) 
Infects files 4 (3.8) 11 (2.1) 
Sends SMS 42 (39.6) 237 (46.1) 
Replaces files, icons, fonts, system apps 15 (14.2) 172 (33.5) 
Installs additional malware/corrupted apps 8 (7.5) 44 (8.6) 
Interferes with anti-virus 5 (4.7) 36 (7) 
Disables or blocks functions, storage 5 (4.7) 9 (1.8) 
Steals data, monitors calls & SMSes 9 (8.5) 87 (16.9) 
Deletes files, fonts, folders, contacts, messages etc 8 (7.5) 8 (1.6) 
Interferes with phone booting/restarting 3 (2.8) 7 (1.4) 
Nuisance (changes settings etc, fake system 
messages, fake anti-virus etc) 
7 (6.6) 15 (2.9) 
Makes calls to paid services 2 (1.9) 3 (0.6) 
Other/unknown 11 (10.4) 13 (2.5) 
 
5.5.2.5 Trends in Malware Infection and Propagation Technologies 
The technologies employed by malware to infect device and propagate is listed in Table 5.8; this is 





vulnerabilities exploited by malware are in the operating system; Bluetooth and file application 
programming interfaces (APIs) are also prevalent infection and propagation technologies. The Cabir 
virus was the first to utilise Bluetooth technology to spread (Parial, 2005). The use of the file API 
confirms the statement in Section 5.5.2.3 that the prevalence of viruses indicates infected files were 
a major propagation technique. 
Table 5.8: Infection and Propagation Technologies, source: Gostev (2006); van Niekerk 
and Maharaj (2011b) 
 
Families (%) Variants (%) 
Bluetooth 5 (16.1) 33 (19.4) 
File API 8 (25.8) 24 (14.1) 
Network API 2 (6.5) 3 (1.8) 
SMS 2 (6.5) 3 (1.8) 
OS Vulnerability 18 (58.1) 124 (72.9) 
MMS 2 (6.5) 12 (7.1) 
Java 1 (3.2) 2 (1.2) 
Email 1 (3.2) 3 (1.8) 
Other/Unknown 2 (6.5) 3 (1.8) 
The majority of malware infections are ultimately due to the users allowing the malware to install 
itself on the device, followed by Bluetooth, MMS and multimedia cards (MMC) (Dunham, 2009). 
However, Dunham also reports a discrepancy in that users indicate larger rates of infections by 
MMS and Bluetooth rather than user installation; he proposes that the users report the propagation 
vectors as the infection mechanism as they are unwilling to accept responsibility for allowing the 
malware to install. From Dunham's report and the statistics illustrated in Table 5.8, it can be 
assumed that whilst the malware exploited OS vulnerabilities and file APIs, they also used social 
engineering to prey on the ignorance or gullibility of users to install them and infect the devices. In 
particular, the CommWarrior malware could propagate via either Bluetooth or MMS, but in the case 
of MMS some user interaction was required (F-Secure Corporation, c. 2007), which indicates social 
engineering. Users may also share infected files, especially Trojans, which aids in the propagation; 
however, as mobile worms are now being detected, a shift may occur where the malware has the 






5.5.2.6 Emerging Trends and Additional Malware-Related Incidents 
Due to the prevalence of mobile devices in modern society, the rapid growth in mobile malware 
numbers is not surprising. As with traditional PC-based malware, the popular devices are targeted; 
therefore the Symbian OS of Nokia was initially the focus of malware coders, however with the 
shift in popularity to the iPhone and Google Android devices, the malware focus has also shifted to 
these devices. Trojans appear to have been the most prevalent type of mobile malware; however, 
there has been the introduction of mobile spyware and worms. The malware payload appears to 
favour those that result in financial profit for criminal elements, yet there are still a large number 
that may leave a device inoperable due to corrupting files. File APIs, Bluetooth, and operating 
system vulnerabilities are reported as the most prevalent infection and propagation methods, 
however in many instances the users allow the malware to install on the device. 
The fact that the Ikee.B worm that targets the iPhone behaved as a botnet (Porras, Saidi, & 
Yegneswaran, 2009) indicates mobile malware attacks may begin to resemble and function more 
like PC-based malware. The Zeus malware, which was originally PC-based and targeted online 
banking, migrated to mobile devices and also targeted mobile banking (Kitten, 2010). Mobile 
phones may also be used to distribute PC-based malware; in March 2010 it was discovered that the 
Mariposa malware was installed on a PC when Vodafone UK's HTC Magic smartphones with the 
Android OS was connected to the computer; this malware then stole the user's account passwords 
(Charette, 2010). Concerns over pre-installed malware have led to the importing of Chinese-made 
mobile devices and infrastructure components being banned in India (StrategyPage.com, 2010d).  
In 2010 CNN hosted and broadcasted a war-game simulating the handling of a major malware 
attack by senior US government. The scenario, called "Cyber Shockwave", was that malware was 
using the mobile networks to propagate, and disrupting services; this migrated to computer 
networks (Cable News Network, 2010). The scenario was interesting as it used the mobile network 
was the point of entry for a malware-based IW attack, and also considered mobile malware 
migrating to computer networks. As occurred in the war-game, it will be very difficult to attribute 
such an attack with any certainty to a single organisation or nation. There is concern that an 
aggressive worm will spread through mobile networks and disrupt services on a global scale 
(Hyppönen, 2010), similar to the PC-based Slammer and Sasser worms discussed in Section 5.4. 
Whilst such a pandemic of mobile malware has not been realised, some of the notable mobile 
malware, such as Cabir and CommWarrior, have been seen in multiple nations, including South 





this illustrates that in twelve hours approximately 15% to 35% of susceptible devices will be 
infected, depending on the address book topology. The authors also indicate that such a worm may 
result in outages or degradation of MMS services due to the MMS switches becoming overloaded. 
Traynor et al. (2009) also illustrate the impact of mobile botnets on the core infrastructure, and 
conclude that less than 24 000 infected devices would reduce the capacity of components in the core 
network by 75%, or 141 000 devices for high capability higher capability mobile networks. 
The advent of application stores for mobile devices has contributed to the distribution of malware; 
most notably is the Trojans that are inserted into legitimate free applications and games on the 
Android store (Mitchell, 2010). Google allows applications to be made available on the store 
without checking them; should there be complaints or malicious content is discovered, then that 
application is removed. Apple however, circumvents this by testing all applications prior to making 
them available on the iTunes store (Hyppönen & Sullivan, 2010). The Android platforms are more 
vulnerable, and this can be seen by the number of new malware types targeting the platform in 2011 
reported by Fisher (2011a; 2011b; 2011d), Roberts (2011c), and Westervelt (2011b). Another 
concern raised with the Android market is a feature that allows users to remotely install applications 
onto their devices; should this be compromised there is potential that it is used to remotely install 
malicious content on devices (Maslennikov, 2011). An application store for Nokia devices is also 
available, as well as multiple websites providing a platform for developers to sell their products; 
such online stores and websites may be increasingly targeted in future to distribute malware. 
PC-based malware has been distributed via social networking websites (this will be discussed in 
Section 5.6); what has not been seen yet is malware that exploits the mobile social networking 
applications. Due to the popularity of both mobile devices and social networking, these integrated 
mobile social networking applications may become a target for malware developers. Future 
evolution of technology may result in common operating systems for PCs, tablets, and mobile 
devices; this may provide malware developers with the ability to produce malware that is device or 
platform independent, which could easily migrate between the different computing and 
communication devices due to common vulnerabilities. 
The growing prevalence of mobile malware indicates that the mobile devices and infrastructure may 
be used to conduct network warfare, using multiple communication technologies to propagate and 
infect devices. The mobile networks could be an entry point for a major network warfare attack on a 





and networking functions within a nation. The psychological impact of such an attack could also be 
large. 
5.5.3 The Role of Mobile Devices and Infrastructure in IW 

























































Figure 5.14: The Role of Mobile Devices and Infrastructure in Information Warfare 
Mobile devices have been used as an improvised command and control platform to instigate mass 
action, which has resulted in popular uprisings. Electronic warfare may target the wireless 





gain intelligence. Malicious code can be distributed in network warfare attacks that overload the 
channel capacity or infrastructure components, and thus deny or degrade services. Network warfare 
and infrastructure warfare are combined as in this scenario the network and infrastructure can be 
considered the same entity. Malicious code may also be used to create backdoors, allowing 
attackers to compromise information and gain intelligence. This backdoor access may also allow for 
attackers to illegitimately transmit psychological operations messages to influence populations; this 
may also be achieved through legitimate access. The predicted security problems with mobile 
devices and infrastructure, combined with their prevalence in Africa, may contribute to the 
susceptibility of African nations to cyber-attack (Goodman & Harris, 2010). 
5.6 Web 2.0 Incidents 
This section discusses incidents regarding Web 2.0 technologies. The objective of this section is to 
identify vulnerabilities and threats from trends in incident reports; this aligns with the study 
objectives of gathering information in these areas, and then using it in the vulnerability framework. 
The possible roles of Web 2.0 technologies in IW will be presented. This section is a combination 
of two previous publications: Pillay, van Niekerk, and Maharaj (2010), and van Niekerk, 
Ramluckan, and Maharaj (2011); the candidate's contribution to these papers is presented here. 
5.6.1 Incidents 
In Pillay, van Niekerk, and Maharaj (2010), the use of Web 2.0 technologies and social networking 
for public advocacy by civil society organisations is illustrated. These technologies have been used 
to promote awareness, pressure organisations into changing policy, and co-ordinating information 
and raising funds in disaster relief operations; the use by government organisations for 
communication was also illustrated. This indicates that this technology may be used to manage 
perception and psychological operations; this can therefore be seen as a form of social information 
warfare. This is applicable to the military environment in what is being termed "influence 
operations" by the US military; this is an extension to psychological operations in that it also 
includes public affairs and other related information operations (Larson, et al., 2009). Web 2.0 
technologies, and in particular social media, are a many-to-many communications medium, these 
tools can be used in public relations, crisis communications, and similar activities. 
After the earthquake in Haiti, and aircraft carrying aid was unable to land; this was posted on 





it had done so within an hour (Kennedy, 2010). Web 2.0 technologies are being actively used to 
conduct influence operations by the Israeli Defence Force (Hodge, 2008; Pfeffer & Izikovich, 
2009): activities include posts from embassies and posting videos of precision air-strikes. The 
Israeli Defence Force is actively recruiting specialist in social media to aid in plugging information 
leaks and conducting influence operations (Pfeffer, 2010; Pfeffer & Izikovich, 2009). In 2010 an 
Israeli raid on an aid ship killed a number of people; images and videos were used by both sides to 
influence perception, however the opposition appeared to have been more successful than the 
Israelis (Shachtman, 2010). In 2011 reports surfaced that the US military has been developing and 
possibly using software named "Persona", which is aimed at generating and managing fake social 
media profiles (Stein, 2011). These fake profiles could be used to influence consensus on 
controversial issues or possibly target individuals be impersonating out-of touch school 
acquaintances (Kerrigan, 2011; Stein, 2011). These incidents illustrate active use of Web 2.0 and 
social media by the military for IW. 
More extreme incidents are the mass anti-government demonstrations that have been orchestrated 
via SMS and social media; in 2003 the Philippines president eventually resigned due to protests of 
up 700 000 people at a time which was largely instigated through SMS (Rigby, 2008). In 2009 
Moldova saw the "Twitter Revolution"; mobile devices and social media were instrumental in 
uprisings in Urumqi, China; and in June 2009 there were mass protest in Iran due to the perception 
of flawed national elections (World Movement for Democracy, c. 2009). What is interesting about 
the Iranian protest that the Web 2.0 and mobile technologies were also used to transmit information 
out of the country as the authorities were censoring the traditional media and Internet access. 
Information was therefore shared through websites such as Twitter and Facebook; The US State 
Department found this source of information so crucial that Twitter was requested to delay a 
network upgrade that would have prevented access to the site (United Nations Foundation, 2009). In 
2010 Mozambique experienced food riots, where SMS was again used to instigate the riots (Jacobs 
& Duarte, 2010); this was effective despite the relatively low mobile penetration of 29% in the 
country (Business Monitor International, 2010). In January 2011 the Tunisian and Egyptian 
governments resigned after mass anti-government demonstrations orchestrated by social media; 
these are described in detail in Section 4.2.7.6. Similar unrest has spread through the Middle East 
and North African regions (Sky News, 2011). In Uganda, Swaziland, and Cameroon the 
governments have blocked access to social networking websites following protests seeking political 





national security concerns; this followed a DoS attack on the blog of the Russian President in 2011 
(Isachenkov, 2011). 
During the 2009 Iran protests, the authorities also blocked access to many social media websites 
(World Movement for Democracy, c. 2009); Chinese authorities blocked access to SMS services 
after the riots in Urumqi; these services were only restored six months later (Daily News, 2010). 
The Tunisian authorities attempted to hack into and delete social media profiles of the main 
instigators of the demonstrations (Madrigal, 2011). The Egyptian government responded to the 
unrest by shutting off access to the Internet and mobile services (Kravets, 2011). However, a work 
around was provided by Google where a fixed-line telephone number was provided for users to 
leave a voicemail message; this message would then be posted on Twitter (News24.com, 2011). 
The concept of preventing access to the Internet and social media was not successful in Egypt as the 
protests had gained momentum at the time and was therefore not as reliant on social media as in the 
initial stages; once the concept had spread the communications medium was no longer required. 
The incidents and government reactions to unrest illustrate a growing concern over the power of 
social media to orchestrate and spread the unrest, even in regions where the Internet or mobile 
penetration is not high. The use of such technologies to co-ordinate mass demonstrations and the 
attempts by the authorities to disrupt this can be considered as a form of command and control 
warfare. 
Web 2.0 technologies present a threat in the form of a conduit for information leaks; the Wikileaks 
incident described in Section 4.2.7.4 is a prime example of this. The Israelis military was forced to 
abandon a raid after a soldier carelessly posted the location and time of the operation; this still 
occurred even though an awareness message was distributed to warn against such leaks (Hodge, 
2010). Information about the head of a UK intelligence service was posted on Facebook by his 
wife; this potentially revealed their residential address, identities of their friends, and other activities 
(Shachtman, 2009a). The security issue regarding this is debated; most of the information was 
known, however the possibility of such information being use to attack or compromise him through 
his family raised concerns (Grobler, 2010; Shachtman, 2009a). It is difficult to determine the 
eventual impact of information releases; a seemingly insignificant piece of information may be 
linked to others, allowing more complete intelligence to be built. The Trustwave Global Security 
Report lists personal information exposure as comprising 30% of attacks via social media, and 





Military's Magenta rootkit and Persona software was also released by the successor to Wikileaks 
(laurelai, 2011; Stein, 2011). 
This threat of leaks corresponds to the possibility of intelligence gathering through social media; 
data mining contributes 20% of the attacks on social networks (Trustwave, 2011). The US Air 
Force monitored public reaction and backlash to an unannounced flight by Air Force One and its 
accompanying fighters over New York; it initially raised fears of another 9/11 type attack by the 
public as it appeared that a commercial airliner was being chased by the fighters (Lardner, 2009). 
Intelligence gathering operations may also target individuals: in early 2011 a warning was released 
by the US Department of Defence regarding a false-flag operation. A fake profile using a photo of a 
recently retired colonel was attempting to add members of the US information operations 
community as friends on LinkedIn (Harding, 2011). Subsequently a second warning has been 
posted on LinkedIn regarding suspicious profiles and activity (Katelhut, 2011; Meeks, 2011). These 
social engineering and false-flag operations could have serious consequences should a high-level 
individual be compromised. An experiment used a fake social media profile under the name of 
Robin Sage; the profile claimed to be employed by the US Department of the Navy as a cyber-
security analyst, and have an advanced degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The 
profile picture depicted a female in her twenties. Approximately 300 connections were made in a 
month; many of these were high-level individuals, many of whom did not realise that the profile 
was a fake (Cisco, 2011). This further illustrates the threat of social engineering on Web 2.0 sites. 
Lawton (2007) indicates that users may be tricked into clicking on malicious links due to sexual 
content; users could also be enticed into controversial or embarrassing behaviour, which is then 
used to blackmail them (van Niekerk, Ramluckan, & Maharaj, 2011). The role of Web 2.0 
technologies in "hacking executives" is further illustrated by Dhanjani, Rios, and Hardin (2009). 
Malware has also used social media as a vector to propagate: KoobFace tricked Facebook users into 
clicking on a link that downloaded a Trojan which hijacked web browsers (Villeneuve, 2010). 
Facebook was also used to propagate malicious emails by the Pushdo botnet (Westervelt, 2009), 
and legitimate websites for job listings were targeted by the Bredolab Trojan (Westervelt, 2011a). 
The Trustwave report indicates that 25% of attacks on social media are related to malware 
(Trustwave, 2011) and a Symantec report lists social media as contributing 12% of the considered 
malicious websites; this is the second most prevalent type of malicious website (Symantec 





traditional Web 1.0 websites, as they require scripting for users to upload and access content 
(Lawton, 2007). 
Due to security concerns, the US military attempted to ban troop access to social media 
(Shachtman, 2009c), however some access was granted (StrategyPage.com, 2010a), and eventually 
it was decided not to ban access (Ackerman, 2011). Many organisations also attempt to block 
employee access; these attempts are ineffective as the employees will still gain access through 
personal devices. Monitoring posts (as the Israeli military attempted) only discovers when there has 
been a leak, but does not prevent them; however this may allow a rapid response to mitigate 
damage. Awareness education is mentioned as the most effective measure to mitigate against social 
media security incidents (Trustwave, 2011); however, as in the leak by the Israeli soldier, this is not 
always effective due to user apathy. The US Army has included social media in its document on 
threat awareness and reporting (Department of the Army, 2010). A defence-in-depth process, where 
all three methodologies are employed to some degree may prove the most effective. In van Niekerk, 
Ramluckan, and Maharaj (2011) the concept of a "honey pot" for social media is proposed; this is 
intended to be the use of fake profiles that are intended to attract attackers and then reverse-social 
engineer them in order to gain insight into their attack methods and objectives. Information 
gathered from this may then be used in awareness training and improve monitoring to detect 
attacks. 
The widespread availability of mobile devices with cameras and social media access may result in 
the movements of military forces being recorded and posted publicly by civilians; the time taken to 
capture and post the image is quick, therefore the information will be available on the Web before 
anything can be done to prevent it. This may prevent the concept of a surprise attack; however, a 
large scale DDoS attack (such as the one that occurred during the Russian involvement in South 
Ossetia and Georgia) may prevent this. 
5.6.2 Incident and Trend Summary 
A number of incidents indicate breaches of confidentiality, or attempts thereof. Due to careless 
posting, social media may be an effective tool for gathering open source intelligence. The integrity 
of links and profiles may be called into question due to the number of fake profiles and malicious 
links. Social media has been seen to be used for perception management as well as targeted attacks; 
it can also be used to propagate malware and orchestrate mass demonstrations. Therefore it is a 





or an improvised command and control platform. There is evidence of military use of social media 
and Web 2.0 technologies. 
These technologies obviously create a security risk through the possibility of leaks, malicious links 
and, and questionable content. The increasing prevalence of the technologies will also result in 
increasing threats and vulnerabilities. Denying access may be ineffective at an organisational level, 
and it has been seen that this tactic did not halt the mass demonstrations in Egypt and Tunisia. 
Monitoring posts will likewise not prevent leaks, however may act as a method of dissuading 
careless posting and acting as an early warning system. Whilst awareness has been cited as being 
the best countermeasure; an incident illustrates that this is not always effective. A defence-in-depth 
strategy using all three methodologies may be more effective, and the concept of a social media 
honey pot was proposed. 
5.6.3 The Role of Web 2.0 in IW 
The vulnerabilities of Web 2.0 and the ability to socially engineer users may allow targeted attacks 
on infrastructure through these websites, in addition to mass perception management. In van 
Niekerk, Ramluckan, and Maharaj (2011) a model is proposed to describe Web 2.0 as an instrument 
of power in a psychological operations message flow model in addition to a framework to describe 
targeted attacks on individuals. A model describing the role of Web 2.0 in IW was also proposed by 
the candidate; an updated version is presented in Figure 5.15. 
In the figure, the relevant pillars of IW are shown, and the corresponding role that Web 2.0 
technologies play, and the objective of these functions. For this scenario, electronic warfare is not 
applicable, and is not shown. Network warfare and infrastructure warfare are combined as the roles 
of Web 2.0 in these aspects are the same. Web 2.0 can act as an improvised command and control 
platform to orchestrate mass demonstrations which ultimately results in popular uprisings. 
Vulnerabilities may be exploited to gain illegitimate access or insert malicious code that will allow 
the extracting of intelligence or disruption of infrastructure services. The technology can be used to 
socially engineer individuals to assist with extracting information and disrupting the infrastructure. 




























































Figure 5.15: The Role of Web 2.0 in Information Warfare, van Niekerk, Ramluckan, and Maharaj (2011) 
5.7 South African Trends 
This section describes trends and that are specific South Africa, however it is necessary to consider 
South Africa in its regional and global context, therefore information for Africa and in particular the 
SADC region is relevant. This will be used to assess the context that South Africa is in, and the 
relevant threats and vulnerabilities. This section corresponds to the study objective of gathering 
information on security incidents and trends. This is a combination of sections from three previous 
research outputs: van Niekerk (2010b), van Niekerk and Maharaj (2010c), and van Niekerk and 





5.7.1.1 Statistics of the African Cyber-Landscape and Related Concerns and Incidents 
As described in Section 2.8.4.3, there is a ratio of approximately 10.8 mobile subscriptions for 
every landline subscription for both voice and data in South Africa. There is an estimated 8.82 
Internet users per 100 inhabitants (International Telecommunications Union, 2011) in South Africa. 
This figure may increase due to additional undersea cables being introduced; this will increase the 
availability and affordability of broadband services in the country, and consequently its prevalence. 
Figure 5.16 shows the increasing and projected capacity of the undersea cables for Sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Africa. By the end of 2011 South Africa is expected to have four active cables 
providing a maximum capacity of 11 460 Gbps; this is expected to have increased to six cables with 
a maximum capacity of 29 380 Gbps by the end of 2013. Comparatively, Sub-Saharan Africa is 
expected to have eight cables with a maximum capacity of 15 140 Gbps by the end of 2011; 
increasing to eleven cables with a capacity of 37 660 Gbps by 2013. This data is provided and 
updated regularly by Song (2011). Given the capacity of 2 920 Gbps in 2008, this is a five-fold 
increase in five years for South Africa, and thirteen-fold increase for Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 




























Of particular concern is the lack of information security awareness in South Africa despite the 
growing prevalence of broadband services in the country; this has been raised independently by a 
number of researchers (Fryer, Merrit, & Trias, 2010; Jansen van Vuuren, Phahlamohlaka, & 
Brazzoli, 2010; van Niekerk, 2010b). The premise is that as new undersea cables become active, the 
increased availability of broadband will reduce prices, resulting in those portions of the population 
who previously have not been able to afford it gaining access. Whilst this additional connectivity 
will aid development in the region, the influx of users will result in the number of vulnerable users 
who are unaware of the security issues surrounding computers and the Internet. The increase in 
vulnerable users may result in a rapid increase in malware infections and cyber-crime (Fryer, 
Merrit, & Trias, 2010; Jansen van Vuuren, Phahlamohlaka, & Brazzoli, 2010; van Niekerk, 2010b); 
this vulnerability may also be exploited for IW purposes. It is also predicted that bots will infect 
80% of the computers in Africa (Carr, 2010); some believe this is nearly realised (Jansen van 
Vuuren, Phahlamohlaka, & Brazzoli, 2010). Such a high infection rate may result in the African 
Internet becoming a massive botnet that can be used in large-scale cyber-attacks; this will have 
severe impacts on network performance in Africa. Whilst these researchers have focused on 
broadband services in general, Goodman and Harris (2010) focus on the security problems that the 
rapid proliferation of mobile phones may cause. The premise is similar: the high prevalence of 
mobile devices combined with the predicted future security problems and vulnerabilities for the 
mobile infrastructure and devices will result in growing susceptibility of African nations to cyber-
attacks and cyber-crime. The lack of general information security awareness is also noted as a 
contributing factor (Goodman & Harris, 2010). It was reported that the monetary loss due to cyber-
crime in South Africa is estimated at R10.9 billion for 2010 (Symantec Corporation, 2011b). 
The SADC region is already experiencing high malware infection rates; Figure 5.17 shows the 
infection rates of this region according to the Microsoft Security Intelligence Report (Microsoft 
Corporation, 2009; 2010a; 2010b; 2011a). The infections are measured in CCM, which is the 
number of computers cleaned by the Microsoft Malicious Software Removal Tool for every 1000 
computers checked (Microsoft Corporation, 2011a). From this it can be seen that some of South 
Africa's neighbouring countries, namely Zimbabwe, Lesotho, and Swaziland, have very high 
infection rates. South Africa was below the worldwide average in the first half of 2009, but since 
then is higher than the average.  
Table 5.9 shows the ranking of the SADC nations in terms of infection rate; this is out of 212 





can be seen that South Africa is in the top quarter of nations in terms of infection rates; some 
neighbouring nations are even higher. The general trend is that the SADC nations listed here are 
increasing in their ranking; this indicates that infections are becoming more prevalent in these 
countries compared to the rest of the world. 
 
 
Figure 5.17: Infections of SADC Countries, source: Microsoft Security Intelligence Reports (Microsoft 
Corporation, 2009; 2010a; 2010b; 2011a). 
 
Figure 5.18 shows the bot infection rates of African nations for July 2009 to June 2010. As can be 
seen, South Africa has high infection rates compared to the worldwide average. The other African 
nations listed are either close to or much lower than the worldwide average. The infection rates are 
again in CCM. Table 5.10 shows the ranking of the African countries out of 86 nations. This again 
shows that South Africa is very high in the rankings. This then confirms the potential of at least 






































malware type in South Africa, miscellaneous unwanted software and Trojans; these are also higher 
than the worldwide average (Microsoft Corporation, 2011b). 
Table 5.9: The Ranking of SADC Countries for the Highest Number of Infections of 212 Countries, source: 
Microsoft Security Intelligence Reports (Microsoft Corporation, 2009; 2010a; 2010b; 2011a) 
Country 1Q09 2Q09 3Q09 4Q09 1Q10 2Q10 3Q10 4Q10 
Angola 166 143 104 112 127 124 78 81 
Botswana 136 132 108 78 90 96   
DRC 82 104 145 144 138 152   
Lesotho 52 72 53 49 14 12   
Madagascar 208 208 210 201 197 201   
Malawi 119 128 159 95 80 85   
Mauritius 155 151 149 155 143 121 81 69 
Mozambique 70 88 124 102 59 68 50 53 
Namibia 38 43 46 40 61 79   
South Africa 84 86 76 47 50 44 30 32 
Swaziland 44 41 63 61 35 43   
Tanzania 148 175 184 152 148 142 93 90 
Zambia 68 73 103 51 30 35   
Zimbabwe 22 20 19 13 22 16   
 
The data presented for the infection rates are only valid for legitimate Windows operating systems 
and not for pirated copies. Therefore the infection rates may be much higher as it is estimated that 
Africa had a software piracy rate of 59% in 2009 (Business Software Alliance, 2010). Usually, 
pirated software remains unpatched; this leaves a number of illegal systems vulnerable to infection 
and attack. Another concern raised by the increasing broadband access in Africa is that this may 
lead to increased software piracy in the region, resulting in more vulnerable systems (Fryer, Merrit, 
& Trias, 2010). The specific piracy rates in some African nations are as follows (Business Software 
Alliance, 2010): 
 Algeria – 84% 
 Botswana and Kenya – 79% 
 Nigeria – 83% 
 South Africa – 35% 
 Zambia – 82% 






Figure 5.18: African Botnet Infections, source: Microsoft Corporation (2010c) 
 
Table 5.10: The Ranking of African Countries for the Highest Botnet Infection Rate of 86 Countries, source: 
Microsoft Corporation (2010c) 
Country 3Q09 4Q09 1Q10 2Q10 Avg. Inf. 
Algeria 78 78 80 79 79 
Egypt 49 30 42 41 44 
Kenya 82 80 83 80 81 
Nigeria 84 84 84 83 84 
South Africa 30 6 11 6 7 
Tunisia 79 81 78 84 80 
 
Whilst South Africa had a relatively low rate it had a high commercial value of $US 324 million for 
the pirated software, which is ranked in the top thirty in terms of actual value (Business Software 
Alliance, 2010). This indicates that there are a number of vulnerable systems in Africa that have not 
been consider in the infection rates; and these systems are vulnerable to attack. Therefore Africa 



































In 2009 South Africa was ranked ninth by the Internet Crime Complaint Centre in terms of the 
number of complaints, contributing 0.15% of the total number of complaints; South Africa was also 
ranked seventh in terms of perpetrators, contributing 0.7% of the total (Internet Crime Complaint 
Center, 2010). Three other African nations appeared in the top ten perpetrators: Nigeria was ranked 
third and contributed 8%, Ghana was ranked sixth contributing 0.7%, and Cameroon was ranked 
ninth contributing 0.6% (Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2010). In 2009 there were four African 
nations in the top ten perpetrators, contributing 10% of the total. In 2010 South Africa dropped off 
this list, leaving Nigeria ranked third contributing 5.8%, and the rankings and contributions by 
Ghana and Cameroon remained unchanged. South Africa moved to sixth place in terms of 
complaints, contributing 0.2% (Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2011). The contribution and 
complaints originating out of Africa is considerably high compared to the generally low penetration 
of the Internet and computers in the region (presented in Section 2.8.4.3); this indicates that Africa 
may already be a launching point for international cyber-crime activity. 
Figure 5.19 shows the total number of South African websites that were hacked from 1 January to 
20 December 2010; Figure 5.20 shows the number of South African Government websites that were 
hacked in this period. A total of 19 335 websites, of which 74 were government, were hacked 
(HackingStats.com, 2010). This indicates there is a potential susceptibility to hacktivism and 
illegitimate access to websites. In the first half of 2010, there were 0.12 sites hosting malware and 
0.25 phishing sites for every 1000 hosts; this decreased to 0.10 malware hosts and 0.11 phishing 
sites in the second half of 2010 (Microsoft Corporation, 2011b).  
As the study focuses on the mobile infrastructure, specific concerns and incidents regarding the 
South African mobile networks should be covered. The main incident was the SMS banking scandal 
of 2009, presented in Section 5.5.1.3. As mentioned in Section 5.3.1, a bombing campaign in Cape 
Town also utilised mobile devices as detonators, similar to the IEDs used in Afghanistan 
(Sabasteanski, 2005). There is concern over the stability of performance of the South African 
mobile providers. In 2009 there were major problems with the three major mobile operators where 
calls were dropped and SMS were not delivered or delayed due to capacity issues (Ajam & Bailey, 
2009). In June 2011 the major networks also experienced outages due to "network glitches" 
(Mtshali, 2011); this was followed by statement by the South African communications regulatory 
body that the three main mobile networks do not meet the performance requirements (South African 
Press Association, 2011). There have been reports of attempted intrusions into the 






Figure 5.19: South African Webpages Hacked, source: (HackingStats.com, 2010) 
 









































































At the time of writing, South Africa has not been the target of a large-scale cyber-based IW attack. 
However, there have been reports of limited DoS attacks in addition to the attempted penetrations of 
the telecommunications networks and the SMS banking scandal; some believe a large scale attack 
against South Africa is unlikely unless there is an event or political decision that a group or nation 
takes offence to or attempts to exploit (Scheepers, 2009). Major global events may also see a rise in 
cyber-crime; this occurred during the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games (Dennis, 2010). In 2009 there 
were reports that the Dalai Lama had been refused entry into South Africa due to pressure from 
China (South African Press Association, 2009a); this occurred again in 2011 (Philp, 2011). The 
2009 incident surrounding the Dalai Lama was during the period of the GhostNet espionage (see 
Section 5.4.1.7); it may have been possible that allowing the Dalai Lama entry may have upset 
Chinese groups, which would have resulted in cyber-attacks aimed at South Africa. There is also a 
contradictory view that as South Africa appears to have close political relations with China, those 
that oppose China may target South Africa (Jones, 2009). The economic interest in Africa shown by 
China and India (Broadman, 2008) may result in the continent becoming the subject of an economic 
information war between the two neighbours, especially as India already appears to have been a 
target of cyber-espionage attributed to China (Information Warfare Monitor and Shadowserver 
Foundation, 2010). Whilst there has been an increase in the broadband capacity in South Africa due 
to the new undersea cables, there measured throughput in September 2010 for the cables on the East 
coast was 500 to 1000 Kbps (Cottrell & Kalim, 2010). Given the magnitude of the DoS attack 
against Myanmar in November 2010 which peaked at over 10 Gbps (Labovitz, 2010), South Africa 
will be vulnerable as such an attack would severely degrade or completely network connectivity. 
Outages of the Seacom cable that were experienced in 2010 and 2011 illustrate the impact should 
one or more of these cables be forced offline through a DoS attack or by physical means; whilst 
websites internal to South Africa are unaffected, the international connectivity was affected (Tubbs, 
2011). As more undersea cables become active, the impact of a single cable outage will not be as 
noticeable; however the current impact of such an outage illustrates that South Africa is vulnerable 
to large-scale DoS attacks. 
Whilst South Africa has not experienced major cyber-related attacks, there has been activity in the 
surrounding region. Numerous instances of internal, politically-motivated, IW in Zimbabwe were 
reposted by Mavhunga (2008). These include DoS attacks on online news media, anti-government 
hacktivist attacks, jamming of radio stations, and monitoring of the Internet and mobile phones. It 





gateway and the jamming of radio broadcasts (Mavhunga, 2008). As discussed in Section 5.6, the 
use of mobile phones and online social media in Mozambique, Tunisia, Egypt, Uganda, Swaziland, 
and Cameroon also shows the growing prevalence of cyber-based activity in Africa. Many of these 
countries are in South Africa's sphere of influence as part of the United Nations and African Union; 
therefore this activity is of relevance to South Africa. South Africa has also experienced internal 
riots and violence related to xenophobia (Karrim, 2009) and dissatisfaction due to poor service 
delivery (Brooks, 2009; Smith, 2009); at one stage the military was deployed in order to mitigate 
the xenophobic violence (BBC, 2008). This violence and frustration could be leveraged in a 
psychological attack through SMS services and possibly social media to further incite violence or 
rioting. 
A concern is that there are only currently three African nations with operational computer security 
incident response teams (CSIRTs): Kenya, Tunisia, and Mauritius, with reports of Morocco, South 
Africa, and Egypt developing CSIRTs (CERT-Africa, 2010a; 2010b). The lack of an operational 
CSIRT in South Africa may result in vulnerabilities, as the CSIRT provides the capability of 
gaining a broader picture of security incidents in South Africa (Scheepers, 2009). The draft cyber-
security policy released by the South African Department of Communications in 2010 allows for 
the development of CSIRTS (Department of Communications, 2010), however political uncertainty 
of mandates and operations results in delays; and in addition other circumstances have resulted in 
some projects to establish a CSIRT in South Africa being terminated prematurely (Grobler & Bryk, 
2010). Goodman and Harris (2010) also cite the lack of national CSIRTs in Africa as being 
problematic, as these would aid in mitigating the predicted security issues regarding the increasing 
accessibility of mobile and broadband services. 
5.7.1.2 South African Information Security Related Legislature 
The main pieces of legislation in South Africa that cover information security are: 
 The Electronic Communications and Transmissions Act (ECT, 2002): this is the basic 
legislation prohibiting unauthorised access to information or communications and the 
interception or disruption of communications. 
 The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related 
Information Act (RICA, 2002): this provides detailed legislation regarding the interception of 






 Protection of Personal Information Bill (POPI, 2009): This legislation is still to be enacted, but 
it aims to provide guidance regarding the security and responsibilities of personally identifiable 
information. 
 Electronic Communications Security Pty (Ltd) Act (ECS, 2002): This provides for an 
organisation to provide communications security for the South African Government and related 
agencies. 
 King III Report (King Committee on Goverance, 2009; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2010): This 
sets the standards for information governance, and states that the senior executive of an 
organisation is ultimately responsible for the information and its security, and that the 
organisation must bear the risk associated with the information. 
 Draft Cybersecurity Policy (Department of Communications, 2010): this makes provision for a 
CSIRT, but focuses mainly on cyber-crime, and does not specifically mention a concerted 
attack on South Africa's information and communications infrastructure. 
None of this legislation has faced a major test in court; therefore their effectiveness cannot be 
assured. There is also the concern that due to inequalities in international laws, those that are 
available in South Africa would not be applicable or enforceable should the perpetrator be located 
internationally. It is apparent that the need for a strong legislative framework and information-
security related agencies in South Africa is recognised. As South Africa is a late-adopter, there will 
be the benefit of hindsight from other international attempts that may aid in the introduction of a 
strong legal framework; however, it is essential to introduce a strong technical framework to 
support it. These frameworks will provide the mechanisms with which to protect South Africa's 
infrastructure. 
5.7.1.3 Section Summary 
Mobile communications are prevalent in South Africa; however due to the undersea cables that are 
being introduced there may be a growth in the broadband subscriptions. This is cause for concern 
due to the lack of security awareness; the influx of new subscribers may result in a rise in cyber-
crime and attacks. South Africa has not experienced large-scale attacks; however there appears to 
be high malware infection rates, particularly of bots. This could be linked to software piracy; and 
the concern of an African Botnet being used as a cyber-weapon may be feasible to a certain degree. 





have been a number of incidents in Africa that are related to IW activities; these are relevant to 
South Africa due to their geographical proximity.  
Concern has been raised that South Africa may become a target for attack due to apparent political 
leanings. There have been reports of intrusion attempts into the telecommunications infrastructure; 
and a cyber-crime attack has managed to compromise a mobile network provider. There are also 
reports of network problems with the mobile network providers; this may result in a vulnerability. 
At the time of writing South Africa does not have an operational CSIRT; this is also considered a 
problem as there is no central body to co-ordinate responses or provide a holistic view of incidents 
in the country. There is legislation that covers cyber-related issues; however, they focus more on 
cyber-crime and have not been tested in court. 
5.8 Chapter Summary 
The chapter presented incident and trend analysis, where the information was gained from 
documents. The benefits of strategic information in an asymmetric conflict were illustrated, and its 
application to the cases of information warfare and security was presented. Trends in conflicts show 
a shift towards low-intensity conflicts which exhibit asymmetry; there appears to be improvisation 
with the use of commercial technology. Combined with the convergence of ICT technologies this is 
resulting in a convergence of the IW functional areas; military IW operations may be required to 
target communications infrastructures that are predominantly civilian. 
The incidents presented in Section 5.3 illustrate that the Internet is becoming weaponised; the 
majority of incidents exhibit a breach of confidentiality in the form of cyber-espionage. There is 
also the appearance of large-scale DoS attacks, this appears to correspond to a shift in the focus of 
malware to botnets. The incidents illustrate the vulnerability of systems and infrastructures to cyber-
based attacks; the Stuxnet worm can be seen as a turning point as it was designed to target specific 
industrial control devices. The national CSIRTs show a general increase in the number of reported 
incidents. The most prevalent reported incident type across six CSIRTs is malware; followed by 
intrusions, attempts at intrusions and scanning. Denial of service attacks are not as prevalent, but do 
occur. 
The mobile security incidents indicate that vulnerabilities in the mobile infrastructure may be found 
and exploited; this has been done to breach both confidentiality and to broadcast illegitimate 





origin. Previous research raised concerns over the possibility of a DoS attack on the mobile 
infrastructure. Mobile malware appears to target the most popular devices; the focus is shifting 
towards Google Android at the time of writing. Most mobile malware appeared to either provide 
direct provide financial gain through the use of SMSs to prime rate numbers, or breach 
confidentiality to gain account information. A worrying trend is the migration of PC-based malware 
to mobile platforms, and the possibility of mobile-based botnets. 
Online social media combined with mobile devices has proven to be an excellent command and 
control tool for mass demonstrations. Web 2.0 technologies have been used as a vector for targeted 
attacks against individuals and communities in what appears to be an attempt at espionage; malware 
has also been distributed via social networking websites. There is concern that social media may 
result in serious information leaks; this has occurred and even affected military operations. It was 
shown that Web 2.0 technologies can be a versatile tool in IW as it is capable of mass 
communications as well as targeting individuals. 
Mobile devices are prevalent in South Africa; however there have been problems with the major 
mobile networks. Political alignment may result in cyber-based attacks against South Africa, 
however none have been seen at the time of writing. There are reports of low-scale attacks and 
penetration attempts against the telecommunication infrastructures. Other nations in Africa have 
experienced IW type activity. African nations exhibit high infection trends, and South Africa has a 
particularly high infection rate of bot infections; this corresponds to concerns over an African 
botnet. The increase in broadband availability may result in higher infection and software piracy 
rates; and a rise in cyber-crime and attacks. The lack of an operational CSIRT and the fact that the 












Chapter 6. Primary Data 
6.1 Introduction 
The results and discussion of the primary data collected during the study is presented in this 
chapter. Section 6.2 presents the expert interviews, Section 6.3 presents the research workshop, and 
Section 6.4 presents the pilot survey of the informal sector. The findings of these sections are 
summarised in Section 6.5.  
6.2 Expert Interviews 
This section presents the results and discussion of the interviews conducted with experts. As 
described in Section 3.4, the interviews were semi-structured according to the respondents' specific 
area of speciality and whether they were international or South African. Email was used to facilitate 
the interviews. The interview responses are to be anonymous; therefore any quotes will refer to the 
respondent as either I1, I2, to I5 for international respondents, and SA1, SA2, to SA7 for South 
African respondents. The objectives of the interviews was to solicit opinions regarding CIIP in 
South Africa and threats to CIIP, the role of the mobile infrastructure in the national critical 
information infrastructure, and threats specific to mobile communications and the mobile 
infrastructure. These opinions will be used in determining the criticality of the mobile 
infrastructure, and vulnerabilities due to the level of implementation of CIIP in South Africa, as 
well as the perceived threats. 
A total of twelve responses were received; five from international respondents and seven from 
South African respondents. Table 6.1 gives a breakdown of the sectors the respondents are currently 
employed in. There is an even split between the total number of those with an academic and 
industry background (five each), with two South African military respondents. Some respondents 
also provided additional documents to support their responses. The respondents were identified by 
their publications, or were professional acquaintances that are employed in the information security, 
critical infrastructure protection, or IW fields. All of the international respondents have authored a 
book or report. The military respondents and one South African industry respondent are 
professional contacts and are employed in the IW and information security fields. The remaining 






Table 6.1: Respondent Breakdown 
Location Industry Academic Military Total 
International 3 2 0 5 
Local 2 3 2 7 
Total 5 5 2 12 
An initial analysis of the responses was conducted by coding the responses into very negative, 
negative, positive, very positive, or unsure. The very negative or very positive responses are where 
the respondent placed emphasis on their response. Unsure indicates that the respondent did not give 
a clear negative or positive response (they discussed both positive and negative aspects), or 
indicated they were unable to comment. A summary of responses for each question will be provided 
in pivot tables, following the initial analysis. This is followed by a more detailed analysis specific to 
individual answers. The following sections present the responses and the analysis. 
6.2.1 Awareness of Critical Information Infrastructure Protection in South Africa 
Respondents were requested to indicate if they are aware of any CIIP efforts and policies in South 
Africa. There is an even split between South African respondents who are and are not aware of CIIP 
(three each); one is unsure. The lack of awareness of CIIP in South Africa is not unexpected due to 
the international respondents, who will most likely be more concerned with CIIP in their respective 
nations. The responses are summarised in Table 6.2.  
Table 6.2: Awareness of CIIP in South Africa 
Location No Unsure Yes Total 
International 4 0 1 5 
Local 3 1 3 7 
Total 7 1 4 12 
The one international respondent who is aware of CIIP in South Africa had contact with a 
corporation in South Africa "which started a pilot research project for CII identification and 
protection in 2007" (I5). 
Two South African respondents are aware of CIIP, but could not provide specific details. The other 
mentioned the laws and standards: "The Electronic Communications Act, RICA, King III, Privacy 
Bill" (I1). The laws referred to here are (in order): the Electronic Communications and 
Transmissions Act (ECT, 2002), The Regulation of Interception of Communications Act (RICA, 





and the Protection of Personal Information Bill (POPI, 2009).  The respondent who is unsure has 
not investigated the issue, however mentions references to CIIP made by the Draft Cybersecurity 
Bill of South Africa. 
The mix of awareness of the South African respondents is more ominous; this indicates there is no 
major consolidated effort for CIIP in the country, or alternatively it is not public knowledge. Should 
there be a major project that is not public, it defeats the purpose as the majority of private 
organisations will not be able to benefit or contribute. The sufficiencies of the South African CIIP 
efforts that are known are investigated in Section 6.2.2. 
6.2.2 Sufficiency of CIIP Efforts in South Africa 
The respondents were asked to comment on the sufficiency of any CIIP efforts in South Africa, and 
to compare South African CIIP to international efforts and policies. The objective is to solicit 
perceptions from experts of possible shortcomings; these may result in a vulnerability from a legal 
or governance perspective of critical systems. 
The South African respondents were asked if the CIIP efforts in South Africa are sufficient; 
however, one international respondent provided a comment that is relevant, and will be considered. 
One South African respondent did not wish to comment and two were unsure; the majority 
responses were that the efforts are not sufficient. The responses are summarised in Table 6.3. 




Negative Unsure Positive Very Positive Total 
International 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Local 0 5 2 0 0 7 
Total 1 5 2 0 0 8 
When asked to compare the South African CIIP efforts to international efforts, three responses 
indicated that it was not as good, one was positive, two were unsure and one chose not to answer. 
Table 6.4 summarises the responses. 




Negative Unsure Positive Very Positive Total 






The specific responses for the summaries presented in Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 overlap, and are 
presented in more detail here. The very negative response and one negative response in Table 6.4 
both considered a lack of a computer security incident response team (CSIRT) as reasons for the 
poor comparison of South Africa's CIIP to those internationally: 
 "Very bad - we do not even have a proper CSIRT" (SA7); 
 "Lack of a national CSIRT (or CERT) makes it harder to coordinate potential cyber attacks both 
internally and internationally" (SA2). 
The negative responses to the sufficiency of South African CIIP and the poor comparison to 
international efforts yielded many comments regarding the slow adoption by the relevant 
stakeholders:  
 "Unclear and overlapping mandates in government departments (NIA, DOC, DPSA, SITA, 
SANDF); slowness in adopting national CIIP policies and strategies" (SA2). The agencies 
referred to in the quote are (in order) the National Intelligence Agency, the Department of 
Communications, the Department of Public Service and Administration, the State Information 
Technology Agency, and the South African National Defence Force; 
 "No, not sufficient yet.  It must be a much more overt and coordinated effort to involve all the 
role players in government and industry" (SA2);   
 "The increase of regulation and legislation in SA has been slow" (SA1); 
 "South Africa needs a decent (CIIP) policy and national strategy" (SA6). 
However, there is indication that South Africa is moving in the right direction: 
 "With the increased importance of IT governance in recent times the impact should be felt in a 
greater manner in industry" (SA1); 
 "The SABS [South African Bureau of Standards] does make an effort to keep track of standards 
implemented by ISO regarding IS, and has continued to show support of standards that enhance 
the security framework" (SA1); 
 There are many organisations in SA that are making efforts to improve security due to the ever 
present threat of reputation loss" (SA1); 
 "The new National Cybersecurity Policy of the Dept of Communications (publish[ed] in the 
recent Government Gazette for public comment) will, if implemented, create a forum for better 





The National Cybersecurity Policy referred to in the last point was released for public comment in 
February 2010, and allows for the implementation of national CSIRTs and forming partnerships 
both internationally as well as locally (Department of Communications, 2010). A response 
comparing South Africa in an international context indicates that the overall attitude towards cyber-
space in general is incorrect: "RSA [Republic of South Africa] lacks a cyber mindset" (SA6). A 
negative comment indicates there is no specific reason for thinking that the South African CIIP is 
insufficient and does not compare favourably with international efforts; this therefore can be 
considered as a perception. Another negative response regarding the sufficiency of South African 
CIIP also appears to be perception based: "Whatever exists, I think we are far from sleeping 
soundly about CIIP in SA" (SA7). 
The positive response regarding the comparison of South African CIIP to international policies was 
from the view that South Africa is considered as a developing country; however poor 
implementation is still a concern: 
 "Considering SA's position as a developing country, our regulatory and legislative 
framework for information security compares well against developed countries. 
However, the implementation of good practice is still lagging, particularly in the 
SMME space where, until recently, the regulatory framework did not apply" (SA1). 
The international response was making an assumption regarding the CIIP in South Africa based 
upon the CIIP in another country: "I am not aware of any but if they are like those in the U.S – they 
fall way short of what is required!" (I1). 
From the number of negative comments, it is apparent that the perception of CIIP efforts in South 
Africa is that they are not sufficient; particularly regarding the lack of a CSIRT and slow 
deployment of regulations. This corresponds to the document analysis of the South African 
information warfare and security landscape, as discussed in Section 5.7. The international response 
implying that the efforts of the U.S. fall short is telling, in that the U.S. have had an operational 
CSIRT for many years; this indicates that South Africa has a long way to go before having 
sufficient protection of the critical information infrastructure. There is a definite need for CIIP in 
South Africa, as is indicated by the following comments: 
 "All countries must develop strategies which are centralised or decentralised or both that need 
to identify what are the critical elements, the treats to them, their vulnerabilities and what needs 





 "SA has been plagued by exploitations of Internet banking sites, loss of personal data by the 
financial industry etc. However, developed countries have suffered the same problems. The lack 
of promulgated privacy laws in SA might be an obstacle to further investment by other 
economies as the legislative framework is not strong enough to enforce organisations' 
compliance with stricter CIIP efforts" (SA1). 
The responses indicate that the perception is that CIIP in South Africa falls short; the lack of a 
CSIRT and coordinated national strategy is a common theme. This results in a lack of situational 
awareness of the incidents, threats, and vulnerabilities that are prevalent in the country. There is 
some indication that the legislation revolving around information security is moving in the right 
direction; however it can be considered imperative that more effort is made in South Africa towards 
safeguarding the CIIP. Section 6.2.3 provides responses for possible solutions to improving CIIP. 
6.2.3 Suggested Solutions for CIIP in South Africa 
Respondents were asked to provide possible solutions (with particular reference to international 
policies already in place) for improving CIIP in South Africa; four South African respondents 
expanded on their answer given in Section 6.2.2. 
A response states that all international policies would be relevant and beneficial to South Africa 
(SA6). Two responses indicate that EU policies are beneficial (SA1, SA2); one is very 
complimentary of the EU policies: "The directives promulgated by the EU, in my opinion, are 
typically ahead of their counterparts across the world. For example, their privacy and information 
security directives preceded local legislation by far" (SA1). 
Other opportunities to improve CIIP that have been suggested include international and local co-
operation: 
 "South Africa should become part of international collaboration" (SA2); 
 "We should also have national conferences to develop joint government / industry policies and 
plans in the same vain as the 'disaster management centres'" (SA2); 
 "There are many examples internationally, and many CERTs and CSIRTs from which we can 
learn and re-use information. Many has indicated their willingness to help" (SA7). 
From the shortcomings and strong points mentioned in Section 6.2.2, and the policies and solutions 
suggested above, South Africa should focus on the following activities: 





 Development of CSIRT(s); 
 International and internal collaboration and capacity building. 
The recommendations and solutions will be discussed in more detail in Sections 8.7 and 9.7. 
6.2.4 Threats 
This question intended to solicit a range of responses regarding IW and information security threats 
to the critical information infrastructure, and the potential impact should these threats be realised. 
All twelve respondents provided one or more threats. The responses were categorised into broad 
themes; the number of occurrences for each theme are summarised in Table 6.5.  
Table 6.5: Broad Themes for IW and Information Security Threats 
Theme No. Theme No. 
Unawareness and complacency 5 Cyber-war and cyber-terrorism 2 
Cyber-crime, hacking, and fraud  4 Denial of Service 1 
Surveillance 2 Illegitimate control 1 
General vulnerabilities 2 Image of corruption in South Africa 1 
Eighteen threats were organised into eight themes. The most common theme was the lack of 
awareness and education of the end user (SA1, SA7), complacency and lack of awareness by the 
government (SA5, SA7); therefore the 'human' can be considered as a vulnerability (I4). Cyber-
crime was also a common theme, where fraud (SA3), "general hacking" (SA4), criminal activity 
through the use of botnets (I3), and the financial implications of cyber-crime (I5) were raised. 
Surveillance (I2) with specific use of botnets to conduct the surveillance (I3), undetected software 
vulnerabilities (I1) and architecture vulnerabilities (I4) were also raised. Other themes include 
cyber-war and cyber-terrorism (I5, SA6), DoS attacks (SA2), illegitimate control (I2), and an image 
of corruption in South Africa with no repercussions for wrongdoing (SA7). 
It was mentioned that the lack of education and awareness by business owners may lead to a lack of 
compliance, especially amongst the SMMEs as "no such compliance was necessary" (SA1) 
compared to those that larger organisations where compliance was required to regulatory 
frameworks. "The King III principle of 'apply or explain' might lead to explanations of 'lack of 
skills and experience, lack of funds'," which may result in an "opt-out reaction to something 
SMME's are not comfortable or familiar with" (SA1). In South Africa there appears to be a focus on 





security threat as the role out does not have the necessary imbedded security measures in place.  
The security measures seem to be additional add-ons" (SA5). 
The concern with general hacking is that it "could seriously influence power, water and 
communications grids availability" (SA4). Cyber-crime can be considered to have the largest 
financial impact (I5), and in particular botnets could " be very lucrative sources of income through 
identity theft, fraud, blackmail and intelligence trafficking/espionage" (I3) and are described in 
more detail with methods to counter this threat:  
"These botnets are semi automated and spread quickly.  Increasingly, they will run 
undetected for weeks to months to years because anti-virus signatures cannot keep 
pace. CI will increasingly become penetrated by bots.  Once inside they can remain 
dormant until required for any range of applications. The source of these threats is very 
difficult to trace, but more important than attributing sources is simple mitigation.  Put 
out the fire before looking for the arsonist.  We are rapidly advancing techniques in 
this area which do not rely on traditional, fallible (but still important and necessary) 
signature-based systems" (I3). 
More concern was raised over cyber-crime related activities, as opposed to cyber-war and cyber-
terrorism. This could be due to the high prevalence and ever-present cyber-crime threat, as opposed 
to the occasional large-scale attacks on (or attributed to) nations, which are termed by the media as 
cyber-war.  
These themes were then aligned to the IW models as described in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4; the 
occurrences for each category of the model is summarised in Table 6.6. From Table 6.5 and the 
content above, confidentiality can be seen to comprise of the surveillance and cyber-crime in terms 
of identity theft. Infrastructure availability concerns arise from malicious hacking and DoS attacks. 
Fraud impacts on the integrity of information, and illegitimate control reduces the integrity of 
systems. The attitudes and awareness of humans provides a broader context as incorrect attitudes 
towards information security may hinder efforts to improve security measures. The "other" category 
is comprised of software and architecture vulnerabilities and general cyber-crime. 
Poor attitudes and awareness can be seen as a large threat, as these may result in insufficient 
protection for critical systems. Together with existing vulnerabilities, the integrity of these systems 
may then suffer, allowing breaches of confidentiality and possible denial of services. It should be 





to the same concerns discussed in Section 5.7. Cyber-war was cited to be the greatest threat in terms 
of effects (I5); the impact of a cyber-war was illustrated by the examples of Estonia, Georgia, and 
Myanmar/Burma in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. South Africa has not been the victim of such attacks: 
"We seem to have been spared any significant attacks" (SA2), however due to the focus on business 
and not on security (SA5), the nation may be severely affected should such an attack occur due to 
lack of preparedness. However, it was mentioned that the security measures for both cyber-crime 
and cyber-war are the same (I5). What was unexpected was the omission of social engineering from 
the threats related to the critical information infrastructure; this however was raised as a threat 
related to the use of mobile communications, presented in Section 6.2.7. 
6.2.5 Mobile Phones as Part of the Critical Information Infrastructure 
The question aimed to solicit the opinions of the respondents regarding the inclusion of the mobile 
phone infrastructure and devices into the critical information infrastructure. This aids in establishing 
the criticality of the mobile infrastructure. Table 6.7 summarises the responses. 




Negative Unsure Positive Very Positive Total 
International 0 0 1 3 1 5 
Local 0 0 1 5 1 7 
Total 0 0 2 8 2 12 
The vast majority of the responses indicate that cell phones and the related infrastructure can be 
considered as part of the critical information infrastructure; some reasons for the mobile phone 
infrastructure being considered as critical is due to the fact that they are part of the 
telecommunications infrastructure, which is considered as one of the five critical infrastructure 
sectors: 
Table 6.6: Aligning Threats to the IW Models 
Theme No. 
Confidentiality / Interception 3 
Availability / Denial and degradation 2 
Integrity / Corruption 2 







 "Information space, cyberspace, are CII.  As part of this cyberspace, cell phones are part of the 
CII too" (I4); 
 "A communications grid is essential to the survival of modern society; as such cellular 
telephony infrastructure can be seen as critical" (SA4); 
 "Yes, it is Cyber Space peripherals" (SA6); 
 "I believe that cell phones are an integral and essential component of the critical infrastructure 
and as such need [to be] protected: (I1). 
Another reason that the mobile infrastructure can be considered as critical is that essential services 
and businesses make use of them, and may even be solely reliant on mobile communications: 
"Without question cell phones are part of the critical infrastructure.  Many people and businesses 
have cut the copper line and only use cellular technology" (I1), who goes on to say that some 
"municipalities and some emergency services organization use the same cellular technologies as 
part of their dispatch and emergency communications systems." This falls under the concept of 
critical infrastructure interdependency, discussed in Section 2.6.2. The high usage of mobile 
communications services by industry and essential services implies that a major disruption of the 
mobile infrastructure could have serious negative consequences for a nation. The use of mobile 
phones by emergency services is echoed by other respondents: 
"Cellphones are definitely part of critical infrastructure. Much of government and 
industry are dependent on voice comms, but increasingly also and data 
communications via cellphone networks. Even security forces (police, defence force) 
are heavily dependent on cellphones and don't always have alternative systems in 
place." (SA2) 
"Yes.  But not just 'phones' per se but mobile devices using cellular networks. In the 
case of 2G and 3G cell networks and phones, civilian (consumer) cell services often 
become the fall-back communications vehicle for first responders (a critical 
infrastructure sector) when their older radio systems are overloaded or insufficient for 
the task.  Cops will routinely use private cells for police business because the radios 
can['t] manage data fast enough. 
With the deployment of 4G HSPA and LTE services, LAN-type speeds are available 
wirelessly at low cost with a range of simple interfaces (USB sticks, WiFi bridging, 





adopted by CI sectors for critical communications, where before they may have leased 
fibre, pulled cable or established private wireless networks using various 
technologies." (I3)     
The prevalence of mobile devices compared to fixed line telecommunications in Africa was raised, 
indicating that the mobile infrastructure may be considered as more critical than other areas with 
higher fixed-line telecommunications infrastructures: "Cell phone play a critical role in connectivity 
especially within Africa.  The demand for fixed line communications (Tellecom) is not the huge" 
(SA5).   
The responses listed as unsure indicated that the criticality of the infrastructure would be 
determined by the use, and the definition of criticality used: "this depends on the definition of 
criticality that you use. I would argue that cell phones as physical entities do not per se count as CII. 
It depends who uses them to what ends" (I5). 
 With ten of the twelve responses being positive, the mobile infrastructure can be classified as 
critical. Reasons given are that it forms part of the telecommunications sector, which is considered 
as one of the five critical sectors, and the reliance of essential services on the mobile infrastructure. 
There are indications that due to the prevalence of mobile services in Africa, this infrastructure may 
be more critical than in other parts of the world. 
Respondents were asked to expand on their answers and indicate if they believe there should be 
explicit CIIP policies for mobile infrastructure and devices. There were seven responses, which are 
summarised in Table 6.8.  




Negative Unsure Positive Very Positive Total 
International 0 2 0 2 1 5 
Local 0 0 0 2 0 2 
Total 0 2  0 4 1 7 
The five of the seven responses were positive, indicating that there should be explicit policies, and 
two indicated that there should not be explicit policies. Two responses cited the fact that the mobile 






 "I believe that cell phones are an integral and essential component of the critical infrastructure 
and as such need [to be] protected.  Security practices and policies must incorporate cell phone 
infrastructure to protect nations and economies" (I1); 
 "Of course, it would be foolish not to consider an integral part of the infrastructure especially 
one that is the main carrier of formal and informal information flows" (I2). 
A negative response indicates that as the "cell phone infrastructure is part of the 
telecommunications infrastructure and should therefore already be covered by CIIP" (I5); the other 
indicates that policies may not be effective: "I am not sure they should. Security is a technical 
problem. I am not sure that “policies” are useful to address technical issues [as] such" (I4). 
A response queries the suitability of current critical infrastructure policies in taking certain 
characteristics of the mobile infrastructure into account: "New cell phone technology does allow for 
Internet connectivity faster and easier. It is also not limited to one location/position. It allows for 
mobile connectivity. I am not sure if the CIIP policies do take this into consideration" (SA5). The 
fact that voice services have been operational for two decades indicates that there might not be a 
need for policies regarding those services; however, the newer data technologies may need explicit 
policies:  
"For cellular voice services - probably not. That paradigm has been operational for 20 
years without the need arising. For 3G/4G data service through cell: absolutely. It 
should at the very least be policy that wireless threats be taken into account during 
design. Similarly, the types of subscriptions purchased from carriers for cellular data 
can be limited in policy (and even ISO [International Standards Organisation] 
standard[s])" (I3).  
Of the seven responses considering explicit policies for the specific protection of the mobile 
infrastructure, five were positive. The change of technology brought about by the prevalence of 
mobile connectivity introduces new threats and vulnerabilities; whilst the CIIP policies should 
cover the mobile infrastructure, these new threats and vulnerabilities need to be taken into account. 
Therefore either existing policies need to be reviewed and updated, or additional policies need to be 





6.2.6 Importance of Mobile Phones for Various Sectors 
This section presents and discusses the responses regarding the importance of mobile phones for 
various sectors, namely: small businesses, large businesses, governments, militaries, intelligence 
and security services, and criminal or terrorist organisations. The objective of soliciting this 
information is to aid in establishing the perceptions of the respondents regarding the criticality of 
the mobile phone infrastructure. The responses are summarised in Table 6.9 to Table 6.14, with 
more detail given below the summary for each sector. 




Negative Unsure Positive Very Positive Total 
International 0 0 1 2 2 5 
Local 0 0 0 3 4 7 
Total 0 0 1 5 6 12 
Eleven of the twelve responses were positive, and one was unsure; this indicates that mobile phones 
are important for small businesses. A response commented that the mobile phones are "very 
important in terms of insecurity: vulnerability of data, conversation" (I4) for small and large 
businesses and government. Multiple responses considered the importance of cell phones to small 
business as critical as it is often their primary means of communication: 
 "Very important it allows for communications and connectivity any time and virtually 
anywhere in the world by dialling only one number" (SA5); 
 "In some cases the only communication tool that becomes vital to the business, especially in the 
case of informal entrepreneurs" (SA1); 
 "Somewhat important for businesses that are geographically based, like shops. However, for 
some really small businesses (eg free-lance painters) and service industries like plumbers, it is 
often their ONLY means of being contacted" (SA2). 




Negative Unsure Positive Very Positive Total 
International 0 0 1 1 3 5 
Local 0 0 0 4 3 7 





As with small businesses, there were eleven positive and one unsure response; this indicates that 
mobile phones are important for large businesses. A response indicated that mobile phones are "to a 
large extent a communication tool" (SA1). The importance of global connectivity and 
communications (SA5) and insecurity (I4) was repeated; however, the importance in terms of 
business competitiveness and access to applications was raised: 
 "Critical for competitiveness.  4G data services will become fundamental for future 
competitiveness and resiliency" (I3); 
 "Extremely important - both voice communications and access to enterprise applications" 
(SA2). 
From the responses, mobile phones are very important to business. Small businesses may be solely 
reliant on mobile phones for their communications; however larger businesses should have access 
to fixed-line telecommunications. However, mobile phones may prove to be very importance for 
competitiveness of both small and large businesses. 




Negative Unsure Positive Very Positive Total 
International 0 1 0 2 2 5 
Local 0 0 1 4 2 7 
Total 0 1 1 6 4 12 
Ten of the twelve responses are positive, with one negative and one unsure; this indicates that 
mobile phones do have importance to governments. A response indicated that mobile phones are 
"not so important" to the functioning of government as "there are many other ways to 
communicate" (I5); another echoed this, but indicated that for rural areas mobile phones may be 
more suitable: "government has established infrastructure in place including fixed-line technology. 
However, in more remote areas plagued by fixed-line theft, cell phones may prove more effective, 
but is clearly more costly" (SA1). 
A response indicated that it is important, but should only be used "with special security 
contingencies" (I2); this was echoed by (SA5): "Important but it is a security risk.  Additional 
security measures needs to be put in place." The security concern was repeated by (I4); however, 
another response considered mobile phones as an "extremely important means of communication, 





Possibly the biggest growth area for e-Gov[ernment] in South Africa" (SA2). An alternative was 
suggested in that the government "will probably be more reliant on TETRA [terrestrial trunked 
radio] infrastructure than traditional cellular infrastructure in the near future" (SA4). 
These responses indicate that there is some importance of mobile phones to government, however, 
they are unlikely to be solely reliant on this form of communications, and additional security may 
be required. An incident discussed in Section 5.5.1.6 indicates there are concerns over military use 
of potentially insecure mobile infrastructures in stability or peace-keeping operations. 




Negative Unsure Positive Very Positive Total 
International 0 1 0 2 2 5 
Local 0 1 0 5 1 7 
Total 0 2 0 7 3 12 
Ten of the twelve responses were positive and two were negative, indicating that mobile phones 
have some importance to the military. A response indicated that the mobile communications 
infrastructure is important for the military as it provides a cheap communications medium that is 
automatically upgraded for commercial reasons:  
"Very important.  It remains a basically secure means of communication over wide 
areas where the infrastructure is in place, and it enables relatively cheap access to state 
of the art data communications and encryption systems (the GSM networks do all the 
upgrading for commercial reasons and the defence force does not have to upgrade their 
proprietary networks all the time)"  (SA2). 
Given that a number of incidents presented in Section 5.5 indicate that the mobile infrastructure is 
not necessarily secure, this response is somewhat surprising. The networks providers do upgrade 
their infrastructure, which does provide for a communications platform for the military; however 
the security of the networks may need to be complemented by other encryption methods. Other 
responses also indicate that additional security measures are required for the military to make use of 
the mobile infrastructure: 
 "With special security contingencies" (I2); 
 "Military will retro-fit commercial equipment and 4G technology in dedicated spectrum, but it 





 "It is a major security risk as the service provider is not run by the military itself.  Additional 
security measures and devices need to be added on" (SA5). 
The possible future reliance on TETRA was repeated (SA4); and two respondents indicated that the 
military should rather rely on their own communications systems: 
 "Hopefully NOT important! They should a) have a policy for use of mobile phones in military 
operations/service and b) have their own communication networks" (I5); 
 "The military has in the past made use of radio and satellite networks effectively. The continued 
use of these technologies could prove more effective in the long term as cell phone usage is so 
dependent on available BSC towers" (SA1). 
From the responses, it can be seen that there is some perception that mobile phones are important to 
the military; however it was raised that additional security mechanisms need to be in place, and that 
the military's own communications infrastructure should reduce the reliance on commercial 
communications systems.  




Negative Unsure Positive Very Positive Total 
International 0 1 0 2 2 5 
Local 0 0 1 3 3 7 
Total 0 1 1 5 5 12 
Ten of the twelve responses were positive, indicating that mobile phones will be important for 
security and intelligence services for both operational reasons and to be able to intercept 
communications: 
 "Extremely important since it can be used for covert communications and almost any country in 
the world" (SA2); 
 "… regarding RICA, cell phones pose a threat to security services. The registration of SIM 
[subscriber identity module] cards is viewed by some as an attempt at a local "Echelon", 
however for day-to-day operations, mobile communication may prove extremely important to 
security and intelligence services" (SA1); 





 "…it will be critical for operations.  They will eventually adopt dedicated spectrum like 
military.  They will also need the ability to intercept and perform surveillance on 4G voice and 
data traffic" (I3). 
Despite its importance, security concerns of using mobile phones for operations were also raised: 
 "With special security contingencies" (I2); 
 "Big risk as the security cannot be trusted" (SA5); 
 "Very important in terms of insecurity: vulnerability of data, conversation" (I4). 
The use of mobile phones can therefore be seen as important to intelligence and security services as 
a source of intelligence through lawful interception of communications. For operational reasons 
(primarily for security services, as discussed in Section 6.2.5) it is still important, however extra 
security measures need to be taken. 




Negative Unsure Positive Very Positive Total 
International 0 0 0 2 3 5 
Local 0 0 0 3 4 7 
Total 0 0 0 5 7 12 
All responses indicated that mobile phones are important for criminal and terrorist operations: 
 "VERY they use them to detonate IEDs [improvised explosive devices]" (I1); 
 "Very important.  It is cheap and dispensable communications which allows for 
communications and connectivity anywhere.  Due to the low level of security on the system 
it creates relative easy access into networks for criminal and or terrorist activities" (SA5); 
 "Organized crime has already adopted the 4G technology and have history of remaining 
one-step-ahead generally. Terrorists and insurgents - though I have no experience dealing 
with them - are known to rapidly adopt technology in clever ways, but not in sophisticated 
manners. (They don't have the money or skills)" (I3); 
 "Extremely important because it provides built-in security and cheap ways to change SIM-
cards to avoid detection or by using multiple phones. It is only risky if the cellphone / 
device number is known to the security forces" (SA2); 





The use of additional security measures by these elements was raised by (I2). The use of mobile 
devices by criminal elements, and legislation attempting to curb this, was discussed in more detail: 
"The RICA act's attempt at registering all SIM cards, for example, is an attempt at 
reducing the anonymity of cell phone usage in the country, as internationally the use of 
unregistered SIMs have proven challenging to crime prevention activities. In SA, with 
a high crime rate, this is surely also a concern. However, the long awaiting Privacy Act 
and RICA seems at loggerheads as registering your SIM may reduce the privacy of 
your communication. Telecoms operators, similar to banks, should make the effort to 
secure their infrastructure and the devices used by consumers to protect their personal 
information, communication and any financial transactions occurring across the 
network" (SA1). 
From the responses, it is obvious that the perception is that mobile phones are very important for 
criminal and terrorist elements. They have a rapid uptake of new technologies, and mobile 
communications provides mobility and is difficult to track. The Regulation of Interception of 
Communications Act (RICA, 2002) is attempting to mitigate the anonymous use of mobile phones, 
and reduce the effectiveness of swapping SIM-cards; however there is a concern that it may also 
contradict privacy legislation. 
When considering the importance of mobile phone communications to various sectors, it is apparent 
from the responses that there is a perception that mobile communications is important to all sectors; 
however the military, government, and security services will probably not rely solely on the mobile 
phone infrastructure and would introduce additional security mechanisms when using them. The 
corporate sector is probably the most reliant on mobile phones; as criminal and terrorist elements 
make use of these technologies it is probably unlikely that the mobile infrastructure of their host 
nation would be targeted with a DoS attack, unless it would further their objectives. 
6.2.7 Threats Related to the Mobile Phone Infrastructure 
This question was intended to solicit a range of responses regarding threats related to the mobile 
infrastructure and use of mobile phones. The responses were categorised into broad themes; the 






Table 6.15: Broad Themes for Mobile Phone Threats 
Theme No. Theme No. 
General vulnerabilities 4 Lack of awareness 2 
Espionage/surveillance 4 Phishing and social engineering 1 
Dependence & unavailability 3 SIM cloning 1 
Cyber-crime / information theft 2 Lack of data verification 1 
Malware 2 Cyber- and terrorist- attacks 1 
A total of twenty-one threat concerns were grouped into ten themes. The most prevalent theme was 
general vulnerability concerns due to remote access to devices and infrastructure (I3, SA7), and 
vulnerabilities of the mobile infrastructure itself (SA5), particularly the home location register 
(HLR) (SA1). The concern of remote access to infrastructures through mobile devices is also raised 
in the research workshop (Section 6.3.2); mobile devices with wireless networking capability could 
be connected to the internal network and act as a wireless access point, bypassing the controls of the 
network perimeter. As the HLR contains subscriber information, particularly for the pre-paid billing 
(SA1; Enck, Traynor, McDaniel, & La Porta, 2005), penetration of this system may result in direct 
financial loss to the network providers (SA1). Corruption of these databases may also prevent 
subscribers from utilising the mobile services if their account balances are reset to reflect 
outstanding payments or no airtime. The HLR is also a central component, and overloading it may 
prove to be an effective DoS attack; this is assessed in more detail in Section 7.4. Espionage and the 
interception of communications was also raised four times (I1, I2, I4, SA2); a related theme of data 
and identity theft from a cyber-crime perspective was raised twice (I5, SA2). As there are a number 
of incidents presented in Section 5.5 which relate to attacks on the mobile infrastructure and 
malware that breaches confidentiality, these concerns are to be expected.  
The reliance on the mobile infrastructure, and the problem of unavailability was raised three times 
(I2, SA2, SA5); this indicates a relevance to DoS attacks. If there is a heavy reliance on an 
infrastructure which is subjected to a DoS attack, the social and possibly economic impacts could be 
severe, as seen in the Estonia and Georgia attacks (Hart, 2008; Landler & Markoff, 2007). Malware 
was raised twice (I1, SA2); given the growing prevalence of mobile malware (presented in Section 
5.5.2), more prominence of the malware threat was expected. However, mobile malware is still 
overshadow in numbers by traditional PC-based malware, and may therefore not be considered a 
major threat at the time of the interviews. The lack of user awareness (I5, SA1), with particular 





was surprisingly not raised for the general concerns in Section 6.2.4; its inclusion here indicates that 
it is still some recognition of its prevalence. Cloning of SIM cards (SA4), the inability to verify data 
or its origin (I2), and the use in terrorist and cyber-attacks (SA6) were also raised. The inability to 
verify the origin of data has implications for integrity through authenticity; the physical sender is 
assumed from the originating device, or who the communication claims to be. Concern of cyber-
attacks with regards to the mobile devices and infrastructure was also illustrated; the relevance was 
illustrated in Section 5.5.1.6, where military activity gained access to national telecommunications 
systems. 
These themes were then aligned to the IW models as described in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4; the 
occurrences for each category of the model is summarised in Table 6.16. The espionage and data 
theft combine to form six occurrences of confidentiality concerns; the integrity is a combination of 
the SIM card cloning, phishing, and poor data and origin verification. The availability and 
dependence concerns correspond to the availability in the IW model. Malware and use in attacks 
combine to form the misuse category, and the general vulnerabilities and awareness combine to 
form the "other" category. These concerns may result in breaches of confidentiality, availability, or 
integrity. 
Table 6.16: Aligning Threats Related to Mobile Phones to the IW Models 
Theme No. 
Confidentiality / Interception 6 
Availability / Denial and degradation 3 
Integrity / Corruption 3 
Other misuse / use in attacks 3 
Other 6 
It was stated that mobile phones "are a real threat to any country's cyber security and CII" and that 
"their wide usage increase all forms of cyber risks" (SA7). Another concern raised was that "the 
security levels are decreased as the amount of users increases via the same tower to allow more 
simultaneous users" (SA5). It was suggested that during large events "the security is switched off" 
(SA5) to maximise the usage of the mobile infrastructure for the large crowds. Furthermore, it was 
stated that mobile infrastructures may be targeted due to the "significant impact of telecoms 
operators on the economies of the world" and that a DoS attack on these infrastructures "could 





is a concern that the widespread use of mobile phones and security issues surrounding this is a 
threat that could be leveraged to damage a nation's economic and social well-being. 
There is also a concern that the introduction of mobile devices and technologies (including wireless 
technologies) into networks that contain industrial processes, such as supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) systems, may make them more susceptible to "autonomous bots" and other 
"anomalous traffic" which could cause damage (I3). This indicates a potential threat to critical 
industrial systems. 
Solutions suggested by the respondents include: 
 "We must develop me [new] technologies and techniques to catch software vulnerabilities and 
validate hardware and firmware are free of malicious circuitry or firmware" (I1); 
 Awareness campaigns and improved organisational attitude and attention to mobile phone 
security (I5); 
 "Increased situational awareness" of threats (SA6); 
 Improve privacy legislation (I4). 
The first response also indicates a possible concern over pre-installed malicious code or hardware in 
devices; this corresponds to incidents discussed in Section 5.5.1.6 regarding concerns over 
malicious content of devices and hardware. 
The greatest perceived category of threat is to confidentiality; this could be due to the fact that 
many of the mobile phone incidents, discussed in Section 5.5, were related to breaches of 
confidentiality. The reliance on mobile phones raises the concerns of unavailability of the mobile 
networks; and the difficulty in verifying the validity of communications over mobile networks 
raises concerns of information integrity, particularly with regards to phishing attacks. Suggested 
solutions include improving awareness, legislation and technologies to mitigate these threats. 
6.2.8 Summary 
Twelve interviews were conducted to solicit opinions on the CIIP efforts in South Africa, the 
criticality of the mobile phone infrastructure, and threats to the critical information infrastructure 
and specifically the mobile phone infrastructure. The responses indicate that the CIIP effort in 
South Africa is not sufficient, and in general it falls short of international efforts. In particular the 
lack of a CSIRT was raised as a concern. The development of a CSIRT, international collaboration, 





concern raised was the lack of awareness and incorrect attitude regarding information security and 
CIIP; this corresponds to findings from the document analysis in Chapter 5. By classifying the 
threats, confidentiality of information appears to be of greatest concern, followed closely by 
integrity and availability. The confidentiality concern is not surprising considering the rise of the 
concept of protecting personal identifiable information. The impacts of cyber-war were illustrated 
in Chapter 5. 
The opinion is that the mobile infrastructure and phones do form part of the critical information 
infrastructure. Only seven responses provided opinion on explicit CIIP policies regarding mobile 
phones and infrastructure; these indicated that explicit policies may be useful and cover gaps 
created by smart mobile devices; however existing policies should cater for the mobile 
infrastructure to some degree. Of the specific sectors considered, the opinion was that mobile 
phones had some importance to all; however, the governments, military, and intelligence or security 
services would not be solely reliant on mobile phones, and additional security mechanisms would 
probably be put in place. It was indicated that mobile phones were important for gathering 
intelligence; and were widely used by criminal and terrorist groups. As with the threats to general 
CIIP, confidentiality is of great concern regarding mobile communications; this is due to the 
perceived ease of intercepting the wireless transmissions. Given that a number of the incidents 
discussed in Section 5.5 are related to breaches of confidentiality, this is again not surprising. 
Availability and integrity again appear to raise equal concern, and the misuse of mobile devices in 
attacks was also explicitly raised. 
6.3 Research Workshop 
The research workshop was held at The Riverside Hotel in Durban, South Africa, on the 9 June 
2011. The objective of the research workshop was to discuss vulnerabilities and threats that are 
relevant to South Africa, from both an information security and risk perspective. Three main aspects 
were to be considered: general threats and vulnerabilities, those specific to mobile devices, and 
those specific to Web 2.0 technologies. This data was used to corroborate the data from the 
incidents and trend analysis and the interviews. Other relevant discussions also occurred. 
There were seven participants, the candidate's supervisor, and the candidate, who facilitated the 
workshop and discussion. Three sessions were held of approximately 90 to 120 minutes each; the 





devices for redundancy and generation of the report and results; however the reporting of the 
discussion is de-identified. 
6.3.1 General Vulnerabilities and Threats 
The focus of these discussions was on the protection of personally identifiable information; this 
corresponds to confidentiality in the IW models. Concerns over incorrect attitudes and a lack of 
understanding and awareness of information security and risk management issues were also raised; 
this was cited as a major contributor to the lack of progress made in these areas in South Africa. A 
participant also raised the fact that it was reported that in the region of R195 million was stolen 
through cyber-related crime during 2008 to 2009. This figure may have been underestimated; a 
report indicated that the financial loss in South Africa during 2010 to 2011 was R10.9 billion 
(Symantec Corporation, 2011b). Even if the amount cited by the participant is underestimated, the 
intent is still clear: the financial loss due to cyber-crime is significant. 
A concern raised was that organisations only introduce security and risk management measures to 
comply with mandatory standards and regulations; they do not appear to want to know or care about 
information security issues. In addition, SMMEs appear to have an attitude that the compliance for 
security and risk management does not apply to them and is only relevant to larger organisations; 
this was also raised in the interviews in Section 6.2.2. These incorrect attitudes may result in 
insufficient measures being introduced to safeguard information and protect systems; this 
contributes to the financial losses mentioned above. 
Concern was raised that organisations and the employees do not fully understand risk; examples 
were given where employees and organisations assume that security and IT risk management was 
automatically handled by service providers to which they were outsourcing their requirements. Risk 
cannot be outsourced, and is carried by the owner of the information; therefore unless there is 
specific contractual obligations, the service providers will not provide security measures for the 
corporation. Chapters 3 and 4 of the King Report on Governance for SA 2009 (King III) (King 
Committee on Goverance, 2009) cover the audit and risk management responsibilities. An example 
was given where organisations do not understand the audit process, and mistakenly assume that 
auditing financial systems to ensure integrity of the financial information is a full security audit; 
they then believe they have had a security audit and have a false sense of security. It was concluded 
that the IT governance of South African organisations is generally weaker than those of 





company had found personal information on random computers while becoming compliant with an 
international standard. The new requirements and legislation, such as King III and the Protection of 
Personal Information (POPI) Bill (Bill 9 of 2009) should improve IT governance by forcing 
organisations into taking responsibility and managing the risk of the information they have 
ownership of. A concern that organisations will move data to their facilities in other countries with 
more relaxed privacy laws may also be circumvented by the fact that Chapter 9 of POPI will require 
any data moving out of the physical boundaries of South Africa must be protected by equivalent 
laws or be contractually bound to the relevant South African legislation (POPI, 2009). The 
discussion indicated that these documents require the organisations, and in particular senior 
management, to take responsibility for the information stored or used by the organisation. The 
information needs to be classified by the data owner; they are responsible for the classification so 
that the relevant security measures are put in place to protect it. The IT departments do have 
responsibility in that they need to ensure that the technological security measures are performing 
correctly. It was suggested that there also be improved communications regarding the limitations of 
security measures, as listing the measures in place may give the impression that the information 
cannot be breached. As discussed above, risk cannot be outsourced, and service providers should be 
explicitly bound by contract to provide security services; however, it was suggested that providers, 
for example cloud computing service providers, should be responsible for the integrity of their 
infrastructure. 
The participants confirmed that cyber-based corporate espionage and DoS attacks do occur in South 
Africa. The example of DoS attacks was that they usually occurred prior to major events, and 
specific online gaming or gambling websites were targeted. The high rates of malware infection and 
hosting in South Africa was also raised; it was commented that South Africa appears to be a staging 
point for malware attacks originating in Eastern Europe. The concern was raised that the increase in 
broadband availability without an increase in security awareness will probably result in an increase 
in the prevalence of malware infections and successful scams; this corresponds to the document 
analysis presented in Section 5.7. It was indicated that the concept of the African Botnet (Carr, 
2010), presented in Section 5.7, may be realised. An example provided of circumventing the threat 
of keyloggers was to use biometrics in addition to passwords; thereby negating unauthorised access 
due to compromised logons. The biometrics, however, are expensive, and the additional security 
may not be necessary on many personal home computers. They will also not circumvent the impact 





performance of the national information infrastructures (NII) on the African continent will also be 
degraded due to the traffic volumes. 
In addition to the lack of awareness, it was raised that organisations and service providers do not 
always have the capability to prevent or detect attacks. In the DoS example, it was stated that the 
service providers were unable to assist or mitigate the attacks. It was stated that in many cases 
organisations only discover that their security has been breached when there is a noticeable 
irregularity, such as a large telephone bill that exceeds actual usage. It was also noted that many 
organisations were unable to implement basic information security controls correctly and are 
therefore unlikely to be able to implement more advanced security measures. An example provided 
was that organisations do not have proper system logging, or do not monitor the logs; this 
contributes to the inability of detecting security breaches. The Verizon Data Breach Report 
(Verizon, 2011) was cited as claiming that many breaches were avoidable, and occurred to incorrect 
implementation of security measures. This lack of awareness, combined with the apathy mentioned 
above, contributes to the significant financial losses due to malicious cyber-activity. Awareness 
training and proper management of security controls could therefore reduce the financial impact at a 
corporate level, and the national economy. 
The main threats discussed were insider threats from current and ex-employees, crime-syndicates, 
and targeted attacks. It was indicated that employees who have recently left an organisation, or are 
about to leave, often feel dissatisfied and intentionally copy or release sensitive information as 
revenge. An example was given where an employee was selling information from a client database. 
It was raised that in most instances of fraud the perpetrator was eventually traced to a residential 
address and was an associate of an employee in the victim organisation. The rise in targeted attacks 
appears related to cyber-crime syndicates; the criminals themselves do not necessarily have the 
technical skills, but they target one or more individuals who do have the necessary access or skills. 
The information or capabilities provided by the targeted individuals allows the syndicate to access 
account information and funds; an example of this is the Vodacom SMS hack (Dingle, 2009), 
presented in Section 5.5.1.3. Examples were also given where CEOs are followed to the airport and 
their laptops are stolen, and a specific computer with was repeatedly targeted and stolen, despite 
other computers that were available to be stolen; it appears the theft was for the information and not 
the hardware. These targeted attacks show susceptibility of organisations and infrastructure; and 
could be used in intelligence gathering and planting of malicious software as part of a cyber-attack. 





(Prevelakis & Spinellis, 2007), where a Greek mobile infrastructure was penetrated, enabling the 
attackers to monitor the communications of high-ranking officials (Section 5.5.1.2). 
It was proposed by a participant that the reason why organisations see large losses to cyber-crime is 
that older generations, who could hold senior management positions, fall for phishing scams more 
easily due to their habit of following requests without questioning the validity. However, examples 
were given where phishing scams are becoming so advanced that technical users also are caught; 
the RSA SecurID hack (Poulsen, 2011) is an example of this. It was also noted that during 
penetration testing, the workshop participant's organisation has a success rate of over 90% for social 
engineering tests. Social engineering was raised in the interviews for threats related to mobile 
communications, but not general threats. The inclusion of social engineering here indicates that it is 
indeed a highly successful threat in South Africa, and should not be discounted. It was also noted 
that vulnerabilities of specific organisations are inadvertently published by individuals who consult 
their peers online, and post configuration settings allowing potential attackers to identify the 
vulnerability; an example of a website dedicated to search and classify information on such online 
help-lines was given. 
Solutions proposed by the participants include data classification; the de-identification of data; the 
introduction of security into the systems or software development cycle; and the introduction of a 
CSIRT. Data classification may be a suitable way of determining the security measures that need to 
be applied to the data; new legislation will require data classification, and the participants expect 
this to improve the protection of confidential information. Data classification can also be used to 
decide what information can be stored on cloud computing services, and what data needs to be kept 
on secure internal networks. It was suggested that instead of trying to protect all the data, it should 
be de-identified by assigning a unique identifier to the data; this identifier, and any data identifying 
individuals, should then be stored with high security and the remainder can be stored on the cloud 
or with reduced security as it is just random data. The introduction of security into the development 
cycle was proposed as being more efficient; an example of this was provided where security was the 
responsibility of the development team, however security experts were made available for 
consultation. This may reduce the number of vulnerabilities in software. The introduction of a 
national CSIRT will provide more effective co-ordination of incident response, and an improved 
warning and view of the bigger picture. This corresponds to the document analysis in Section 5.7 
and the interviews in Section 6.2. However, a concern was raised that a CSIRT may be used to cut 





from any agencies that may misuse it. Segregation of duties was also highlighted, where one person 
is not responsible for an entire process, which may aid in mitigating breaches and fraud.  
It was also noted by the participants that there is a lack of information security related content in 
many academic degrees; it was also perceived that the degrees were inconsistent between different 
institutions. The lack of a professional or regulatory body overseeing the industry and academic 
degrees was also noted. Such a body, similar to the Engineering Council of South Africa, may aid in 
ensuring academic quality and consistency by accrediting degrees; and allow registration of 
professionals in the field. In particular, the concern was over many self-taught web-developers who 
do not have the necessary skills or understanding to effectively implement security. Providing for 
apprenticeships and registration of professionals will ensure the quality of those in the field, and 
reduce the number of vulnerabilities due to sub-standard development. Such a professional body 
may be able to address a number of issues: lack of awareness or understanding, apathy, aid in 
improving the inclusion of security in the development lifecycle, and improve education. 
The protection of personally identifiable information appears to be the greatest concern measured 
by the time spent discussing it. This indicates that confidentiality is of primary concern; this 
corresponds to the results of the interviews presented in Section 6.2. As with the interviews, the 
focus appears to be on cyber-crime; however the examples illustrating susceptibility to attacks can 
also be exploited by a state or state-sponsored attacker. Awareness and incorrect attitudes was again 
raised; social engineering was illustrated to have high success rates. Other threats included insider 
threats and targeted attacks by criminal syndicates. New legislation and standards are expected to 
improve information security in general by forcing organisations into taking responsibility for the 
security and risk management of their systems and information; whilst this is aimed at mitigating 
cyber-crime, it will also aid in mitigating concerted cyber-attacks. The prevalence of malware in 
South Africa, and the concerns that South Africa is being used as a staging post for attacks, 
indicates that the concept of Africa becoming a cyber-weapon may be realised to some extent. The 
infection rates are expected to worsen as Internet access becomes more readily available. Proposed 
solutions include the continued introduction of relevant legislation and a CSIRT at a national level; 
at an organisational level solutions include data classification, segregation of duties, and de-
identifying data. The use of biometrics in addition to passwords was suggested to mitigate 
unauthorised remote access. The formation of a regulatory body to oversee the industry was 
proposed as a method of ensuring quality and consistency in academic degrees and in professionals 





6.3.2 Mobile-Related Discussion 
This section presents the workshop discussion that considered mobile-related issues. The perception 
of the participants was that the introduction of mobile devices into the organisations has been ad-
hoc. Organisations may provide devices that are cheaper, with more flaws and less functionality; 
therefore employees may prefer to use their own better quality devices. Organisations have less 
control over the personal devices, therefore the security cannot be assured; this may introduce 
vulnerabilities into the organisation's network. It was raised that employees will still have their 
personal devices even if organisations force them to use supplied devices. It was noted that the use 
of personal laptops is often restricted, however there is less restriction on personal smart-phones; it 
was suggested that in these cases there is no realisation that the smart-phones have similar 
capabilities to laptops. Introducing mobile devices into the organisation's networks may result in a 
breakdown of the network's perimeter security. An example was provided where a penetration 
testing application was installed on a smart-phone, which was subsequently used to gain insider 
access to the corporate network. Mobile devices may provide rogue access points inside the 
network perimeter, thereby circumventing the perimeter security controls. The difficulty in 
managing the security settings and installed applications on mobile devices was also raised.  
A suggested solution to these problems is that organisations employ MAC address filtering on the 
wireless network access points; should an employee wish to connect a personal device, it needs to 
be registered with the IT department who will ensure the relevant security measures are in place on 
the device. MAC address filtering will not aid in mitigating cases where users connect wireless 
capable mobile devices to computers on the internal network; continuous monitoring will be 
required to detect any rogue wireless access points. Shielding may be used to contain the wireless 
signals within the physical boundaries of the building; however, this may prove to be expensive. 
Many smart-phones also have the capability of using wireless access points to make voice-over-IP 
(VOIP) calls, similar to Skype, as an alternative to the standard GSM or 3G mobile networks. These 
calls are susceptible to interception as they are carried by open IP networks; it was suggested that 
policies or requirements be introduced to encrypt or restrict VOIP calls to mitigate accidental 
breaches of information. Other peripheral devices, such as printers, also utilise wireless networks to 
communicate; poor security settings and allowing the wireless signal to penetrate beyond the 
organisation's physical boundaries may result in the information being intercepted. An example was 
provided where the wireless security was breached during a penetration test and the information 





store device demonstrations, may also provide attackers with a method of accessing networks. An 
example was provided where demonstration devices were used to access online chat rooms; it is 
possible malicious activity could be conducted using these devices with no way of tracking the 
perpetrator. 
Malware on mobile devices is also a concern; an example was provided of a mobile botnet utilising 
geo-location information to flood base stations with requests in specific locations; this can be seen 
as an example of a mobile DDoS attack. In response to a query by the candidate regarding reports 
of pre-installed malware on mobile devices (as described in Section 5.5.1.6), it was stated by a 
participant that some countries randomly sample imported components and devices for malicious 
code. In Section 5.5.1.6 it was presented that mobile infrastructure components from countries were 
banned due to concern of pre-installed malware. It was also stated that it is impossible to check for 
all possible pre-installed threats or previously unseen malware; a warning was also given that often 
the labels stating where a device was manufactured often means it was assembled there and 
individual components could be manufactured in another country. This suggests that restricting 
devices by manufacturing origin may not be successful in preventing pre-installed malware. 
A concern was raised over the fact that RICA will not be as effective as intended. An example was 
provided where pre-registered SIM cards are being sold; these are apparently registered using false 
documentation and are being sold at a higher price. This was subsequently corroborated when 
arrests were made in conjunction to the selling of these SIM cards (Nair, 2011). Using in-store 
demonstration devices may also effectively circumvent the RICA process. It was agreed during the 
discussion that the act did not target the correct population; criminal elements will attempt to 
circumvent the required SIM card registration process, whereas law-abiding citizens will register 
their mobile numbers. It was noted that while the act requires service providers to make provision 
for intercepting communications, it does not specify requirements or methods to do so. This may 
result in sub-standard intercept methods that are ultimately ineffective. A potential problem that was 
raised is that of lawful interception of VOIP: this is a layered service, and providers of each layer 
may claim that it is the responsibility of other layers to make provision for the lawful intercept. 
Concern was also raised regarding the security of the information registered during the RICA 
process; it was noted that there is probably a repository of information that may be an attractive 
target for an attacker. Such information may potentially be used to clone SIM cards to pre-
registered numbers. These concerns are similar to one raised in the interviews, where RICA and 





be effective; as presented in Section 5.7.1.2, the legislation may not be updated or corrected until it 
is tested by a court case. 
From the outcomes of the discussions in the workshop related to mobile devices, the potential for 
cyber-based attacks through mobile devices is illustrated. Examples of mobile devices being used to 
circumvent perimeter controls and gain insider access could be used to compromise networks 
controlling critical infrastructure. The example of the mobile-based DDoS illustrates these devices 
could potentially be used in network warfare on the mobile infrastructure; in the document analysis 
presented in Section 5.5, experts are expecting a mobile worm equivalent to the PC-based Slammer 
worm (Hyppönen, 2010). There appears to be an under-estimation of smart-phone capabilities, and 
difficulty managing the security on these devices. The concerns raised regarding the effectiveness 
of RICA indicate potential legislative vulnerabilities. Unsecured VOIP communications and 
wireless communications to peripheral devices may provide opportunities of maliciously accessing 
information; and the possibility of pre-installed malware illustrates the potential for mobile devices 
to be utilised in a network warfare scenario. 
6.3.3 Web 2.0 Related Discussion 
This section presents the discussion related to Web 2.0 technologies. It was noted that employees 
are expecting the social connectivity in the workplace that is afforded by social media; this is 
consistent with the document analysis in Section 5.6. An example was provided where employees 
were provided with social media style connectivity internal to the organisation; however this was 
not utilised as the employees preferred external access to their existing friends. This tendency to be 
connected online socially raises concerns that corporate information may inadvertently be posted 
online, or employees could post something that harms the corporate image. The example presented 
in Section 6.3.1 of users posting configuration settings seeking advice may become more 
pronounced with users actively seeking social media connectivity and communications. Even if the 
universal resource locators (URLs) of social media websites are blocked, an example was provided 
of websites that are allowing users to access the websites by acting as a proxy. It was also noted that 
organisations check employees' activities through their social media profiles; this is also done 
during the recruiting process. This suggests a potentially persistent human threat where control 
mechanisms and policies are subverted intentionally in order to interact socially with persons 
external to the organisation, where sensitive information could be leaked. As the issue is related 






It was noted that the nature of Web 2.0 sites is that content is often referenced from other sources; 
therefore it is difficult to determine the actual origin of the content. This content may be images, 
video, code, or applications; often Real Simple Syndication (RSS) is used. The problem is that this 
provides for rapid propagation of malicious content; and even if the website is reputable, it does not 
mean that the original source of the content is. Web 2.0 based malware was described in Section 
5.6. It was also noted that application programming interfaces (APIs) on a social media site 
provided access to more information than what a user gave permission to access. These 
vulnerabilities may provide indirect methods of delivering malicious content or accessing 
information. 
From the outcomes of the workshop discussions related to Web 2.0, it is apparent that these 
technologies can act as attack vectors. Their use as social communication mediums may also 
provide avenues for accidental information leaks. Examples of this are provided in Section 5.6.  
6.3.4 Summary 
The objective of the workshop was to solicit information regarding prevalent threats and 
vulnerabilities in South Africa from information security and risk perspectives. The discussion 
focussed on cyber-crime, and the protection of personally identifiable information. Social 
engineering, insiders, and criminal syndicates were identified as threats. Cases of corporate 
espionage and DoS attacks against specific websites do occur in South Africa; and a rise in targeted 
attacks has been noticed. Incorrect corporate attitudes towards information security were raised in 
addition to the lack of awareness and understanding. The prevalence of malware in South Africa 
was noted, and the concept of an African botnet was considered feasible. Proposed solutions again 
include the introduction of a CSIRT and legislation. At an organisational level, data classification, 
de-identifying the data, segregation of duties, and introducing security into the development cycle 
were suggested solutions. The use of biometrics as an additional security layer was also suggested. 
It was also proposed that a professional body be formed to regulate the industry and ensure quality 
of the academic offerings and professionals working in the field.  
Examples provided in the discussion related to mobile devices indicates the possibility of these 
device being used to perform network warfare operations; infected devices may be used to conduct 
DDoS attacks against the mobile infrastructure, spread malware, or bypass perimeter controls of 
networks and provide insider access to potential attackers. MAC address filtering was suggested to 





effectiveness of RICA; malicious elements are able to circumvent the requirements of the act, 
indicating that RICA may only provide a false sense of security. There is concern regarding the 
information access of APIs in social media sites, and the difficulty in determining the origin of 
content; this may also be used to propagate malicious content. The use of social media by 
employees raises concerns over accidental information leaks. It is apparent that these technologies 
can act as attack vectors. 
The perception of the respondents is that South Africa is behind on implementing the protection of 
systems and the information that reside on them. It is apparent that modern technologies have 
changed the threat and vulnerability landscape, and organisations have not fully come to terms with 
these changes. The human still appears to be a major vulnerability in information security. The 
aspects of the workshop that relate to the findings from the interviews (Section 6.2) and document 
analysis (Chapter 5) are consistent. 
6.4 Survey 
The objective of the survey was to determine the reliance on mobile communications by the 
informal sector. This focus combines with the interview focus on the government, military, and 
corporate sectors, providing coverage of a variety of sectors in South Africa. This corresponds to 
the research objective of determining the criticality of the mobile phone infrastructure; the reliance 
of the informal traders on mobile communications will be compared to their reliance on the other 
communication technologies. Only a pilot study was performed; this research is a project on its own 
and should be conducted as future research with the attention it deserves. It was expected that the 
informal sector would be overwhelmingly reliant on mobile phones; however this pilot indicates 
that this may not be the case. This dynamic deserves a more in-depth investigation that does not fall 
into the realm of this project. As described in Section 3.6, the pilot was conducted in central 
Durban, and the guide selected the participants. Nine prospective respondents were approached; one 
did not wish to participate, providing eight responses. Section 6.4.1 provides the demographics of 
participants, and Section 6.4.2 provides the results of the questions aimed at determining the 
reliance on mobile communications. Section 6.4.3 summarises this section. 
6.4.1 Demographics 
This section presents the demographics (age, race, and gender) and basic information regarding the 





the tables where there were no answer are left blank for clarity. Table 6.17 to Table 6.19 provide the 
demographics of the respondents. 
Table 6.17: Age 
Under 20 21-40 41-60 Over 60 
Prefer not to 
answer 
 5 1 2  
 
Table 6.18: Race 
African Indian Coloured White Other 
6 1  1  
 
Table 6.19: Gender 
Male Female Prefer not to answer 
5 3  
Some information regarding their business was solicited; this is presented in Table 6.20 to Table 
6.22, and Table 6.23 presents the perceived monetary usage by the participant's on their mobile 
phones.  
Table 6.20: Do you have employees? 
No No – it is a family business Yes 
4 1 3 
 
Table 6.21: How many customers do you serve per day? 
Less than 20 21-50 51-75 76-100 More than 100 
3 2 1 1 1 
 
Table 6.22: What do customers usually spend each visit? 
Less than R10 R10-R50 R51-R75 R76-R100 More than R100 






Table 6.23: How much do you spend per day on your cell phone? 
Less than R10 R10-R20 R21-R50 R50-R100 More than R100 
2 3 3   
In future research, the categories in Table 6.22 and Table 6.23 should be revised; where the 
categories below R50 are expanded, and have a single category of More than R50. 
As the participants state they use less than R50 per day, the financial impact of a widespread 
services outage of the mobile service providers may not seem large; however, taking this over the 
entire informal sector the impact may become greater. The longer the outage lasts, the greater the 
impact. Should the informal sector be reliant on the mobile communications, then there will be a 
greater financial impact on the social well-being of the informal sector, their suppliers and their 
customers. Section 6.4.3 presents the gathered data from the pilot to indicate the possible reliance 
on mobile communications. 
6.4.2 Access, Usage, and Reliance on Mobile Communications for Business 
This section presents the perceptions of the pilot sample on their usage and reliance of mobile 
phones. Information was solicited on the access of the sample to various communications 
technologies (mobile voice, SMS, fixed-line, Internet and email) and the perceived usage and 
importance of each of these technologies. 
Table 6.24 presents the access to communications technologies. All participants have access to their 
own mobile phone. Only one had access to their own fixed-line telephone, Internet, or email; seven 
had no access to these technologies at all, even from borrowed or public access points. This 
indicates prevalence in the penetration of mobile devices to the informal market. 
Table 6.24: Access to Communications Technologies 
 
I do not have 
access 
I have my own 
I borrow from 
someone else 
I use a public or 
community one 
How do you access a cell phone?  8   
How do you access a landline 
telephone? 
7 1   
How do you access the Internet? 7 1   





Table 6.25 presents how the participants perceived the majority of their of the communications 
technology use between private or business purposes. In some cases, two responses were provided; 
this was taken as equal use, and assigned 0.5. Six participants felt they used their mobile phone 
more for private reasons, one for business reasons, and one was equal between business and private 
use. The single responses for the other technologies indicated equal use for fixed-line telephone; 
and private reasons for both email and Internet use. These responses in indicate that a widespread 
outage of mobile communications may have a more profound social impact than a business impact 
for the informal sector. 
Table 6.25: Perceived Use between Business and Private 
 
I do not have 
access to this 
For my business 
For private 
reasons 
I mostly use cell phones for:  1.5 6.5 
I mostly use landline telephones for: 7 0.5 0.5 
I mostly use the Internet for: 7  1 
I mostly use emails for: 7  1 
 
Table 6.26 presents the view of the importance of the communication technologies for their 
informal business. The importance of mobile phones was mixed: three responses each for No 
difficulty and Very difficult, and one response each indicating it is not required or there will only be 
a small difficulty. No participants required email or Internet access for their business, and the 
respondent with access to the fixed-line telephone felt that it was important to the running of the 
business.  
Table 6.26: Perceived Importance of Communication Technologies for Business 
 








How difficult would it be to conduct your business 
without a cell phone? 
1 3 1 3 
How difficult would it be to conduct your business 
without a landline telephone? 
7   1 
How difficult would it be to conduct your business 
without Internet access? 
8    
How difficult would it be to conduct your business 
without email access? 





The distribution of the responses according to the categories for mobile phones indicates that there 
may not be an overwhelming reliance on the mobile communications. However, due to the higher 
penetration of mobile phones, there will be more reliance on the mobile communications than fixed-
line telephones. 
The participants were asked to rate their usage of various communication technologies. The 
responses are summarised in Table 6.27. One respondent each listed never and less than once a 
week for using mobile phones for making business calls, two listed everyday and four listed more 
than once a day. For private use, mobile phones were divided one response each for less than once a 
week and a few times a week, and six for more than once a day. The responses rating the use of 
SMS services were the same for both business and private reasons: two listed never and three each 
for a few times a week and more than once a day. One participant did not wish to respond to the 
their use of mobile money functions; three listed that they did not have access, one each for never 
and less than once a week, and two listed that they used mobile money a few times a week. The 
response with fixed-line access indicated it is used a few times a week for business, and every day 
for private use.  The response with Internet and email access indicated they use email a few times a 
week for private reasons, but never for business; the Internet access was listed as never being used. 
The use of communications technologies in general appears to have a slightly higher frequency for 
private use than business use. This indicates that an outage may have a more immediate social 
impact than a business impact for the informal traders. The longer an outage lasts, the greater the 
impact will be on the business. The impact of a possible failure or outage of the communications 
technologies was rated by the participants; the responses are presented in Table 6.28. The responses 
related to the mobile phones were spread evenly amongst the four categories (two each); this does 
not correspond to Table 6.26, where the difficulty was split three each for no difficulty and very 
difficult and one each for small difficulty and not used for business. This will be discussed more 
below. One response regarding the impact of a fixed-line outage indicates badly affected and seven 
listed that they do not use it; this corresponds with the responses for fixed-line telephones in Table 
6.26. One response regarding the email and Internet facilities indicated that there will be no affect 
on their business should there be a service outage; seven indicated that the technology is not used 
for their business. In Table 6.26 all responses indicated their business did not require these facilities. 
Therefore these responses do not correspond perfectly; however the meaning is not altered in that as 





Table 6.27: Usage of Communications Technologies 
 














How often do you use a cell phone to 
make calls for your business? 
 1 1  2 4 
How often do you use a cell phone to 
make calls for private reasons? 
  1 1  6 
How often do you use the SMS 
function for business purposes? 
 2  3  3 
How often do you use the SMS 
function for private reasons? 
 2  3  3 
How often do you use a cell phone to 
use mobile money (M-PESA etc)? 
3 1 1 2   
How often do you use a landline 
telephone for your business? 
7   1   
How often do you use a landline 
telephone for private reasons? 
7    1  
 How often do you use email for your 
business? 
7 1     
 How often do you use email for 
private reasons? 
7   1   
 How often do you use the Internet 
for your business? 
7 1     
 How often do you using the Internet 
for private reasons? 
7 1     
 
Table 6.28: Perceived Impact of Failure of the Communication Technology 
 
I do not use 







How badly will your business be affected if 
the cell phones stopped working? 
2 2 2 2 
How badly will your business be affected if 
the landline telephones stopped working? 
7   1 
How badly will your business be affected if 
the Internet stopped working? 
7 1   
How badly will your business be affected if 
the emails stopped working? 





Participants were asked to elaborate on what the purpose of making mobile phone calls for the 
business was. There reply was they check the market prices, or place orders. They were then asked 
what they would do if they could not make the phone call; their reply was they would walk to the 
market. The reason for the discrepancies between Table 6.26 and Table 6.28 is that it may be 
difficult to run the business without mobile phones; however, if there is a major service outage the 
respondents will make other arrangements and the business will not be badly affected. It was 
expected that the informal sector would be overwhelmingly reliant on mobile communications. 
From the responses it is clear that whilst there is more reliance on mobile communications than 
other technologies due to penetration, there does not appear to be a perception of reliance by the 
respondents themselves. To accurately determine the role of mobile communications and the 
reliance on these technologies in the informal sector, an in-depth study that deserves the attention of 
a full research project is required. 
6.4.3 Summary 
A pilot survey was conducted, where information was solicited from informal traders; the objective 
of the full survey was to ascertain the level of reliance on mobile phone communications. The 
results of the pilot study indicate that the informal traders appear to use mobile phones more for 
private communications than for business purposes. It was expected that this sector would be 
overwhelmingly dependent on mobile communications; however the participant's responses were 
mixed. This indicates that there is some reliance; however, their businesses are not solely dependent 
on mobile communications. The high penetration of mobile phones compared to fixed-line 
telephones can be seen in that all respondents had access to mobile phones. This indicates that the 
mobile phone infrastructure has penetrated all levels of business; whereas fixed-line 
communications have not. Therefore it can be said that the mobile infrastructure is as critical as the 
fixed-line infrastructure, if not more so. 
6.5 Chapter Summary 
This section summarises the key findings of this chapter. Three primary data gathering techniques 
were employed: expert interviews, a research workshop, and a pilot survey. The objectives were to 
solicit information that could be used in assessing the criticality of the mobile phone infrastructure, 





From the interviews, the perception is that the CIIP in South Africa needs to improve. In both the 
interviews and workshop issues regarding the governance of IT were raised, and the lack of a 
functional CSIRT in South Africa was identified as a problem, as there is no centralised source of 
information to give a clearer view of the big picture regarding cyber-crime and cyber-based attacks 
in South Africa. The introduction of new legislation and standards in South Africa is expected to 
improve the governance by forcing organisation into compliance and taking responsibility. 
However, as raised in the interviews, the focus is on increasing the availability of Internet 
connectivity for business and economic reasons, and security is still a side-issue. The concerns that 
were raised in the interviews and the workshop show consistency with the document analysis in 
Chapter 5.  
Cyber-crime came across strongly in both the interviews and workshop; both the financial impact 
and issues of privacy and the protection of personally identifiable information were raised. This is 
not surprising given the prevalence of cyber-crime attacks on personally identifiable information. 
Fraud was raised in both the interviews and workshop; the workshop indicated that most fraud was 
traced back to residential addressed of persons associated with employees of the victim 
organisation. Examples were provided in the workshop of insider threats and targeted attacks by 
crime syndicates; this is consistent with examples in the document analysis presented in Chapter 5. 
The susceptibility to the threats related to cyber-crime indicates that there will be susceptibility to 
similar attacks originating from nation-states, who potentially have more resources than cyber-
criminals. Such incidents are discussed in Chapter 5. There may therefore be a high susceptibility to 
cyber-based attacks against South Africa. 
In both the interviews and workshop it was raised that there is a lack of awareness and 
understanding, and improper attitudes toward information and IT security. The introduction of new 
legislation is expected to improve the situation regarding organisational compliance. User 
awareness is still an issue. In the workshop it was indicated that social engineering has very high 
success rates. Many users are expecting access to social networking within the organisation; 
concerns are therefore against leaks and damage to corporate image due to careless posting; this is 
consistent with the document analysis in Chapter 5. An additional problem with Web 2.0 
technologies is that the original source of the content is difficult to determine due to the cross-
referencing of websites; this provides for rapid propagation of malicious content. 
From the workshop it was indicated that cases of cyber-based corporate espionage do occur in 





has not been targeted as of yet. In the workshop, an example was given of small-scale DoS attacks 
against specific websites in South Africa. The prevalence of malware in South Africa was raised in 
the workshop; it was indicated that it appears that South Africa is being used a launching point for 
attacks. This is consistent with the malware infection rates and the concept of an African Botnet as 
presented in Chapter 5. This indicates there is susceptibility to malware infection and to DoS 
attacks, as using infected computers in Africa to launch attacks will impact on the international 
bandwidth of the hosting nations as well as the target. A concern is that the growth of access 
without the corresponding security and awareness will magnify the problem. An example was given 
where biometrics are being used in conjunction with passwords; this may be useful in preventing 
malicious access to critical infrastructure systems. 
The interviews indicate that the mobile infrastructure is part of the critical information 
infrastructure. Reasons for this are given as reliance of other sectors on mobile communications, 
and the fact that the mobile infrastructure is included as part of the information and communications 
sector, which is considered as critical. The heavy reliance of society on mobile communications was 
raised in the interviews; in the workshop an example was provided of a mobile DDoS attack on the 
base stations, resulting in local loss of services. Concerns were also raised over the effectiveness of 
RICA in the workshop; examples were provided of how the process is being circumvented. This 
could indicate potential legislative weakness, where it is possible to continue malicious use of the 
mobile communications. 
The survey considered the informal sector, and the interviews consider small and large businesses, 
government, military, intelligence and security services, and criminal and terrorist elements. From 
the responses, it is apparent that mobile communications has some importance for all sectors. It was 
indicated that the military, governments, intelligence and security services should implement 
additional security measures, and should have other means of communication. It was noted in the 
interviews that mobile communications may be the only form of communications available to small 
businesses; the results from the pilot survey indicates that this is probably the case for the informal 
sector. However, the participants did not perceive their businesses as being completely reliant on 
mobile communications; it appears to be used more for private reasons, and the results of the impact 
of a potential outage were spread evenly across the categories. The results indicate that there may 
not be an immediate impact on the informal sector should there be an outage of the mobile 
communications. The penetration of mobile phones into all levels of society was hinted at as all 





The potential use of mobile devices in attacks was raised in both the interviews and the workshop; a 
particular concern was the fact that the devices can circumvent the network perimeter controls. 
Examples were provided in the workshop of this being conducted during a penetration test. 
Confidentiality is also a concern regarding mobile devices; the ease of intercepting communications 
was mentioned in both the interviews and workshop. An example of intercepting wireless 
communications during a penetration test was provided during the workshop; the susceptibility of 
using a mobile phone's VOIP capability over open networks to interception was also raised. This is 
consistent with the document analysis, where incidents of unauthorised access to mobile 
communications were presented. 
Solutions suggested in both the interviews and workshop is the introduction of CSIRTs and 
continued introduction of cyber-relevant legislation. Data classification and segregation of duties, 
anonymising or de-identifying data, MAC address filtering in the organisation to aid in preventing 
unauthorised devices accessing the network, and the introduction of security into the development 
cycle were also identified in the workshop; international collaboration and internal capacity 
building was identified in the interviews. Biometrics in addition to passwords may aid in mitigating 
unauthorised access to critical systems. Due to the large issue with awareness, measures should be 
taken to improve awareness of users and organisations regarding cyber-threats. Developing new 
technologies and techniques to counter the security issues surrounding mobiles was also suggested. 
It should be noted that the data gathered in the three methods are not sufficient on their own to 
prove any theory; however they support the theories and trends that were discussed in Chapter 5, 
and give indications of the specific scenario in South Africa. The outputs from this chapter and 
Chapter 5 will be used in conjunction with the mathematical and simulation results in Chapter 7 as 













Chapter 7. Simulations and Calculations 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the simulations and calculations to determine critical points in the mobile 
infrastructure, and the feasibility of attacking these nodes. Section 7.2 conducts a graph theory 
analysis of the mobile infrastructure; this identifies possible singularities or central nodes that may 
be vulnerable to attack. Section 7.3 calculates the capacity of the wireless channels of mobile 
networks to assess the feasibility of performing a DoS attack on channels. Section 7.4 presents 
simulations of mobile worms, and assesses the capability of the physical infrastructure hardware to 
carry these loads. Section 7.5 calculates the range at which wireless communications can be 
detected and jammed; this illustrates the feasibility of electronic warfare tactics against the mobile 
infrastructure. Section 7.6 simulates the correlation accuracy required for eavesdropping or 
jamming 3G signals; this illustrates the complexity of electronic warfare operations against 3G 
communications. 
7.2 Graph Theory Analysis 
As described in Section 2.7.1.10, graph theory analysis can be done on networks and infrastructures 
to determine critical nodes; if any singularities or centralised systems are discovered, these may be 
considered as vulnerabilities. These systems may serve as choke points, or failure of the device may 
result in failure of the overall infrastructure. This section presents an analysis of the mobile 
infrastructure to identify possible singularities, centralised systems, and critical nodes in the mobile 
infrastructure. For this analysis, a simplified mobile infrastructure will be used; the information 
flow under consideration is the requests for connection from the towers to the core infrastructure, 
therefore devices that provide additional mobile services are ignored; these are usually associated 
with the mobile switching centres (MSC), base station controllers (BSC), or home location register 
(HLR). Therefore the SMS switching enter (SMSC) can be considered as part of the MSC, the 
authentication centre can be considered as part of the HLR, and the GPRS gateways can be 
considered as part of the BSCs. From Traynor et al. (2009), there can be up to 200 towers (BTS) per 
MSC, and up to ten MSCs per HLR; for the purposes of this analysis, it will be assumed that each 





Figure 7.1 shows the graph, where the dashed lines indicate devices not shown (only BSC 1 and 
BSC 10 are shown for each MSC, likewise only MSC 1 and MSC 10 are shown). From this it can 
be determined that the HLR node has ten edges (one for each MSC); the MSC nodes have twenty 
edges (ten to the BSCs, nine to the other MSCs, and one to the HLR). The BSC nodes have 21 


















Figure 7.1: Graph of a Simplified Mobile Infrastructure 
Table 7.1 shows the numbers of devices and the degree of the nodes for the graph shown in Figure 
7.1. For the case of three HLRs, the HLR nodes have a higher degree to allow for connection to 
each other. As discussed in Section 2.7.1.10, the graph scale type is determined by the relationship 
between the frequencies and the degree of the nodes.  
Table 7.1: Frequencies and Degrees of Nodes for a Simplified Mobile Infrastructure 
Node (Hardware device) Frequency (Number of devices) 
Degree of Node (Number of 
connections) 
For one HLR 
BTS 2000 1 
BCS 100 21 
MSC 10 20 
HLR 1 10 
For three HLRs 
BTS 6000 1 
BCS 300 21 
MSC 30 20 





By inspection of Table 7.1, it can be seen that the node distribution is not governed by a power law, 
which indicates that the mobile infrastructure is not a scale-free network (Lewis, 2004). From this 
graph, it can be seen that there are critical nodes based on geographical location: each BSC is 
critical to the connectivity of a small geographic area, and the MSCs are critical to the connectivity 
of larger geographic areas. Due to the nature of the HLR, upon which the infrastructure relies for 
authentication and billing information, this is a critical node as its malfunction will render the 
infrastructure inoperable. 
Due to the clustering of nodes in geographical locations, it is theoretically possible to target specific 
nodes deny services in these areas; however certain nodes may have a larger load capacity than 
others. For example, the MSC will be able to carry larger loads than a localised BSC. There is also 
the possibility that the channels themselves become overloaded due to a DoS attack; Enck et al. 
(2005) investigate this possibility by assessing the capacity of the stand-alone dedicated control 
channel (SDCCH) to carry SMSs. This research is expanded by Traynor et al. (2009) to investigate 
a potential DoS attack on the HLR. Section 7.3 applies the study of Enck et al. to the South African 
situation. Fleizach et al. (2007) investigate the propagation of mobile malware; this is expanded 
upon in Section 7.4, where the network loading and time to failure due to aggressive mobile 
malware is simulated. 
From the interviews presented in Section 6.2, the HLR handles billing. As contract fees can also be 
paid in-store, this indicates that there is some form of transfer of subscriber billing information from 
the stores to the mobile infrastructure. Therefore there is the potential that the billing systems may 
be attacked through insecure systems in stores. Corruption of the billing database may result in 
affected subscribers having mobile services denied should all the billing information be set to 
indicate there are outstanding fees or no airtime. It will also be possible to breach the confidentiality 
of subscriber account and residential information through the store interface. 
The graph theory analysis of the mobile infrastructure indicates that there is clustering in 
geographical areas, and the network is not scale-free. Therefore there are critical nodes that govern 
specific geographical areas; BSC control localised areas, MSCs control larger areas, and the HLR 
controls much larger geographical areas. By targeting these nodes, it may be possible to deny 
services to the relevant geographical area. It may also be possible to perform a DoS attack on the 






7.3 Calculations to Determine Message Capacity of Mobile Network 
Channels 
As with computer networks, the mobile infrastructure will have a maximum operating capacity; 
should the infrastructure be bombarded with large amounts of illegitimate traffic, the mobile 
services will be denied. This is essentially a network warfare attack on the mobile infrastructure. 
Enck et al. (2005) calculated the number of messages required to saturate the stand-alone dedicated 
control channels (SDCCHs) of a mobile network; as the SDCCH channels are used for 
authentication and delivery of SMSs, both voice and message services will be denied due to a 
saturation of these channels. In their paper, the cities of Washington D.C. and Manhattan were used 
as an example for the calculations; this section presents similar calculations are performed for four 





, which equates to approximately 1.3 km
2
 to 2 km
2
. Table 7.2 shows the relevant 
statistics for four metropolitan areas in South Africa, with the calculated number of sectors based on 
the sector sizes above. 
Table 7.2: South African Metropolitan Statistics and Calculated Number of Mobile Phone Sectors 
Metropolitan Area Population* Area* 
Population 
Density* 






eThekwini (Durban) 3 161 844 2 291km² 1 379 1762 1146 
Cape Town 2 969 458 2 460km² 1 207 1892 1230 
Johannesburg 3 295 088 1 644km
2
 2 003 1265 822 
Tshwane (Pretoria) 2 040 517 2 174km
2
 938 1672 1087 
*Source: South African Cities Network (2011a) 
Enck et al. (2005) suggest that there are typically two SDCCHs per mobile carrier for a GSM 
network; however, this may increase for areas of dense population. The paper also indicated that 
each SDCCH could carry approximately 900 messages per hour. The following equation then may 
be used to calculate the message capacity limit of the mobile networks in a metropolitan area 
(adapted from Enck et al. (2005)): 
 7.1 
where C is the overall capacity in messages per second. Table 7.3 shows the capacity for four South 
African metropolitan areas, for the number of sectors (determined in Table 7.2), and various 





and five carriers, and taking the case of two and three SDCCHs per carrier; this gives six, nine, ten, 
and fifteen SDCCHs per sector. 
Table 7.3: Message Capacity (messages/second) of Mobile Networks for Metropolitan Areas 
Metropolitan 
Area 




SDCCHs per Sector 
6 9 10 15 
eThekwini 
(Durban) 
1762 (1.3) 2643 3964.5 4405 6607.5 
1146 (2) 1719 2578.5 2865 4297.5 
Cape Town 
1892 (1.3) 2838 4257 4730 7095 
1230 (2) 1845 2767.5 3075 4612.5 
Johannesburg 
1265 (1.3) 1897.5 2846.3 3162.5 4743.8 
822 (2) 1233 1849.5 2055 3082.5 
Tshwane 
(Pretoria) 
1672 (1.3) 2508 3762 4180 6270 
1087 (2) 1630.5 2445.8 2717.5 4076.3 
From the results shown in Table 7.3, the maximum quantity of messages the SDCCHs would be 
able to process is 7095 messages per second (this is for fifteen SDCCHs and 1892 sectors in Cape 
Town). After that figure has been reached, both voice and messages services will be severely 
degraded, if not denied, due to the SDCCHs being overloaded. If the infrastructure is operating 
close to its capacity limits, fewer messages may be required in order to disrupt services. An 
example is the backlog of BlackBerry messages after the initial outage in 2011 resulted in continued 
disruptions (Press Association, 2011). Mobile service disruptions in South Africa were also 
attributed to high operating loads (Ajam & Bailey, 2009). 
A possible method for attacking a mobile phone infrastructure by saturating services with 
illegitimate SMSs is to compromise web-based SMS services and employing them to transmit the 
SMS (Enck, Traynor, McDaniel, & La Porta, 2005). For this to occur the Internet would need to 
carry the equivalent data that would be sent in the SMSs; Table 7.4 shows the required Internet 
capacity for the message rates in Table 7.3 assuming each SMS is 1500 bytes as described in Enck 
et al. (2005). 
From the Internet capacity required shown in Table 7.4, the worst case scenario for attacker is a 
required capacity of 81.2 Mbps. As the three-digit prefix of South African mobile phone numbers is 
arranged according to network provider rather than geographical area, it may be difficult to target 





capacity required for each of the four metropolitan areas, a total of 282.9 Mbps is required to 
saturate the four largest metropolitan areas of South Africa. Considering the DoS attack against 
Myanmar (Burma) reached 14 Gbps (Labovitz, 2010), the Internet traffic required to conduct the 
attack is feasible. However, there may be a limitation regarding the capacity of the web-based SMS 
services to carry such a load; multiple providers of such services may need to be compromised in 
order to achieve the desired result. Given that the aggressor is attempting such an attack in the first 
place, compromising multiple web-based SMS providers should be feasible. 
7.4 Simulations of Mobile Network Traffic Load due to Mobile Malware 
This section provides simulation results for the message traffic load on a mobile phone 
infrastructure due to the spreading of a mobile-based worm. The simulations will hold for similar 
situations; but as not all infection characteristics of mobile worms are the same, it will not hold for 
all. The section is intended to give an indication of the potential severity of mobile worms in a DoS-
style network warfare attack on the mobile infrastructure. The section also intends to illustrate the 
importance of computer simulations in analysing potential attacks and the effect on infrastructures.  
Simulations conducted by Fleizach et al. (2007) focussed on the topology of the address book of 
mobile devices and the capacity of the links between nodes on the malware propagation for the 
cases of voice over IP and MMS. The simulations presented in this section intend to illustrate the 
impact on the hardware nodes, and the time taken to overload those nodes. 
Section 7.4.1 provides simulation based on the Beselo worm that targeted Nokia's Symbian OS; and 
Section 7.4.2 provides a simulation for a hypothetical scenario where a mobile worm is 
Table 7.4: Internet Capacity Required (Mbps) 
Metropolitan 
Area 





6 9 10 15 
eThekwini 
(Durban) 
1762 (1.3) 30.2 45.4 50.4 75.6 
1146 (2) 19.7 29.5 32.8 49.2 
Cape Town 
1892 (1.3) 32.5 48.7 54.1 81.2 
1230 (2) 21.1 31.7 35.2 52.8 
Johannesburg 
1265 (1.3) 21.7 32.6 36.2 54.3 
822 (2) 14.1 21.2 23.5 35.3 
Tshwane 
(Pretoria) 
1672 (1.3) 28.7 43.1 47.8 71.8 





intentionally used to infect devices in attempt to perform a DoS attack. The purpose of these 
simulations is to provide an estimate on the load that the hardware of the mobile infrastructure will 
bear from such an attack. Section 7.4.3 provides a summary and some additional analysis of the 
simulation results. As these are simulations, they comprise of multiple equations and decisions; the 
flow diagrams for the simulations are presented in Appendix D. 
7.4.1 Simulations Based on the Beselo Worm for Symbian Platforms 
The simulations in this section are based upon the Beselo worm that infects the Symbian OS. This 
worm propagates by sending MMSs to the entire contact list of an infected device every two 
minutes (Cisco, 2009). The simulations are conducted using the Matlab software. 
An artificial limit on the device population is set, so there are a maximum number of devices that 
can be infected; this is done as in the real world there is a finite number of devices. One minute is 
allowed for the transmission of the message and the installation of the worm on the next device, 
prior to that device beginning to transmit. Therefore there will be three minutes between the time a 
message is sent to a device and the time it begins transmitting (assuming it is infected). It is 
assumed that there are on average 100 contacts in a device's contact list. The Monte-Carlo 
simulation randomises the probability of infection; initially, it is assumed that 1% of the recipients 
will be infected, thereafter the probability is decreased according to the number of devices in the 
maximum population that have not been infected, and this is randomised using Matlab's built-in 
random number generator. Each time point is an average of 1000 iterations of the simulation; as the 
random number generator returns a four-digit number between zero and one with three decimal 
places (an example is 0.495), the number of iterations allows each number between zero and one an 
equal probability of being randomly generated. For the purposes of the simulation, it will be 






Figure 7.2: Number of Infected and Transmitting Devices with Time for a Population of 1500 Devices 
 
 





Figure 7.2 shows the growth in the number of infected devices and the devices transmitting infected 
MMSs to propagate as time progresses for a maximum population of 1500 devices. The lag between 
the time the devices are infected and when they begin to transmit can be seen. As each device only 
transmits every two minutes, and given the one-minute delay for new devices to become infected, 
approximately half of the population transmits each minute; this reduces the maximum possible 
effect of the worm. Figure 7.3 shows the graph of the number of message sent. Assuming that each 
device has 100 contacts listed in the address book, there will be approximately 75000 messages 
being sent every minute. The S-shaped curve is a result of the initially slow spreading of the 
infections due to a small number of transmitting devices; this gathers momentum, and then tapers 
out as the number of clean devices decreases, reducing the likelihood of new infections. 
Figure 7.4 compares the infection and transmission characteristics of the worm spreading for 
various population sizes. The difference in time for the maximum infection to be reached is slight; 
doubling the population size does not double the time taking to reach maximum infection. This 
characteristic is due to the non-linear nature of the infection rate; as more devices are infected, the 
more transmission are made and the higher the chance of subsequent infections. The delay between 
the device infection and transmission is again visible. For a population of 4500, the delay between 
2000 devices being infected and 2000 devices transmitting is slightly in excess of ten minutes; 
however, when considering incident response on a national scale, this delay is negligible. Figure 7.5 
compares the number of messages sent; these follow the same trends as in Figure 7.4. What is 
significant is that for a population of 1500 devices that are infected, that within fifty minutes the 
infected phones will be sending 75000 MMSs; for a population of 4500, the number of MMSs 
exceeds 200000 within an hour. This indicates that a virus targeted at a popular mobile device will 
have a significantly greater impact in a relatively small amount of additional time. This additional 
load on the infrastructure may hamper legitimate traffic. In addition, it will be frustrating for the 
individuals receiving an MMS every two minutes, and expensive for those whose phones are 
infected and sending the MMS. The continuous transmission or reception of messages may also 






Figure 7.4: Comparison of Infected and Transmitting Devices for Various Populations 
 
 





7.4.2 Simulations for a Hypothetical Worm and the Impact on the Cellular Phone 
Infrastructure 
This section simulates a hypothetical worm with multiple propagation vectors: Bluetooth, SMS, and 
MMS. The Beselo worm described in Section 7.4.1 can also propagate via Bluetooth (Cisco, 2009), 
therefore the ability of mobile worms to have multiple propagation vectors is feasible. For this 
example it will be assumed the intention is to create a DoS attack on the cellular infrastructure. For 
the purposes of the simulations, it will be assumed that infected devices will send messages every 
minute to all contacts in the address book of the device. Device and channel limitations will be 
ignored as the purpose of these simulations is to investigate the theoretical loading such a virus will 
place on the hardware of the mobile network infrastructure. To initiate the spread of infections, an 
infected device can be intentionally been left in an area with large quantities of human traffic, such 
as a shopping mall, to transmit and infect nearby devices via Bluetooth. As with the simulation in 
Section 7.4.1, the results are averaged over 1000 iterations, and the address book is set to 100 
contacts.  
Figure 7.6 shows the number of infected and transmitting devices over time for various maximum 
populations. Figure 7.7 shows the number of messages sent per minute, and Figure 7.8 shows the 
number of infected and transmitting devices for various initial infections. All figures are for a 
maximum population of 3000, one initial infection, and no additional load unless otherwise stated. 
For these simulations, infrastructure hardware limitations are not considered. 
The shape of the graphs showing the increase in infected devices is similar to those in Section 7.4.1, 
except that as there is a transmission every minute, the infection can spread faster resulting in a 
steeper curve. In Figure 7.6, the time delay between a specific number of infected devices and the 
same number transmitting is reduced and the number of transmitting devices can approximate the 
maximum number of infected phones, compared to the Beselo worm in Section 7.4.1. As shown in 
Figure 7.7, the number of messages transmitted per minute by the infected devices will be 
maximised, which will increase the load on the infrastructure hardware. From Figure 7.8, it is 
apparent that increasing the number of initial infections does accelerate the spread of the infection, 







Figure 7.6: Infected and Transmitting Devices for Various Populations with no Additional Load or Hardware 
Limitations and one Initial Infection 
 







Figure 7.8: Infected and Transmitting Devices for Various Numbers of Initial Infections with no Additional Load 
or Hardware Limitations for a Maximum Population of 3000 and one Initial Infection 
Figure 7.9 to Figure 7.11 repeat the above simulations, but account for hardware limitation and 
additional loading from legitimate traffic. According to Enck et al. (2005), a short message 
switching centre (SMSC) from the year 2000 could process 2500 SMS messages per second. This 
figure will be used as a more recent capacity of the switching centres was not found; the simulations 
can be repeated in future when this data is available and compared to the results presented here. 
These simulations will also allow for additional loading on the infrastructure; this can be assumed 
to be continuous legitimate traffic. Once the simulation has reached a point where the hardware is 
saturated, the probability of new infections is reduced by a factor determined by dividing the 
number of messages handled by the total number of messages this (this is the probability that a 
message will be successfully sent). 
Figure 7.9 shows the increase in infected and transmitting devices for various additional loads. 
Figure 7.10 shows the number of messages sent, the number that can be handled by the SMSC, and 
the number of messages rejected or failed due to network saturation for various additional loads. 
Figure 7.11 shows the impact of the number of initial infections. Table 7.5 gives times taken to 






Figure 7.9: Infected and Transmitting Devices for Various Additional Loads, with Hardware Limitations of 2500 
msgs/sec for a Maximum Population of 3000 and one Initial Infection 
 
Figure 7.10: Number of Messages Sent, Handled, and Rejected for Various Additional Loads, with Hardware 






Figure 7.11: The Impact of Initial Infections, with no Additional Load and Hardware Limitations of 2500 msgs/sec 
for a Maximum Population of 3000 




0% Load 25% Load 50% Load 75% Load 
1500 
1 49.2 38.6 35.1 31.0 
2 46.2 35.1 31.9 28.0 
3 44.1 33.3 30.0 26.1 
3000 
1 38.2 36.4 34.2 30.7 
2 35.1 33.2 31.0 27.6 
3 33.2 31.4 29.1 25.6 
4500 
1 37.7 36.1 34.0 30.8 
2 34.3 33.0 30.7 27.5 
3 32.6 30.8 28.9 25.5 
From Figure 7.9, it is apparent that high additional loading on the infrastructure will impair the 
ability of mobile worms to propagate and spread; the plot for a 75% additional load does not reach 
its theoretical maximum within eighty minutes. However, the higher the additional load, the less 
time it takes for the infrastructure hardware to reach a saturated state, as is shown in Figure 7.10 and 





more messages will fail as opposed to being successfully processed. Figure 7.11 and Table 7.5 show 
that more initial infections results in the infections spreading faster. 
The above simulations were done for smaller populations, approximating 0.1% of a metropolitan 
area. The simulations in Figure 7.12 to Figure 7.14  increase the maximum number of devices that 
can be infected to 30000, which is approximately 1% of a metropolitan population in South Africa. 
As there are five mobile networks, the simulations will use five SMSCs, each with a processing 
capability of 2500 messages per second. 
Figure 7.12 shows a comparison of number of infected and transmitting devices for various loads; 
the corresponding number of messages sent, handled and rejected for various loads are shown in 
Figure 7.13. Figure 7.14 shows the impact of the initial number of infections. Table 7.6 provides the 
time until the mobile infrastructure is overloaded for various populations, loads, and initial 
infections. 
 
Figure 7.12: Infected and Transmitting Devices for Various Additiona1 Loads, one Initial Infection, Hardware 






Figure 7.13: Messages Sent, Handled and Rejected for Various Loads, one Initial Infection, Hardware Limitation 
of 2500 msgs/sec (using five SMSCs), and a Maximum Population of 30000 
 
 
Figure 7.14: The Impact of Initial Infections, no Additional Load, Hardware Limitation of 2500 msgs/sec (using 






Table 7.6: Time to Network Saturation (minutes) for Various Initial Infections and Additional Loads, with 




0% Load 25% Load 50% Load 75% Load 
15000 
1 45.4 43.8 41.4 37.8 
5 38.1 36.3 34.0 30.6 
10 34.9 33.1 30.9 27.5 
30000 
1 44.6 43.1 41.0 37.8 
5 37.2 35.7 33.6 30.4 
10 34.1 32.4 30.6 27.4 
45000 
1 44.4 43.0 41.0 37.8 
5 37.1 35.4 33.6 30.3 
10 33.9 32.3 30.4 27.2 
 
Figure 7.12 again illustrates that higher loads impair the ability of the mobile worm to spread 
infections, however these loads result in reduced times to infrastructure saturation, as shown in 
Figure 7.13 and Table 7.6. Figure 7.14 again shows that larger numbers of initial infections tend to 
accelerate the propagation of the worm. Based on the times for a metropolitan area shown in Table 
7.6, assuming 1% of that population has devices that can be infected, the mobile infrastructure 
could become saturated with illegitimate message in approximately twenty-seven to forty-five 
minutes. For this given scenario in the simulations, it may take a few hours for the worm to infect 
the maximum possible number of devices. 
Traynor et al. (2009) show that 23 500 infected devices should be sufficient to reduce the ability of 
HLRs to carry legitimate traffic by 75%, or 141 000 infected devices for higher capability HLRs. 
Given the malware propagation illustrated in Figure 7.12, this will be achieved in an hour. This 
indicates that should the concentration of the infections be too widespread to perform a DoS attack 
on an SMSC or the control channels, the impact on the HLR may still deny services. From Section 
6.3.2, the example of a mobile botnet using geo-location to instruct all infected devices to flood the 
mobile network in a specific geographic region may easily be used to deny mobile services given 
the results of the simulations. 
7.4.3 Summary of Mobile Network Traffic Simulations 
Basing the SMSC processing capacity as 2500 messages per second, and one SMSC per mobile 





mobile networks in a metropolitan area. From Section 7.3, it was calculated that 7095 messages per 
second would be required to saturate the SDCCHs in a metropolitan area. Therefore it is more likely 
that the SDCCH would become overloaded prior to the SMSC, however the overall impact will be 
the same; mobile services in the metropolitan area would be denied or severely degraded. From the 
simulation results and calculations in Section 7.3, it would be safe to assume that the degradation or 
service denial will become noticeable within an hour. This lends legitimacy to the Cyber 
Shockwave scenario presented by CNN (Cable News Network, 2010), and discussed in Section 
5.5.2.6; where city-wide mobile communications were being lost due to the spread of a mobile 
worm.  
The limitations of mobile devices may also impact on the propagation of mobile malware. Devices 
may not be able to process the quantities of messages the malware is attempting to send. For 
example, if the malware attempts to send a message to everyone on the contact list every one 
minute and there are a hundred contacts, that could result in the device trying to send more than one 
message a second. This could render the device unusable, and the user may simply switch off the 
device to prevent financial loss due to the sheer number of messages. This will still effectively deny 
mobile service to those users, and there will still be the psychological impact of the frustration due 
to the incoming and outgoing messages on the device. 
7.5 Calculations for Jamming and Detection Ranges 
This section calculates the range at which wireless signals, both from mobile infrastructure, and 
wireless networking, can be effectively detected and jammed. This will therefore be primarily 
related to the electronic warfare functional area. These calculations are done in such a way that the 
maximum theoretical jamming or detection range is calculated, assuming perfect conditions. 
However, these ranges may be reduced according to local geography and built environment.  
Section 7.5.1 calculates the maximum range at which mobile phone signals can be effectively 
jammed, and Section 7.5.2 calculates the maximum range for which these signals can be detected. 
Section 7.5.3 calculates the jamming range for wireless networking, and Section 7.5.4 calculates the 
range for which these signals can be detected. Section 7.5.5 summarises the section. 
7.5.1 Jamming Mobile Phone Channels 
This section calculates the maximum range for which a jammer of given power can effectively jam 





operate on four main frequencies: 850MHz, 900MHz, 1800MHz, and 1900 MHz (Adamy, 2009; 
Ojanpera & Prasad, 1998). 
For the purpose of these calculations, we can assume the height of the base station is 30m, the 
height of the mobile device is 1.5m, and the height of the jammer's antenna, hj, is 3m. The distance 
between the mobile device and the base station is 1km. The effective radiated power (ERP) of the 
base station is typically 10W to 50W (Adamy, 2009), which corresponds to 40dBm to 47dBm. The 
ERP of the mobile device is typically 1W to 6W (Adamy, 2009), corresponding to 30dBm to 
37.8dBm. From the list of radio frequency power sources for communication jammers surveyed in 
Holt (2010), an output power of 100W (50dBm) is typical for a jammer that can operate across all 
four frequencies of the mobile phones. 
Equation 2.10 in Section 2.5.5 provides the equation for the jammer-to-signal ration (JSR): 
  
For the purposes of these calculations, the antenna gains, Grj and Gr, can be ignored. For digital 
communications, such as GSM and WCDMA that is used in South Africa, the JSR should be equal 
to or greater than 0dB to successfully jam the channel. To calculate the maximum jamming range, 
the JSR is set to zero, and the channel loss for the jamming signal, Lj, is replaced with the relevant 
equations for line of sight propagation and two-ray propagation. Equation 2.6 in Section 2.5.4.1 
gives the calculation for line of sight propagation: 
  
Equation 2.7 in Section 2.5.4.1 gives the calculation for two-ray propagation: 
  
The general equation to calculate the maximum jamming distance becomes: 
 7.2 
where dj is the maximum jamming range. The numerator (A) and denominator (B) of the exponent 
for line of sight propagation are: 
 7.3 
where Ls, is the channel loss of the desired signal, ERPj is the ERP of the jammer, and ERPs is the 
ERP of the desired signal. The equation for the case of two-ray propagation becomes: 
 7.4 





The first step is to calculate the Fresnel Zone of the desired signal. Equation 2.5 in Section 2.5.4.1 is 
used: 
  
Table 7.7 gives the Fresnel Zone figures for the four frequencies. As the distance between the 
mobile device and base station is 1km, line of sight propagation occurs for all four frequencies; the 
channel loss is also provided in Table 7.7. 
Table 7.7: Fresnel Zone and Channel Loss for the Desired Signal 
f (MHz) 850 900 1800 1900 
FZ (km) 1.59 1.69 3.38 3.56 
Ls (dB) 91.03 91.52 97.55 98.02 
Two strategies can be employed: jam the downlink (base station to mobile device) or the uplink 
(mobile device to base station). The Fresnel Zones for the cases of jamming the downlink and 
uplink are shown in Table 7.8. To jam the downlink, the mobile device is targeted, and the base 
station is targeted to jam the uplink. 
Table 7.8: Fresnel Zones for Jamming Signals 
f (MHz) 850 900 1800 1900 
FZ (km) 
Jamming downlink 
0.16 0.17 0.34 0.36 
FZ (km) 
Jamming uplink 
3.19 3.38 6.75 7.13 
As the range is not known before the calculation, the ranges need to be solved for both line of sight 
and two-ray propagation using Equations 7.2 and 7.4; these ranges are shown in Table 7.9. The ERP 
of the base station was set to 10W. The figures for the line of sight propagation are larger than that 
of the corresponding Fresnel Zone, therefore they are incorrect, and two-ray propagation occurs. 
The irrelevant distances are formatted with the strikethrough. 
Table 7.9: Jamming Ranges for Targeting the Downlink for a Jammer Output Power of 100W 
Freq (MHz) 850 900 1800 1900 
dj (km) 
Line of sight  
3.16 3.16 3.16 3.16 
dj (km) 
Two-Ray 





This process is repeated for the case of jamming the uplink, and the results are shown in Table 7.10. 
The ERP of the mobile device was set to 1 W. Again, the line-of-sight propagation figures are 
proven to be incorrect, and two-ray propagation occurs. The irrelevant distances are formatted with 
the strikethrough. 
Table 7.10: Jamming Ranges for Targeting the Uplink for a Jammer Output Power of 100W 
Freq (MHz) 850 900 1800 1900 
dj (km) 
Line of sight  
10 10 10 10 
dj (km) 
Two-Ray 
5.66 5.82 8.32 8.51 
By comparing the two sets of results for the downlink and uplink, it can be seen that the maximum 
jamming for the case of targeting the uplink is greater; therefore that is the most effective strategy. 
These results give the case for the maximum jamming range for a jammer with 100 W ERP, 
resulting in a JSR of 0 dB, which will allow the jammer to jam only one channel at any given time. 
To jam more channels, the jammer will either have to reduce the distance to the target, or radiate 
more power. The maximum jamming range of all cases is 8.5km for a frequency of 1900 MHz. At 
this range, nine devices are required to cover a metropolitan area of 2000 km
2
. 
The largest output power of the devices listed by Holt (2010) that can cover all four mobile 
frequencies is 300 W (54.77 dBm). Table 7.11 provides the maximum jamming range for a device 
with this output power. As it was established that two-ray propagation was applicable to both the 
downlink and uplink, only these figures are calculated. 
Table 7.11: Jamming Ranges for a Jammer Output Power of 300W 
Freq (MHz) 850 900 1800 1900 
dj (km) 
Downlink  
0.94 0.96 1.36 1.40 
dj (km) 
Uplink 
7.45 7.66 10.84 11.14 
The maximum range is extended to 11.14 km for the case of the jammer with an output power of 
300 W. For this range, six devices would be required to cover a metropolitan area of 2000 km
2
. 
Given that a DoS such as described in Sections 7.3 and 7.4.2  could be launched from any location 





them ineffective if a large scale DoS is intended, unless there are electronic warfare assets in the 
region, such as in a peace-keeping operation.  
There are commercial mobile phone jammers that are available which can be used for both GSM 
and 3G mobile phones (Nichols & Lekkas, 2002). Assuming a power output of 300W, and a 
maximum range of 11km; each device will be able to cover an area of 390 km
2
. For the South 
African metropolitan areas, this will require between four and seven devices. For an output power 
of 100W and a maximum range of 8.5km, each device will be able to cover an area of 227 km
2
; 
therefore between seven and eleven device would be required. Given the strength of the device 
output signals, it will not take long to triangulate the position of these devices using electronic 
warfare direction finding equipment, and neutralise them. The effects therefore will be temporary. 
7.5.2 Detecting Mobile Channels 
For these calculations, the height and ERP of the base station and mobile device will be the same as 
those in Section 7.5.1. As with jamming, the first step is to calculate the Fresnel Zones; Table 7.12 
provides these for detecting the downlink and uplink. To detect the downlink, the target is the base 
station transmission, and the target is the mobile device to detect the uplink.  
Table 7.12: Fresnel Zones for Detecting Signals 
f (MHz) 850 900 1800 1900 
FZ (km) 
Detecting Uplink 
0.16 0.17 0.34 0.36 
FZ (km) 
Detecting downlink 
3.19 3.38 6.75 7.13 
To calculate the distance at which a signal can be detected for line of sight propagation was given in 
Section 2.5.4, Equation 2.8: 
  
To calculate the distance at which a signal can be detected for two-ray propagation was given in 
Section 2.5.4, Equation 2.9: 
  
Solving for d gives the range at which the signals can be detected. For the calculation a receiver that 





frequency range of 80MHz – 3GHz, and has a sensitivity of -131dBm (Holt, 2009a). This is also 
one of the most sensitive receivers listed, which will provide a truly maximum range for which 
these signals can be detected. A typical SIGINT antenna will have a gain in the region of 5dB to 
20dB (Holt, 2009b); for the purposes of these calculations a mid-range figure of 12dB will be used. 
Table 7.13 provides the detection ranges for the downlink and uplink of mobile phones; as with the 
jamming, the range was calculated for both the line of sight and two-ray propagation. 
Table 7.13: Detection Ranges for Mobile Phones 
f (MHz) 850 900 1800 1900 
Downlink Detection 
Range (km) 
Line of Sight 




356.55 356.55 356.55 356.55 
Uplink Detection 
Range (km) 
Line of Sight 




44.83 44.83 44.83 44.83 
Given the results of for line of sight propagation, which are clearly incorrect as they are too large, 
two-ray propagation occurs between the intercept antenna and the mobile device or base station. 
The irrelevant distances are formatted with the strikethrough. The downlink signal can therefore be 
detected at a range of 356.55 km, and the uplink can be detected at a range of 44.83 km. These 
ranges are for all frequencies, and two-ray propagation is frequency independent (for the case of the 
jamming, channel loss between the device and base station was frequency dependent, therefore the 
range would not be the same for all frequencies). If both parts of the conversation need to be 
intercepted, then both the uplink and downlink would be required; the range will then be limited to 
44.83 km. 
Given the Athens Affair incident discussed in Section 5.5.1.2, where the actual infrastructure was 
compromised in order to eavesdrop, the electronic warfare option is not the most efficient. As with 






7.5.3 Jamming WLAN and Bluetooth 
The process and formulae for calculating the jamming range are the same as those in Section 7.5.1. 
Both WLAN and Bluetooth operate on a frequency of 2.4GHz and have similar power outputs, 
therefore they present a similar target from an electronic warfare perspective. Bluetooth devices 
with a class 2 power output (which will be used for connecting devices and peripherals) have an 
ERP of 2.5mW (4dBm). It can be assumed these devices will be at a height of 1.1m, and connect 
over a distance of 9m. Bluetooth devices with a class 1 power output (such as access points) have 
an output power of 100mW (20dBm), and can be assumed to be located at a height of 2m and 
connect at distances of 90m. A jamming output power of 100W and 300W will be used for the 
calculations. As in Section 7.5.1, the ranges are calculated for the case when the devices are 
operating near their maximum range in order to estimate the maximum distance at which jamming 
will be effective. Table 7.14 provides the details and results of the calculations. 
Table 7.14: Calculation Results for Jamming WLAN and Bluetooth 
 Two devices 
(9m separation) 
Access point to 
device 
Device to access 
point 
Two access points 
(90m separation) 
FZ for the desired 
channel (km) 
0.12 0.22 0.22 0.4 
Loss for the desired 
channel (dB) 
59.13 59.13 59.13 79.13 
FZ for the jamming 
channel (km) 
0.33 0.33 0.6 0.6 
Range for line of 
sight (km), 100W 
1.8 0.28 1.8 1.8 
Range for two-ray 
(km), 100W 
0.77 0.31 1.04 1.04 
Range for line of 
sight (km), 300W 
3.11 0.49 3.11 3.11 
Range for two-ray 
(km), 300W 
1.02 0.40 1.37 1.37 
 
From the results in Table 7.14, it can be seen that in all cases, except for the case of an access point 
transmitting to a device and a jammer with an ERP of 100W, that two-ray propagation will occur as 
the distances for line of sight are larger than the Fresnel Zone. For the case of the access point to the 
device and a jammer ERP of 100W, the two-ray propagation calculation yields a distance less than 





formatted with the strikethrough. The maximum jamming range for all cases is 1.37 km. Assuming 
commercial jamming devices with an output of 300W; each device will cover an area of 5.9km
2
. 




As WLAN and Bluetooth utilise frequency hopping, there may be additional complexities, as the 
signal never remains on the same frequency for long. The jammer may be able to track the hopping, 
and therefore ensure that the majority of the transmitted signal is unreadable. However, in an 
environment that has multiple WLAN connections it may be difficult to track the exact signal, 
therefore it may be a better strategy to distribute the jammer ERP over all signals detected at that 
location. 
7.5.4 Detecting WLAN and Bluetooth Transmissions 
This section calculates the maximum range for which WLAN and Bluetooth signals can be 
detected. The equations and detection specifications are the same as Section 7.5.2: the receiver has a 
sensitivity of -131dBm, and the antenna has a gain of 12dB. The operating frequencies, ERPs, 
heights, and distances are the same as in Section 7.5.3. Table 7.15 shows the relevant Fresnel Zones 
and detection ranges. As before, the range was calculated for both line of sight and two-ray 
propagation. 
Table 7.15: Calculation Results for Detecting WLAN and Bluetooth 
 Device (2.5mW) Access Point (100mW) 
FZ (km) 0.33 0.63 
Line of Sight 222.73 1405.4 
Two-Ray 8.60 29.11 
As before, the line of sight calculations yields distances which are larger than the Fresnel Zone, and 
are therefore incorrect; two-ray propagation occurs. The irrelevant distances are formatted with the 
strikethrough. For the calculations, it can be seen that the presence of a signal originating from a 
device with an ERP of 2.5mW is 8.6km; and 29.11km for an access point with an ERP of 100W. 
For eavesdropping the issue of frequency hopping is different; the signal needs to be tracked for all 
its hops. Many commercial and free WLAN detection software versions are available for devices 
with wireless network interface cards; coupling sensitive detection equipment to a notebook may 





having someone in a position nearby the target will be more cost effective and achieve the same 
results. 
7.5.5 Discussion and Summary of Jamming and Detection Range Calculations 
For eavesdropping on WLAN or Bluetooth, using specialist sensitive equipment may not 
necessarily improve the effectiveness of intercepting the signal; given the ranges, having someone 
near the target to intercept the signals will achieve the same results with no real extra complexity. 
For the case of jamming WLAN and Bluetooth signals, it may be difficult to track a single signal in 
a highly populated environment. Therefore jamming all signals in the target's location may be 
simpler and achieves the desired effect, even if it is not as efficient. A significant problem in using 
electronic warfare attacks to target these signals in an urban environment, is trying to locate and 
lock onto the correct signal in a very highly populated electromagnetic spectrum. Jamming will 
prove to be a simpler exercise; however any devices radiating enough power to jam the signals over 
a large area will be easily located by direction finding equipment. 
Given the ranges for eavesdropping and jamming, targeting a choke point where large quantities of 
traffic related to the target may be more efficient. This allows the attacker to disrupt or intercept 
multiple communications with less control; to target the mobile devices will require more assets. 
For example, if an organisation's mail server is targeted, the relevant emails will be intercepted as 
long as the target is using the organisation's email system, even if the target is at a remote location. 
Targeting these network components may also be done from any location with an Internet 
connection, whereas targeting the wireless channel requires proximity to the target. Electronic 
warfare attacks therefore will probably be less effective than network warfare attacks unless there 
are military electronic warfare assets in the vicinity. 
7.6 Simulations for CDMA Eavesdropping and Jamming  
This section provides simulations for the case of using an intercepted spreading sequence to 
eavesdrop or jam a CDMA signal. A previous version of this section was published in van Niekerk 
and Maharaj (2010b). 
In 3G mobile communications, the signal is modulated with CDMA spread-spectrum technology. 
As discussed in Sections 2.5.5 and 2.8.4.2, CDMA uses a unique spreading sequence for the 
transmitting and reception of the signals. These signals are difficult to detect and are jam resistant 





to estimate the sequence used for spreading by analysing the signal; for commercial applications 
such as mobile phones the spreading sequences are relatively short and this may be possible, 
however long spreading sequences used in military communications may prove to require large 
computing resources (Adamy, 2009). Yao and Poor (2001) proposed a process that uses an 
expectation-maximisation algorithm to estimate the spreading sequence, and was aimed at primarily 
eavesdropping applications (Yao & Poor, 2001); however, the estimated sequence may also be used 
to improve jammer performance by mitigating the processing gain. By estimating the spreading 
sequence, information is gained which will allow for correlated jamming (Shafiee & Ulukus, 2009). 
Simulations were performed using the Matlab software to investigate the effects of the correlation 
between the estimated sequence correlation and the actual sequence on jammer and detector 
performance. The simulations were done for a specific SNR and JSR, and performance is 
determined by the BER. The simulations were Monte Carlo simulations, where the data streams and 
channel noise was randomly generated; the simulations results were averaged over 100 iterations. 
The generated data streams consisted of 100000 bits for each user, and the generated channel noise 
was additive white Gaussian noise at a SNR of 10 dB. No other channel characteristics were 
modelled. A total of six users were simulated, and all signals had equal strength at the receiver. The 
simulations are based on Equations 2.18 and 2.19 in Section 2.8.4.2, which describe multiuser 
environment of mobile communications. The channel is described by: 
,  
and the output of the detector is described by: 
.  
Length-31 Gold codes were as spreading sequences to generate the correlation matrix; the values of 
this matrix were then adjusted to test the impact of correlation between the estimated and actual 
sequences. Various values for the JSR at the receiver were used for the jamming simulation, and the 
jammer was considered as one of the six users. Figure 7.15 shows the results of the jamming 
simulation. A 30% bound is shown in the figure, as for digital signals approximately 30% of the 
signal needs to be jammed for the jamming to be effective (Adamy, 2009; Poisel, 2004).  
For low values of JSR, high correlation is required to have an impact on the target signal. As the 
JSR increases, the correlation value required to effectively jam the signal decreases. This indicates 
that powerful jammers (or jammers close to the target receiver) may overcome spread spectrum 





improve the effectiveness of the jammer. The estimated sequence will need to be accurate, as a JSR 
of 5 dB (the signal is three times stronger) requires a correlation of 0.6 between the estimated 
sequence and actual sequence. 
 
Figure 7.15: Signal Performance under Spread Jamming 
Figure 7.16 shows the results of the eavesdropping simulation. This figure illustrates that very high 
correlation between the estimated and actual sequences is required to achieve reasonable 
eavesdropping performance, even for high SNRs. The simulation assumes perfect power control; 
this is unlikely at an intercept receiver, and channel characteristics such as fading were not 
modelled. Therefore it can be assumed that actual performance would be worse, requiring a higher 
correlation value. There is also the added complexity of the timing of the signal; synchronous 
signals may be easier to estimate the spreading sequence conduct eavesdropping, whereas 
asynchronous signals will be more difficult. The jamming scenario does not require correlation 
values as high as eavesdropping, as the intention is to introduce errors, and any additional 
interference will have some detrimental effect on the target signal. For eavesdropping, the objective 
is to correctly demodulate the target signal without errors; this is highly dependent on the estimated 
sequence being correct. The requirements for this form of eavesdropping are therefore much higher 





As discussed in Sections 7.5.1 and 7.5.2, the ability to jam or eavesdrop on the mobile wireless 
channels is local; combined with the limitations of effectively jamming or eavesdropping on 3G 
signals, this method is not efficient unless there is a presence of specialist military electronic 
warfare assets in the area. 
 
Figure 7.16: Performance of Eavesdropping Using an Estimated Sequence 
7.7 Chapter Summary 
In Section 7.2, the mobile infrastructure was analysed through the use of graph theory to determine 
critical nodes. The analysis illustrates that a mobile infrastructure is not scale-free, but appears to 
have critical nodes according to geographical areas; BSCs control localised areas, and MSCs and 
HLRs control larger geographical areas. This also may impact on the capacity of the control 
channels in the densely populated metropolitan areas. 
Section 7.3 calculates the capacity of the control channels for South African metropolitan areas, and 
the feasibility of launching a DoS attack via web-based SMS services. This showed that just over 
7000 messages per second were sufficient to deny services to a metropolitan area, and that the 
Internet traffic required was feasible to compromise the web-based SMS services. Section 7.4 
simulates the propagation of mobile malware and the time taken for the infrastructure hardware to 





metropolitan area could become overwhelmed in less than an hour; however given the messages 
required to achieve this, it is more likely that the control channels will become saturated. 
Sections 7.5 and 7.6 assess the feasibility of electronic warfare attacks against the wireless 
channels; Section 7.5 calculates the maximum effective range for jamming and detecting the uplink 
and downlink of mobile communications, and wireless networking. The ranges are in the order of 
kilometres and can only cover localised regions; whereas the eavesdropping attacks experienced in 
Greece has the capability of intercepting specific phone numbers, and multiple targets from wider 
geographic regions, without having to track the targets movements. Section 7.6 simulates the 
performance of jamming and eavesdropping on 3G communications where the attacker attempts to 
estimate the spreading sequence. While the complexity of eavesdropping is prohibitive without 
specialist equipment, jamming is feasible, but the range will again be limited. Compared to the 
possibility of a mobile worm or exploiting web-based SMS services to perform DoS attacks, the 
electronic warfare attacks are not much of a threat unless there is hostile electronic warfare 















Chapter 8. Vulnerability Assessment 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter triangulates the data from Chapters 5 to 7 and uses this to assess the vulnerability of 
the mobile infrastructure from an IW perspective. This is a primary objective of the study. Section 
8.2 discusses the criticality of the mobile infrastructure; and Section 8.3 discusses the threats. The 
vulnerabilities and the associated impacts are discussed in Section 8.4; the modified TVA 
worksheet and risk assessment is presented in Section 8.5. Section 8.6 calculates and presents the 
infrastructure risk and vulnerability ratings and Section 8.7 presents opportunities to improve these 
ratings. Section 8.8 reviews the proposed assessment and the chapter is summarised in Section 8.9. 
8.2 Criticality of the Mobile Infrastructure 
An objective of the study was to provide an indication of the criticality of the mobile infrastructure. 
The information that contributes to this originates from the literature, interviews (Section 6.2), and 
pilot survey (Section 6.4).  
In the literature (Section 2.8.4.3), the high prevalence of mobile communications in South Africa 
was noted. There is a ratio of 10.75 mobile telecommunication subscriptions for every fixed-line 
subscription; there are 10.85 mobile broadband subscriptions for every fixed-line broadband 
subscription. There are 92.67 mobile subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, and 10.52 mobile broadband 
subscriptions per 100 inhabitants in South Africa (International Telecommunications Union, 2011). 
A number of health and socio-economic development projects in Africa also utilise the mobile 
infrastructure. This level of prevalence implies a high reliance on mobile communications in South 
Africa, which indicates that the mobile infrastructure can be considered as critical to the social and 
economic wellbeing of South Africa. 
From the interviews, ten of the twelve respondents indicated that the mobile infrastructure is part of 
the critical information infrastructure; the remaining two were unsure. The reasons provided 
indicates that the mobile infrastructure forms part of the national information and communications 
infrastructure, which is considered as critical. The reliance on mobile communications was raised, 
in particular their use by emergency services, government and businesses. A respondent indicated 
that some organisations in the developed world are solely reliant on mobile communications. These 





Five of seven respondents indicated that there should be explicit protection policies for the mobile 
infrastructure due to some of their unique characteristics; two respondents did not believe there 
should be specific policies, as existing critical information infrastructure policies should cover the 
mobile infrastructure. These responses indicate that there is some concern over the protection of the 
mobile infrastructure, and that there are some unique aspects of the mobile infrastructure that 
should be addressed specifically. 
The majority of interview respondents (eleven of twelve) considered mobile phones as important to 
both small and large businesses; six of these considered them very important. The remaining 
respondents for each were unsure. It was indicated that for smaller businesses mobile 
communications may be the only form of telecommunications available. Ten of twelve respondents 
considered mobile communications important to government and security and intelligence services, 
with one respondent unsure and one considering other communications methods more important. 
Ten of twelve respondents considered mobile communications important for the military, and two 
suggested that due to the dedicated military communications the mobile phones are unimportant. 
However, the release by Wikileaks suggested that there were concerns that insurgents were able to 
eavesdrop on mobile conversations of both Coalition diplomats and military in Afghanistan 
(presented in Section 5.5.1.6); this indicates that modern militaries with sophisticated satellite 
communications do make use of mobile devices in conflict zones. The reports of Israeli forces 
penetrating the mobile infrastructure in order to distribute psychological operations messages, 
presented in Section 5.5.1.6, show an application of IW to the mobile infrastructure. The interview 
respondents also indicated that additional security measures needed to be taken should government, 
security, intelligence, or military personnel use public mobile communications. It was also raised 
that due to possible insecurities, mobile communications may be important to these sectors due to 
their ability to gather intelligence on malicious actors. All twelve respondents indicated that mobile 
communications is important to criminal and terrorist actors; seven emphasised their response to 
very important. The suggested importance to these groups ranges from using mobile to detonate 
improvised explosive devices, or the fact that they may form "cheap and dispensable 
communications" (SA5). The use of mobile devices and social networking applications in popular 
uprisings indicate this technology may be critical for the demonstrators, but also for the authorities 
in preventing the demonstrations. These responses suggest that the mobile communications are 
important to all sectors; albeit for slightly different reasons. Therefore the mobile infrastructure can 





especially in conflict zones, indicates that there is a definite relevance of the mobile infrastructure to 
IW. The hacking and distribution of psychological operations messages through the public mobile 
infrastructure confirms this. 
The pilot survey of informal traders (presented in Section 6.4) indicated that there was a higher use 
of mobile communications than for business purposes. Whilst the survey is insufficient to draw any 
firm conclusions, there is an indication that the traders have mixed perceptions regarding the 
importance of mobile communications for their business. There will be an impact on their business 
should mobile communications be lost, however it appears to be more of a useful tool than a 
necessity. All the respondents had access to their own mobile phone, which again indicates the 
prevalence of mobile phones in South African society. The reports of the instability of the mobile 
networks (presented in Section 5.7) also indicated severe public frustration over the network 
outages (Ajam & Bailey, 2009; Mtshali, 2011); therefore there is a general perception that mobile 
devices are essential. It will therefore be more likely that immediate psychological and social 
impacts are experienced due to a major mobile network outage caused by a cyber-attack before the 
economic effects are felt. From the indications from the pilot survey and reports, the mobile 
infrastructure can be considered an integral part of society and is therefore part of the critical 
information infrastructure. 
The overall indication is that mobile communications, and therefore the devices and infrastructure, 
are critical. In South Africa, there is a high prevalence of mobile communications compared to that 
of the equivalent fixed-line communications. Examples have been provided where public mobile 
networks are used for military and government communications, and military attacks on the 
infrastructure for psychological operations purposes. This indicates the relevance of the mobile 
infrastructure to IW. Therefore it can be concluded that the mobile infrastructure is part of the 
critical information infrastructure, and it is feasible that the vulnerability assessment treats it as 
such. 
8.3 Threats 
This section presents the potential IW threats to the mobile infrastructure. It was shown that the 
broader context is relevant and has an impact when considering IW; therefore the non-technical 
factors presented in Section 8.3.1 can be considered to be associated with the Context block of the 
IW Lifecycle model presented in Section 4.2. The technical threats comprise of those methods that 





terms of the prevalence of the methods used; this is presented in Section 8.3.2. These technical 
threats can be related to the weapons block of the IW lifecycle model. Section 5.2.4 summarises the 
threats and provides the ratings. 
8.3.1 Non-Technical Factors 
From the examples discussed in Chapter 5, a wide range of threats can be seen; from disgruntled 
individuals, cyber-crime groups, insurgents, and foreign government organisations, including their 
militaries; these are a general threat as well as specific to the mobile infrastructure. 
From the trend and incident analysis (Sections 5.4 to 5.7), cyber-attacks were seen from hacker 
groups, disgruntled employees, possibly nations, cyber-criminals, and the military intent to obtain 
cyber-weapons. Examples were provided from Zimbabwe where the government and their 
opposition were using cyber-attacks. The most prevalent was breaching confidentiality; however, 
there have been a number of large-scale DoS attacks since 2007. Attacks on the mobile 
infrastructure originate from cyber-crime, such as the SMS banking scandal; the military, from the 
reports of the Israeli penetration of the mobile infrastructure; insurgents, from the concerns that the 
mobile communications of the US forces in Afghanistan were compromised; a disgruntled 
employee who penetrated the mobile infrastructure; and possibly intelligence or other state-backed 
organisations, which may have been involved in the penetration of the Greek mobile infrastructure. 
Web 2.0 websites, in particular social networks, have also been targeted by cyber-crime. There is 
also the possible use by intelligence agencies, evident from the reported false-flag operations; the 
intention of the US military to obtain the Persona software also indicates military use for IW 
purposes. As many smart mobile devices have integrated Web 2.0 functionality, these threats are 
also relevant to the mobile devices. What is also apparent from the incident analysis is that many 
incidents are related in some way to controversial issues or decisions; therefore involvement in a 
conflict situation or controversial activity may result in the increase in the threats depending on who 
opposes the action. 
From the interviews (Section 6.2), the broad themes for general threats and vulnerabilities include: 
lack of user awareness and complacency; cyber-crime, hacking and fraud; surveillance; general 
vulnerabilities; cyber-war and cyber-terrorism; denial of service; illegitimate control; and the image 
of corruption in South Africa. Cyber-crime, cyber-terrorism, cyber-war attacks were listed as the 
threat actors, where the focus was on cyber-crime and related issues. There was a strong weighting 





threats that breach confidentiality. The image of corruption is South Africa was an interesting point, 
in that this perception may result in higher threat activity due to the idea that they are more likely to 
escape prosecution in South Africa. The broad themes for the mobile threats and vulnerabilities 
include: general vulnerabilities; espionage and surveillance; reliance; cyber-crime and information 
theft; malware; lack of user awareness; phishing; SIM cloning; lack of data verification; and cyber-
attacks or terrorist-attacks. The threat actors are again listed as cyber-criminals and general cyber-
attackers. The responses were weighted strongly towards threats that breach confidentiality. 
The workshop discussion (Section 6.3) also indicated that cyber-crime syndicates are a common 
threat; the discussion largely revolved around cyber-crime and the protection of personally 
identifiable information; this again indicates a concern over confidentiality. The insider threats were 
specifically mentioned; in particular employees that are about to leave the organisation, or former 
employees that have recently left were indicated as the most common. The threat from competitors 
in terms of corporate espionage was also raised; and it was indicated that this does occur in South 
Africa. From the mobile related discussion, the devices themselves can be considered as part of a 
threat to information infrastructure in that they can be used to circumvent the network perimeter 
controls. Cyber-crime was also mentioned in that there are reports of the legislative controls related 
to mobile communications being subverted. Web 2.0 can also be seen as a threat in that it facilitates 
the possibility of information leaks and propagates malicious code. It was indicated that it appears 
South Africa is being used as a launching point for attacks, and that it is feasible that Africa may 
have large botnet infections allowing it to be used as a cyber-weapon. 
The financial impact of intellectual property theft and espionage outweighs the financial losses due 
to cyber-crime against individuals. In the Wikileaks incident discussed in Section 4.2.7.4, it was 
stated the lawyers conducting a case against China for stealing software. This indicates that state-
sponsored corporate or industrial espionage is also an economic threat.   
Due to the importance of mobile communications to insurgents, general criminal groups, and 
terrorists, it is unlikely that they will intentionally attempt to disrupt mobile services unless in 
unique circumstances. Denying mobile communications in conjunction with a physical attack may 
further hinder emergency services and rescue efforts, and aid in spreading frustration and fear due 
to the unavailability of communications to check on the health of friends and family. Miller (2005) 
raises this possibility, and Muir (2005) reports that the mobile phone networks were overloaded 





The African-specific trends presented in Section 5.7 provide a political context: there are concerns 
regarding the political alignment of South Africa; both China and India are taking an economic 
interest in Africa, and South Africa has been put in a situation where a political decision (whether to 
allow the Dalai Lama entry into the country or not) will upset one group or another. As China has 
been blamed for a number of cyber-based attacks, it is possible (assuming the reports are correct) 
that political actions which oppose Chinese goals may result in such attacks directed at South 
Africa. A converse opinion is that supporting Chinese wishes may attract attacks from the 
opposition. The internal political tensions in Zimbabwe exhibited some low-key cyber-attacks; 
should this expand, South Africa may be affected by some cyber-attacks. The political unrest across 
Africa in 2011 may also result in a higher threat environment, as this indicates more active potential 
aggressors. As mobile devices and social networking played a role in this unrest, it is possible that 
other cyber-attack methods may be used to further the goals of political groups. South Africa has 
experienced riots regarding the lack of service delivery, and xenophobic attacks; these may be 
incited through use of mobile communications, or possible instigate an external attack on the nation. 
It can be seen that cyber-crime is extremely prevalent; therefore the threat likelihood of cyber-crime 
is very high. Cyber-crime is also related to cyber-war, as the botnets that are operated by the cyber-
crime organisations can be used by groups or nations to perpetrate cyber-attacks. Due to the 
incidents and factors summarised in this section, it can be seen that politically motivated groups or 
activists perpetrate a number of acts; therefore the threat from these groups is high. Incidents 
attributed to nation-state organisations, such as the intelligence agencies or military, are also 
apparent. The nations may have more resources to assign to developing cyber-attacks; if not, they 
can use the cyber-crime infrastructure that is for hire. Therefore their capability is greater than or 
equivalent to the cyber-crime capability, however the likelihood may not be as high, therefore the 
threat can be considered as medium. The threat of insider access also needs to be accounted for as 
they have greater access than the external actors; from the workshop and some incidents, it can be 
seen this is a prevalent threat, and can therefore be rated as high.  
8.3.2 Technical Factors 
Of the technical threats, malware is one of the most prevalent. The CSIRT data presented in Section 
5.4.2 illustrates that the most prevalent incident reported is related to malware or some form of 
malicious code. There is a shift from the initial virus and worm propagation that result in 
widespread disruption of network services to cyber-crime based malware. These are usually in the 





From the workshop it was indicated that the concept of an African botnet is plausible. The 
documents released indicating the US military were reportedly involved in developing a rootkit 
codenamed Magenta indicates there is intended military used of malware; as rootkits can remain 
undetected, this is a serious threat. In addition, the Stuxnet incident indicates that malware can be 
used to target and affect control systems; when Conficker infected military systems it again 
illustrated that malware is a threat to military equipment and operations. Malware has also been 
targeting mobile devices, and this is a rapidly growing threat; Section 5.5.2 presented this in detail. 
There are emerging trends which suggest mobile malware is also shifting towards cyber-crime, and 
PC-based malware has been seen to migrate to mobile platforms in order to attack mobile banking 
applications. Web 2.0 technologies have also been seen as a vector to propagate malware; this may 
be used in future to propagate mobile malware. Malicious code was used in many espionage attacks 
based on the Advanced Persistent Threat. 
A high proportion of the incidents discussed in Section 5.4 constitute system penetrations to steal 
information; some of these appear to be acts of state-sponsored espionage. The initial attacks were 
facilitated through hacking and the later attacks were facilitated through a combination of social 
engineering and the advanced persistent threat, which behaved like a botnet. This indicates a level 
of corporate, economic, industrial, and political espionage. Examples were provided of attempted 
false-flag operations conducted via social networking websites. The workshop confirmed the 
existence of corporate espionage in South Africa; and the high success rates achieved by social 
engineering indicate that this is a relevant threat in South Africa. System intrusions and intrusion 
attempts were listed as the third most prevalent threat by ranking of the CSIRT data (presented in 
Section 5.4.2); scanning is the fourth most prevalent, which indicates some intent to attempt to 
target those systems. Hacking was mentioned in the interviews; the concern was the impact on 
infrastructure services, however this could also be used to access or maliciously alter information. 
The possibility of espionage through mobile communications due to penetration of the 
infrastructure or by intercepting the wireless channel is apparent. The penetration of the Greek 
mobile infrastructure afforded the attackers the ability to monitor high-level individuals; in addition, 
Wikileaks documents indicated there was a similar concern that insurgents could gain access to the 
Afghan mobile infrastructure to monitor calls by US forces and diplomats. The research considered 
indicates that it is possible to intercept and break the encryption of the mobile wireless channel; this 
was also raised in the interviews. The interception will be discussed in more detail later, as it is 





Since 2007 there have been a series of large-scale DoS attacks due to botnets; three have targeted 
national infrastructure, and a series of smaller ones have targeted specific organisations and 
government websites. The threat of DoS attacks was also raised by an interview respondent; 
however the indications from the workshop is that South Africa only experiences low-level DoS 
attacks against specific websites. Given the through-put and capacity of the undersea cables in 
South Africa, a large-scale DoS equivalent in magnitude to the one that targeted Myanmar in 2010 
will result in severe degradation of services in South Africa should the country be targeted; this was 
presented in more detail in Section 5.7.  The CSIRT data also shows some reported DoS attacks in 
the nations; however this is not a very prevalent threat; and is the sixth ranked threat. There is also 
the possibility of mobile-based DDoS attacks on the mobile infrastructure; this was raised by a 
report and in the workshop. Academic research also explores the possibility that exploiting 
legitimate SMS services and flooding the mobile networks may also result in denial of SMS and 
voice services. The calculations and simulations in Sections 7.3 and 7.4 further indicate that a DoS 
attack against the South African mobile infrastructure is feasible; the specific impacts of these will 
be discussed in Section 8.4.2. Reports also indicate that mobile botnets can be used to flood local 
towers and infrastructure with messages or requests; due to the prevalence of mobile malware and 
reports of SMS flooders this is likely to be more prevalent than exploiting the web-based SMS 
services. It is also possible to deny the services on the devices; an example was provided where a 
malformed SMS could crash the communications of mobile phones. It may therefore be 
theoretically be possible to craft an SMS that could crash infrastructure components. This type of 
attack was discovered through research by security experts, and no reports of this method being 
used in an actual attack were found.  
What should be considered is that if there is a high infection rate of bots in South Africa, then a 
DoS attack could conceivably come from the systems within the national boundaries. This will be 
more severe as an attack originating externally could be mitigated by blocking the national 
gateways, leaving the networks internal to the country unaffected; however, an attack originating 
from internal systems will be very difficult to protect against. 
Section 8.3.1 listed out the broad themes for threats and vulnerabilities that arose from the 
interviews. The ones that are relevant to technical threats are: hacking and fraud; surveillance; 
general vulnerabilities; denial of service; and illegitimate control. The relevant broad themes related 
to the mobile infrastructure are: general vulnerabilities; espionage and surveillance; reliance; cyber-





focus of the threat and vulnerability category was of breaches of confidentiality; however aspects 
related to denial of service are also raised. What is interesting is that malware was mentioned for 
mobile devices, yet not for general threats. SIM cloning was raised; this is unique to mobile 
infrastructure and has been used effectively in a cyber-crime incident in South Africa to intercept 
the communications between the online banking and the target. Calls could also be made which 
would be charged to the target's account. 
In addition to the malware, intrusion, and DoS threats already mentioned, fraud and website attacks 
are the second and fifth most prevalent incidents reported to the national CSIRTs. Fraud was also 
raised in the workshop and interviews. It was indicated in the workshop that many cases of fraud in 
South Africa are traced back to associated of employees in the victim organisation. The SIM card 
cloning and the SMS banking scandal incident can both be considered as forms of fraud. These 
incidents raise concerns over the actual origin of the information; thereby affecting integrity. This 
concern was also raised in the interviews in relation to threats and vulnerabilities of the mobile 
devices and infrastructure. Examples include the distribution of SMSes in Kenya advocating 
violence, the penetration of the mobile infrastructure to distribute psychological messages, and a 
disgruntled employee sending messages supposedly from an organisation.  
Section 5.5.1.4 presents research suggesting that the encryption used in the GSM wireless channels 
is susceptible to being broken; the research shows how it is possible to eavesdrop on mobile calls. 
However, there are some technical difficulties with implementing this indicates that it is probable 
that only organised groups with high intent and capability will attempt this; provided they have a 
high return on investment. Section 7.5 provides range calculations for electronic warfare jamming 
and communications intercepts; Section 7.6 simulates the accuracy required to estimate the 
spreading sequence in order to intercept CDMA communications signals. These indicate that 
electronic warfare solution to deny or intercept communications are not as efficient due to range 
limitations, required manpower, and equipment capabilities unless there are already military assets 
in the area with this capability. Lawful intercept or network warfare methods may be more efficient 
as they can be done remotely and access more information, or deny services, with limited available 
human capability. The required capability may initially be higher; however the overall process may 
be more efficient. This indicates that there will be a higher threat from network warfare attacks than 
electronic warfare attacks, unless there are operational military electronic warfare assets in the area, 





As discussed in Section 8.3.1, the workshop participants considered both the mobile devices and 
Web 2.0 technologies as a technical threat in themselves. Mobile devices may be used to subvert 
network perimeter defences and Web 2.0 technologies may be a vector for attacks and information 
leaks. They may also be used as a platform for distributing hate speech and psychological 
operations messages, as discussed above. Mobile devices, combined with social networking 
applications, have been instrumental in a number of popular anti-government uprisings. The mobile 
devices may also be compromised through attacks on vulnerabilities in the Bluetooth and WLAN 
implementation; however these need to be done at a relatively close range to the target. Targeted 
attacks were raised in the workshop, where high-level individuals are targeted and their laptops are 
stolen; this may also extend to mobile phones. Phishing was raised in both the interviews and 
workshop; these attacks have now migrated to mobile phones and are seen in South Africa. The use 
of voice-over-IP (VOIP) services from mobile devices on open networks may result in interception 
of the communications.  
Due to the antennas on both the towers and mobile devices, there is a level of electromagnetic 
exposure of the infrastructure and devices. This makes them susceptible to electromagnetic pulses 
and directed energy devices. It was indicated in reports presented in Section 5.5.1.6 that the mobile 
infrastructure is more susceptible to these attacks than the fixed-line infrastructure. However, the 
proliferation of these devices is low and requires a high technical capability. Homemade devices 
may only have limited power, therefore their effects may be minor, and they would possibly only 
interfere with a single tower at a time, resulting in multiple attacks on the towers. Protection against 
lightning and shielding may also be sufficient to mitigate attacks by the low-powered devices. 
Aspects not discussed in previous chapters include physical threats. As cable theft in South Africa 
(Vermeulen, 2011) and Trinidad and Tobago (Cellular-news.com, 2007) have affected mobile 
services, it should therefore be included here for completeness. Physical attack against information 
infrastructure components is a valid IW tactic as this will effectively deny services. The most 
vulnerable points in mobile communications are the mobile devices (targeted theft is discussed 
previously) and the base station towers. Whilst base stations may be protected by fencing, the base 
station may be damaged or destroyed by thrown explosive devices and the antenna may be damaged 
by gunfire. Such an attack may only damage a single tower; therefore a concerted effort to damage 
multiple towers would be required to disrupt services over a larger geographical area. This method 





of artillery or air strikes, which could target and destroy more crucial components, such as the 
switching stations.     
The majority of information collected in the workshop, interviews, and incident analysis indicates 
that threats which breach confidentiality are the most common. Those that result in denial of 
services or corrupt integrity occurred in similar quantities in interviews; however from the incidents 
DoS attacks against the information infrastructure are more prevalent in terms of large-scale attacks. 
Fraud, which affects information integrity, is far more prevalent at an everyday organisational level 
than denial of service-attacks; however this is more related to cyber-crime than IW attacks. 
Widespread use of mobile communications affords more opportunities for intercepting information. 
Web 2.0 technologies may be used to facilitate information leaks; this is also relevant to mobile 
devices as many smart phones have integrated social networking applications. 
8.3.2.1 Rating the Technical Factors for Threats 
Assuming an IW attack is a given, the likelihood of the attack vectors or methods should be rated; 
this will be used to weight the threat ratings. As malware is prevalent, especially in South Africa, it 
can be rated as having a very high likelihood of being used in an attack as it has been leveraged for 
both espionage and infrastructure attacks. The malware is used to create botnets, which support 
cyber-crime and can be used to conduct DoS attacks. Mobile malware is growing in prevalence, and 
examples have been provided where information can be stolen or possible DDoS attacks on the 
towers from the mobile devices can be conducted. As mobile malware needs to be generated for 
various mobile platforms, and requires certain functionality, this threat is not as prevalent as PC-
based malware, and can be rated as a medium likelihood. Malware distributed by social media has 
been seen; whilst this has not targeted mobile devices, it may affect systems connected to the 
mobile infrastructure. In future it may be possible to infect mobile devices through Web 2.0 
technologies, therefore the likelihood of this attack can be considered medium. The use of 
malformed SMSes or images to crash mobile device or take control of enterprise servers has been 
identified by research; however no information was found that suggests this has been successfully 
implemented as an attack; the likelihood can therefore be considered as low. DoS attacks on the 
mobile infrastructure may be conducted via external SMS entities by flooding the networks with 
illegitimate SMS messages or requests; this has only been proposed in academic research, and no 
information on real-world attacks using this method was found. This method is feasible, and allows 






Penetrating infrastructure appears to occur regularly; and a number of incidents indicate that the 
mobile infrastructure could also be penetrated to either eavesdrop or leave one's own messages. 
There are also reports of regular attack attempts against the South African telecommunications 
networks. In terms of an IW attack, this has a high likelihood. Penetrating the infrastructure may be 
aided by insiders; this is a prevalent threat in South Africa and has already once been illustrated 
how the legitimate functioning of mobile communications services were exploited. Therefore the 
insider threat can be rated as having a high likelihood of occurrence. The subversion of the South 
African mobile provider was by cloning SIM cards. This may allow illegal calls to me made which 
are more difficult to trace, and may allow the interception of some mobile communications; in 
terms of IW, this is more likely to be used by non-state actors rather than national agencies and can 
therefore be rated as high and low, respectively.  
Due to complexities in intercepting the wireless channel, this is unlikely to be conducted during 
peacetime; in a conflict zone there may be electronic warfare equipment available which will allow 
for this. However, using intercept facilities in the infrastructure will be more efficient. The 
likelihood is therefore very low for peace-time conditions, and medium for conflict zones. Jamming 
the wireless channel is less complex and therefore may be conducted more frequently. In conflict 
zones one can assume a high prevalence of jamming due to the threat of IEDs detonated by mobile 
communications and insurgents using them for communications; in peacetime the prevalence will 
be low. The likelihood of EMP or directed energy devices being employed is very low due to low 
proliferation of such devices. The likelihood of physical threats during peace-time are low as 
network warfare-style attacks will be more efficient, however they are still possible; during conflict 
physical attacks are more likely due to the military assets, and can be rated as medium. 
The use of mobile devices also presents threats. Targeted attacks where devices are stolen have a 
high prevalence in South Africa; targeted attacks may also attempt to exploit vulnerabilities in the 
WLAN and Bluetooth capabilities of devices, however these are less likely due to the technical 
capability required and the man-power required to gather the information; therefore these can be 
rated as low. Mobile communications forms a delivery method for phishing and psychological 
operations attacks; these are increasing and examples were provided of the use for PSYOPs. 
Combined with social media, mobile communications have also been used to incite mass 
demonstrations and delivered hate speech inciting violence. These threats are growing in 
prevalence, and can therefore be rated as having medium likelihood. Mobile devices can also be 





workshop. Accidental breaches (a user connecting a mobile device in the network and allowing 
wireless access) cannot be relied upon for IW, and therefore the threat likelihood is low. 
Intentionally introducing the device to access the networks may result in the eventual loss of the 
device, however the benefit to the attacker may be worth the loss; this can be rated as a medium 
likelihood. Information leaks may also occur through mobile devices due to social media 
applications, the mass storage on the devices, and the use of VOIP services on unsecured networks. 
The threat of leaks can be considered as having a high likelihood as attackers may copy information 
onto the devices, which provide an excellent transportation mechanism. This can be rated as a high 
likelihood as insiders will have access to copy the information. It is also possible to intercept VOIP 
communications, but this will be somewhat opportunistic unless the network is permanently 
monitored. In an IW environment, especially where cyber-espionage is prevalent, VOIP 
interception may exhibit a high likelihood of occurrence. 
8.3.3 Threat Summary 
Section 8.3.1 discussed the threat context and non-technical factors. For the South African situation, 
it can be assumed that IW threats will originate from a rogue or vigilante group, or a nation state. 
These threats can be seen to have the capability or will to implement attacks, or employ the 
capability of cyber-criminal groups for these attacks. The likelihood of an attack on South Africa is 
low; however, due to the current political unrest in Africa (Jacobs & Duarte, 2010; Malakata, 2011; 
Sky News, 2011), this could be elevated to medium if the situations are not dealt with sufficiently at 
a political level. Table 8.1 provides the matrix to calculate the threat rankings. As the likelihood of 
threat action is medium, this row is presented with white text on a black background; this row 
provides the threat rating according to the threat capability.  
Table 8.1: Matrix for Threats 
Likelihood of 
Action 
Threat Capability / Prevalence  
V. Low Low Med High V. High 
V. Low V. Low V. Low Low Low Med 
Low V. Low Low Low Med High 
Med Low Low Med High High 
High Low Med High High V. High 
V. High Med High High V. High V. High 
The prevalence of the individual attack methods provides an indication of the preferred weapon or 





high capability in that area. Table 8.2 provides a list of the threats discussed in Section 8.3.2 and 
their threat rankings, calculated from the prevalence and likelihood of threat action. Four general 
threat ratings are provided, prior to rating the specific threats to the mobile infrastructure, and 
threats due to mobile use. The medium rating of the likelihood of threat action moderates the 
prevalence of the threat types; therefore the overall ratings range from low to high. For example, 
whilst there may be a very high threat from malware, the threat of it from an IW application is high. 
These threat ratings will be associated with vulnerabilities to create potential impacts; this is 
discussed in Section 8.4. 
8.4 Vulnerabilities and Impact 
The vulnerabilities, and the potential impact of them being exploited by threats, are derived from 
the incident and trend analysis (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5), the interviews (Section 6.2), the 
workshop (Section 6.3), and the simulations and calculations (Chapter 7). Section 8.4.1 discusses 
the non-technical factors, and the technical factors are covered in Section 8.4.2. Section 8.4.3 
summarises the vulnerabilities and provide the vulnerability ratings. In this section, the worst-case 
scenario for a defender will be considered for the impacts and vulnerabilities. The impact types are 
breach of confidentiality, corruption (breach of integrity), and denial of services; these were 
identified in Section 2.3.2.1 and incorporated in the proposed IW Lifecycle Model in Section 4.2.6. 
For non-technical factors, impacts can be considered as general as they affect a broad range of 
social, economic, and political areas. 
8.4.1 Non-Technical Factors 
The political position of South Africa may result in attacks targeted towards the country. Views that 
South Africa may be targeted due to the apparent political alignment with China or the potential to 
upset Chinese patriots who have aggressive cyber-tendencies. Any controversial political decisions 
on an international scale, or the involvement in conflicts, may also attract attention from potential 
cyber-aggressors. Chapter 5 showed that political context often played a major role in instigation of 
attacks. Therefore the political context in Africa, which has seen widespread instability and mass 
anti-government demonstrations across the continent, may spark attacks. Issues of perceived poor 
service delivery in South Africa may also result in a socio-political environment similar to those in 
Tunisia and Egypt where there are widespread demonstrations which could eventually be targeted at 












Malware Very High High 
Social engineering High High 
DoS Medium Medium 
System penetration High High 
Threats to the mobile infrastructure 
Jamming 
conflict zone High High 
peace-time Low Low 
Wireless intercept 
conflict zone Medium Medium 
peace-time Very low Low 
Infrastructure penetration High High 
Malware Very high High 
Mobile and social media malware Medium Medium 
Malformed or malicious messages Low Low 
SMS flooding from web-based services Low Low 
SMS flooding from mobile botnet Medium Medium 
SIM cloning 
non-state actors High High 
state actors Low Low 
Insider threats High High 
Physical threats 
conflict zone Medium Medium 
peace-time Low Low 
Directed energy and EMP Very low Low 
Threats presented by the use of mobile devices and infrastructure 
Phishing Medium Medium 
PSYOPs and hate speech Medium Medium 
Uprisings Medium Medium 
Penetration tool 
accidental Low Low 
intentional Medium Medium 
Bluejacking Low Low 
WLAN attacks Low Low 
Targeted attacks stealing phone High High 
Leaks through social media High High 
Leaks due to mass storage High High 





The economic interest in Africa by Asian countries may also result in Africa being the object of 
strong economic and information competition. Aligning politically and becoming involved in 
international cyber-security efforts will provide South Africa with international political backing to 
aid in mitigating attacks; the draft cyber-security policy does make provision for the international 
involvement of South Africa in cyber-security groups; this will provide some assistance in the event 
of an attack. The control can be rated as medium. The capability required to exploit political 
vulnerabilities is very low; as can be seen from the Estonian cyber-attacks, seemingly insignificant 
decisions at a global level may be used as an excuse to attack. There are a number of possible 
impacts: mass uprisings, economic impacts due to DoS attacks, or loss of international support and 
investment in a nation. The impact will be rated as high, due to the impacts on Estonia and the 
uprisings in North Africa. 
An aspect that came across strongly in the South African trends due to the number of researchers 
focussing on this is the lack or end-user awareness regarding security issues in South Africa; this 
was also raised in the interview and workshop. This creates a general vulnerability in that users are 
susceptible to scams and malicious links that may result in additional infected systems (possibly 
creating more bots). The lack of awareness may also indicate that basic security measures, such as 
updating anti-virus programs, are not done on a regular basis. The high infection rate presented in 
Section 5.7 indicates that this is definitely the case; and due to the increasing accessibility of 
broadband and smart mobile devices, this vulnerability will increase. This may result in an 
economic impact, due to the personal and corporate information that is compromised. There may 
also be legal and political implications: should a large number of compromised systems participate 
in a DoS attack it would initially appear that it originated from the country, resulting in political and 
legal problems. The only possible control mechanism is awareness campaigns; these are not widely 
implemented in South Africa, therefore the control mechanism can be rated as low. The required 
capability to overcome the lack of user awareness is minimal and can be rated as very low. The 
exact impact is difficult to determine, however due to the prevalence of malware in South Africa, it 
can be rated as medium, escalating to high should there be a rapid increase Internet access. 
In addition to user awareness, the incorrect attitude of organisations was raised in both the 
workshop, and interviews. It was pointed out that some organisations are apathetic and only do the 
minimum to ensure compliance, whilst smaller businesses may have the perception that information 
security only applies to the larger organisations. These attitudes indicate that the implemented 





crime or IW. This will allow for system penetrations and theft of information (in terms of both 
cyber-crime and espionage), a degree of malware infection, and potential exposure of personal 
information. This also provides more scope for insider threats. The primary control would be to 
pass legislation to force organisations into improving their information security; however this takes 
time to be fully implemented, therefore the control rating can only be considered as medium. The 
required capability to overcome these vulnerabilities is low. The financial impact in the UK and US 
due to espionage was significant, and the existence of corporate espionage in South Africa was 
confirmed in the workshop. This will also create a negative impression from international investors 
should there be large information security problems. Therefore this impact can be rated as high. 
Ineffective policies allow for accidental and intentional breaches from insiders; this may be a result 
of poor corporate attitude, a lack of capability and understanding, or by accident. The banking SMS 
scandal illustrated the relevance of the insider threat to the mobile infrastructure. No technical 
capability is required to overcome this vulnerability; the targeted may be bribed, threatened, or 
willing due to dissatisfaction. Therefore the required capability rating can be considered low. 
Contracting experts to assist with generating and testing these policies will aid in significantly 
reducing the insider threat. One such concept is segregation of duties, which was raised in the 
workshop; this ensures that no one person has all the access to contribute to a full breach. This 
control can be rated as medium, as it was also indicates that multiple people are bribed by 
syndicates to effect the breach. 
There is legislation in South Africa related to information security, and some specifically relevant to 
the mobile infrastructure. Whilst it is stronger than most of Africa, it has not been tested in court, 
and in some cases is not fully implemented. Examples were given in the workshop (Section 6.3) 
that RICA is being circumvented, and concerns were raised regarding its ultimate effectiveness. The 
image of corruption in South Africa, as raised in the interviews, may also contribute to this 
vulnerability as there appears to be an opportunity for conducting malicious activity in the country. 
This legislature will probably not be applicable to many countries; therefore if an attacker is 
international, it will be difficult to prosecute them. There is no effective control, other than political 
will or public pressure, which does not seem to be prioritised; a draft national information security 
policy has been released and there is the Protection of Personal Information Bill which is yet to be 
enacted. It can be seen that some effort is being made; therefore the control can be rated as medium. 
As RICA already appears to have been circumvented, the required capability to overcome 





can be classed as low for an IW environment; this applies mostly to criminal groups being able to 
communicate. 
The lack of CSIRTs in Africa was a general problem; due to the political unrest in Tunisia and 
Egypt, the operations or implementation of two CSIRTs may be hindered. In particular, the lack of 
a fully operational national CSIRT in South Africa means the nation does not have a central 
response point to handle incidents, and there is no consolidated information or broad picture of the 
information security incidents in the country. Compared to other nations with operational CSIRTs, 
South Africa will be vulnerable to an IW attack as the fragmented information may hinder the 
detection and response to the attack. As with the legislature, the control is political will and 
pressure; there are attempts at introducing a CSIRT in South Africa, and the draft national cyber-
security policy makes provision for a national and sector CSIRTs. The control can therefore be 
rated as medium. The required capability to exploit this vulnerability will again low. The impact of 
this will be medium; a CSIRT will aid in detection of attacks, identify related incidents, and provide 
incident response. However, this will not necessarily prevent the attacks from occurring in the first 
place. The CSIRT is a detective and reactive measure, which aids in mitigating the effects and 
attacks. 
Lack of user awareness can be considered the vulnerability that is the most prevalent concern; this 
appears in both general vulnerabilities and mobile vulnerabilities. The lack of a national CSIRT and 
legislative issues is also a common concern. 
8.4.2 Technical Factors 
This section will discuss the technical vulnerabilities of the mobile infrastructure. Prior to this, it is 
worth assessing the national vulnerability and risk due to the common attack methods exhibited in 
the trend analysis. Of the significant attacks, system penetration for espionage and DoS attacks are 
prevalent. Some of the major espionage attacks relied on social engineering and malware; from the 
gathered data malware and lack of user awareness the two primary concerns in South Africa. This 
indicates that in general the controls against such an attack in South Africa are low. The required 
capability can be classed as medium; as the malware and targeted phishing requires more planning 
and effort than would be expected an opportunistic cyber-criminal group to perform. The impact of 
such an attack can be rated as high; the trends indicate that the information targeted is not 
necessarily classified, however it can still be sensitive, especially in the quantities stolen. In many 





Very low capability is required to conduct DoS attacks; groups have the option of hiring a botnet. 
Controls include sinkholes and black holes (presented in Section 2.4.2); these methods appear to be 
effective at redirecting traffic targeted at specific websites or customers within an ISP. These 
methods may not be as effective at relieving overloaded international gateways. In the workshop it 
was indicated that the service providers do not have the capacity to handle DoS attacks; therefore 
there may not be proper implementation of these countermeasures. The high botnet infection rates 
in South Africa compared to the global average indicates a susceptibility to these attacks, as the ICT 
systems within the national boundaries could be used to attack itself. The controls can therefore be 
rated as low. The impact of the large-scale DoS attacks on Estonia and Georgia can seen to be 
significant; disrupted communications and financial losses in the order of millions of dollars were 
seen. The impact can therefore be rated as high. The threat associated with this type of attack 
appears to be attributed more to rogue groups than nation states, even though Russia as a nation was 
accused of supporting or conducting the attacks against Estonia and Georgia. 
8.4.2.1 Denial of Service and System Breaches 
A potential vulnerability of South African mobile infrastructures is the apparent high load that they 
operate at. A report indicated that network outages have been due to over-subscription (Ajam & 
Bailey, 2009). Network outages in 2011 also suggest that there may be operating conditions that 
affect network stability; the report that the networks do not meet the requirements for call 
processing also indicates high loading. These conditions result in the mobile infrastructure being 
susceptible to DoS attacks. All that is required is additional requests or SMS messages that flood 
the network. This can be achieved through the use of malware or exploiting legitimate SMS 
services. The required traffic to deny services through SMS and malware is discussed in Sections 
7.3 and 7.4. From this it can be seen that it is feasible, and the capability exists to conduct such 
attacks; however the required capability may be more than a conventional computer network-based 
DoS attack due to the mobile systems or the requirement to exploit the SMS services. The rating for 
the required capability will therefore be low. Section 2.7.2.1 lists an indirect control for high 
capacity as a threat warning system; as there is not an operational CSIRT in South Africa, this 
control can be rated as very low. The resulting impact will be prolonged widespread outages of 
services; there will also public frustration shown during minor outages and the financial loss to the 
relevant network providers. There will also be general national network performance degradation 
should the attack come from web-based SMS entities, due to the traffic following to the websites; 





effects of a mobile worm on the infrastructure components; this attack will be limited to the mobile 
infrastructure, and the effects will not be immediately felt; therefore the impact can be rated as 
medium. 
Centralised mobile infrastructure components are also susceptible to DoS attacks, as increased 
traffic across wide geographical areas may bottle-neck at these components. Examples include the 
billing infrastructure, home location registers (HLRs), and mobile switching centres (MSCs). These 
can also be seen as regional singularities. The graph theory analysis presented in Section 7.2 
indicates that there are various levels of centralisation according to the geographical area and 
population centres. The same attacks described for the loading conditions apply for centralisation in 
terms of DoS attacks by flooding with illegitimate traffic. The required capability will be the same 
type as above; however additional resources will be required due to the increase in traffic flow. 
Therefore the required capability will be rated as medium. The controls listed in Section 2.7.2.1 for 
centralisation and singularities include redundancy, static and dynamic resource allocation, rapid 
recovery, deception, decentralisation, and self-organisation and collective behaviour. The 
simulations took a degree of redundancy into account; it terms of DoS attacks, redundancy will just 
provide the network with extra capacity, and will only slow down a determined attack. As the 
general structure of the mobile infrastructure is freely available, deception is not possible. The base 
stations are effectively self-organising and perform dynamic resource allocation in that the users are 
allocated to the nearest free cell or base station; this will aid in mitigating an overload in specific 
cells, however the core network may still come under stress. Quick response to an attack will be 
key; recovery may not be as quick as the mobile devices and external SMS entities are outside the 
control of the service provider, and this is where the recovery need to take place. The overall rating 
for the controls can therefore be considered as medium. The impact can be rated the same as for the 
high operating loads above. 
General vulnerabilities may be exploited in order to penetrate the system or infrastructure. These 
vulnerabilities may come in the form of misconfiguration, unpatched systems, or outdated 
signatures for anti-virus and other security application. The high levels of software piracy in South 
Africa indicate that there may be a high prevalence of general threats due to unpatched and 
vulnerable systems. Many vulnerabilities are widely known, and freely available hacking tools or 
malware kits exploit these. Therefore the required capability to overcome general vulnerabilities is 
low. The majority of vulnerabilities can be prevented by ensuring the systems are patched and anti-





are effective against known vulnerabilities exploited by hacking tools and malware, and can also 
detect known attacks. Previously unknown vulnerabilities also allow attackers to penetrate systems 
and are susceptible to malware. The Stuxnet worm exploited multiple known and unknown 
vulnerabilities. The required capability to overcome these will be rated as high, as the 
vulnerabilities and relevant exploits need to be researched. As these vulnerabilities are previously 
unknown, the controls mechanisms for these are non-existent; some control devices, such as anti-
virus, firewall, and IDS may be able to identify an attack through unusual activity or code. In many 
infrastructures, air-gaps are used, where the infrastructure components are physically and 
electronically separate from the Internet and corporate networks. However, the Stuxnet worm 
illustrated that air-gaps can be easily circumvented through removable mass storage. The control 
effectiveness against unknown vulnerabilities can therefore be rated as low. Various impacts are 
possible through exploiting general vulnerabilities. System penetration may be able to breach 
confidentiality; this can be rated high due to sensitive information being breached (as in the Athens 
Affair incident), or the use of personal information by cyber-criminals. System penetration could 
also affect the integrity of stored information in addition to breaching confidentiality; the recovery 
from this will be more complex, and can therefore be rated as very high. Penetrations may also 
allow attackers to deny services; there is potential for wide-spread outages, which will also result in 
direct financial loss to the relevant organisations. The impact of a DoS attack can therefore be 
considered high. Malware can also breach confidentiality and system integrity ultimately denying 
services, as the Stuxnet worm did. The rating for confidentiality breach will be the same as above. 
Affecting system integrity and denying service can be rated as very high as physical damage may be 
done to the systems which require replacing.  
8.4.2.2 Electro-Magnetic Exposure and Electronic Warfare 
Due to the very nature of mobile communications, there is electromagnetic exposure. This indicates 
that directed energy or EMPs could damage or destroy infrastructure components. The reports 
indicate that the mobile telecommunications components are more susceptible to this type of attack 
than fixed-line telecommunications. The required capability to overcome this in terms of 
widespread infrastructure damage is very high due to the technical requirements. Grounding 
provides is standard in the telecommunications sector; however this provides little protection. 
Shielding does provide more protection, however this is not usually done for civilian infrastructure. 
The controls can therefore be rated as low. The impact of directed energy will be low; towers will 





EMP will be worse, and this may result in widespread outages due to destroyed components 
(including power supplies), and can be rated as high. 
The wireless channels may be targeted through electronic warfare attacks. Jamming intends to 
introduce interference and make the received signal unrecoverable. Devices and equipment is 
available to jam both GSM and 3G systems; however 3G systems are more resilient to jamming. 
Section 7.6 presented the accuracy required to target a specific 3G signal without interfering with 
the other signals; this also maximises the jammer effectiveness. Military technology is also readily 
available to jam mobile communications, especially due to the threat of IEDs. Even though these 
devices are available, they are usually only sold to government and military buyers; however it may 
be possible to produce home-made jamming devices. The required capability to jam mobile 
communications can therefore be rated as low for GSM and medium for 3G. The controls are built 
into the communication channel design; this takes the form of power control and the natural anti-
jam properties of 3G spread spectrum signals. These can be overcome by increasing the jamming 
output, or moving the jammer closer to the tower or device. The controls can therefore be rated as 
low for GSM, and medium for 3G. Homemade and some commercial devices will have a low 
impact; only a localised area will be affected and multiple devices will be required (as illustrated in 
Section 7.5). Military jamming equipment have larger ranges as calculated in Section 7.5; the 
impact from these can be considered medium due to the increased range and efficiency of these 
devices. Due to these limited ranges, the option of a network warfare attack may be more efficient. 
Bluetooth and WLAN communications can also be jammed; this can be considered as part of the 
mobile infrastructure as they are communication methods which allow for mobility. Due to the 
power output, close proximity, and antenna height compared to that of the mobile towers (as 
presented in Section 7.5), jammers may be less effective against these technologies due to the 
shorter range that the jammer is effective. This indicates a higher required capability, as not only 
does the attacker need to possess the equipment, but must be able to locate the desired target with 
greater accuracy. Therefore the required capability can be rated as medium. Whilst these 
technologies utilise CDMA similar to the 3G channels, the controls against jamming for Bluetooth 
and WLAN are less effective than that of the 3G mobile due to the lower power output and shorter 
ranges, and can therefore be rated as low. The impact of such an attack will be very low due to the 






Wireless channels are also susceptible to interception. Section 7.5.2 presents the maximum 
detection ranges for mobile communications. Section 5.5.1.4 presented a method that researches 
claim will enable eavesdroppers to intercept and break the encryption on GSM calls. 3G 
communications are more difficult to intercept and detect due to the spread spectrum nature. 
Section 7.6 illustrates the accuracy required to use correlation with estimated sequences to improve 
intercept performance. From this, the required capability to intercept GSM communications is 
medium; for 3G this can be rated as high. Weaknesses in the GSM controls (the encryption) have 
been illustrated; however this still provides some protection, and can be rated as medium. Due to 
the spread spectrum nature and improved encryption algorithm for 3G, the controls can be rated as 
high. The impact of general eavesdropping on individuals will be low; however in a conflict zone, 
the interception of sensitive information from diplomatic or military personnel can have a high 
impact.  
Bluetooth and WLAN can also be intercepted; Section 7.5.4 presents this information. Due to the 
lower power and shorter range of the transmissions and the quantity of signals, it will be more 
difficult to detect and target a specific Bluetooth or WLAN transmission. This indicates that 
individuals will need to be targeted in a high population environment, and the attacker would need 
to be within close proximity to be effective. In a conflict zone, the prevalence of these technologies 
may not be as high, particularly in controlled environments. Statements from the workshop (Section 
6.3) indicate that the technology and capability required to intercept wireless communications is 
readily available; therefore the required capability can be considered as medium, taking into 
account targeting an individual and coming into proximity. The available controls include the 
wired-equivalent privacy (WEP) and Wi-Fi protected access (WPA), which can be circumvented; 
therefore the controls can be rated as medium. General interception of wireless communications 
poses a medium impact, as financial and account details may be removed. In a conflict zone, 
sensitive information may be compromised; therefore the impact can be high. There is also the 
possibility of altering the integrity of the information through modification or fabrication in addition 
to the eavesdropping; this impact will be very high as the correct information is compromised, and 
the victim has incorrect information. 
8.4.2.3 Physical Exposure and Other Vulnerabilities 
Physical exposure leaves some infrastructure components susceptible to physical attack; the base-
stations are easily identifiable and could be targeted. The capability to overcome the physical 





base-station. Improving the physical security will be an effective control against individuals or 
groups; however the protection against air-strikes or artillery will be less. Therefore the control can 
be rated as low. The core infrastructure components will have more protection; the required 
capability to physically attack these would be medium, and the control effectiveness will prevent 
most attacks, except military strikes. The rating control rating is also high. The impact of attacking 
a base-station is low as only a localised area will be without services. The impact of attacking the 
core infrastructure will be high as regional or national services may be affected. 
The risk of in-store access to the billing infrastructure was raised in Section 7.2. Account details and 
payment updates can be made from the stores. Such an attack is unlikely, and no reports have been 
found of this occurring. The attacker will need to gain access to the store computers and be familiar 
with the billing systems; therefore a high capability will be required. There are some controls 
mechanisms, such as security cameras, however these may be circumvented via unattended network 
points. There are also security guards and attendants in the store and shopping centres. The control 
strength can be rated as high. Gaining illegitimate access will allow an attacker to breach the 
confidentiality of subscriber information; this can be rated as medium. In addition, the integrity of 
the billing system and possibly deny services to users. The impact could potentially be high should 
an attacker be able to gain access and corrupt all the billing information; this can be rated as high. 
Some device communications modules are sensitive to unusual conditions; therefore they are 
susceptible to malformed messages or images. The report highlighting the possibility of such an 
attack was presented in Section 5.5. This type of attack can be considered to be similar to a buffer 
overflow attack. The required capability to overcome this vulnerability can be considered as 
medium; the device vulnerabilities need to be researched, and the malformed message needs to be 
generated and transmitted. The only control for this is a possible firmware update on the device. 
This will have very high effectiveness, however users may not upgrade the device firmware, 
therefore the control effectiveness can be rated as high. The result of such an attack results in the 
device communications modules crashing, which is a DoS attack. The impact of such an attack will 
be limited; only the devices can be targeted, and not all device models may be vulnerable. Therefore 
the impact rating can be considered low. 
It is conceivable that some infrastructure components may have similar vulnerabilities; the required 
capability to exploit these can be considered high. The vulnerability needs to be researched; 
however the accessibility to infrastructure components will be lower than devices. As before, the 





control will be similar to the device control: a firmware upgrade or patch, which will be very 
effective. The impact will be greater than that of the devices as the infrastructure components will 
fail and some local or regional services may be lost; therefore the impact can be rated as medium. 
Section 5.5 presented a report of a vulnerability that allowed a mobile enterprise server to be 
hijacked by transmitting malicious images. Similar vulnerabilities may allow malicious or 
malformed messages to hijack the system. The enterprise server is a centralised system, and could 
be used to further propagate malicious code and applications. The report indicated that the 
vulnerability was patched, and is the only report of such an incident or vulnerability. These servers 
may also be compromised be malware, mobile malware, social media malware, and system 
penetration. The required capability to do so appears to be high, as a specific vulnerability needs to 
be researched and exploited. Patching these vulnerabilities will provide a very high protection 
against these attacks. Exploiting the servers could lead to denying all organisational mobile 
communications connected to the server, which will have a high impact. Confidentiality could be 
breached, and malicious code could be distributed allowing for further breaches of confidentiality; 
this will have a very high impact.  
A similar concept is the centralised kill switch, which enables malicious applications to be removed 
remotely, or to deactivated lost or stolen devices. Compromising such a system may allow attackers 
to deny services of all relevant devices remotely. The required capability will be same as that of the 
enterprise server. The controls could include extra authentication prior to implementing a wipe; this 
will provide a strong control as each individual device will require different authentication. This can 
therefore be rated as high. The impact will be low, as only relevant devices will be affected (a 
specific brand or make of operating system). 
In addition to the sensitivity to malformed messages, the operating systems (OS) and modules of the 
mobile devices may exhibit vulnerabilities that can be exploited by mobile malware; Section 5.5.1.6 
illustrated the prevalence of OS vulnerabilities in the malware. These vulnerabilities may allow the 
malware to propagate, steal information, send illegitimate SMSs or make calls, or corrupt data or 
the OS. The required capability to overcome these vulnerabilities is low as the development kits to 
generate applications are available; these can be used to produce malicious applications. Anti-virus 
and firewall applications, in addition to the device's own security settings, will provide a strong 
control; messages and files can be scanned for known malicious content, and applications can be 
blocked from accessing communication technologies. However, many users may not make use of 





be limited to vulnerable devices. Those that corrupt files or integrity will have little impact on the 
infrastructure; only the devices will be affected. Therefore the rating for corruption is low. Others 
that steal account information or connect to premium rate numbers will have a larger affect as this is 
financial; more recent version target mobile banking but are still not as prevalent as PC-based 
malware. The rating for this breach of confidentiality is medium. The impact for devices that 
conduct DoS attacks will be higher; there is the financial impact of the transmitted messages and the 
degradation of the mobile network services. The network impact of this was discussed above and in 
more detail in Section 7.4, and can be rated as high. 
There are also vulnerabilities in the implementation of Bluetooth and WLAN on mobile devices and 
access points. This may allow illegitimate access and system penetration. The required capability 
and controls are the same for the interception of Bluetooth and WLAN discussed above. The 
required capability and controls are therefore both rated medium. The impact can be a breach of 
confidentiality and integrity of the devices; rated medium and high respectively. Should an access 
point be breached, then the exposure will be greater, and the impact can be rated high and very 
high, respectively. 
The way in which the mobile infrastructure registers SIM cards is vulnerable to allowing SIM 
cloning. This type of attack was used in the SMS banking scandal (Section 5.5.1.3) and was raised 
in the interviews (Section 6.2). The technology is seemingly readily available to clone SIM cards. 
As of yet, there is no evidence of a control other than awareness; therefore this can be rated as low. 
This vulnerability primarily provides cyber-criminals with a means of communicating 
anonymously, and may not feature highly in an IW attack. SIM cloning subverts the authenticity of 
calls; this has a medium impact due to the financial aspects. As in the SMS banking scandal, there is 
a chance of breaching confidentiality; this can be rated as medium due to the financial impacts due 
to compromised account details and the potential breach of sensitive messages that are broadcast in 
the open.  
8.4.2.4 Vulnerabilities Introduced by Mobile Devices 
Mobile technologies also create vulnerabilities and risks to organisations. As was raised in the 
workshop, mobile devices can be used to subvert the perimeter defences of networks and provide 
insider access. Given that it was stated this was used for penetration testing, it implies that the 
capability is readily available, and therefore can be rated as low. Controls suggested for this include 
MAC address filtering; this will provide increased security for devices trying to connect to the 





therefore be rated as medium. The impact of such an attack is the same as a system penetration of 
the organisation's network. 
Mobile devices can also be used to instigate violence and social unrest, as seen in the 
demonstrations in North Africa. Very low capability is required to do this. The only controls are to 
shut off Internet and mobile access; however the success of this has been inconsistent. Therefore the 
control will be rated as medium. The impact is high; governments have effectively been 
overthrown, and it has also led to civil war in one case. 
Mobile devices may also be used to propagate PC-malware as illustrated by an example in Section 
5.5.2. This appears rare; however the required capability will be medium as new devices need to be 
infected prior to packaging. Both mobile and PC-based anti-virus applications should provide a 
strong control, rated high. As a large number of devices need to be infected and connected to PCs 
for there to be any significant impact; the malware would most likely attempt to breach 
confidentiality, and can therefore be rated as medium. Mobile devices also provide a mechanism for 
information leaks; they are capable of mass storage, transmitting information through social media, 
and the integrated cameras are capable of capturing images and video. Very low capability is 
required to leak the information. The possible controls for this can be also be rated as low, unless it 
is a high-security environment where phones are not allowed; this then can be rated as high (there is 
the possibility that a device could be smuggled in). The devices will be used to breach 
confidentiality; the impact can be rated as high in normal security, and very high for high security. 
8.4.3 Summary 
The required capability to exploit a vulnerability, control strength, and impact were discussed in 
Sections 8.4.1 and 8.4.2. The required capability and control strength are used to provide a 
vulnerability rating. The matrix used is presented in Table 8.3.  




V. Low Low Med High V. High 
V. Low V. High V. High High High Med 
Low V. High High High Med Low 
Med High High Med Low Low 
High High Med Low Low V. Low 






Table 8.4 summarises the vulnerabilities as discussed above, and provides the individual 
vulnerability ratings. 







General/Non-technical    
Awareness Very low Low Very High 
Corporate attitude Low Medium High 
Ineffective policies Low Medium High 
Legislature Low Medium High 
CSIRT Low Medium High 
Political Very low Medium High 
DoS Very low Low Very high 
System penetration Medium Low High 
Technical    
Operating conditions Low Very low Very high 
Centralisation and singularities Medium Medium Medium 
Mobile enterprise server High Very high Very low 
Centralised kill switch High High Low 
General vulnerabilities Low High Medium 
Previously unknown vulnerabilities High Low Medium 
Electromagnetic exposure Very High Low Low 
Jamming GSM Low Low High 
Jamming 3G Medium Medium Medium 
Jamming WLAN and Bluetooth Medium Low High 
Intercept GSM Medium Medium Medium 
Intercept 3G High High Low 
Intercept WLAN and Bluetooth Medium Medium Medium 
Device communications sensitivity Medium High Low 
Infrastructure sensitivity High Very high Very low 
Device OS vulnerabilities Low Medium High 
Bluetooth and WLAN device 
vulnerabilities 
Medium Medium Medium 
Physical exposure – base stations Low Low High 
Physical exposure – core components Medium High Low 













Store access High High Low 
Vulnerabilities due to mobile devices   
Subvert perimeter Low Medium High 
Instigate violence Very low Medium High 
Propagate Malware Medium High Low 
Information leak – normal security Very low Low Very high 
Information leak – high security Very low High High 
 
From the general and non-technical factors, we can see that South Africa is vulnerable to an IW 
attack. From the technical vulnerabilities of the mobile infrastructure, six of twenty-one listed are 
rated high or above, seven are rated as medium, and eight are rated as low or less. A concern is the 
high loads which the mobile infrastructure appears to be operating under; this may leave it 
susceptible to DoS attacks. It can also be seen that mobile devices in the organisation increase the 
vulnerability of the organisation's ICT infrastructure to attack, as four of five vulnerabilities are 
rated as high or above. The vulnerabilities will be prioritised according to the risk they present; 
these will be calculated in Section 8.5. The vulnerabilities and risks will be discussed further in 
Section 8.6. 
8.5 Modified TVA and Risk 
This section presents the modified TVA table and the risk ratings. The threat and vulnerability 
ratings indicate the likelihood of a successful attack; the matrix for this is presented in Table 8.5. 
This is then used with the impact to get the risk rating; the matrix is presented in Table 8.6. 
Table 8.5: Matrix for the Likelihood of a Successful Attack 
Threat 
Vulnerability 
V. Low Low Med High V. High 
V. Low V. Low V. Low Low Low Med 
Low V. Low Low Low Med High 
Med Low Low Med High High 
High Low Med High High V. High 






Table 8.6: Matrix for Risk 
Impact 
Likelihood of a Successful Attack 
V. Low Low Med High V. High 
V. Low V. Low V. Low Low Low Med 
Low V. Low Low Low Med High 
Med Low Low Med High High 
High Low Med High High V. High 
V. High Med High High V. High V. High 
 
Table 8.7 summarises the vulnerabilities, their associated threats, and the resultant likelihood of a 
successful attack. The associated impacts are also listed, and the resultant risk ratings are provided. 








Impact type and 
rating 
Risk rating 
Non-technical and General Factors  
Awareness (High) 













Corporate attitude and 
ineffective policies 
(High) 








Insider (High) High High 




Cyber-crime  (High) High General (Low) Medium 
Rogue groups (Low) Medium General (Low) Low 
CSIRT (High) 
Cyber-crime (High) High General (Medium) High 
Rogue groups 
(Medium) 
High General (Medium) High 
Nation States 
(Medium) 




High General (High) High 
Nation States 
(Medium) 














Impact type and 
rating 
Risk rating 
DoS (Very high) 
Rogue groups 
(Medium) 
High DoS (High) High 
Nation states (Low) High DoS (High) High 
System penetration 
(High) 









High operating load 
(Very high) 
Mobile DoS (Medium) High DoS (Medium) High 
Exploit SMS 
functionality (Low) 




Mobile DoS (Medium) High DoS (Medium) High 
Exploit SMS 
functionality (Low) 















DoS (High) Medium 




















DoS (High) Medium 














DoS (High) High 
Malicious messages 
(Low) 































DoS (High) High 




Corruption and DoS 
(Very high) 
Very High 






















DoS (High) High 




Corruption and DoS 
(Very high) 
Very high 










sensitivity (Very low)  
Malicious messages 
(Very low) 
Very low DoS (Medium) Low 
WLAN and Bluetooth 
device vulnerabilities 
(Medium) 
















Directed energy (Low) Low DoS (Low) Low 


















WLAN access point 
vulnerabilities 
(Medium) 








Jamming GSM (High) 
Jamming – military 
(High) 
High DoS (Medium) High 
Jamming – home made 
(Low) 
Medium DoS (Low) Low 
Jamming 3G 
(Medium) 
Jamming – military 
(High) 
High DoS (Medium) High 
Jamming – home made 
(Low) 
Low DoS (Low) Low 
Jamming WLAN and 
Bluetooth (High) 
Jamming – military 
(High) 
High DoS (Low) Medium 
Jamming – home made 
(Low) 















Intercept 3G (Low) 
Eavesdropping – 





























Physical exposure – 
base stations (High) 
Conflict/military 
(Medium) 
High DoS (Low) Medium 
Peace/Homemade 
(Low) 
Medium DoS (Low) Low 





Low DoS (High) Medium 
Peace/Homemade 
(Low) 



















Physical exposure – 







CIA (High) Medium 
SIM authenticity 
weakness (High) 






























High Uprisings (High) High 





normal security (Very 
high) 




Information leak high 
security (High) 





The general vulnerabilities show that due to the high vulnerability, South Africa is at high risk from 
an attack. The threats are generally not high, other than malware and cyber-crime. This indicates 
that the national vulnerabilities need to be addressed in order to reduce risk. The lack of awareness 
should be addressed. The corporate attitudes could be addressed indirectly by introducing firmer 
legislation regarding information security; this will also directly address the apparent shortage of 
cyber-related legislature in South Africa. The introduction of a publicly accessible CSIRT will aid 
in awareness, assisting organisations with incidents, and provide much needed intelligence 
regarding the threats and big picture of the incidents in South Africa. Such a facility may also 
provide crucial support in the event of a major cyber-attack against the national ICT infrastructure. 
There are sixty-three technical risk elements listed for the mobile infrastructure; fourteen are low, 





was taken, which will result in a skewing towards the high ratings of the risk, the majority are due 
to either high vulnerability, or high impact. This again indicates that vulnerabilities need to be 
addressed, and the potential high impact also further indicates the criticality of the mobile 
infrastructure. Of particular concern is the ability of malware and hacking to exploit vulnerabilities 
of critical systems; this may allow attackers to access potentially sensitive conversations (such as 
the Athens Affair) and corrupt information to hinder recovery. Infrastructure control systems may 
also be corrupted, resulting in the ultimate denial of services; due to the corruption (or damage) of 
systems, the recovery from the initial attack will take longer. The high operating load and 
centralisation or regional singularities of components also results in susceptibility to DoS attacks. 
The vulnerabilities introduced by the use of mobile devices result in high risks. In these instances 
the threats associated with this use are also rated high, which increases the risks where the 
vulnerability is low. Of particular note is the very high ratings for information leaks; this 
vulnerabilities need to be prioritised and addressed. Solutions include stricter device filtering and 
policy implementation. 
The vulnerability and risks are further analysed and discussed in Section 8.6, where the 
infrastructure vulnerability and risk are calculated. Different aspects of the IW threats and impacts 
will also be compared and discussed. 
8.6 Infrastructure Vulnerability and Risk 
In this section, the infrastructure and vulnerability risk ratings are calculated and presented. Section 
8.6.1 presents the overall infrastructure vulnerability and risk ratings, whereas Section 8.6.2 will 
provide comparisons of the IW threat elements and impacts types. Section 8.6.3 will summarise the 
section. 
8.6.1 General 
The infrastructure vulnerability and risk ratings are calculated and presented in this section. Section 
8.6.1.1 will present the calculation of the infrastructure vulnerability rating, and Section 8.6.1.2 
presents the calculation of the infrastructure risk rating. 
8.6.1.1 Infrastructure Vulnerability Rating 






Table 8.8 summarises the number of elements and individual ratings, and provides the infrastructure 
vulnerability rating for non-technical or general factors, technical factors, and vulnerabilities 
introduced by mobile devices into ICT infrastructures. 
Table 8.8: Infrastructure Vulnerability Ratings 
 General Technical Mobile Due to Mobile 
No. of elements 8 21 5 
No. rated Very Low 0 2 1 
No. rated Low 0 6 0 
No. rated Medium 0 7 0 
No. rated High 6 5 3 
No. rated Very High 2 1 1 
Infrastructure Rating 12.1 13.93 8.77 
Maximum possible rating 14.14 22.91 11.18 
As can be seen from Table 8.8, the vulnerability due to general or non-technical factors is high; this 
is also true for vulnerabilities introduced into ICT infrastructures due to mobile usage. The rating 
figure for the technical vulnerabilities of the mobile infrastructure is at a point where it can be 
considered at the juncture of medium and high. This indicates that whilst the vulnerabilities are 
present, it is not crucially vulnerable to attack the few high priority vulnerabilities can be addressed 
prior to controls being implemented for others. The high priority vulnerabilities were indicated in 
Section 8.5. It is important to look at the rating in context of the maximum possible rating; an 
increase in this gives an indication of a worst-case vulnerability environment. An increase in the 
maximum possible rating indicates an increase in potential vulnerabilities for an attacker to exploit.  
These rating figures will allow an assessor to compare the vulnerability with previous (and future) 
assessments; as threats arise and controls are introduced, the ratings will change, giving an 
indication of an increase or decrease in vulnerability. The intention is to use this figure to chart the 
vulnerability ratings over a period of time; ideally the figure should decrease, indicating the number 
of vulnerabilities or the severity of the vulnerabilities has decreased. 
The high vulnerability ratings arising from the assessment for general vulnerabilities is in line with 
the number of concerns regarding the information security issues; namely the severity of a few key 





also correspond to concerns regarding the ability to manage new technologies, and the possibility of 
them being used as an attack vector. This further indicates that mobile devices may be an effective 
tool in IW and intelligence gathering. The vulnerability rating of the mobile infrastructure indicates 
that the infrastructure is a potential target for IW attacks due to the number of vulnerabilities 
present, and their nature and severity. 
8.6.1.2 Infrastructure Risk Rating 
The infrastructure risk rating is calculated using Equation 4.3 presented in Section 4.3.1: 
 
Table 8.9 summarises the number of elements and individual ratings, and provides the infrastructure 
risk rating for non-technical or general factors, technical factors, and risks introduced by mobile 
devices into ICT infrastructures. 
Table 8.9: Infrastructure Risk Ratings 
 General Technical Factors Due to Mobile 
No. of elements 18 63 7 
No. rated Very Low 0 0 0 
No. rated Low 1 14 0 
No. rated Medium 1 17 1 
No. rated High 16 28 3 
No. rated Very High 0 4 3 
Overall Rating 16.4 27.51 11.49 
Maximum possible rating 21.21 39.69 13.23 
As can be seen from Table 8.9, the risks are high for all categories. The risk figures are expected to 
be larger than the vulnerability figures as there are multiple threats and impacts associated with 
each vulnerability. The risks due to mobile use indicate that there are a few elements, but of high 
risk.  
8.6.2 Comparative 
This section presents trends comparisons of the vulnerability and risk ratings related to specific 
impact types and IW functional areas, namely network warfare and electronic warfare. A 
comparison of threats is also made. The equations are used as in Section 8.6.1, however each impact 





8.6.2.1 Impact Types 
The vulnerability and risk ratings are compared for different impact types. As above, the impact 
types are breach of confidentiality, corruption (breach of integrity), denial of services, and general; 
these were identified in Section 2.3.2.1 and incorporated in the proposed IW Lifecycle Model in 
Section 4.2.6. The purpose of this comparison is to assess the relative risk of information attributes 
(confidentiality, integrity, and availability) being breached. This will give an indication of the type 
of controls required to be implemented to protect the information and relevant systems. Table 8.10 
summarises the vulnerability and risk ratings for the various impact types. 
Table 8.10: Comparison of Ratings by Impact Type 
 Confidentiality Corruption Denial General 
Vulnerability 
No. of elements 18 9 16 5 
Overall Rating 14.66 9.85 13.4 8.94 
Maximum 
Possible Rating 
21.21 15 20 11.18 
Risk 
No. of elements 35 14 35 12 
Overall Rating 22.18 15.3 14.66 13.15 
Maximum 
Possible Rating 
29.56 18.71 29.56 17.32 
The comparison shows that breaches of confidentiality exhibit the largest risk, followed by 
corruption, and then DoS attacks. However, vulnerability to DoS attacks is higher than that of 
integrity and only slightly lower than that of confidentiality. Confidentiality also has a threat of 
insider attacks and due to penetration by mobile devices; corruption has s higher impact, but it is 
more difficult to effect and therefore less likely. Consequently, breaches of confidentiality become 
the higher risk threat. 
At a general level, South Africa is vulnerable to attack with a rating of 8.94 out of a maximum of 
11.18. This is due to a severe lack of awareness of users with regard to information security issues, 
a lack of an operational CSIRT, insufficient implemented legislature, perceived political 
alignments, and some internal dissatisfaction. The risk is not as high, rating 13.15 out of a 
maximum of 17.32. The current political instability in Africa also heightens the vulnerability and 
risk of an attack. These ratings indicate a concerted effort needs to be made to improve particularly 
awareness and the implemented legislature, and commission a CSIRT that is publicly accessible. 





be very carefully made, as Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 show that this is often the catalyst for IW 
attacks against a nation or organisation. 
Figure 8.1 shows a visual representation of the risk and vulnerability comparison for the various 
impact types. Those that show high vulnerability and risk (and therefore are located towards the 
upper right corner of the plot) should be prioritised. From the plot, the priority for technical factors 
should be, in order: protection of confidentiality, availability, and then integrity. Often controls for 
confidentiality also provide controls for integrity, for example encryption and digital signatures. 
General non-technical factors should also be addressed in parallel, however by addressing the 
technical areas, some mitigation of legal vulnerabilities may be provided. 
 
Figure 8.1: Scatter Graph of Impact Types 
8.6.2.2 IW Functional Areas 
The vulnerability and risk ratings are compared for two IW functional areas, namely electronic 
warfare and network warfare. The equivalent impacts (jamming and DoS, and interception and 
breach of confidentiality) will be considered. The purpose of this comparison is to provide an 
indication the relative effectiveness of the two functional areas against the mobile infrastructure. 
Table 8.11 summarises the vulnerability and risk of the two IW functional areas. For this 
comparison the vulnerability of mobile enterprise servers was not considered; only the wireless 
communication channels and infrastructure components were considered, where the actual 





















Table 8.11: Comparison of Ratings by IW Functional Area 
 Electronic Warfare Network Warfare 
 Jamming Intercept DoS Confidentiality 
Vulnerability 
No. of elements 3 3 6 4 
Infrastructure 
Rating 
6.4 4.69 6.24 6 
Maximum 
Possible Rating 
8.66 8.66 12.25 10 
Risk 

















In terms of denial, there is a slightly greater vulnerability to jamming than a network warfare DoS 
attack; however the risk due to network warfare is much higher. In terms of confidentiality, there is 
a higher vulnerability and risk due to network warfare. This is partly due to the fact that in some 
cases the communications are not encrypted whilst transiting through the infrastructure components. 
In this example, the network warfare DoS poses more risk due to the types of attack considered, of 
which there are more vulnerabilities to a DoS attack than a breach of confidentiality. This indicates 
that network warfare solutions may be more efficient than electronic warfare. If the range 
limitations are taken into account, network warfare can be considered as a better strategic option; 
however should military assets be available in a conflict zone, electronic warfare may prove to be a 
better tactical option. Network warfare, in general, has more delivery threats, and also has the 
possibility of insider assistance. 
Figure 8.2 presents a visual representation of the comparison. From the plot, the priority should be 
in securing the availability of mobile services and the confidentiality of the communications from a 
strategic network warfare attack. In a conflict zone, there should also be focus on protecting the 
signals from electronic warfare attack. From this it may be required to develop a mobile 
infrastructure equivalent of a sinkhole or black hole to redirect or filter traffic flooding the network. 
Introducing end-to-end encryption will reduce the vulnerability and risk due to interception from 






Figure 8.2: Scatter Graph of IW Functional Areas 
8.6.2.3 Network Warfare Threats 
As network warfare was shown to present a higher risk, various threats associated with network 
warfare are compared. Table 8.12 summarises the vulnerability and risk ratings for the threats. 









No. of elements 6 4 4 7 
Overall Rating 7.42 7.14 5.92 8.43 
Maximum 
Possible Rating 
12.25 10 10 13.23 
Risk 
No. of elements 9 7 7 14 
Overall Rating 11.79 9.9 10.25 15.23 
Maximum 
Possible Rating 
15 13.23 13.23 18.71 
There is a larger vulnerability and risk to system penetration over malware; this is due to the 
additional vulnerability associated with system penetration. It should be noted that malware might 
contribute to system penetration, as in the GhostNet and related incidents. Traditional PC-based 
malware exhibits greater vulnerability and risk ratings over the emerging mobile malware and 
social media malware. There is a greater vulnerability to mobile malware over social media 

























well known or prevalent as the traditional computer anti-virus applications. Social media malware 
presents a higher risk as it is not limited to specific devices, and targets Internet banking which is 
still more prevalent than mobile banking. 
Figure 8.3 presents the threat comparison visually. The plot indicates that priority should be given 
to addressing the threat of system penetration, traditional malware, and then the emerging malware 
versions. Improving anti-virus protection on networks will aid in mitigating traditional malware, 
social media malware, and therefore system penetration. It was indicated that many breaches could 
have been easily prevented; therefore the focus should be on ensuring systems are patched, and 
security mechanisms are up to date and properly configured. 
 
Figure 8.3: Scatter Graph of Network Warfare Threats 
 
8.6.3 Summary and Discussion 
The vulnerability of the mobile infrastructure can be considered to be high mid-range given the 
maximum possible rating. The figure is high though due to the number of vulnerabilities. Whilst a 
generic mobile infrastructure was considered, this raises concerns over the susceptibility of the 
South African mobile infrastructure to attack. The related risk is high; this is due to possible high 
impacts and some high vulnerabilities. Even though the worst-case scenario was used, the high 
vulnerability and risk values indicate that extra measures need to be taken to improve the security of 
the mobile infrastructure. The high risk rating corresponds to the discussion in Section 8.2; both 























Of the technical risks, those related to breaches of confidentiality were the highest, followed by 
corruption and then denial of service. This is to be expected as a large proportion of attacks 
discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 can be considered espionage, and the prevalence of 
confidentiality issues in the interviews and workshop. The high risk rating indicates that this 
prevalence has been correctly reflected by the proposed framework. The integrity rating is high due 
to the fact it is often coupled with breaches of confidentiality or denial of service attacks; for 
example the Maroochy sewerage incident and the Stuxnet worm both impacted on the integrity of 
the systems, and the GhostNet types attack had the ability to both makes changes to the targeted 
systems as well as access information. Large scale DoS attacks on nations are not as prevalent; 
whilst the immediate impact is greater, it is not always as long lasting as some breaches of 
confidentiality have been. For instance, the leaked information to Wikileaks is still being gradually 
released, and some socio-political ramifications are still being felt assuming it is true that the 
releases contributed to sparking the uprisings in North Africa (presented in Section 4.2.7.6). 
Therefore denial attacks having the lowest risk rating again correspond to the data, indicating the 
proposed framework has correctly reflected this. The general impacts indicate that there is a 
vulnerability to IW attacks, and some risk; however due to low threat the risk is not as high as it 
could be. 
The comparison of the IW functional areas illustrates that network warfare presents a higher risk 
rating than electronic warfare; this indicates that the proposed framework correctly reflects the 
discussions of the data. Despite network warfare presenting a higher risk, should military electronic 
warfare assets be available in a conflict area, these would provide a better tactical option than 
network warfare. The comparison of the network warfare threats indicates that the framework 
correctly reflects the high risk presented by malware and system penetration. 
There were two aspects that were not covered in the assessment above as they do not relate directly 
to an IW attack on the mobile infrastructure, or misuse of services for IW purposes, but are in some 
way relevant and are discussed here for completeness. The first relates to the vulnerability of the 
mobile infrastructure; in Section 2.7.2.1 dependency on other infrastructures was listed as a 
vulnerability category. The mobile infrastructure has some dependency on the electric power grid, 
however backup generators and solar power will be able to provide some functionality should there 
be widespread power disruption. Therefore an indirect attack on the electric power grid may 
eventually result in service outages; however there will be additional, more possibly more severe, 





mobile services to detonate IEDs; this was raised in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. This is one of the 
reasons that military electronic warfare is used to target mobile phones in conflict zones. Whilst 
these devices are known for their effectiveness in the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts, mobile 
detonate bombs have been used in South Africa, as mentioned in Sections 5.3 and 5.7. 
8.7 Opportunities 
This section discusses opportunities and possible solutions to the vulnerabilities or to mitigate the 
impacts. These opportunities are derived from the incident and trend analysis (Chapter 5), the 
interviews (Section 6.2), and the workshop (Section 6.3). Sections 8.7.1 and 8.7.2 present the non-
technical and technical factors, respectively. Section 8.7.3 summarises this section. 
8.7.1 Non-Technical 
A number of non-technical opportunities and solutions were proposed in the interviews and trend 
and incident analysis; these range from international assistance to building local capacity. These 
factors are presented in more detail in this section. 
The fields of IW, information security, and critical information infrastructure protection have been 
researched and effective tools and methods have been developed, particularly in Europe and the 
United States. There is the opportunity to gain capacity and knowledge through participation and 
engagement at an international level through conferences and working groups. This can then be 
used to facilitate local engagement to grow further in these areas. In particular, capacity building in 
defensive information warfare areas should be prioritised, not only by the military, but by 
government in general and major service providers. 
South Africa has the capacity to introduce a CSIRT; it was indicated in the interviews that 
international CERTS are willing to aid in the creation of a South African CSIRT. This CSIRT 
should be developed with the specific aim of interacting with public and private organisations, and 
some information, such as annual reports, warnings, and advisories, should be accessible by the 
general population to improve awareness. 
Improve general awareness of information security issues is imperative. The lack of awareness was 
raised repeatedly throughout the study, indicating the prevalence of this problem and the concern it 
is creating. Awareness training programmes for security online, for mobile devices, and social 
networks should be conducted. Further reinforcing awareness of information security throughout 





suggested that information technology related degrees should increase the level of security 
considerations in the modules. This could include the concept of integrating security in 
programming and development from an early stage. It was also suggested in the workshop that the 
introduction of a professional body to oversee and accredit degrees and professionals could aid in 
improving the overall quality of professionals and the implementation of systems in South Africa, 
thereby reducing vulnerabilities. 
South Africa has an opportunity to learn from international legislation, standards, and policies; 
those developed in Europe were specifically cited in the interviews. The advantage of this is that 
these have already had been implemented and therefore tested more thoroughly, which allows for 
some hindsight. From the workshop it was clear that the POPI Act will be compliant with all the 
major corresponding international laws. This provides a unique opportunity to ensure organisational 
compliance at an international level once the bill has been enacted. The introduction of policies 
specific to new technologies, or the rapid revising of existing policies to include issues raised by 
these technologies will aid in addressing specific threat and vulnerabilities at an early stage, prior to 
bad habits being formed by employees with regards to the use of modern technology. 
For the specific case of mobile technology, equivalent security techniques and controls to PC-based 
networks should be research and developed. This will allow for better prevention, detection, and 
response should an attack occur. 
8.7.2 Technical 
A number of technical solutions were suggested in the workshop, interviews, and trend and incident 
analysis. These factors are presented in this section as opportunities to improve defensive measures 
against IW attacks. 
Stricter filtering mechanisms to prevent unauthorised devices from connecting to the network 
should be implemented. Internet service providers should also improve filtering and monitoring 
capabilities, and introduce black holes and sinkholes if this has not already been done. 
Data classification was strongly recommended in the workshop as a technique to identify sensitive 
information, thereby ensuring sufficient protective measures are assigned to the data. Data 
classification may be mandatory by the POPI Bill; as it is yet to be enacted, organisations have the 





Increasing redundancy of critical systems may aid in protecting against attacks; providing for extra 
capacity and dynamic introduction of these systems will mitigate down-time in the event of physical 
damage or increase capacity in the event of a DoS attack. 
Whilst South Africa is unlikely to be targeted by a large scale EMP, some additional shielding of 
infrastructure components could aid in survivability and longevity of components; this will also 
mitigate the impact of other directed energy devices. 
All systems should have the most recent anti-virus protection and patches, even if they are behind 
an air-gap; any flash drives, laptops, or other devices used to perform maintenance and transfer 
information to the systems behind the air-gap should also be fully protected. This will reduce the 
chance of malware transiting the air-gap and infecting the control systems and infrastructure 
components. 
A technical control that should be implemented is end-to-end encryption of communications; this 
will mitigate the threat of information or communications being intercepted in transit, even when 
the infrastructure or communications medium itself does not provide encryption capability. In 
particular, mobile communications and VOIP links should employ mandatory end-to-end 
encryption should any potentially sensitive information be required to be communicated across the 
channel. 
A method that may aid in mitigating legitimate mobile applications being compromised by malware 
is to provide a method of digitally signing them, and providing the message digest of the file to 
ensure their integrity before installing.   
In Section 5.6 the concept of a social media honey pot was mentioned; this was originally proposed 
by the candidate in van Niekerk, Ramluckan, and Maharaj (2011). This control could be employed 
to gain intelligence on social media threats and provide warning to users that have potentially been 
targeted. Gaining such information could then be used to improve awareness training regarding the 
threats on social media websites. 
8.7.3 Summary 
South Africa has the opportunity to become the leading nation in the continent in terms of 
information warfare and security. The apparent lack of focus on the information security (in 
particular cyber-security) area may eventually hinder economic development due to direct financial 





lose existing investors should international legislative requirements for information security become 
stricter and prohibit information interaction with nations that do not have equivalent laws. The 
POPI Bill provides an opportunity to ensure international compliance. 
Generating awareness and additional training dedicated to information security will improve reduce 
the national vulnerability; improving the capacity will also indirectly aid in improving the technical 
countermeasures, providing for more secure and stable information environment in South Africa.  
8.8 Review of the IW Vulnerability Assessment Framework 
This section will review the performance of the proposed vulnerability assessment framework. The 
objective was to propose a framework that was adaptable, scalable, and progressed logically from 
high-level concepts to implementation. 
The application of the framework to a corporate cloud computing example in Section 4.3.2, and the 
mobile infrastructure at a national level in the thesis, indicates that scalability has been achieved. 
The framework is modular in that any section of the assessment can be replaced by another method, 
allowing for adaptability; the application to the cloud computing scenario in Section 4.3.2 and the 
mobile infrastructure above also indicates a degree of adaptability. The aim of the framework was 
to provide a logical progression through high-level concepts to the implementation and assessment 
and analysis. The implementation in Section 4.3.2 and above illustrated the logical progression of 
the framework, where the data for the above assessment was presented in Chapter 4 to Chapter 7. 
Due to security and ethical concerns, not all assessment methodologies could be implemented, such 
as penetration testing of the actual infrastructure and related systems. From Section 4.3.2, it was 
indicated that the framework correctly reflected the cloud computing scenario, and Section 8.6.3 
indicates that the data from Chapter 4 to Chapter 7 is correctly reflected by the assessment above. In 
Section 8.6.2 the vulnerability and risk of various aspects were compared; namely the impact type, 
IW functional areas, and various threats. This indicates that the framework provides the capability 
for comparative analysis. 
From this there is indication that the proposed vulnerability assessment performed its functions 
adequately. The outcomes of the assessments corresponded to the data and literature, and the 
framework proved to provide a logical progression through the assessment process. The framework 
also provided a means of comparing various aspects of the threat, vulnerability, and risk 





8.9 Chapter Summary 
The chapter performed the vulnerability and risk assessment of a generic mobile infrastructure from 
the data presented and framework in Chapter 4 to Chapter 7. It was determined that the mobile 
infrastructure does form part of the national critical information infrastructure; the prevalence of 
and dependence on mobile communications in South Africa indicates that it may be more critical 
than in other nations.  
Major threats to South Africa include the high rates of malware infection and software piracy 
leaving systems vulnerable. The likelihood of threat action is low; however due to the current 
political in Africa, this can be elevated to medium. The lack of user awareness presents a very high 
vulnerability to South Africa; there is also a vulnerability to large-scale DoS attacks. The apparent 
high load of the mobile infrastructure in South Africa presents a high technical vulnerability due to 
the increased susceptibility to DoS attacks on the infrastructure. The highest risk is the exploitation 
of vulnerabilities in infrastructure systems to allow breaches of confidentiality, integrity, and 
possible denial of services. The use of mobiles also presents a high risk of data leaks to 
organisations. Comparative analysis indicates that breaches to confidentiality form the highest risk, 
network warfare techniques may prove to be more efficient in strategic attacks, and the threats 
malware and system penetrations present the highest risk. These correspond to the discussion in 
Chapter 4 to Chapter 7. Increasing awareness and implementing a CSIRT to aid with both response 
and improvement of technical security provides major opportunities for South Africa to mitigate the 
risk. The proposed framework was reviewed, and the objectives of the framework have been met, 







Chapter 9. Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the thesis, and will discuss the outcome of the study objectives, present 
recommendations, and propose future research. Section 9.2 discusses the objective of further 
developing a framework to conduct infrastructure vulnerability assessments; Section 9.3 discusses 
the information gathered regarding attack on the information infrastructure. Section 9.4 discusses 
the criticality of the mobile infrastructure, and the framework application to the mobile 
infrastructure is discussed in Section 9.5, while Section 9.6 discusses the secondary objectives. 
Section 9.7 presents the recommendations from the study, and Section 9.8 suggests future research. 
9.2 Further Develop a Framework for Infrastructure Vulnerability 
Assessments from and IW Perspective 
An objective of the study was to propose a vulnerability assessment framework that could be used 
to assess information infrastructures from an IW perspective. To do this, a consolidated model for 
IW incidents was proposed, which could then be related to the risk and vulnerability assessment 
frameworks. Both the IW Lifecycle model and the vulnerability assessment framework were 
proposed in Chapter 4. 
The IW Lifecycle Model was proposed to form a coherent model by combining aspects of IW 
models that were presented in the literature review. A two-level model was proposed: the high-level 
provided the basic concepts of the model, and the second layer provided the detail of the IW 
concepts. The dual layers were required as some of the detailed concepts overlapped multiple high-
level blocks. The model was used to analyse a number of incidents, some of which were used to 
review the model. The model adequately described the incidents, and from the analysis it could be 
seen that the role played by the context in shaping the IW incident regarding the methods used was 
as important as the technical vulnerabilities that were exploited. The model satisfied the objectives 
of being scalable and applicable to different IW functional areas. The model was also used to relate 
the IW aspects to the vulnerability assessment framework. 
The proposed vulnerability framework was an amalgamation of different frameworks and methods 
discussed in the literature review. The framework was categorised at a high-level according to a 





Relevant information sources and methodology types were provided for data gathering; for the 
specific case of a technical vulnerability analysis, a modified Minimum Essential Information 
Infrastructure was suggested, which then incorporated technical investigation techniques such as 
penetration testing and simulations. The information is rated according to a modified FAIR analysis 
method, where the vulnerability and risk ratings are outputs of process using risk matrices. A 
mathematical process using vector magnitudes was proposed where the individual risk and 
vulnerability ratings are used to calculate a single rating for an infrastructure; this can also be used 
at a national or organisational level. 
The vulnerability assessment was applied to the secondary scenario of cloud computing, which was 
used to perform an initial review of the framework, and the primary focus of the mobile 
infrastructure. The outcomes of the assessments were consistent with the data and literature. The 
specific details of the outcomes themselves will be discussed in Sections 9.5 and 9.6.1. The 
proposed framework satisfied the objectives of being scalable, providing a logical flow through the 
assessment process from high-level to detailed implementation, and providing the ability to 
compare vulnerability and risk for different aspects. The structure of the framework was such that it 
could be adaptable; however this was not implemented in the study. 
The proposed model and framework satisfied their objectives, and were successfully implemented 
in the study for analysis and assessment of various scenarios. This objective of the study was 
therefore completed. 
9.3 Gather Information Relating to Attacks against the Information 
Infrastructure 
An objective of the study was to gather information regarding attacks on the information 
infrastructure and trends in information warfare and security. Of particular interest are those 
incidents and trends that relate to South Africa. This information was gathered from documents as 
presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, and from expert input in the form of interviews and a 
workshop, presented in Chapter 6. Computer simulations and mathematical calculations were also 
conducted; these provided a method of feasibility or impact analysis; this was presented in Chapter 
7. The gathering of the information was also related to application of the proposed framework, as 
this data provided the basis for the vulnerability assessment. This also provided the data to establish 





At an international level, there is prevalence in attacks that seek to break confidentiality, 
particularly through system penetration of government or related organisational systems. A number 
of similar attacks appear to be state sponsored, and target national and international organisations 
and governments in what appears to be widespread cyber-espionage. The shift of malware to focus 
on botnets corresponds to the first large-scale DoS attacks that targeted Estonia and Georgia; such 
attacks have grown in size, where the attacks on Myanmar are reported to have peaked at 14 Gbps. 
Both espionage and DoS attacks appear to be politically motivated. The prevalence of malware in 
the CSIRT reports and in the attacks discussed, in addition to reports of a military attempt to 
develop a rootkit, indicates that the Internet is becoming weaponised. Outcomes from the interviews 
also highlight concerns over breaches of confidentiality and DoS attacks; however the primary 
concern was related to lack of user awareness and cyber-crime related activities.  
Attacks on mobile devices and the mobile infrastructure follow similar trends; a number of 
significant attacks, mobile malware, and research in the field of mobile security revolve around the 
breach of confidentiality. Military use of or attacks on the mobile infrastructure were illustrated; 
this indicates that the mobile infrastructure is relevant to IW. The threat of mobile malware is 
growing, and experts are expecting a global pandemic of mobile malware equivalent to the major 
worms in 2003 and 2004; the concern is that this would deny mobile services as the worms 
degraded network performance. The outcomes of the interviews also focussed on confidentiality 
issues. DoS attacks were raised due to the reliance on mobile communications, however no 
documented record of a DoS attack on the mobile infrastructure was found. General vulnerabilities 
were a common theme, and malware and awareness were raised. The possibility of a DDoS attack 
on the mobile infrastructure was raised in the workshop, and the use of mobile devices in 
penetrating networks. The interview and workshop outcomes therefore corresponded to the 
documents considered. Social media have also been shown to be a vector for attacks and malware; 
as before the attacks target confidentiality. The expected availability of social media by employees, 
and breaches of confidentiality through this medium were raised both in the workshop and the 
documents considered. The combination of social media and mobile devices played a significant 
role in many protest actions; and there are reports of intended military use of social media for 
influence operations, and examples were presented of targeted attacks using social media. This 
therefore can be considered as a tool that is relevant to IW. The emergence of mobile and social 
networking technologies has resulted in a convergence of ICTs; this convergence is also seen in the 





and concepts have already begun to impact on IW and information security, and the affects are 
likely to become more prominent. 
Through analysis of the incidents using the IW Lifecycle Model, it can be seen that the context of 
the IW incident shapes it as much as the technical vulnerabilities and exploits. This supports the 
models that specifically consider the context, and Armistead's (2010) statement that the broader 
issues need to be considered. This indicates that high profile, controversial decisions and context 
may be a good predictor for DoS attacks. Possession of highly valuable information and political 
alignment in an environment of strong competition could prove a strong predictor for cyber-
espionage attacks. 
A concern that was prevalent in both the interviews and workshop is the lack of user awareness 
regarding security issues. This appears particularly relevant to Africa and South Africa; other trends 
in Africa are high infection rates of malware and high rates of software piracy. The lack of 
awareness and piracy rates appear to contribute to the high number of infections. The workshop 
confirmed that these infections are seen, and compromised computers in South Africa have been 
used as a launching point for attacks. The high infections of botnets could indicate that South Africa 
is highly vulnerable to DoS attacks from its own information infrastructure. The workshop also 
confirmed that cyber-based corporate espionage takes place in South Africa, and that social 
engineering has very high success rates. The political situation in Africa, as well as the internal 
xenophobic attacks and service delivery riots, may provide motivation for social IW incidents such 
as those in North Africa. Other political decisions that have attracted international attention, such as 
denying the Dalai Lama entry (Philp, 2011; South African Press Association, 2009a), and perceived 
political alignment may also attract attacks from rogue groups and possible other nations. The lack 
of an operational CSIRT was raised in the documentation considered, the interviews, and the 
workshop. This contributes to the lack of a big picture regarding the information security incidents 
in the country, and would make the defence, response, and recovery in the event of a large-scale 
attack difficult and un-coordinated. South Africa therefore can be seen as being vulnerable to attack, 
both from within and external aggressors. 
9.4 Establish the Criticality of the Mobile Infrastructure 
The criticality of the mobile infrastructure needed to be established as it was being treated as part of 
the national critical information infrastructure. Questions in the interviews provided expert opinion 





infrastructure. A pilot survey of informal traders in the eThekwini Municipality (Durban and 
surrounding areas) was conducted to gain an indication of the reliance on the informal businesses 
on the mobile infrastructure.  
From the interviews, the outcomes indicated that the mobile infrastructure should be considered as 
critical. The majority of responses also indicated there should be specific policies towards 
protecting the mobile infrastructure; however some considered that existing critical infrastructure 
protection policies were sufficient. The responses also showed that mobile communications is 
important to most sectors; however use by government, military, and security or intelligence 
services should have additional security. The importance and use of mobile communications by 
criminal groups implies that the infrastructure is critical to security and intelligence services to 
conduct lawful intercepts. The outcomes of interviews correspond to the reports of incidents, 
concerns, and roles of mobile security that were discussed in the trend and incident analysis. Of 
particular note are the military attacks on mobile infrastructure for influence operations, concerns of 
insurgents accessing military and diplomatic communications by penetrating the infrastructure, and 
the use of mobile devices in uprisings and the resultant blockage of services indicate that the mobile 
infrastructure is already relevant to IW, and may play increasingly larger roles in future information 
conflicts. As many of the demonstrations occurred in Africa, this is of particular relevance to South 
Africa. 
The prevalence and reliance of mobile communications was evident from the literature review, 
trend analysis, and interviews. The high penetration of mobile phones was seen in a pilot survey 
was conducted to assess the use of mobile devices by informal traders. However, the results 
indicated that the traders considered the social use of mobile communications of higher importance 
than the business use; the indications are that whilst outages of mobile services will have some 
impact on the traders, they did not view it as critical. The investigation of the reliance of informal 
traders on mobile communications should be conducted as a future, separate study where all the 
factors can be assessed in-depth. 
The corresponding results from the interviews and documents indicate that the mobile infrastructure 
is critical, especially in South Africa where there is high reliance on the mobile communications 
compared to fixed-line telecommunications. The reports relating mobile communications to military 
activities and mass demonstrations indicates a growing relevance of the mobile infrastructure to IW 
activities; this corresponds to the effects of modern ICTs on the IW construct discussed in Section 





work where all factors can be assessed in-depth; the results from the pilot indicated that there is 
some reliance, but mobile communications are perceived as more important for social 
communications, and not critical for the informal business. 
9.5 Application of the Proposed Framework to the Mobile 
Infrastructure 
The proposed vulnerability assessment was applied to a generic national mobile infrastructure. The 
data gathered was used as the basis of the assessment, which was conducted according to the 
proposed framework. This assessment is presented in Chapter 8. As discussed in Section 9.2, the 
outcomes from the assessment corresponded to the data, indicating the results are reliable.  
The assessment of the mobile infrastructure rated the threats, vulnerabilities, and risks; from the 
risks the vulnerabilities were prioritised, and some aspects were compared. The threats were rated 
according to their prevalence and the overall probability of an attack. In the general context 
malware, social engineering and system penetrations were rated as high threats and DoS attacks as a 
medium threat. Threats to the mobile infrastructure that are rated high include: jamming in a 
conflict zone, infrastructure penetration, malware, and SIM cloning for cyber-crime use. Those 
rated as medium threat include: mobile and social media malware, SMS DoS from mobile botnets, 
and both wireless intercept and physical threats in a conflict zone. The use of mobile phones also 
presents a threat, where those related to leaks and targeted attacks where the device is stolen are 
rated high; the use of the devices to penetrate networks, for phishing, and distribute hate speech or 
incite demonstrations are rated as medium. 
The vulnerabilities were rated according to the capability required to overcome them, and the 
effectiveness of the controls that are in place; the most vulnerable areas will be highlighted here. In 
terms of general, contextual vulnerabilities, two stood out with very high ratings: a lack of user 
awareness, and vulnerability to DoS attacks. At a national level, the lack of a CSIRT and 
insufficient legislature are rated as high; poor corporate attitude and general system penetration are 
also notable vulnerabilities that are rated high. A technical vulnerability of the mobile infrastructure 
that was rated very high is the apparent high operating load; outages and reports by the regulatory 
body that the call drop rate is too high and does not meet requirements indicates that the 
infrastructure may be very susceptible to a DoS attack. Device OS vulnerabilities, susceptibility to 





cloning are rated as high. The vulnerability to an information leak in a normal security environment 
is very high, but is only high in a high security environment. The vulnerability to mobiles 
subverting network perimeter controls and being used to instigate violence are also rated high. The 
calculated infrastructure rating for general vulnerabilities is 12.1 out of a possible maximum of 
14.14. The rating is 13.93 out of a possible maximum of 22.91 for technical vulnerabilities of the 
infrastructure, and 8.77 out of 11.18 due to vulnerabilities created by mobile use. From this it can be 
concluded that there is a significant general vulnerability to attack, and the use of mobile phones do 
impact on security; the mobile infrastructure vulnerability is high due to the number of 
vulnerabilities, but they are on average high mid-range vulnerabilities. 
The risks rated very high are associated with general vulnerabilities and previously unknown 
vulnerabilities which are exploited by malware and system penetration and confidentiality is 
breached and data corrupted. Risks of information leaks or the subversion of perimeter controls by 
mobile devices are also rated very high. These vulnerabilities should be prioritised to mitigate the 
vulnerability and risk. Technical vulnerabilities that present a high risk is the interception of 
wireless network transmissions, vulnerabilities in wireless access points, jamming in a military 
environment, device vulnerabilities, high operating load, centralisation of infrastructure 
components, and breaches of confidentiality due to vulnerabilities in mobile enterprise servers. All 
general vulnerabilities have a high risk associated with them, except for legislative vulnerabilities. 
The risk ratings are 16.4 out of 21.21 for general vulnerabilities, 27.51 out of 39.69 for technical 
infrastructure vulnerabilities, and 11.49 out of 13.23 for vulnerabilities due to mobile use. The high 
risk for the technical vulnerabilities corresponds to the outcome of the study that the mobile 
infrastructure is critical. The risk ratings for the general vulnerabilities and those due to mobile use 
indicate that these vulnerabilities can have a significant impact on organisational and national 
security. 
The risk and vulnerability ratings were compared for various aspects. The outcomes of this 
comparison indicated that breaches of confidentiality posed the greatest risk and had the highest 
vulnerability rating; mitigating this impact type should therefore be prioritised. Of the technical 
impacts, corruption of data presented a higher risk than DoS attacks, even though it had the lower 
vulnerability rating. This is due to the severity of the impacts, which is often coupled with DoS and 
breaches in confidentiality. The general vulnerabilities were rated lowest for both vulnerability and 
risk; however these should not be ignored as they may aid in mitigating the technical vulnerabilities 





warfare, and therefore can be considered the more efficient option for a strategic attack on the 
mobile infrastructure. Should military electronic warfare assets be available in a tactical 
environment, they will probably be the more efficient. The comparison of threats showed that 
system penetration presented the highest risk and vulnerability rating, followed by malware. The 
ratings of social media and mobile malware should be monitored, as they can be expected to 
increase as these threats grow in prevalence. The comparisons are consistent with the data collected. 
Suggested solutions and controls to mitigate vulnerabilities are discussed in Section 9.6.2. 
The vulnerability and risk assessment indicated that South Africa is vulnerable to attack, and in the 
current environment, this does present a noticeable risk. In particular, the lack of user awareness 
poses a large problem, and the negative effects are already being seen. The mobile infrastructure 
also exhibits a number of vulnerabilities, of which the highest risk is related to the threat of system 
penetrations of the infrastructure, allowing attackers to monitor communications. The mitigation of 
general vulnerabilities should be prioritised as this presents a very high risk, and reports presented 
in the trend analysis indicate that many breaches could have easily been avoided.  Network warfare 
methods can be seen as a high risk to the mobile infrastructure, and confidentiality breach is the 
highest risk impact; therefore controls mitigating these should be prioritised.  
9.6 Secondary Objectives 
Secondary objective included the application of the proposed framework to a second infrastructure, 
and providing possible solutions to mitigate identified vulnerabilities. The application of the 
framework to a second infrastructure; as part of the initial review of the framework, it was applied 
to a scenario of cloud computing. The outcomes of the application to the cloud computing scenario 
is summarised in Section 9.6.1. Potential solutions to vulnerabilities were assessed as part of the 
data gathering, and are discussed in Section 9.6.2. 
9.6.1 Application of the Framework to Cloud Computing 
A secondary objective of the study was to apply the proposed framework to another infrastructure 
in addition to the primary application to the mobile infrastructure. This was provided in Section 
4.3.2, where the framework was initially reviewed by applying it to a cloud computing scenario.   
The results from the assessment indicated that social engineering and exposure due to mobile 
devices that can access cloud services posed a very high risk. These vulnerabilities were also rated 





very high as a threat. The vulnerability of different cloud service models was the same; however the 
risk varied for some impacts types due to their magnitude. Confidentiality presented the highest 
risk, however it did not have the highest vulnerability rating. Corruption was the second highest 
risk, but had the lowest vulnerability rating of the three technical impacts. DoS was the lowest risk, 
but exhibited the highest vulnerability rating. There was a difference between the IaaS and SaaS or 
PaaS models for the DoS risk rating; the risk was higher for the SaaS and PaaS models due to the 
increased impact should service be lost. The non-technical factors also presented some risk; this 
confirmed that the broader context does influence vulnerability and risk. 
9.6.2 Possible Solutions to Vulnerabilities 
Possible solutions to mitigate vulnerabilities and threats arose from primarily the interviews and 
workshop. The document analysis also provides some information. The possible solutions were 
presented as under the opportunities phase of the vulnerability assessment in Section 8.7, and 
originated from the interviews, workshop, and documents analysed. 
Following from the general vulnerabilities, the documents, workshop, and interviews all raised the 
need for additional legislation, the introduction of a CSIRT, and information security awareness 
campaigns. The legislation will also aid in forcing organisations into applying information security 
measures. There was also a suggestion in the workshop that a professional body with oversight of 
academic degrees and professionals in development and IT security and management to ensure that 
there is a minimum quality; this will hopefully increase the general quality of information systems 
and reduce vulnerabilities.  
Technical solutions include introducing stricter filtering mechanisms to control mobile device 
connection to networks and introducing data classification. For the mobile infrastructure 
specifically, additional shielding could be provided to aid in mitigating the effects of 
electromagnetic interference (including lightning), increasing redundancy in mobile infrastructure 
components, and ensuring all servers and components are patched and have the latest anti-virus 
signatures. Even those systems behind an air-gap need to be patched and protected as the Stuxnet 
worm managed to transit the air gap. End-to-end encryption of communications should be 
mandatory in organisations with sensitive or confidential information. 
Solutions proposed in this study include the introduction of social media honey pots to investigate 
attacks through the social networks. This may provide information to aid awareness efforts. Using 





mitigating legitimate applications being compromised by malware by allowing users to check that 
they have not been altered. Intrusion detection systems could also be employed on the mobile 
infrastructure to detect and monitor unusual quantities of requests originating from web-based 
entities and specific components in the infrastructure. Should there be no real-world reason for the 
influx of messages, then it could signify a mobile worm outbreak or system penetration. 
These solutions originate from the study, and do not provide an exhaustive list. Mitigating the most 
commonly exploited vulnerabilities will force attackers into finding alternative methods, which at 
least increase the complexity required for a potential attacker. 
9.7 Recommendations 
The recommendations from this research follow directly from the opportunities and solutions 
discussed in Section 8.7 and summarised in Section 9.6.2. Naturally, it is recommended that 
research in the relevant areas needs to be continued; this is discussed in more detail in Section 9.8. 
The recommendations presented here focus on those that can be implemented by network providers 
and organisations to directly mitigate the vulnerabilities and risks. 
At a national level, a series of initiatives should be implemented. These include information security 
awareness campaigns in communities; schools could be targeted to raise awareness of the learners, 
who could take this back to their communities. There is intent to conduct such projects, as shown by 
the awareness research conducted by Grobler, Jansen van Vuuren, and Zaaiman (2011). Due to the 
high penetration of mobile devices and the evolving threats for these devices, there is a need to 
include these devices in the training in addition to PC-based security. Additional legislature also 
needs to be implemented; the Protection of Personal Information Bill is yet to be enacted. This 
legislation will provide excellent support for the existing legislature and standards in South Africa. 
A suggestion that arose from the workshop was the further introduction of information security into 
tertiary computing-related curriculum. The security aspects should be raised for the various topics; 
however security in the development lifecycle should be stressed. A way of ensuring the 
introduction of security into the curriculum is, as suggested in the workshop, is to have a 
professional body oversee and accredit the curriculum; they can also provide for registration of 
information systems professionals. 
The introduction of a CSIRT should be prioritised. Such a facility would provide much needed 





event of an attack. Such a facility is also crucial to continuing research in the information security 
and IW areas. Whilst many government CSIRTs keep their information confidential, the high 
infection rates and low awareness situation in Africa indicates the CSIRTs need to play a more 
public role. Therefore, should the relevant government CSIRTs or their governing agencies wish to 
restrict access to the CSIRT services, a second CSIRT should be implemented to respond to general 
public and organisational issues outside of the government departments. 
Infrastructure components need to patched and have the latest security measures. Whilst this should 
be done for all information-based infrastructures, the focus here will be on the mobile infrastructure. 
The Stuxnet worm illustrated that even components behind an air gap could be targeted and 
attacked; and the number of incidents illustrated that the mobile infrastructure can be penetrated. 
One incident indicated that the communications are only encrypted over the wireless channels. To 
circumvent this, and end-to-end encryption solution for mobile communications should be 
introduced for any organisation that requires to transmit or discuss sensitive information over public 
mobile or network channels. Additional systems should be introduced to monitor unusually high 
traffic on the mobile networks, with the ability redirect or block the traffic if it is found to be 
malicious. This can be seen as a mobile equivalent of an intrusion detection system and sinkhole.  
Organisations should also introduce measures to mitigate the risk due to the use of mobile devices 
and related technological concepts, such as cloud computing. Suggestions arising from the 
workshop are to implement MAC address filtering to mitigate untrusted mobile devices connecting 
to the wireless networks. Data classification will aid in identifying the protection information 
requires. Awareness training should also be provided to employees to ensure they have some 
knowledge of the threats that mobile devices and social networking present to them personally and 
the organisation. As suggested in Section 5.6, a defence-in-depth approach is often best, where a 
combination of preventative and detection measures is taken. The preventative measures can be 
seen as restricting access, installing security applications, and awareness training; detective 
measures include monitoring of user activity and profiles. 
A number of the recommendations are non-technical in nature; this is largely due to the lack of 
awareness and poor attitude surrounding information security issues. Some technical measures 
suggested can be easily implemented; others will need to be researched and developed. The 





9.8 Future Research 
This section provides suggestions for future research. This follows from the areas identified during 
the data gathering process of the study and outcomes from the study; some recommendations also 
require some areas of research covered in this section to be conducted. The primary focus of future 
research needs to be the continued monitoring and analysis of future IW and security incidents and 
trends; particularly the impact of evolving technologies on these fields. The evolution of malware, 
particularly on the mobile and social network platforms, also needs to be monitored and analysed. 
Whilst the anti-virus and security vendors do this well, some additional academic research is needed 
to analyse the long-term impacts of malware on society and national economies. For Africa, this 
research should focus on the possible hindrances malware and the related cyber-crime creates for 
national economic and social development; if this can be quantified then it may force the relevant 
governments into taking action to improve their national cyber-security efforts. 
As suggested from the pilot survey, the reliance of informal traders on mobile communications 
should be researched in depth. This can also be expanded to all business sectors, from the micro-
enterprise level to the large corporations. This may give an indication of the national economic 
reliance on mobile communications; similar research for traditional fixed-line telecommunications 
and web-based communications will allow for the comparison of the economic and social 
importance of ICTs in the country. 
The continued research in the information warfare and security areas to develop new defensive 
measures to protect infrastructure and information should continue. The research in South Africa 
should expand on the current IW areas to information operations, which can be seen as an extension 
to IW. A taxonomy needs to be developed in addition to the frameworks for implementing 
information operations across the military and government. The difficulties regarding political 
mandate that has hindered the development of a CSIRT may also hinder the introduction of full 
spectrum information operations across the military, government departments, and other agencies. 
An important area of research will be the development and introduction of dedicated information 
security degrees and diplomas at tertiary institutions. These need to be researched carefully and 
catered to the current requirements of industry for them to be viable. The graduates need to gain the 
relevant experience and knowledge that is required in industry from these degrees to give them a 
high chance of being employed; industry buy-in for such programmes will also be required. Unique 





also need to be researched to improve the quality of the degree offerings as well as the resultant 
graduates. 
An interesting point to research is the possible roles that the Tunisian and Egyptian CSIRTs played 
during the unrest in those countries. A concern was raised in the interview that CSIRTs could be 
used to block access to the internet and other communications technologies. At the time of this 
study, not enough information was available to assess if the CSIRTs did contribute to the 
government response to the unrest. This should be research if more information becomes available. 
By conducting the suggested research at academic institutes across South Africa, further insight will 
be gained that will aid in improving the information security landscape in the country. This will in 
turn improve the economic and social impact of evolving technologies. 
9.9 Conclusion 
Three modern ICT concepts have been considered to various extents in this thesis: mobile 
communications, Web 2.0, and cloud computing; where the focus has been on mobile 
communications. These technologies exhibit their own vulnerabilities, and introduce vulnerabilities 
and threats into the information infrastructures. These new technologies also appear to impact on 
the IW constructs; as the technology converges, so do the IW functional areas. 
The thesis proposed a descriptive IW model and a vulnerability assessment framework. The 
proposed IW lifecycle model was used to analyse a number of incidents; this analysis supported the 
views that context is important in IW, as this provides the reason and motivation for attacks. 
Therefore non-technical vulnerabilities may be equally as important as the technical vulnerabilities 
which are exploited during the attack. The proposed vulnerability framework provided the direction 
for the data gathering in the thesis. The framework was applied to a scenario of cloud computing, 
but the focus was on the application to the mobile infrastructure. 
The results of the assessment indicated that South Africa is vulnerable to cyber-based attacks; these 
vulnerabilities present a high risk to the nation. It was shown that the mobile infrastructure is 
critical or important to all sectors; therefore it needs to be afforded protection from potential attack. 
The assessment results indicated that the mobile infrastructure is also vulnerable to attack, and that 
malware and system penetration exploiting general vulnerabilities presents the highest risk to the 
infrastructure. A serious vulnerability is the apparent high operating loads, which result in the 





and network warfare techniques appear to be the most effective at a strategic level against the 
mobile infrastructure. The results of the assessment correspond to the gathered data, indicating 
reliability. 
The gathered data indicates that system penetrations to breach the confidentiality of sensitive 
information appear to be the most prevalent attack. The evolution of malware to the botnet form 
corresponds to the evolution of large-scale DDoS attacks; these may become more prevalent should 
the number of infected systems increase. However, the primary focus of malware appears to be 
accessing account login details for financial cyber-crime purposes. The use of malware in cyber-
espionage attacks and in attacks on infrastructure, indicate that the Internet is becoming increasingly 
weaponised. Attacks on the mobile infrastructure also focussed on confidentiality breaches; 
however some military attack were aimed at distributing psychological operations messages. The 
threat of mobile malware is also evolving rapidly, and it may not be long before pandemics are seen 
that seriously degrade the mobile services. Social media sites have also been seen to be used to 
distribute malware, amongst other attacks. The combination of social media and mobile devices 
were instrumental in the initial phases of mass anti-government demonstrations. From a South 
African perspective, a lack of user awareness and software piracy are contributing to high rates of 
malware infection and general vulnerabilities in the country and its neighbours. From various 
aspects, there is a vulnerability to attack, and an increase in cyber-crime activity is expected. A 
large-scale attack is not expected; however controversial political positions may attract aggressive 
attention. As a large proportion of the demonstrations took place in Africa, this is of particular 
relevance to South Africa, where a number of xenophobic attacks and service delivery riots have 
been experienced. This may be used to the advantage of an attacker, and also heightens the political 
tension in the region. 
It is recommended that measures be taken nationally to improve the context of information 
insecurity in South Africa: the introduction of awareness campaigns and a CSIRT should be 
prioritised, and the supporting legislature should also be in place. A stronger presence of security in 
the computer-based modules at tertiary institutions was also suggested. In the mobile infrastructure 
all systems should be fully protected, there should be redundancy in the infrastructure, and 
additional measure should be developed and introduced to detect and protect against attacks. 
Organisations also need to introduce new, and possibly stricter, security measures to mitigate the 
threats and vulnerabilities posed by social media and mobile devices. Suggested future research 





specifically monitoring incidents and trends. Quantifying the importance of the mobile 
infrastructure to the national economy and society is also an important area of future research. 
The primary and secondary objectives of the study were met; the IW model and vulnerability 
assessment were proposed and applied. Information was gathered regarding the cyber-environment 
in terms of attacks and incident trends. The mobile infrastructure was shown to be critical, and 
possible vulnerabilities in a generic mobile infrastructure were assessed. Broader contextual 
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Appendix C. Communications Theory 
This appendix describes the background to communications theory. The explanations presented are 
to facilitate understanding of concepts in radio communications to those who do not have 
experience in the field; therefore the explanations may not be presented in a manner generally 
accepted as technically correct by the discipline. The explanations are also inclined more towards 
the estimations used in electronic warfare, as described by Adamy (2009), than pure radio 
communications. Section C.1 describes the mathematics of decibel calculations, and Section C.2 
describes the propagation of radio waves. The measures of performance that are relevant to this 
dissertation are described in Section C.3. 
C.1  Decibel Mathematics 
Many terms in communications theory are ratios, such as a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) or a 
jamming-to-signal ratio (JSR). These ratios are presented in decibel form, and can be calculated as 
follows (Taub & Schilling, 1991):  
 A.1 
If S=100 and N=5, then the ratio S/N = 20, and K becomes 13dB. In electronic warfare calculations, 
when most values are represented in decibel format, output powers also need to be converted. The 
unit for this is the dBm, which is normalised to one milliwatt (or in a ratio to 1mW); the equation is 
therefore (Adamy, 2009): 
 A.2 
If P=100W, then we calculate K for P=100000mW, which gives K=50dBm. Gains are effectively 
ratios between the input and output, and are also expressed in the decibel format. A loss can be 
considered as a gain less than one, or a negative gain in decibel form. 
C.2  Radio Wave Propagation 
As radio waves propagate, they can be reflected off obstructions and the ground. They are also 
subject to interference, called noise, from the environment, which may result in errors in the 
reception of digital signals. Shannon's Theorem (Shannon, A Mthematical Theory of 
Communications, 1948) states that the noise limits the capacity of information that a 





describe the propagation of radio waves; these generally calculate the energy loss as the radio wave 
propagates through the environment (Poisel, 2004). In extremely built-up environments, radio 
signals may reflect off many objects, in some cases there may not be a direct signal between the 
transmitter and receiver. These reflections may result in multiple versions of the same transmitted 
signal being received, not necessarily at the same time, and the path of each reflected version of the 
transmitted signal may experience different degradation (or enhancement); this is known as 
multipath fading (Poisel, 2004). 
Interference may come from many sources; the local temperatures create noise in the antenna, 
known as thermal noise. Celestial bodies may also contribute to interference (Poisel, 2004); solar 
flares sometimes cause outages of both satellite and terrestrial communications. The overall 
external noise that interferes with a radio signal is usually modelled on statistical probability 
densities, such as a Gaussian probability density (Taub & Schilling, 1991). As the noise interferes 
with the radio signal, the quality of the signal can be described by the ratio of the signal strength to 
the strength of the noise; this is known as the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR); the equation to calculate 
the SNR in decibels is presented in Section C.1. 
Depending on the distance between the transmitter and receiver, the height of the antennas, and the 
frequency, the communications signal may reflect off the ground resulting in two signals being 
received. This is known as two-ray propagation, occurs when the distance between the transmitter 
and receiver is greater than the Fresnel Zone; if the distance is less than the Fresnel Zone, then line 
of sight propagation occurs (Adamy, 2009; Poisel, 2004). Equation 2.5 in Section 2.5.4.1 
determines the Fresnel Zone. Each propagation method experiences different losses, Equations 2.6 
and 2.7 determine the signal loss. 
Modulation is required to transmit information by radio waves. The radio wave is transmitted at a 
specific frequency; very often this does not correspond to the frequencies of the human voice or of 
digital data. The radio signal is then modified to carry the original signal (voice or data) at its 
frequency. Many modulation schemes are available for both analogue and digital transmissions; the 
explanation of these schemes does not fall into the scope of this study. In digital communications 
the noise experienced through transmission may result in errors when the signal is demodulated; 





C.3  Performance Measures of Communications Systems 
The function of a communications system is to transfer information from one location to another; its 
performance is how well this is achieved. The quality of a digital communications signal is 
measured by the BER, or probability of error (Adamy, 2009), which is a ratio of the number of bits 
in error to the total number of bits received. This is related to the SNR or JSR, as the interference is 
what introduces errors in the signal demodulation. The lower the BER, the better the signal quality; 
therefore the lower the BER for lower SNRs indicates better performance of the communications 
system or channel. The point of jamming is to render a signal unreadable by increasing the noise 
and introducing errors; generally if a third of the bits are in error the signal becomes unreadable 
(Adamy, 2009). As the intention of jamming is to increase the number of errors, an increase in the 
BER for a lower JSR indicates better jammer performance. 
Usually the performance of a communications channel is represented graphically as the BER versus 
the SNR; for jamming it is the BER versus the JSR. If one needs to measure the impact of a specific 
parameter of performance, the graph will be of the BER versus the parameter; the BER (or other 
measure of performance) is the dependant variable. These graphs usually are semi-log graphs, 
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Appendix E. Interview Gatekeeper's Letter 
To Whom It May Concern: 
 
PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH AS PART OF THE PHD RESEARCH DEGREE 
 
Name: Brett van Niekerk 
Student No: 991160530 
 Project Topic: Vulnerability Analysis of Modern ICT Infrastructure from an Information Warfare 
Perspective 
As part of the research, the student is interviewing professionals in the field to gain both South 
African and international perspectives on issues in critical information infrastructure protection and 
information warfare. One or more of these professionals that have been identified are members of 
your organization. 
Your assistance in permitting access to your organization for purposes of this research is most 
appreciated. Please be assured that all information gained from the research will be treated with the 
utmost circumspection. Confidentiality and anonymity will be strictly adhered to by the student. 
Interview candidates will not be required to answer questions that may refer to sensitive 
information, and may withdraw from the process at anytime should they choose, without any 
consequences to themselves or the organisation. 
If permission is granted then UKZN requires this to be in writing on a letterhead and signed by the 
relevant authority. 







Appendix F. Interview Letter of Informed Consent 
Dear Respondent, 
PhD Research Project 
Researcher: Brett van Niekerk (Tel: 031 260 8521; email: 991160530@ukzn.ac.za) 
Supervisor: Prof MS Maharaj (Tel: 031 260 8023; email: maharajms@ukzn.ac.za)  
Research Office: Ms P Ximba 031-2603587 
I, Brett van Niekerk, am a PhD student at the School of Information Systems and Technology, of 
the University of KwaZulu-Natal. You are invited to participate in a research project entitled 
“Vulnerability Analysis of Modern ICT Infrastructure from an Information Warfare Perspective”.  
The aim of this study is to develop a framework for assessing vulnerabilities and associated risks in 
modern day ICT infrastructures, particularly in a South African context. 
 Through your participation I hope to gain a perspective of the state of play of critical information 
infrastructure protection in South Africa in an international context, and the applicability of mobile 
phones to the concept of a critical information infrastructure.   The result of the interview is 
intended to contribute to placing critical information infrastructure in context, and establishing the 
criticality of the cell phone infrastructure.   
Your participation in this project is voluntary. You may refuse to participate or withdraw from the 
project at any time with no negative consequence. There will be no monetary gain from 
participating in this survey. Confidentiality and anonymity of records identifying you as a 
participant will be maintained by the School of Information Systems and Technology, UKZN.   
If you have any questions or concerns about the interview or about participating in this study, you 
may contact me or my supervisor at the numbers listed above.   
Sincerely 
 
Investigator‟s signature____________________________________   Date_________________ 
 





PhD Research Project 
Researcher: Brett van Niekerk (Tel: 031 260 8521; email: 991160530@ukzn.ac.za) 






I__________________________________________________(full names of participant) hereby 
confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project, and I 
consent to participating in the research project. I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from 
the project at any time, should I so desire. 
SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT                                                     DATE 
 















Appendix G. Survey Questionnaire 
UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL 
School of Information Systems and Technology 
 
PhD Research Project 
Researcher: Brett van Niekerk031 260 8521 
Supervisor: Prof MS Maharaj031 260 8023 
Research Office: Ms P Ximba 031-2603587 
 
Use of Communications Technologies 
The purpose of this survey is to solicit information regarding the use of cell phones, telephones and 
email/Internet for business and social activities. The information and ratings you provide us will go 
a long way in helping us identify the importance of cell phones to the informal economy. The 
questionnaire should only take 10-15 minutes to complete. In this questionnaire, you are asked to 
indicate what is true for you, so there are no “right” or “wrong” answers to any question. Work as 
rapidly as you can. If you wish to make a comment please write it directly on the booklet itself. 
Make sure not to skip any questions. Please tick the applicable box. Thank you for participating! 
Section 1: Demographic and business information 
This section is for statistical purposes only, and will not be used to identify or contact you in any 
way. 
1. Age Under 20 21-40 41-60 Over 60 
Prefer not to 
answer 
      
2. Race African Indian Coloured White Other 
      
3. Gender Male Female 
Prefer not to 
answer 
  
      
4. How many employees 
do you have? 
No 
No – it is a 
family 
business 






5. How many customers 
do you serve per day? 




6. What do customers 








7. How much do you 








Section 2: Investigation of accessibility, usage and reliance 
This section investigates the access to, usage of and reliance on cell phones, landlines, the Internet 
and emails. Please tick the most relevant option: 
 
I do not have 
access 
I have my own 
I borrow from 
someone else 
I use a public or 
community one 
8. How do you access a cell 
phone? 
    
9. How do you access a 
landline telephone? 
    
10. How do you access the 
Internet? 
    
11. How do you access 
emails? 
    
 
Please tick the most relevant option: 
 
I do not have 





12.  I mostly use cell phones for:    
13.  I mostly use landline telephones for:    
14.  I mostly use the Internet for:    






Please tick the most relevant option: 
 








16. How difficult would it be to conduct 
your business without a cell phone? 
    
17. How difficult would it be to conduct 
your business without a landline 
telephone? 
    
18. How difficult would it be to conduct 
your business without Internet access? 
    
19. How difficult would it be to conduct 
your business without email access? 
    
 
Please tick the most relevant option: 
 

















20. How often do you use a cell 
phone to make calls for your 
business? 
      
21. How often do you use a cell 
phone to make calls for private 
reasons? 
      
22. How often do you use the SMS 
function for business purposes? 
      
23. How often do you use the SMS 
function for private reasons? 
      
24. How often do you use a cell 
phone to use mobile money (M-
PESA etc)? 
      
25. How often do you use a landline 
telephone for your business? 
      
26. How often do you use a landline 
telephone for private reasons? 
      
27.  How often do you use email for 
your business? 
      
28.  How often do you use email for 
private reasons? 
      
29.  How often do you use the 
Internet for your business? 





30.  How often do you using the 
Internet for private reasons? 
      
 
Please tick the most relevant option: 
 
I do not use 
this for my 
business 
No affect Small affect 
Badly 
affected 
31. How badly will your business be affected 
if the cell phones stopped working? 
    
32. How badly will your business be affected 
if the landline telephones stopped 
working? 
    
33. How badly will your business be affected 
if the Internet stopped working? 
    
34. How badly will your business be affected 
if the emails stopped working? 




End of the Questionnaire 







Appendix H. Survey Letter of Informed Consent 
Dear Respondent, 
PhD Research Project 
Researcher: Brett van Niekerk (Tel: 031 260 8521; email: 991160530@ukzn.ac.za) 
Supervisor: Prof MS Maharaj (Tel: 031 260 8023; email: maharajms@ukzn.ac.za)  
Research Office: Ms P Ximba 031-2603587 
I, Brett van Niekerk, am a PhD student at the School of Information Systems and Technology, of 
the University of KwaZulu-Natal. You are invited to participate in a research project entitled 
“Vulnerability Analysis of Modern ICT Infrastructure from an Information Warfare Perspective”.  
The aim of this study is to develop a framework for assessing vulnerabilities and associated risks in 
modern day ICT infrastructures, particularly in a South African context. 
Through your participation I hope to gain a perspective of the importance of cell phones in 
business.   The result of the survey is intended to contribute to estimate the economic impact of cell 
phone service disruptions.   
Your participation in this project is voluntary. You may refuse to participate or withdraw from the 
project at any time with no negative consequence. There will be no monetary gain from 
participating in this survey. Confidentiality and anonymity of records identifying you as a 
participant will be maintained by the School of Information Systems and Technology, UKZN.   
If you have any questions or concerns about completing the questionnaire or about participating in 





Investigator‟s signature____________________________________   Date_________________ 
 





PhD Research Project 
Researcher: Brett van Niekerk (Tel: 031 260 8521; email: 991160530@ukzn.ac.za) 






I__________________________________________________(full names of participant) hereby 
confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project, and I 
consent to participating in the research project. I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from 
the project at any time, should I so desire. 
SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT                                                     DATE 
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